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PREFACE
1. This dissertation attempts to provide a scholarly interpre-
tation of Locke's political theory, the interpretation which reveals
him as a classical liberal who defended property and justice. The
major task of this dissertation is to elaborate this interpretation,
and defend it against all major alternative interpretations. This
task is performed in INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 1, and CHAPTER 2. The
interpretation I offer is based on Locke's texts, and the writings of
his 17th-century predecessors and 18th-century successors. Appendix 1
criticizes Peter Laslett' s "historical" approach to the Two Treatises.
Appendix 2 criticizes a "philosophical" approach to Locke's political
theory. I shall reject those approaches, and show the overall sound-
ness of my approach to Locke's political theory.
2. A subsidiary task of this dissertation is to criticize
Locke's liberal political theory. CHAPTER 3 criticizes the concept
of property which he uses in his political theory, by offering a detailed
analysis. CHAPTER 4 criticizes his political theory by showing how
it disintegrates with the erosion of its basis, i. e., a myth of
appropriation. However, the present study is not intended to offer
a full-scale critique of Locke's theory. It merely shows how his theory
can be criticized on the basis of the interpretation provided in this
dissertation. The major purpose of the p~esent work is to understand
Locke rather than criticize him. A systematic critique of his liberalism
would have to take into account the whole classical-liberal tradition
which developed after Locke. Such a task goes far beyond the scope
of this dissertation. A large portion of the present study embodies
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the Spinozist motto: "non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed
intelligere" ("Smile not, lament not, nor condemn; but understand").
3. But is it difficult to understand Locke's liberal political
theory? His Second Treatise is not a difficult book, and any educated
person can understand the gist of what he says without any special
difficulty. Nevertheless, anyone who aims at a deeper unde~standing of
his political philosophy is bound to face certain obstacles. I should
like to mention three obstacles here, and indicate how I have tried
to overcome them in the present study.
3. 1 First, there is a vast amount of literature on Locke, and
there have been quite a few interpretive disputes about various parts
of his political theory over the past few decades. I have. discovered
that this literature is an obstacle, rather than an aid, to the under-
standing of Locke's political theory. I have carefully examined recent
scholarly works, and have come to the conclusion that a majority of
recent commentators live in Plato's Cave. They comment on shadows of
Locke, and comment on those who have commented on those shadows. Though
there are a few exceptional scholars, many commentators - especiallv,
leading Locke scholars - live in this Cave.
At the initial stage
of my research, I thought ! might be ~t.yiug in a ~ave. But I spent
quite a number of days in the Special Collection Room of Glasgow
University Library, and quite a'number of nights at home, trying to
understand what Locke wrote. Then I began to see that scholars such
as Peter Laslett, John Yolton, C. B. Macpherson, John Dunn, etc.
are the cave-dwellers .who make it difficult for us to understand
what Locke really meant. The works by recent scholars, with the
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exception of a few, are a great obstacle to the understanding of what
his political theory is about. I have overcome this obstacle by criticizing
their views. In fact, CHAPTER 2 ("Locke and Modern Illiterates") is
wholly devoted to the views of recent scholars. But I have also made
a number of critical comments in my extensive notes. To some readers,
my critical comments may sound too harsh at times.* But I have made
those comments in the conviction that dwelling in a cave is bad for
our intellectual health. In criticizing the views of established scholars,
I have adopted Nietzsche's maxim rather than the Spinozist motto:
"Objection, evasion, happy distrust, pleasure in mockery are signs of
health: everything unconditional belongs in pathology."
3. 2 A second obstacle,l have tried to overcome is connected with
Locke's status as an independent philosopher. Since I attempt
to offer a scholarly interpretation of his political theory, I make
use of the writings of his predecessors such as Hobbes, Grotius and
Pufendorf. But this scholarly approach has limited utility, and it
is dangerously misleading. Locke isa modern philosopher who aspired
to be ,independent, and refused to be influenced by the views of his
predecessors and contemporaries. All his writings, from the Preface
to the unpublished First Tract on Government to The Reasonableness of
Christianity, reveal that Locke developed his own thought by his own
intellectual labour. James Tyrrell, who was more interested in the
gossip and rumours of his contemporaries, wrote to Locke in 1690:
"you utterly refused to reade any bookes upon that subject [concerning
human understanding]: that you might not take any other mens notions:
and that you have taken another course since that time I did not
beleive [sic]·t (Correspondence, IV, 36). Locke practiced the policy
,* From time to time, I use the word "illiterate". The word has to be
taken in its literal sense. It is not intended to be a term of abuse.
xof independent thinking which he advocated in his Essay. He read
extensively, and absorbed a variety of ideas from other theorists.
But he did not swallow those ideas. He digested them by his own
"meditation". "Reading", said Locke, "furnishes the mind only with
materials of knowledge; it is thinking [that] makes what we read ours."
We can turn the materials into knowledge "only by our own meditation";
we must "chew them over again" (Works, III, sect. 20). With respect
to politics, Locke remarked: "I am so little acquainted with books,
especially on those subjects relating to politics." And politics
"require[s] more meditation that reading." (Works, X, 308 & 309.)
Given Locke's policy of independent thinking (or his own "meditation"),
it is not easy, nor very fruitful, to discuss the sources of his political
ideas. We should, above all, avoid loose talk about the "influence"
of this or that theorist on Locke. An intellectual historian's broad
brush is too coarse for his independently cultivated thought.
This poses a special difficulty for anyone who tries to
produce a scholarly interpretation of Locke's political theory. Is it
possible to offer one? The need for a solid scholarly work on his
political theory is great, given the deplorable chaos of present-day
Locke scholarship. My solution to this difficulty is to use his
predecessors' (and successors') writings, for ,thepurpo.se of clarifying
Locke's own me.anihg rather Utatl determining the precis~ source of.
his ideas. I have .made extensive use of their writings" in order to
clarify Locke's concepts of justice and property. Aristotle and
Cicero as well as Grotius and Pufendorf are used for this purpose.
These four names appear on the reading list Locke recommended for a
study of politics and morality (Works, III, 296; IX, 176; and X, 307f.)D
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I have used Hobbes' writings not because Locke studied them carefully,
but because Pufendorf studied them carefully and transmitted some
Hobbesian ideas to Locke. I have also used 'the writings of Hume and
Smith despite the fact that they came after the publication of the
Second Treatise. The reason for this is that Hume and Smith clearly
express the harmonious relationship between justice and property, and
in this respect what Locke sa~d can be clarified by reference to what
they said. My use of the works of other theorists is intended to
serve a clarificatory, rather than antiquarian, purpose. Only in a
few cases I have presented some interesting connections between Locke
and his predecessors to satisfy our antiquarian interests.
3. 3 The third obstacle concerns the very nature of Locke's
political theory. It is often described as a "normative" political
theory,. and as such it is distinguished from an "empirical" theory
of government. This characterization, however, is not quite accurate.
The distinction Locke drew between "two parts" of politics is fairly
well known: one part concerns "the original of societies, and the rise
and extent of political power", while the other concerns "the art of
governing men in society" (Works, III, 296). This distinction is
often thought to correspond to toe simple distinction between a
"normative" theory and an "empirical" theory. There is no denying
that a study of "the art of government;"; according to Locke, is
more concrete (or more "empirical") than the'first, general branch
of politics. The art of government, he says, can be best "learned by
experience and history, especially that of a man's own country" (~.).
It is an empirical study of the laws and institutions of a particular
country. On the other hand, the general branch deals with the norms
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and facts about a political society which go beyond one particular
country. Locke variously describes this branch of politics: It is
a "general part of civil law and history" (Works, IX, 176). The word
"history" here suggests that experience is not ignored in this branch.
It concerns "the natural rights of men, and the original and foundations
of society, and the duties resulting from thence" (~.); or "the ground
and nature of civil society; and how it is formed into different models
of government; and what are the several species of it" (Works, X, 307).
Locke suggests that this branch of politics serves as a "foundation"
for a study of the art of government, and offers "an insight" into
the particular constitution of government (~.). From these descriptions,
we can infer that the general branch of politics deal~ with the general
facts and norms about men, the origin of society, the ground of political
power, and different forms of government.
Now I have drawn attention to Locke's characterization of
the general branch of politics. This is because his own political theory
deals with this branch. Locke is explicit about this, and he adds that
Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium is "the best book" that deals
with this branch (Works, III, 296). Locke's political theory somewhat
resembles one of those Open University "foundation" cuurses which
bear a general title such as "man, society, and politics". But
there is something -peculiarly obscure about the way in which 'Locke
talks about the "original and foundations" of society, or the "genet:al
part" of civil law and history. The subject-matter is ~bstract, and
it intermingles facts and norms. Though this abstractness is common
to any modern theory of natural law and natural rights, it becomes
an acute problem in Locke's political theory. Throughout the Second
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Treatise, he abstracts from concrete facts and universal norms ~
mixing them together. He presents either an idealized, universalized
version of specific events that took place in 17th-century England,
or a factual ("factualized") version of univer~al principles of
politics, law, and morality. In short, the abstractness of his political
theory is not the abstractness of abstract principles. _ It is the abstract-
ness which arises from the obscure way in which Locke mixes what happened
in 17th-century England with what ought to happen in the ideal, universal
world. A careful reader would notice that his political theory of the
Second Treatise becomes more and more concrete and empirical as we
approach toward the end of the book. In the beginning of the book,
he discusses "the state of nature" and "mankind". Indeed, "mankind"
has not been split into political societies at this stage. There is,
therefore, a general movement from abstract normative principles to
conc.rete empirical events in the Second Treatise. Nevertheless, over
and above this general movement of thought, there is an obscure mixture
of facts and norms, of.what happened in 17th-century England and what
ought to happen in the whole world. This mixture is most conspicuous
in Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise, "Of Property".
I shall not dwell on this obscure mixture here. I should only
like to indicate that there is a mixture in Locke's political theory.
And I should like to indicate how I have coped with this peculiarjty.
I have analyzed Locke's admixture of what happened (in a particular
place and at a particular time) and what ought to happen (universally),
but in the end I have treated it as a myth. I shall not treat the
whole of Locke's political theory as a myth. But I have treated his
account of appropriation as a myth, the story within which what ought to
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happen actually happens. I believe that this treatment can be justified.
I also believe that by treating certain parts of Locke's political theory
as mythological, we are able to appreciate his status as a political
philosopher. He is an articulat0r of beliefs. He articulates the
political and economic beliefs of the modern age. This treatment
would also enable us to criticize his political theory. It is
"ideological" - not in the sense that it is intentionally propagandistic,
but in the sense that his theory remains coherent by virtue of the
projection of his beliefs and ideas onto the world that exists. His
political theory loses its coherence, once we treat this projection as the
chimera of his brain. It is not accidental, therefore, that Hume the
first anatomist of chimeras of our brain (e.g., the argument from design,
the idea of necessary connection, etc.) - is the first major theorist who
criticized Locke's political theory.
I have indicated above how I have overcome the third obstacle
- the peculiar abstractness of Locke's political theory. Just like
the first two obstacles (namely, the vast secondary literature on Locke,
and his independence frem other theorists), this obstacle must be removed
if we are to probe deeply into Locke.
4. Finally, I should mention the fact that I have produced the whole
dissertation by a method somewhat similar to Locke's - by a "discontinued
way of writing" (Essay, The Epistle to the Reader). Also, I original!y
wrote certain parts of it for the purpose of publication. For these
reasons, there is a certain amount of overlap in the contents. (For
instance, Grotius' definition of "a right" is quoted in more than one
place.) I hope that the overlap is not intolerable, and I would appreciate
it if the reader could treat it as a virtue rather than as a vice. It
does save the trouble of going back and forth for the sake of a cross-
reference.
SUMMARY
As it is explained in the PREFACE, the major task of this
dissertation is to offer a scholarly interpretation of Locke's political
theory, while its minor task is to criticize his political theory. A
large portion of this dissertation is devoted to the major task.
INTRODUCTION ("John Locke and Classical Liberalism") presents
the broad framework of interpretation which I adopt, the framework of
classical liberalism. Classical liberalism can be summed up in the
words of Lippmann: "Thus in a free society the stC\te does not administer
the affairs of men. It administers justice among men who conduct their
f f ad ""Cl . 1 1· b 1·" I th ..own a a rs, ,ass1ca 1 era asm t as use e exp ressi on, 1S a
theoretical tradition. In Britain, Locke, Hume and Smith are the main
proponents of classical liberalism. Its chief feature is that it
defends the rule of law on the one hand, and the (pTedominantly economic)
liberty of each individual man on the other. The state, on this view,
is a predominantly judicial entity while private men are predominantly
economic beings. Classical liberalism is the doctrine which asserts
that there is, and ought to be, a harmony between law and liberty;
or between public lustice and private property. Locke's political
theory belongs to this species of liberalism.
CHAPTER 1 ("Property and Justice: An Exposition of Two Major
Components of Locke's Liberalism") offers a detailed exposition of
Locke's classical liberalism. There are two major components of
his liberalism: his account of appropriation in Chap. 5 of the Second
Treatise, and his theory of the bounds of the legislative power in
Chap. 11 of the Second Treatise. The former explains how men have,
and ought to have, determined their exclusive domains of disposal in
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the material world of common goods. To ·put it simply, it is an account
of the origin of property. The second component of Locke's liberalism
specifies the limits of the supreme power of the state. Its central
claim is that the state ought to administer justice (instead of settling
disputes arbitrarily). The task of CHAPTER 1 is to clarify each component
of Locke's liberal political theory, and how one component is related to
the other. PART 1 offers a detailed exposition of Locke's account of
appropriation, together with a discussion of the connecting links
between his account of appropriation and his claim about the state's
obligation to administer justice. PaRT 2 discusses Locke's theory of
the bounds of the supreme power of the state, with particular reference
to his concept of justice.
CHAPTER 1,:PART 1 offers a clear and detailed exposition of'
Locke's account of appropriation, by treating it as a myth. His formulation
of the problem of the origin of property ts mythical: ~hat is the
legitimate manner by which men are likely to have converted the God-
given community of things into the proto-17th-century world of property?
He offers a story about the beginning, expansion, and settlement of
,
property. He attempts to.show that the world of property which
resembles the 17th-century world of property emerged from the original
community of things by a legitimate process and as a matter of fact.
Within his story or myth of appropriation, events in 17th-century
England are hardly distinguishable from events in the distant past;
and what ought to happen now seems to have happened long ago. Sect. 1. 2
of PART 1 analytically shows what is in this story. Sect. 1. 3 is an
extended discussion about the purpose of Locke's story of appropriation.
The purpose is to protect men's present possessions by positive laws
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against the arbitrary power of the state. Or to put it another way,
the purpose is to claim that the state ought to administer justice
among those men who have acquired their possessions by their labour,
commercial exhange, and their ancestors' labour. This purpose lies
outside of Locke's account of appropriation. Within his account, he
obliquely claims that 17th-century men's possessions are legitimate
. " ." b hpossess~ons - or propert1es - ecause t ey are the consequence of
the legitimate mode of acquisition and exchange. Once he obliquely
establishes the pre-political legitimacy of 17th-century men's possessions,
he can claim that men's possessions in the 17th-century as well as their
lives and liberties are their "propertt es", or the objects of their
exclusive rights of disposal. If he can establish this claim, then
he can defend the claim about justice (and also the.claim about legitimate
taxation). This is why Locke tries to establish the pre-political
legitimacy of 17th-century men's possessions. This purpose implies,
of course, that he is trying to defend a violence-free economic society
of property-owners against arbitrary government. My extended discussion
about the purpose of L~cke's account of appropriation covers a variety of
topics: for example, the point of natural rights in the 17th-century
theoretical context (Sect. 1. 3 (1» and the possibility of the "internal"
apprehension of Locke's myth of appropriation (Sect. 1. 3 (4». The
detailed treatment is due to the recent controversy over Locke's
purpose, and the misunderstandings which surround it.
CHAPTER l~ PART 2 expounds Locke's theory of the bounds of
the supreme power of the state. But it focuses on his cpncept of justice
since his claim about the administration of justice is the central
claim of his theory of the state. Locke's concept of justice receives
a careful reconstructive analysis, and the negativity of justice is
explored. Justicf!, as opposed to such positive virtues as "charity"
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and "liberality", is the negative virtue of abstention. The best way
to understand Locke's concept of justice is to treat "justice" as the
practical negation of injustice, i.e., the avoidance or correction of
injustice. A just act, or the justice of an agent, is an act of abstain-
ing from another man's exclusive right (or "property"); namely, it is
to "preserve" another man's "property". Suum cuigue tribuere is to
leave everyone in the quiet enjoyment of his own objects. The negative
concept of a just "act" can be found in Locke. To identify this concept,
I first turn to Cicero and modern Ciceronians (Grotius, Hume and Smith),
and then pull together Locke's scattered remarks on justice. The
administration of justice, or the justice of a spectator, is the impartial
execution of equal laws for the purpose of the mutual preservation of
men's exclusive rights of disposal ("properties"). This purpose can
be rephrased as the maintenance of "justice", provided that we mean
by it the maintenance of the ~ unjust state of affairs, namely,
the elimination of injustice from a society of the holders of exclusive
rights ("properties"). Locke's concept of justice is the concept of
"corrective justice" rather than that of "distributive justice", to
use Aristotle's distinction. This "justice" presupposes each man's
"property". The sbate's chief obligation is to "preserve" men's
"properties" (i.e., to prevent and correct injustice) as an impartial
spectator. This negative justice supports the smooth function of the
economic society based on men's labour and voluntary exchange.
CHAPTER 2: Few men treat Locke as a defender of property and
justice, i.e., as a classical liberal. CHAPTER 2 ("Locke and Modern
Illiterates") examines the interpretations of Locke's political theory
offered by recent scholars and philosophers. In PART 1, I examine one
popular view and four interpretations of his account of appropriation.
xix
The four interpretations offered by academic commentators are "philosophical"
(Becker, Day, et al.),"neo-Kantian" (Yolton and Tully), "pseudo-Marxist"
(Macpherson), and "historical-revisionist" interpretations (Laslett and
his followers). These interpretations are criticized severely, and rejected
once and for all. They are either inadequate, partial accounts of
what Locke says; or plainly false, groundless rumours. Macpherson's
interpretation and Laslett's are two of the most influential interpretations.
The largest space is devoted.t9,their views~ My criticism demonstrates
that Macphetson can read neither Locke nor Marx, and that Laslett's
attempt to link Locke and Filmer is indefensible on the historical as
well as rational grounds. Other scholars who have followed Laslett's
lead in their self-consciously historical mission (Dunn, Tully, Kelly,
and Ryan) are shown to have repeated Laslett's groundless cl~im.
In CHAPTER 2, PART 1, Cambridge Historical Revisionism is shown
to be bankrupt. In CHAPTER 2, PART 2, I examine interpretations of
Locke's concept of justice briefly. Commentators have had confused
discussions about his concept of justice. The most conspicuous
confusion is to ascribe the concept of distributive justice to Locke.
Both John Dunn and James Tully suffer from this confusion, and the
latter's interpretation has received laudatory comments from other
scholars. My analysis of Locke's concept of justice in CHAPTER 1,
PART 2, reveals that their views - and their excite~ent ~ are wrong-headed.
CHAP'L'EtL2is desLgned to undermine the authority of recent- seho lars,
CHAPTER 1 and CHAPTER 2 establish the authenticity of
my scholarly interpretation of Locke's political theory beyond any
reasonable doubt. Locke is a classical liberal who defended property
and justice. To put it more accurately, he defended "justice" against
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arbitrary government. He defended "justice" for the sake of the mutual
preservation of men's "propertie~"; hence, for the sake of .the smooth
function of the modern economic society where every man minds his own
b ' h' " t "uS1ness, or 1S own proper y •
CHAPTER 3 ("Locke's Concept of Property") is a second-order
inquiry. It offers a detailed analysis of Locke's concept of property,
by combining historical scholarship with philosophical criticism.
Though some of the claims made in this chapter support my interpretation
of Locke's political theory, this chapter is on the whole independent
of the major task of this dissertation. It analyzes, and criticizes,
the concept of property which he uses in his.politicalth~ory •. Hence,
it offers a critique of Locke's political theory at'a eecond-order .
level, or at the level where he uses concepts. PART 1 ("Images and
a Reconstruction of the Meaning") separates Locke's loose images
about property from his strict meaning of the word "property". Property,
strictly speaking, is a man's exclusive right of disposal; or the object
of his exclusive right of disposal (where the "object" in question is
determined by the substance of Locke's discourse). PART 2 ("An -Malysis
of Locke's Concept of Property" examines the way in which various entities
(a man's mind, power, body, material objects, law, other men) are
related to each other, when a man is said to have "a property in"
an object. LOcke arranges these entities in a definite manner,
when he speaks about property. He treats each man's mind as the central
decision-making agent, and uses hisoon-normative liberty of action
as the basis of his exclusive right of disposal. Since the ~ is
the indispensable core of this concept of property, it is called the
ego-centric concept of property, or the agent-centred concept of property.
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PART 2 of CHAPTER 3 thoroughly explores the ego-centric structure
of Locke's concept of property. It examines the core of Locke's concept
of property first: a man vs right of disposal (Sect. 2. 2). It then
examines the fringe of his concept of property: the exclusiveness of
a man's right of disposal (Sect. 2. 3). Since no detailed analysis of
Locke's concept of property has been offered since the publication of
the Second Treatise, I devote a number of pages to,the clarification of
his philosophical assumptions about property (in the strict sense). 1b~;n 7
showing that Locke belongs to the modern tradition of natural, sUbjective
rights which tried to separate a right from a law, and assimilated a right
to a man's power (or liberty) (Sect. 2. 21: A Right as a Species of
Power: A Historical View). From Pufendorf in particular, Locke takes
over a moderate version of the doctrine ~f the bifurcation of a law and
a right. He maintains that though a right is distinct from a law, a
right is a man's liberty (or pow~r) under the restraints of a law. After
R historical survey, I attempt to anatomize the core of Locke's concept and
criticize it. A right of disposal over X is a man's liberty to dispose
of X according to his will, within the bounds of the laws he is under.
This complex locution is Locke's own. It consists of two unit-ideas:
"a liberty of disposal" and "the bounds of a law". Each unit-idea is
clarified, and a certain amount of conceptual confusion is pointed out
(Sect. 2. 22 (A) and (B». A man's liberty to dispose of (i.e., contr-ol
or arrange) his body, actions, and possessions is a particular species
of the general liberty of action which Locke discusses in the Essay, II,
xxi. The idea of "the bounds of a law" is explicable in terms of the
causal power and right which a law-maker has. A combination of the two
unit-ideas yields Locke's idea of "a right of disposal". Th.i:sidea,
however, is a confused idea of a right (Sect. 2. 22 (C». First of
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all, a law does not impose an obligation on a variety of actions, and
in that case a man's right to dispose of X becomes identical with his
non-normative, natural ability to do (or not to do) what he wills with
X. However, this is a sheer conflation of the normative entity which
ought not to be violated by others and each man's introverted, ability
to control his actions (by the power of the mind). This confusion
brings about many absurd consequences: e.g., a man can lose a right
to own his house by drinking Scotch, and ceasing to be "a free agent" at hUi»e.
Secondly, even if a law restrains certain actions, a right is not an agent's
positive liberty consistent with the law. Rather, an agent's liberty
is called a right if the law prohibits other men from taking his liberty.
All rights presuppose an intersubjective norm. Locke's formula, "cogito
ergo meum (id est)", is palpably false, and we must look at a rule-govexned
institution rather than the relationship between a man's mind and actions,
if we want to understand what a right is. The modern tradition of subjedi"'~
rights rests on a series of inventions rather than any sound philosophy.
After a careful anatomy of the core of Locke's concept of property, I
turn to its fringe and briefly clarify what it means to say that a man
has an exclusive right (or that his right of disposal is exclusive). (Sect.
2. 3). Finally, I make concluding remarks to suggest that we should
abandon Locke's concept of property, if we are to theorize on property
and a right. I also suggest, however, that his informal notion of
property serves our everyday purpose. (Sect. 2. 4.)
CHAPTER 4 ("Locke's Liberalism: A Critical Assessment") attempts
to criticize Lockeis liberal.political theory. It tries to show how
his liberal political theory disintegrates when it5 basis - his account
of appropriation - gets undermined. There are many ways in which we
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can criticize Locke's political theory. But since CHAPTER 4 is not
designed to offer a full-scale critique of his liberalism, I simply
show one easy way in which we can see how his political theory loses
its coherence. As I have shown in CHAPTER 1, Locke'S account of
appropriation is a myth which mixes what happened in the past and what
ought to happen in the 17th century. His theory of the state -·his
claim about the state's obligation to administer justice in particular
rests on the myth that men's current possessions are in fact the
consequence of the legitimate acquisition and exchange of goods in
the past. If appropriation did not take place in the same way that
Locke says it did, then his account of appropriation fails to
establish the legitimacy of present possessions. But everyone knows
that his story is a fairy-tale, or a wildly exaggerated story. So
by raising a historical objection~ I criticize Locke's ideological
distortion and show how the disintegration of his account of appropriation
affects the rest of his political theoy.
CHAPTER 4 is relatively short, and I do not intend to offer
any balanced assessment of Locke's political theory. Its purpose is
merely to present an example of criticism rather than any balanced
evaluation or a full-scale critique. It is to show what type of
criticism, will become possible, once we understand his political theory
property - namely, in the way I have understood it in CHAPTER 1.
There are three appendices. Appendix 1 and Ca long) Appendix 2
can be read as self-contained critical pieces, while Appendix 3 is somewhat
dependent on my discussion in PART 2 of CHAPTER 3.
Appendix 1 ("A Cri tique of Laslett' 5 Treatment of the Two
Treatises) criticizes Peter Laslett' s view that Locke wrote the Two
Treatise in response to the Exclusion Crisis and with the primary
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objective of refuting Filmer's doctrine of absolute monarchy. One of
Laslett's serious mistakes is to treat the Second Treatise as a
refutation of Filmer's works. Laslett himself has discovered that
Locke wrote a substantial portion of the Second Treatise before the
First Treatise, and before he read Filmer's Patriarcha. Nevertheless,
he believes (without sufficient evidence) that Locke wrote the Second
Treatise to refute Filmer. His extensive, editorial comments are
based on this groundless belief. Laslett' edition of the Two
Treatises, scholarly as it is, has created a tendency among commentators
to attach tremendous significance to the Locke-Filmer connection. I
hold that Laslett is deeply misguided. We should treat Filmer as
an intellectually jnsignificant opponent of Locke, and Locke's political
theory of the Second Treatise as largely independent of Filmer's doctrine.
(For my account of the development of Locke's political theory, see
Appendix 2, Sect. III, (i).)
WBereas Appendix I criticizes Laslett's "historical" approach
to Locke's political theory, Appendix 2 criticizes a "philosophical"
approach to it. Appendix 2 is entitled "Locke's Political Theory and
its Epistemological Foundations: A Systematically Misguided Projecttt•
The relationship between Locke's political theory and his epistemology
has been discussed occasionally by commentators. But there has never
been a satisfactory account of"how the two are related to each other.
I attempt to offer a complete account. Since my answer is intended to be
complete, this is a long ttappendix". I perform two main tasks. First,
I criticize the attempts, made by M. Milam, J. Yolton, and J. Tully, to
treat Locke's epistemological doctrines as the foundations of his
political theory (especially, his account of appropriation). Their
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attempts are systematically misguided. Sect. II of Appendix 2 shows
how misguided they are. Secondly, I perform a task of liberation.
I try to liberate every commentator on Locke (including any future
commentator) from the futile project of searching for the "epistemological
foundations" of Locke's political theory in the Essay. Section III of
Appendix 2 is devoted to this task.
The systematic confusion from which Milam, Yolton and Tully
suffer has a fundamental cause-. They are addicted to the "foundationalist"
picture of philosophy. This picture of philosophy, or this meta-philosophy,
treats "epistemology" (or methodology) as the "basis" on which the
superstructure of "political theory" (or any other branch of social
or natural sciences) stands. This picture may appear to be upside
down to those who are intellectually healthy. But many academics
are addicted to this meta-philosophical drug. This is an opium of
the intellectuals which originally grew in Germany in the latter
half of the 19th century. Locke did not take this opium, unlike many
recent scholars. Sect. II of Appendix 2 shows how horrible the effects
of this opium are. Sect. III provides a complete cure for this philosophical
disease. It provides a new picture of how Locke's political theory is
linked to his epistemology, the picture of two discourses horizontally
linked by a few non-epistemological themes. According to the new picture
it provides, Locke discusses knowledge, politics, and toleration by
using a common strategy of demarcating the proper domain of an agent
(or its power), for the common purpose of ending disputes among agents.
The unity of his philosophical corpus can be best explained in terms
of his deep-seated concern with "property" and "justice". (For this
point, see Sect. III, (ii) of Appendix 2.) The task of liberation
performed in Appendix 2, if it is successful, will put an end to
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the sick, neo-Kantian approach to Locke - the ideological inversion
which began in Germany more than a century ago, and spread over to
various academic institutions of the present-century.
Appendix 3 is a supplement to my analysis of Locke's concept
of property. It is entitled "Locke's Ego-Centric Concept of Property,
with Special Reference to 20th-Century Commentators and l7th~tury
Theorists". It performs two tasks. First, it surveys 20th-century
commentators' inadequate understandings of Locke's concept of property.
Secondly, it tries to show that his concept of property is strongly
ego-centric in comparison with Hobbes', or Grotius', or Pufendorf's.
Locke's concept of property is ego-centric in the sense that the mind,
or the agent, is an indispensable basis of this concept. But it is
ego-centric in a stronger, full-blooded sense as well: the real
presence of other men is not required for the intelligibility of the
concept of property. In this respect, he is unique among other major
theorists of the 17th century. Appendix 3 should be read in conjunction
wi th PART 2 of CHAPTER 3 •
To conclude the present summary: This disserta.tion·consists of
PREFACE, INTRODUCTION, four CHAPTERS, three APPENDICES, and extensive
NOTES. From the author's viewpoint, these ingredients are of equal
importance. The appendices and notes are not merely "appended" to
the main body of the dissertation. They cont a.i.nideas as well as
references, and critical remarks as well as some hitherto unknown information.
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INTRODUCfION
JOHN LOCKE AND CLASSICAL LIBERALISM
INTRODUCTION
JOHN LOCKE AND CLASSICAL LIBERALISM
"Thus in a free society the state does not
administer the affairs of men. It
administers justice among men who condyct
their own affairs." (Walter Lippmann)
In this dissertation, I shall provide an interp~etation of
Locke's political theory. Though I use the word "interpretation",
it is not a creative interpretation born out of my fancy. It is
an interpretation solidly based on Locke's texts, and the theoretical
writings which he read. Since it can be objectively defended, I
prefer to call it an "exposition" of Locke's political theory.
In CHAPTER 1, I shall present this exposition (or an objectively
. ) 2defensible interpretat10n •
The purpose of this Introduction is to indicate the broad
interpretive framework within which Locke's political theory can be
properly understood. This interpretive framework is "classical
liberalism". I regard Locke as a classical liberal. This claim might
appear to be banal. After all, many commentators classify Locke as a
"liberal", and some add the adjective "classical". Nevertheless, the
word "liberal" has been used in a very liberal manner to designate
diverse institutions and ideas. So we need to specify what we mean
by a "liberal" or "liberalism".
What do we mean when we say, "Locke is a liberal", or "Locke
is the founder of liberalism"? There is no consensus among scholars
as to what makes Locke a liberal. Some commentators claim that
2
3he is a tremendously illiberal theorist. I shall leave aside all
interpretive disputes, and offer a brief explanation of what 1 mean
by a classical liberal. Without going into the details of his political
theory, I should like to identify the tradition of classical liberalism
and briefly characterize its salient features.
I intend to use the word "liberalism" (or "classical liberalism")
to designate a theoretical tradition rather than a political movement.
1 use the adjective "classical" to distinguish this brand of liberalism
from the post-Benthamite liberalism which advocates legal reform.
Locke is a founder of this tradition. It· is tradition known as
"liberal constitutionalism". "Liberal constitutionalism" is a specific
brand of "liberalism". This serves as a useful (if not perfect)
description of Locke's political theory. A brief definition may be
given here. First, what is "constitutionalism"? A historian of
"constitutionalism" states the following:
All constitutional government is by definition limited
government ••• constitutionalism~n ancient as well
as modern form~has one essential quality: it is a
legal limitation of government; it is the antithesis of
arbitrary rule; its30pposite is despotic government, thegovernment of will.
This minimal definition of "constitutionalism" can be captured in one
sentence. In the words of Hume, constitutional government is "a government
of Laws, not of Men" (GC, I, "Of Civil Liberty", 151). Given this
minimal definition of constitutionalism, it is easy to see that Locke
defended "constitutionalism". He defended a government of laws, and
attacked arbitrary rule or tyranny. "Where-ever Law ends, Tyranny begins"
<.g, 202), and "a Government without Laws" is "a Mystery in Politicks,
unconceivable in humane capacity; and inconsistent with humane Society"
(219). Secondly, we should ask why we add an adjective "liberal" to
"constitutionalism". The reason seems to be that modern constitutionalism
4places greater emphasis on the legal protection of individual "liberty"
than ancient constitutionalism. The primary function of laws, according
to modern defenders of constitutionalism is the protection of individual
liberty. Locke states: liberty "is to be free from restraint and
violence from others which cannot be, where there is no Law" (57;
emphasis added). Liberal constitutionalism, therefore, is a doctrine
which defends both individual liberty and the rule of law.
Locke is one of the first theorists who clearly formulated a
liberal-constitutionalist political the~ry. The heyday ·of liberal
constitutionalism, however, is the 18th century. In Britian, Adam
Smith and David Hume greatly enriched this theoretical tradition by
developing political economy on the one hand and jurisprudence on the
other. They explored two elements of liberal constitutionalism -
individual liberty in economic society, and the general laws which the
state enforces. In Germany, Kant developed the concept of a universal
law which protects the freedom of all individuals. Wilhelm von Hu~bolt
expressed the Lockean idea of the "bounds" of power in the title to his
book: "Ideas toward an Investigation to Determine the Proper Limits
4of the Activity of the State" (1792).
I shall not go into the historical development of liberal-
constitutionalist thought. My purpose here is to indicate the broad
framework of interpretation which I shall adopt in this dissertation.
For this purpose, I have used the label "liberal constitutionalism"
and dropped several names. In the remainder of this Introduction, I
shall offer a further characterization of this species of liberalism
by referring to Locke and his liberal successors.
The label "liberal constitutionalism" is useful because it
immediately indicates its opposition to arbitrary government. But its
5utility is limited. The term "constitutionalism" suggests that a
doctrine in question is a political doctrine, or a political doctrine
conceived in the spirit of jurisprudence. Yet modern liberalism in
Britain - whether it is Locke's, or Smith's, or Hume's - is based on
economic considerations. The individual liberty which is to be
protected by a universal law is predominantly "economic" in character.
It is, above all, the liberty of individual property-owners. The
label "liberal constitutionalism", on the other hand, signifies the
regular mode of government, and it draws our attention to the
governmental mechanism which prevents the abuse of power. In order
to avoid any narrow political connotation, I shall continue to use such
expressions as "liberalism'~ or "classical liberalism'~ or "liberal
political theory". It should be noted that when I use one of these
expressions, I refer to a doctrine which defends both the rule of
law and the (predominantlY,economic) liberty of each individual man.5
The most concise formula of classical liberalism is Walter
Lippmann's. I have quoted it at the beginning of this Introduction.
It consists of two parts. First, "in a free society the state does
not administer the affairs of men". To be more precise, the state ought
not to administer private men's own affairs. Secondly, the state
"administers justice" (i.e., ought to administer justice) "among men who
conduct their own affairs". In other words, the state ought to balance
the relationship between those private men by enforcing laws impartially.
Later we shall see Locke's formulation of the same idea. To anticipate
it: the state ought not to take men's "properties" arbitrarily, but it
ought to preserve their properties by the impartial execution of equal
6As I said, classical liberalism defends "law" !!!.9. "liberty".
The harmonious relationship between "law" and "liberty" can be restated
as follows. The state should administer justice, while each individual
man should manage his own affairs or his "property". Adam Smith clearly
expresses this harmonious relationship between "justice" and "property".
I shall quote from his lecture on jurisprudence:
The first and chief design of every system of government is
to maintain justice; to prevent the members of a society
from incroaching on one anothers property, or seizing what
is not their own. The design here is to give each one the
secure and peacable [sic1 possession of his own property.
{The end proposed by justice is the maintaining men in what
are called perfect rights.} (W, (A), i, 1; emphasis added.)
Smith's use of the word "property" here is reminiscent of Locke's.
It means one's own "thing", where a thing includes one's "person"
and "reputation" as well as one's possessions. The crucial point
is that the state's administration of justice prevents one man from
invading another's own affair or domain. "The end of justice", says
Smith, is "to secure from injury" (LJ, (B), 6). The state, therefore,
ought to prevent mutual injury among those who conduct their own affairs.
The administration of justice presupposes the laws which prohibit men
from injuring one another. Given the negative concept of justice, it is
easy to see that the state's administration of justice helps the
economic activities of individual property-owners. Given the negative
concept of laws, we can understand why individual Liberty is compatible
with the enforcement of laws. In short, the so-called "economic
liberalism" goes hand in hand with the judicial concept of the state as
6an impartial justice-dispensing, spectator.
In Hume and Kant, we can also find the peaceful harmony of an
individual "liberty" and a universal "law", or of private "property"
7and public "justice". This is the chief characteristic of classical
liberalism. And this, as we shall see,is the most conspicuous feature
of Locke's liberalism. If we are to understand or examine classical
liberalism, we must clarify how a theorist sustains this peaceful
harmony.
Our clarification will be rewarding if we focus on "property"
and "justice" rather than "liberty" and "law". There are a few reasons
for this. First, the concept of property is more complex than that of
liberty, while the concept of justice is more complex than that of law.
Hence, we obtain a richer picture of classical liberalism by treating
"property" and "justice" as its two key elements, and clarifying them.
Secondly, "property" is of particular significance to classical liberals
and 17th-century theoretical ancestors (such as Grotius and Pufendorf).
They all paid special attention to the question about the origin of
(external) property. They were ~ satisfied with an abstract discussion
of individual liberty. "Property", in their view, is the guarantee as well
as the concrete expression of "liberty". Locke in particular attached
special significance to his account of the origin of (external) property.
(Here the word "external" is used to indicate that the object of one's
own is an external, physical object, rather than an "internal" object
such as ones life or liberty.)
Thirdly, their concept of justice deserves attention because it
is very narrow in comparison with our concept of justice. By "our"
concept of justice, I mean the concept which has been frequently discussed
in recent years by philosophers and political theorists, i.e., the
concept of "distributive" (or "social") justice. Classical liberals such
as Locke, Smith, Hume, and Kant hold that the concept of distributive
8justice is insignificanto This modern trend started when Grotius ousted
the Aristotelian concept of distributive justice from his natural
jurisprudence. The classical-liberal concept of justice, though differently
named, is that of "corrective" (or "commutative") justice. This is the
justice which tries to eliminate injustice (or violence) from the
transaction of private right-holders. John Stuart Mill appears to be
one of the first theorists who introduced the concept of distributive
- 7(or social) 'justice into liberalism. But whatever the case may be, we
tend to confuse our broader concept with the narrow classical-liberal
concept of justice. In fact, recent interpretations of Locke suffer
from this confusiono We can avoid this confusion if we focus on the
classical-liberal concept of justice from the start, and get a very clear
picture of classical liberalism.
For these reasons, I shall treat "property" and "justice" as
the two central concepts of classical liberalism. In CH.\PTER 1, I shall
show in detail that Locke's political theory fits into the general picture
I have provided above. Locke, if properly understood, is the founder
of classical Lfbe ra lLsm, He defended" justice" against arbitrary government,
and he defended "justice" for the sake of the violence-free, modern
economic society where everyone minds his own business or his "property".
This picture of Locke as a classical liberal, I believe, is old and·
authentic. Many academic interpreters in recent years have forgotten,
or discarded, this classical-liberal picture of Locke. They have
produced most queer interpretations of Locke's political theory.
I shall present, or restore, the classical-liberal picture of
Locke in CHAPTER 10 Then I shall attack recent interpretations of Locke's
political theory in CHAPTER 2. These two chapters, taken together,
establish the authenticity of my understanding of his liberalismo
9In CHAPTER 3 and CHAPTER 4, I shall examine Locke's liberalism critically.
I shall examine his concept of property first (CHAPTER 3), and then
discuss the self-deceptive quality of his liberalism (CHAPTER 4).
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NOTES to INTOODUCrrON
1. Quoted from W. Lippman~, The Good Society (2nd ed.; London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1943), p. 267.
2. I shall not address any methodological or philosophical question
about anli'fnterpretation"o The proof of the pudding is in the
eating. If there is no such thing as an "objective" interpretation,
then I shall simply claim that my interpretation is a defensible
one. Unlike many recent interpretations, mine can be defended
by what Locke actually said.
I do not have any special, pre-conceived "method" of
interpretation. But I should perhaps mention the fact that
I began to read Locke's texts as a foreigner. I have had to
face the problem of "overcoming" the gap between myself and
his texts. This is not a theoretical problem, but a practical
problem. So I have solved it by practical means - by reading
Locke's texts carefully. The following statement, made by
Hans-Georg Gadamer, confirms my view that being a foreigner
is an advantage in an interpretive exercise:
The first presupposition which implies the concept
of interpretation is the "foreign" character of
what is yet to be understood. Indeed, whatever is
immediately evident, whatever persuades us by its
simple presence, does not call for any interpretation.
(Hans-Georg Gadamer. "The Problem of Historical
Consciousness", Interpretive Social Science:
A Reader, ed. P. Robinson & W. M. Sullivan (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1979), p. 111.)
3. C. H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca,
N. Y., 1958), p. 21.
4. For a useful historical survey of the doctrines of early liberals,
see F. A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics
and the History of Ideas (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1978) •
5. As it is clear from the contents of this dissertation, I do not
discuss Locke's theory of toleration (except briefly in Appendix
2). I hold that it is a significant component of his "liberalism".
Nevertheless, I shall limit the scope of this dissertation by
concentrating on his discourse on property and justice.
6. Hayek rightly points out that the distinct.ion between "political
liberalism" and "economic liberalism" (such as the one drawn by
Benedetto Croce) is useless for our characterization of liberalism
in Britain. See Hayek Ope cit., p. 132.
11
7. The use of the expression "social" justice is of comparatively
recent origin. Though the expression is used in more than one
sense, it is frequently used as a synonym of "distributive"
justice. F. Hayek suggests that J. S. Mill is the first modern
liberal theorist who used "social and distrubutive justice".
See his Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1982), vol. 2, p. 63 et passim. Hayek is one of the few
theorists who attach great significance to the narrow classical-
liberal concept of justice.
CHAPTER 1
PROPERTY AND JUSTICE:
An Exposition of Two Major Components
of Locke's Liberalism
CHAPTER1
PROPERTY AND JUSTICE
An Exposition of Two Major Components
of Locke's Liberalism
"Aristotle is allowed a master in this science
[ioeo, the science of politics), and few enter upon
the consideration of government, without reading his
Politics. Hereunto should be added, true notions of
laws in general; and property. the subject-matter about
which laws are made. He, that would acquaint himself
with the former of these, should thoroughly study the
judicious Hooker's first book of Ecclesiastical Polity.
And property I have nowhere found more clearly explained,
than in a book, intitled. Two Treatises of Government.
But not to load your young gentleman with too many books
on this subject, which require more meditation than reading;
give me leave to recommend to him Puffendorf's little
Treatise, De Officio Hominis et Civis."
(Quoted from Locke's letter to Richard King, dated 25 Aug.
1703; Works, X, 307f., emphasis added.)
In this chapter I shall offer an exposition of two major
components of Locke's liberal political theory. The first
component is his theory of property; or more accurately, his account
of appropriation in Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise. The second
component is his theory of the state - more specifically, his
theory of "the Extent of the Legislative Power" in Chap. 11 of
the Second Treatise. These two chapters of the Second Treatise are
the core of Locke's liberal political theory. I shall give an
exposition of each component of Locke's liberal political theory,
and explain how his account of appropriation is related to his attempt
to limit the supreme power of the state.
Locke's political theory is a fusion of the modern theoretical
tradition of "natural rights" and the ancient-medieval tradition of
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"consti tutionalism".
the Second Treatise.
He combines the two traditions in his own way in
I have quoted above a passage from Locke's letter
to Richard King. The passage not only informs us of Locke's opinion of
what books we should read for a study of politics. It also indicates
the theoretical context in which Lockeos political theory can be
properly understood. Aristotle and Hooker and two of the patron saints
of "constitutionalism", of Itagovermnent of laws, not of men"o Pufendorf
is a modern proponent of "natural rights"o Locke hints that he has
studied both traditions. He links them by saying that "property" is
"the subject-matter about which laws are made". "Property" in this
context can mean either a man's natural exclusive right of disposal over
his possessions, or his natural exclusive rights in general. (Alter-
natively, we can say that "property" means the object which is a man's
"own", whether it is a material object or no t s )
Locke holds that every man has a minimal exclusive domain of
his own, by virtue of his natural status or the status God granted to him.
This minimal exclusive domain consists of each :nan's life and "what
tends to the Preservation of the Life". It consists of each man's
life, "Liberty, Health, Limb", and the minimal "Goods" required for his
preservation (g,6). The law of nature demands: "no one ought to
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or [minimall Possessions".
Nobody ought to "impair" or "take away" or damage these minimal objects
of another man (6). In his proposed reform of the Poor Law, Locke
stated: "Every one must have meat, drink, clothing, and firing. So
much goes out of the stock of the kingdom, whether they work or no"
(Bourne, ~, II, 382).
Beyond the minimal sphere of his life, liberty, and few
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possessions, there is a larger private sphere which every active human
being fo~ by his own efforts and the efforts of his ancestors. This
larger, exclusive domain is called "property"o We can call this
larger domain an "enlarged property", and the minimal domain the
"minimal property". (Locke.'s actual usage suggests that "property", in the
proper sense of the word, is the exclusive domain already enlarged by
the efforts of private men.) His account of appropriation in Chap. 5
of the Second Treatise explains how each man can legitimately begin and
enlarge his exclusive, material domain in the pre-political world of
common resources. In his view, each man can legitimately demarcate his
material domain by means of his own labour, his voluntary exchange
(including the use of money), and his natural inheritance. Those men
who have demarcated their exclusive private domains by their own efforts,
and the efforts of their ancestors, unite themselves to protect their
domains effectively. This is the origin of a political society.
Each man's enlarged domain consists of his life, liberty and the
possessions which he has acquired by the natural methods of acquisition
(ioe., his labour, voluntary exchange, money and inheritance).
Positive laws, according to Locke, are the great instrument by which
each man's domain is effectively protected from the invasion of other
men.
Locke's theory of "the Extent of the Legislative Power" is an
attempt to show the "bounds" within which the holder(s) of the supreme
power of the state ought to acto It consists of claims against
arbitrary rule (or a government of will), as well as claims for the
rule of law (or a government of laws). Locke's central claim is that
whoever holds the supreme power of the state, regardless of the form of
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government, has an obligation to "administer justice". The adminis-
tration of justice formally means the impartial administration of lawso
But in Locke's view, not every product of a legislature counts as a "law".
The "laws" in question are the laws which protect one manos "property"
(ioeo, his life, liberty and possessions) from the violence and injury
of otherso Hence, the supreme political agent has an obligation to
sustain, by laws, a violencE-free relationship among the citizens who
have their own private domainso In short, the supreme political agent
the "legislative", or the "magistrate" - has an obligation to "preserve"
their "properties" by lawso
This is an outline of the two components of Locke's liberal
political theory. Let me sharpen this outline. His liberal political
theory nicely fits into Walter Lippmann's formula of classical liberalism:
"In a free society the state does not administer the affairs of meno It
administers justice among men who conduct their own affairs." (Quoted
in my Introduction, p. 2.) According to Locke, every man demarcates -
and ought to demarcate - his private domain of rights, independently of
the state's administration of justice. By nature, every man is a little
sovereign within the domain which he demarcates by his own efforts (and
inheritance). On the other hand, the state has a right and power to
deal with public affairs, i.e., the affairs of the intersections of
privately demarcated rights. Whereas "property" signifies the private
realm within which each man minds his own business, "justice" signifies
the public adjustment of one man's relation to another man's "property"
by means of equal laws. Within Locke's liberal theory of the state,
there is peaceful coexistence between private "property" and public
"jus tice". The supreme political agent's proper business is to make
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laws and enforce them impartially, for the purpose of preventing and
correcting one man's violation of another man's right (or "property").
On the other hand, each man's duty or "office" is to keep his actions
within the bounds of the laws. Within the legal bounds, each man has
a liberty to dispose of his proper objects (i.eo, his life, his liberty
or actions, and his possessions) as he thinks fit. The happy harmony
between private property and public justice is, at the same time, the
harmony between positive liberty and negative laws. We must probe
into the way Locke harmonizes "property" with "justice", and "liberty"
with "law". To probe into the nature of this harmony is to grasp
Locke's liberalism by the root. It is to grasp his liberalism as a
fusion of the modern tradition of "natural rights" and the ancient-
medieval tradition of "constitutionalism"; namely,as a fusion of radical
economic premises and conservative political conclusions.
A majority of recent Locke scholars have failed to clarify the
harmonious relationship between "property" and "jus tice". They have
been puzzled and dismayed by the enigmatic, Janus-like feature of
Locke's political theory. Without multiplying words, I shall explain
the nature of the harmony or fusion, and thereby conclude my outline
of Locke's liberal theory of the state. First, let us look at how he
fuses men's present possessions with their rights or "property".
According to Locke, men have rights over their present possessions
because they, and their ancestors, have aCquired them by their honest
labour (and other legitimate methods). Men's present possessions are,
in fact as well as in theory, the result of the legitimate acquisition
and legitimate exchange which began in the pre-political past. There
were no such things as illegitimate possessions in the pre-political
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past; there was not a single robber. If there had been a robber,
then men's present possessions would rest on robbery. 'Then their
possessions would have to be redistributed to rectify injustice, i.e.,to
restore to each man what he should have acquired if there had been no
robber. Yet according to Locke, there is no need to rectify the acts
of injustice committed in the pre-political past. No such ac twas
committed in the pre-political past. Everybody acted justly! To
maintain this position, he uses a mythological notion of the pre-political
past, and writes a story of appropriation according to which every pre-
political man acquired his goods as he ought to have acquired them.
Locke's view goes well beyond the abstractly philosophical position
that every man has a right to dispose of external goods, if he has
acquired them by his honest labour (and other legitimate methods).
Every man has such a right not only if, but because, he has acquired
external goods by his honest labour (and other legitimate methods).
Men "enter into society with one another", for the purpose of preserving
"what honest industry has already acquired" (A Letter concerning
Toleration, Works, VI, 42; emphasis added).
Having seen Locke's attempt to fuse menus present possessions
with their rights or "property", we can now discuss how he connects men's
rights or "property" with "justice". "Jus tice" deals with men's
possessions as well as their lives and liberties. I shall quote a
passage which sums up the way Locke establishes harmony between
"property" and "justice". The passage is long, but it is worth quoting
in full:
The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men
constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing
their own civil interests [i.e., property] •
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Civil interest I call life, liberty, health, and
indolency of body; and the possession of outward things,
such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.
It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the
impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all the
people in general, and to every one of his subjects in
particular, the just possession of these things belonging
to this life. If anyone presume to violate the laws of
public justice and equity, established for the preservation
of these things, his presumption is to be checked by the
fear of punishment, consisting in the deprivation or
diminution of those civil interests, or goods, which
otherwise he might and ought to enjoy. But seeing no man
does willingly suffer himself to be punished by the
deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his
liberty or life, therefore is the magistrate armed with
the force and strength of all his subjects, in order to
the punishment of those that violate any other man's
rights. (Quoted from A Letter concerning Toleration,
Works, VI, 9f.)
This passage clearly shows that LockeRs concept of justice is that of
"corrective justice". It presupposes that each man has rights (or
property, or civil interests), prior to his dealings or interactions
with other men. The administration of justice in the formal sense is
"the impartial execution of equal laws", or the treatment of equal
cases in equal manners. But its purpose is to protect men's rights
from mutual violation. This is what Locke means when he says, "to
secure unto all the people in general, and to every one of his subjects
in particular, the just possession of these things belonging to this
life". The crucial point here is that justice does not "give" a
right to any party in any positive sense. Justice "leaves" the
existing rights of men intact, unless a dispute of rights arises.
Suum cuigue tribuere, according to Locke, means: leave everyone's
right alone. Every private man, as we have seen, determines his right
or the objects of his righto What justice does is to protect the
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right each man has against the unjust violence of others, by impartially
executing the criminal law which specifies proper measures of punishment
and the civil law which specifies proper measures of reparation.
Locke's concept of justice, unlike the recent concept of "social
justice", is entirely negative and conservative.
The chief characteristic of Locke's political theory is that
the negative and conservative n~tions of law and justice are combined
with the strongly economic notions of positive liberty and natural
rights. In his view, each man's "right" (or "property") is not opposed
to every government; it is opposed only to arbitrary government. The
public administration of justice is not opposed to the unequal possessions
of men. It is only opposed to an unequal treatment of the rights which
men already have (including the rights they have over their unequal
possessions). Locke defends any government which rules by laws,
provided those laws are designed to preserve the society where each manls
life, liberty and possessions are protected against the violence of other
men. This society has an economic basis in the labour of men and their
voluntary exchange.
In what follows, I shall give a more detailed exposition of Locke's
liberal political theory. The outline I have presented above will be fully
elaborated in two parts. In PART 1; I shall discuss in detail his account
of appropriation of Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise. In PART 2, I shall
discuss his theory of the extent of political power, with particular
emphasis on his negative concept of justice. My discussion in PART 1
is long. I shall deliberately break down the barrier between the two
components of Locke's liberalism, when I come to discuss the purpose
of his account of appropriation in PART 1.
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PART 1. Locke's Account of Appropriation
It is easy to provide an exciting interpretation of Lockeos
account of appropriation. Many commentators have done this in recent
years. All we need to do is to make imaginative use of bits and pieces
of what Locke says in Chapter 50 It is also easy to criticize what he
sayso Many critics have done this, too. They have pointed out his
obscurity and the absence of any rigorous argument. However, it is
very difficult to explain what is going on in Chapter 5 of the Second
Treatiseo Many commentators and critics have failed to explain it.
They have simply produced various interpretations and criticisms. They
resemble critics and producers of Hamlet who, after disputing what is
going on in the play, happily reduce its contents to make it intelligible
for 20th-century readers and audiences. I am not opposed to the
creative use we may make of Locke, nor to a critical evaluation of his
account of appropriation. Yet to maintain intellectual health, we must
distinguish an "exposition" (ioeo, an objective interpretation grounded
in our respect for what Locke meant to say) from our creative inter-
pretation and critical evaluationo What I attempt to do below is to
explain what Locke's Chapter 5 is about, and what it is for. It is an
irony of history that Locke stated in 1703 that he had "explained"
"property" more "clearly" than anyone else had done before. We in the
20th century remain uncertain of the point of his account. My exposition,
I hope, will put an end to all futile interpretive disputes that have
plagued a quarter of the English-speaking intellectual world.
If one wishes to give an exposition, rather than an interpretation,
of Locke's account of appropriation, then one must answer two basic
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questions. First, what problem did Locke try to solve in Chapter 51
Secondly, why did he want to solve that particular problem? I shall
offer the following answers. First, Locke tried to solve the problem
of the legitimate conversion of the original community of things into the
world of property. He tried to show that there is a legitimate manner,
or method, by which men were able to convert the God-given world of
common things into the world of property. Secondly, he tried to solve
this problem in order to limit the supreme power of the state (i.e., the
political or legislative power). The legitimate method of conversion
which Locke portrayed in Chap. 5 does not owe its legitimacy to any
political authority. By showing that there is a pre-political,
legitimate method of acquiring property, Locke can argue that men form
a political society to seek a legal protection of their property.
\
He can
also argue that whoever holds political power ought not to take their
property arbitrarily. In short, the purpose of Locke's account of
appropriation is to protect men's properties by positive laws against
the arbitrary 'exercise of the supreme power of the state. These are
the short answers to the two questions posed above. I shall elaborate
these answers below. Apparently, we need to look beyond Locke's
Chapter 5 in order to get the second answer. But we can derive the
first answer directly from what he says in the beginning of Chapter 5.
Let us see how he formulates the problem "Of Property".
I. 1 Locke's Formulation of the Problem in Chap. 5
In Section 25 of Chap. 5, Locke formulates the problem he under-
takes to solve. His formulation is not immediately clear to us, though
it was clear to well-educated 17th-century readers. To state it simply,
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it is the problem about the origin of property. Hobbes discussed the
origin of property (or dominion) in various places of De Cive and
Leviathan. Groitus discussed it in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Bk 2, Ch.a.
Pufendorf discussed it in De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Bk 4, Ch.4. And
Locke discussed it in Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise.
One notable feature of their discussions of the origin of
property (or dominion) is that they tried to show how the original
"community" of things turned into the world of property. In Hobbes'
case, this original community is the state of nature where everything,
including ~veryoneJ~ body, is common to everyone else. "Before the yoke
of Civil Society was undertaken", says Hobbes, "no man had any proper
Right; all things were common to a1l men" (De Cive, XII, 7). This
original "community" is not a community in the proper sense of the wordo
Hobbes himself says: this state is "neither Propriety nor Community; but
Uncertainty" (Leviathan1 XXIV). Grotius and Pufendorf had different
ideas of the original community of things, and they offered different
accounts of the legitimate conversion of the original community into the
world of property. LockeQs account of the origin of property is based
on his idea of the original community of things, and it tries to show
how the original community was legitimately transformed into the world
of property.
The opening paragraph of Ch. 5 deserves careful analysis. I
shall quote the whole paragraph, dividing it into four segments:
(i) "Whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us,
that Men, being once born, have a right to their
Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink,
and such other things, as Nature affords for their
Subsistence: Or Revelation, which gives us an account
of those Grants God made of the World to ~, and to
~, and his Sons, 'tis very clear, that God, as King
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
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~ says, 000 has given the Earth to the Children
of Men, given it to Mankind in common.
"But this being supposed, it seems to some a very
great difficulty, how anyone should ever come to
have a Property in any thing:
"I will not content my self to answer, That if it be
difficult to make out Property, upon a supposition,
that God gave the Word to ~ and his Posterity in
common; it is impossible that any Man, but one
universal Monarch, should have any Property, upon a
supposition, that God gave the World to Adam, and
his Heirs in Succession, exclusive of all the rest
of his Posterityo
"But I shall endeavour to shew, how Men might come
to have a property in several parts of that which
God gave to Mankind in common, and that without any
express Cornpact of all the Commoners."
(~, 25).
Passage (i) says: the existence of the original community of things can
be confirmed by "natural reason" and "revelation". This community is
the world God gave to mankind "in common" such that every member of the
human species had "a right to their Preservation". To clarify Locke's
idea of the original community, we must understand his idea of the "common
right" of every man. This is a right which each human being had, in
the beginning of the world, to take and make use of an indefinite portion
of the God-given world. By "common" is meant "just like any other
member of the human species". It is the right which everyone had "in
common with Adam" (!I, 87), or "in common with others" (,§I, 25).
I shall briefly show how Locke derives the common right of
everyone, and further clarify the indefinite feature of this right. In
the First Treatise, Locke rejects Filmer's claim that God originally
gave the world to Adam exclusively, and claims instead that the Bible says
God gave the world to mankind in common (!I, 24, 29, 30, 40). In short,
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Locke derives "the common right" from biblical evidence. But he
elaborates what he finds in the Bibleo Since God implanted in every
man "a strong Desire of Self-preservation when He made him", "he
followed the Will of his Maker" in pursuing "that natural Inclination
he had to preserve his Being" (U, 85)0 "Therefore", says Locke,
every man originally "had a right to make use of those Creatures, which
by his Reason or Senses he could discoverll(FT, 85) or "a right to a use
of the Creatures" (86)0 This is a common right to make use of lower
creatures for self-preservation, and it implies a common right to seize
animals and plants for the sake of self-preservation. But the world
God gave to mankind includes the earth itselfo In Chapter 5 of the
Second Treatise, it is assumed that everyone originally had a common
right to make use of an indefinite portion of the earth. He speaks of
"the common right" with respect to movable natural provisions (E,
27, 28, 29, 30)0 And when he discusses the appropriation of land, he
speaks of "the right of another" (36) or "his Neighbour's share" (37),
meaning that a man's neighbour originally had a right to the seizure and
use of an indefinite portion of the external world just like anyone else.
The common right of everyone is a right to take, and make use
of, an indefinite portion of the God-given external world. It is a
right of free access to an indefinite portion. Since the object of the
common right is an indefinite portion of the external world, we can
designate Locke's concept of "common right" as "an indefinite right"o
The expression "an indefinite right" derives from Pufendorf. He
referred to the common right of everyone as "an indefinite right" in
De Jure Naturae et Gentium (4, 4, 4, et passim). But this expression
can be properly used to capture the chief characteristic of Locke's
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concept of the common right of everyone. To state this characteristic
more precisely, the common right of everyone is ~ a right to use the
definite portion of the external world which a man has already seized
or taken, ~ a right to the seizure and use of an indefinite portion
of the external world. It is a right of free access to an unspecified
portion of the God-given, external world. Since God originally gave
this right for the purpose of the preservation of every man, it is also
regarded as "a right to their [menvs] Preservation, and consequently
to Meat and Drink" (.2!., 25).
Let us return to the opening paragraph of Chap. 5 which I have
quoted. Sentence (ii) says: given the supposition of the original
community of things, "some" find that there is a difficulty explaining
"how any one should ever come to have a Property in any thing". To
have "a property in" a thing means to have "an exclusive right of
disposal over" ito I shall not discuss here what Locke meant by the
word "property" in any detail. This ques tion will be fully explored,
and examined, in CHAPTER 3. We should only note that if a man has a
"property in" X, then it logically implies that nobody else has "a
right to" X, or a rightful claim to take or make use of X. In the
context of Locke's account of the transformation of the original community
into the world of property, this means that if a man "comes to have a
property" in an X portion of the world God gave to mankind in common,
then everyone else' s "common right" mus t - logically J mus t - be
cancelled with respect to Xo Hence, anyone who tries to explain the
legitimacy of the transformation of the original community of things into
the world of property needs to show that the cancellation of the "common
right" of everyone is justified. Locke's strategy, as we shall see
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later, is to show that the cancellation of the "common right" involves no
injury to other men.
Locke's statement (ii) is not about any specific theorist, nor
about any specific difficulty. He wants to make a general point: given
the true premise that things were originally common to mankind, "some"
find it very difficult to understand, or explain, how each man's exclusive
property could arise from the original community. Peter Laslett and other
scholars have mistakenly identified "a very great difficulty" with Filmer's
objection to Grotius' account of the origin of property. I shall criticize
their interpretation later (in CHAPTER. 2 ). Locke is speaking of "a very
great difficulty" of "some" indefinitely.
In Passage (iii) Locke mentions Filmer's view as a possible response
to the prima facie difficulty, and brushes it aside. Filmer recommended
his readers to abandon the very idea of the original community of things',
and to embrace his alternative premise instead. In criticizing Grotius in
Patriarcha, he stated:
I have briefly presented here the desperate inconveniences which
attend upon the doctrine of the natural freedom and community
of all things. These anj many more absurdities are easily
removed if on the contary we maintain the natural and private
dominion of Adam to be the fountain of all government and propriety.
Filmer's alternative premise and his conclusion (i.e., absolute monarchy),
according to Locke, are plainly false. So he declares that even "if it be
difficult to make out Property", "I will not content my self" to accept
Filmer's false alternative.
Finally, we come to the most important part of the opening
paragraph of Chap. 5, i.e., Locke's own formulation of the problem of
the origin of property. As he puts it, it is the problem of "how"
"Men might" "come to have a property" "in several parts of that which God
gave to Mankind in common". This is a problem about the method or
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manner of appropriation, rather than the problem about why there should
be anything like property at all. It is the problem of ~ men come to
~ a property in definite portions of the God-given world of common
things. "Appropriate" is Locke's favourite word. He uses it in a
somewhat flexible way, exploiting certain images associated with it.
But what he strictly means by "appropriate" is to set aside a definite
portion of the external world as one's "own" or one's property, i.e., to
2come to have a property in a definite portion of the external world.
Locke indicates, from the start, that each man's appropriation or his
coming to have a property in a part of the world is independent of "any
express Compact of all Conmone ra" (25). In Sect. 26 of Chap. 5, he
states that since God has "given" "all the Fruits ••0 and Beasts" "for
the use of Men", "there must of necessity be a means to appropriate
them some way or other before they can be of any use ••• to any
particular Man" (26). Locke's task in the rest of Chap. 5 is to show
what is the specific manner of appropriation (with respect to land as
well as fruits, beasts, and water).
Thus Locke's account "Of Property" in Chap. 5 of the Second
Treatise is an account of the'manner of appropriation which is independ-
ent of any explicit compact of all commoners. To be perfectly clear
about Locke's problem, however, we must ask one important question.
II
Is he trying to explain how men in fact appropriated the God-given world
of common things? Or is he presenting the manner in which men ought to
appropriate the God-given world of common things? In other words, is
Locke providing an account of the de facto mode of appropriation, or an
account of the de jure mode of appropriation? Is he presenting a
record of facts (i.e., what happened), or an outline of norms (i.e.,
what ought to happen)? This question would embarrass Locke, and if we
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press this question hard we shall soon be able to develop a critique of
his account of appropriation. Though we do not need to criticize him
at this point, we must clarify what he does in Chap. 5 by answering the
either/or question which I have raised. The answer is this. Locke
deals with the normative as well as the factual question of appropriation.
He blurs the distinction between the factual question about the way men
have actually or probably appropriated the world, and the normative
question about the way they ought to appropriate the world. He
blends the two questions together into a story of appropriation.
Within this story, he shows that there is a manner of appropriation
which is both legitimate and factual (or probable or practicable).- -
Since Locke's account of appropriation is a single narrative
which unifies the normative and factual question, it is difficult to
formulate his "problem" in any precise way. He ambiguously asks, in
the opening paragraph, how men "might" come to have a property in
definite portions of the world. What is this "mightlt? This conjectural
"might" is a mixture of what has happened and what ought to happen.
Analytically speaking, he undertakes either one of the following tasks
(a) he presents the legitimate manner of appropriation, and then he
claims that men are likely to have adopted this mode of appropriation
(or it was practicable for them to do so); or (b) he presents the
de facto mode of appropriation first, and then explains why this mode
of appropriation is legitimate. Either way, Locke attempts to show
that there is a legitimate mode of appropriation which men have
actually (or probably) adopted. His account of appropriation
attempts to deal with one compound problem within a single narrative:
How have men appropriated the originally common world, and why is it
legitimate to appropriate it in that particular manner?
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It is significant that Locke addresses one compound problema
I have ~-formulated his problem on the basis of an analysis of his own
obscure formulation of the problema But if we were pressed to state
what Locke's ~ problem is, then we would have to repeat his non-
analytical question, ioeo, how men "might" come to have a property in
distinct portions of the God-given common worldo This unclear formu-
lation of the problem, as I said, is a blend of norms and facts. This
suggests that Locke's account of appropriation is a story, or an extended
metaphor, or a my tho In fact, the prominent feature of his account is
that it is mythicalo As it stands, it is neither a factual investigation
into the development of property nor a straightforward attempt to justify
the specific mode of appropriation which existed at a particular point
in time. Locke blends the two, and writes a mythical story or a fairy-
tale within which what ought to happen actually happens. We can
certainly extract from his story some rudiments of his factual
investigation into economic history, or some rudiments of his justificatory
arguments for the acquisition of property by labour. Nevertheless, we
can only extract them from his story, his extended metaphor, or his myth.
To call it a myth is not to dismiss it, nor to criticize it (though we
can criticize it if we so choose)o I am at the moment trying to explain
the prominent feature of Locke's account of appropriation by classifying
it as a my tho
Let us look at how Locke blends norms and facts. I shall cite
only two examples hereo First, it is legitimate, according to him,
for a man to appropriate the common world by his labour if "there is
enough, and as good left in common for others" (27). This is a
normative judgement of Locke'so But this is combined with a prima facie
factual claim that "Labour, in the Beginning, gave a Right of Property" (45).
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A second example is thiso In the beginning of the world, there was a
"measure of Property" that each man should appropriate only as much as
he can make use of (31, 36). In addition, everyone actually regulated
his behaviour by this measure: "This measure did confine every Man's
Possession, to a very moderate Proportion" (36)0 There was no "room
for Controversie about the Title, nor for Incroachment on the Right of
others"; "Right and conveniency went together"; "what Portion a Man
carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless as well as
dishonest to carve himself too much" (51). This is Locke's version of
the Golden Age which Ovid and other Roman poets had portrayed.
In these examples, Locke makes prima facie factual claims.
Each man's labour did in fact give rise to a right of property; the
measure of property did in fact confine the size of his possessions;
and there was no possibility of any controversy about rights. But these
claims are factual only in the prima facie sense; they are presented as
facts within Locke's story. No historical evidence is produced to show
how men actually acquired goods; whether they had anything like a
"right"; or whether men in the early ages of the world fought among
themselves or lived in peace. Indeed, anyone interested in the history
of the concept of a right would find this story amusing. As far as we
know, the concept of a right did not have any means of expression until
near the end of the middle ages in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, or Arabic.
Ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle did not have the equivalent
of our expression "a right", as distinct from Itthe right action" and
"the right thing to do"o Nor did the Romans, according to Maine,
possess the concept of a legal right. Or if we turn our eyes to what
appears to be a unique and bizzare language such as Japanese, we find
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that the word lIa rightll did not exist until the latter half of the 19th
century when modern Western ideas (e.g., J. So Mill's idea of "liberty")
flooded into Japan, and forced its intellectual leaders to devise a
linguistic expression for the peculiar entity "a right". If we are to
take a sound historical viewpoint, we must affirm that the concept of a
right (as distinct from a law, or an objective right) is a modern
3invention - largely, a 17th-century product made out of ~.
Locke's prima facie factual assertions are, in fact, the state-
ments of what would (or could, or might) have happened!! primitive men
had shared his normative judgements and had acted according to those
judgementso They are the expressions of what, in Locke's normative
judgement, ought to have happened. But they are presented, and disguised,
as what has actually happened. Locke nowhere says that such and such
events ought to have taken place though they did not actually take place.
He is not a Rousseau who concentrates on the question of legitimacy by
brushing aside facts on the ground of his ignorance, or their irrelevance.4
Nor is Locke a Hume who, in his conjectural history, tries to explain
how a norm (ioe., a new relation of "ought;" or "ought not;") can arise
from a repeated experience of facts (ioeo, a Itconjunction" of "isll and
"is not")5. Locke blurs the edge between norms and facts, and narrates
a story in the way a believer characteristically apprehends a myth.
About the apprehension of a myth, Kolakowski has made a pertinent comment:
The blurring of the distinction between descriptive
and normative elements is in fact characteristic of
the way in which a myth is apprehended by believers:
narration and precept are not distinguished, but are
accepted as a single reality. That which the myth
commands, or holds up to be worshipped and imitated,
is not presented as a separate conclusion but is
directly perceived as part of the story. To under-
stand a myth rightly is not only to understand its 6
factual content but to accept the values implied in it.
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~Kolakowski is commenting on Georg Lukacs' Marxism, the Romantic Marxism
which tries to overcome the gap between "is" and "ought" by an act
of self-commitment and practical affirmation. But his comment aptly
describes the way Locke tells his story of appropriation. He tells his
story from the viewpoint of a committed believer, the one who believes
that property ~ originate from each man's labour. He does not
distinguish between "narration" and "precept"; he accepts them "as
a single reality" and invites us to accept them as such.
Of course, there is nothing profound in the way Locke mixes
norms with facts. He simply follows an intellectually obscure procedure,
though the procedure he adopts may be emotionally satisfying to those who
share his beliefs. Locke did not write Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise
as a philosopher who tried to examine arguments. Nor did he write it as
a social scientist who tried to explain observed events. He wrote it as
a believer. Merits and defects of his account of appropriation arise
from the fact that he effectively articulated his own beliefs about
the origin of property, without trying to defend them rationally. To
apply what Hume said about Locke's account of the idea of power, his
account of appropriation is "more popular than philosophical" (!!:lli" 157).
The beliefs he articulated were also a part of the 17th century's growing
beliefs about labour, commerce and property.
Locke described himself as having "explained" "property"
"clearly", but from the viewpoint of a non-believer, he expressed
his beliefs about property clearly.
I shall make one more comment on Locke's "compound" problem
to clarify what he does in Chap.5. I have said that he addresses the
question concerning the de jure and de facto manner of converting the
original community of things into the world of property. We need to
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clarify what is meant by "the world of property" here, Just as Locke
mixes what has actually happened with what ought to happen, he mixes
(real or idealized) event~ in the 17th century with (real or idealized)
events in the distant pasto He blends the past and the present in his
story so that they become hardly distinghishable. {See~, 40-43 in
particular)o Given this mythical blend, we cannot tell whether Locke's
men convert the original community into the 17th-century world of property,
or into the world of property which is supposed to have existed in the
distant pasto The only thing that we can be certain of is that Locke's
men convert the original community into the proto-17th-century world -
the world which resembles the 17th-century world of property, or contains
the rudiments of it.
Locke's account of appropriation is a self-contained discourse
which has a definite beginning and a definite end. It portrays how men
initially began to have property; how they expanded their property; and
how they settled their property by forming political societies in some
parts of the world. But it is impossible to date the events which
Locke presents in his account. Is he writing about 17th-century approp-
riation in England and America, or is he discussing the appropriation
which took place in the distant past ("the first Ages of the World" (39),
and then the age of commercial economy and scarce land)? This question
is unanswerable. He says, for instance, that "in the beginning all the
World was America" (49). And he refers to "the wild Indian" in the
"vast Wilderness of the Earth" (25, 36). But Locke is certainly, not
talking about the past as it really was. He is presenting a picture
of the remote past by making use of an American Indian, and turning
him into a Robinson Crusoe who lives in the vast wilderness of America.
His account of appropriation is quasi-historical, not historical. The
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events he presents in his account cannot be dated because he blends
the remote past and the 17th century. Here again we must treat his
account as a story, an extended metaphor, or a myth.
The important point, however, is that the world of property
which Locke describes at the end of his account resembles the 17th-
century world of property in some important respects. It is the world
where "Gold and Silver" "may be hoarded up without injury to anyone" (50).
It is the world where men enjoy the "disproportionate and unequal
Possession of the Earth" (50). And it is the world of growing commercial
~conomy (48). Strictly speaking, Locke cannot maintain that the world
of property which legitimately emer.ges from pre-political appropriation
is the 17th-century world of property. Elsewhere in the Second Treatise,
he explicitly says that men do not live in the state of nature very long,
but "are quickly driven into Society" (127). He also says that most
political societies precede our recorded history (101). To be
consistent, Locke cannot claim t.hatmen stayed in the state of nature
until the 17th century. On the other hand, however, he tries to show
that something like the 17th-century world of property emerges out of
the pre-political process of appropriation (by labour, voluntary exchange,
the use of money, and inheritance). He emphasizes that men "enlarge
their Possessions of Land" disproportionately by the use of money and
the sale of agricultural products (48). This enlargement is legitimate
because men have tacitly agreed to use money (50).
Locke's justification of unequal possessions at the end of Chap. 5
is somewhat oblique, and it is a subject of controversy among commentators.
But the fact of the matter is simple. The whole of Chap. 5 is intended
to show that the proto-17th-century world of property, the world which
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contains the rudiments of the 17th-century world, could legitimately
arise from the original community of things. One important feature
of the distribution of land in the 17th century (and also, in the
20th century) is that some men own disproportionate pieces of land, while
others do not own any land. Locke's aim is to defend the possessions
which men actually enjoy in the 17th century against the arbitrary
power of government, by showing that their possessions ~ave
legitimately arisen independently of a~y existing political authority
Given this aim, and given the fact of unequal possessions, he tries
to show in Chap. 5 that men's unequal possessions could legitimately arise
before any political society was founded. Locke is not interested
in defending the large possessions of the rich against the poor,
or defending the small possessions of the poor against the rich. He
is rather trying to accommodate the fact of unequal possessions into
his liberal theory of the state, without thinking that there is a serious
problem about unequal possessions.
I now conclude my account of Locke's formulation of the problem
about the origin of property. The problem he tries to solve can be stated
as follows: What is the legitimate manner by which men are likely to
have converted the original community of things into the proto-17th-
century world of property? This compound problem, if it can be called
a "problem" at all, blurs the distinction between the factual question
and the normative question about appropriation. It also blurs the
distinction between the past and the present. Hence, Locke's account of
appropriation is a myth wfthin which he expresses his beliefs about the
origin of property. But 17th-century readers who lived under arbitrary
government can easily draw morals from his story: we have a property
in external goods because we work hard, and our ancestors worked hard;
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our possessions are exclusively "our own" by nature; hence, no man
including a monarch ought to take our possessions arbitrarily.
1. 2 Locke's Account of Appropriation: An Analytical Exposition
In this section, I shall provide an analytical exposition
of Locke's account of appropriation. I shall treat the framework
of his narrative - the beginning, expansion, and settlement of
property- as given. My task is to clarify the various claims Locke
advances within this framework. It is a task of bringing about the
internal clarity of his compound account by analyzing it into its
constituent parts. This task is necessary, though not sufficient,
for the purpose of grasping the point of a myth.
Locke first shows that every man, in the beginning of the world,
could legitimately begin his property by labouring. He speaks of the
beginning of property frequently: man "begins the Property" (ST 28);
"the beginning of Property" (30); "whoever has imploy'd ... labour 00
hath begun a Property" (30); "Labour, in the beginning, gave a Right of
Property" (45);"the Property which Labour and Industry began" (45); and
"Labour could at first begin a title of Property in the common things of
Natu re" (51). To say that man begins his property (in the beginning of
the world) means, strictly speaking, that he begins to have "a property
in" a portion of the God-given world (in the beginning of the world).
Locke's lo.cution "a property in", as I said, can be rendered as "an
exclusive right of disposal over". According to Locke, the legitimate
manner by which every man can begin to have "a property in" a part
of the God-given world is labouring, provided his labouring takes
place under the condition where no other man would be injured.
Since "every Man has a Property in his own Person, and the "Labour
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of his Body, and the ~ of his Hands 00. are properly his~ he can
legitimately mix his labour with an external good (27). By joining
"something that is his own" to the external good through labouring,
he "makes it his Property", namely, he begins to have Aa property
in" it (27)0 Everyone can convert a part of the common world to
his property by this simple method. It is a quasi-chemical method
of removing a natural object from the common world, mixing his labour
with it, and "joining" or "annexing" "something that is his own"
to it. By this simple method, each man can appropriate a piece
of land as well as beasts, fruits, fish and water (28-30,32). He can
legitimately begin his property "at least where there is enough, and
as good left in common for others" (27). This condition is usually
known as the "sufficiency" condition among Locke commentators.
Macpherson has made it famous by showing how Locke allows men to
"transcend" this Gondition.7 But to be exact, this is the condition
which merely ensures that no other man would be injured. It is not
important to Locke whether the "sufficiency" condition comes to be
"transcended" in the course of appropriation. What is important
is the idea that nobody ought to harm, or injure, another man by
appropriating a part of the common world.
The principle that nobody ought to injure another man is the
basic principle of any theory of natural law and natural rights.
Cicero and Pufendorf, for instance, emphasized the significance of
this principle. In De Officiis, Cicero stated: "the first thing
that justice requires of us is this; no one should do any hurt to another
unless by way of reasonable and just retribution for some injury
received from him".8 Pufendorf similarly emphasized the significance
of a man's duty to avoid injury. Of men's "mutual duties",
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i.e., one man's duty toward another man, "the first place belongs to this
one: let no one injure another" (De Officio Hominis, 1,6,1; also, ~
Jure Naturae, 3,1,1). Ac the beginning of the Second Treatise, Locke
formulates the fundamental precept of the law of nature as follows:
"no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or [minimal']
Possessions" (6). Unfortunately, Locke nowhere clarifies what he means
by "harm" or "injury" in the way Pufendorf or Hobbes does. He uses
the notion informally. But in Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise, he does
claim that pre-political appropriators were able to avoid injuring another
man. By this he roughly means that pre-political appropriators did not
restrict another man's freedom seriously by their acts of appropriation.9
Let us return to Locke's story of appropriation. The rest of
his story about appropriation in the first ages of the world can be
summed up as follows. God gave the world to "the use of the Industrious
and Rational", and wherever men "fixed" their labour, they could fix
their "property" (34). They improved the world by their labour, and
took "pains" to cultivate land or to catch beasts (34, 32, 30). God
also "Commandedueach man to labour, and the "Condition of Humane Life,
which requires Labour and Materials to work on, necessarily introduce[d]
private Possessions" (35). Besides the principle of non-injury there is
another principle which limited the amount of property men could
acquire; everyone should acquire only "as much as [he] can make use
of to any advantage of life before it spoils" (31). This use/non-
spoilage principle is basically God's prohibition that nobody ought
to destroy lower creatures purposelessly (6). A similar principle
applies to the possession of land: everyone ought to take good care
of his land, in order that its produce will not decay (38).
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In the beginning of the world, then, there were two principles
by which appropriators had to regulate their actions. But as a matter
of fact, every ap{Jropriator "was only to look that he used them
a.e., the goods he has appropriated] before they spoile~' (46); he did
not have to worry about injuring another mano The reason for this is that
every primitive man produced and consumed very little in the state of
superabundance God created. Locke states:
No Hans Labou~ could subdue, or appropriate all: nor could
his Enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was
impossible for any Man, •••, to intrench upon the right of another,
or acquire, to himself, a Property, to the Prejudice of his
Neighbour (36).
Thus the principle of non-injury cannot possibly be violated, given the
primitive economic condition. This makes us wonder why Locke stipulates
the principle of non-injury in the form of the "sufficiency" condition.
Clearly, he wants to say that the primitive mode of appropriation
he describes was not only legitimate but practicable. By this method
of persuation, he leads his readers to believe that the events he
describes in his story actually took place.
Finally, Locke makes one negative claim about the origin of
property. He claims that property did not arise from any express
compact of all commoners. He offers two reasons for this negative claim:
First, if "such a consent as that was necessary Han had starved,
notwithstanding the Plenty God had given him" (28). Secondly, such
a consent would have caused great inconvenience: "Children or Servants
could not cut the Heat which their Father or Master had provided for
them in common" (29). The first reason is primary. Locke's view is
that since man's starvation, which would be inevitably caused by
universal consent, is contrary to the will and grant of God,
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universal consent cannot be the legitimate method of beginning property.
After providing a positive account of the beginning of property and
rejecting what he takes to be the false alternative, Locke concludes
his account of the beginning of property:
We see how labour could make Men distinct titles to several
parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein there could be
no doubt of Right, no room for quarrel (39).
Locke's account of appropriation in Ch. 5 has two additional
phases: the expansion of property, and the settlement of property.
The expansion of property may be understood in the aggregate sense of
the development of the state of affairs where men have a property in
external goods; or in the individual sense of the expansion of each man's
property. Locke explains the aggregate expansion of landed property
by reference to the "value" enhanced by labour. To put it simply, private
ownership of land develops, because privately improved land yields
valuable crops, owing to the labour e~pended on that land. In Locke's
own words: it is not "strange" that "the Property of labour should be
able to over-ballance the Community of Land", because "'tis Labour
indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing" (40). If we
compare "an Acre of Land planted with Tobacco, or Sugar, sown with Wheat
or Barley" with "an Acre of the same Land lying in common, without any
Husbandry upon it", then the former obviously has more cash value.
Where does the difference come from? Locke's answer is that "the
improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value" (40).
According to his "very modest Computation", "9/10 or even "99/100"
of "the Products of the Earth useful to the Life of Man" are the "effects
of labour". Only a negligible portion of their value is derived from
"Nature" (40).
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Locke's claims about the "value" of land and its produce in
sects. 40 - 43 of the Second Treatise have misled many commentators.
They have been misled to believe that he has something called "a labour
theory of value", or that he defends the claim that everyone has a
property in external goods because he greatly enhances their value by
their labour.10 We shall not let their interpretations change the
import of Locke's simple story. He is addressing the question why
privately-owned land has developed and has been able to surpass (or
"over-ballance") the land left in common. His answer, as we have seen,
is that land yields economically valuable products, only if it has been
improved and cultivated by human labour. To quote one more sentence,
"Labour • • • puts the greatest part of Value upon Land, ••• I tis
to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful Products" (43).
Some of us may wonder how !hi! can be an answer to the Question posed.
Locke, of course, makes two assumptions here. First, he,assumes the
validity of his early claim, i.e., the claim that each man can legitim-
ately appropriate a part of the co~non land by mixing his labour with
that part (provided that he takes good care of it and does not spoil
its produce). Secondly, he assumes that men are motivated to produce
cash crops by appropriating distinct portions of the common land.
Given their economic motivation, they are likely to convert "the
community of land" into "the property of labour". They are likely to
enclose "an Acre of Land", produce "Twenty Bushels of Wheat", and sell
the wheat to the rest of mankind so that the whole of mankind will also
receive a "Benefit" (43). Locke does not go as far as to claim that
private ownership of land develops because its agricultural products
bring cash to its owners, and those owners want to be rich. He makes
a slightly more decent claim that each private appropriator of land
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can benefit himself as much as he can benefit the rest of mankind
(by a commercial exchange).
Locke's claims about "value", "labour", and "property" in
sects. 40-43 are causal claims rather than justificatory claims.
He tries to explain how "the communic.y of land" diminishes, and how
"the property of labour" Increases to "over-ballance" the former.
He specifically refers to the 17th-century English situation in sects.
40-43. "The Community of Land" (40) is the common land in England
which was growing small as a result of appropriation. This
"community of land" is presumably the left-over from the land which
God originally gave to mankind in common. It is significant that Locke
does not hesitate to insert a few paragraphs about the 17th-century
English situation, immediately after he has completed his account of
appropriation in the beginning of the world (39). He casually inserts
sects. 40-43 into his story of the pre-political state of property, by
writing one sentence ("Nor is it so strange, •••, the Property of
labour should be able to over-ballance the Community of Land" (40».
Th ls clearly shows that it is not important for Locke to distinguish
the development of appropriation in a specific 17th-century political
society frem the development of appropriation in the pre-political
state of nature (which succeeds the first ages of the world). Locke's
obscure blend of the past and the present, and the political and the
pre-political, finds its clearest expression in sects. 40-43.
Elsewhere in Chap. 5, Locke adds that the progressive
appropriation of land by "labour" "does not lessen but increase the
common stock of mankind" (3n, assllming that an export of agricultural
products spreads the benefits of private appropriation to the rest of
mankind. This, we can say, is a justificato~y claim for the expansion
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of property in the aggregate sense.
What about the individual expansion of property? Each man,
according to Locke, can legitimately expand his property by labouring,
exchanging goods voluntarily, and using money. The "expansion of
property", in fact, is my expressiono Locke prefers to speak of
"enlarging" one's "possessions" (46, 48, 49)0 In Chap. 5 he hardly
dinstinguishes "possessions" in the sense of the material goods which
a man enjoys as a matter of fact, from "property" in the sense of the
material goods which a man has an exclusive right of disposal. Within
his informal story, all subtle distinctions, especially the distinction
between facts and rights, collapse. He largely transforms the
supposedly juridical category of property into an economic category of
material possessions. This transformation is conspicuous when Locke deals
with the expansion of a man's "property", or the enlargement of his
possessions.
The expansion of a man's property, in Locke's view, was
chiefly caused by the use of money. This expansion happened at the time
when commercial economy took over the primitive economy of hunters and
gatherers. At this stage of economic development, each man could
legitimately expand his goods as long as "nothing perished uselesly[sic J
in his hands" (46). By bartering the easily perishable plumb which
a man gathered for the nuts which would last for a year, he "did no
injury; he wasted not the common Stock; destroyed no part of the
portion of Goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished
uselesly in his hands" (46). Similarly, if he exchanged his nuts for the
more durable goods such as "a piece of Metal", or "a Diamond", and kept
them all his life, he did not invade the right of others; he could
"heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased" (46). For
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"the exceeding of the bounds of his just Property [does] not [lie] in the
largeness of his Possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly
[sic 1 in it" (46).
Each man, in the beginning of the world, had a property in the
"things really useful to the Life of Man", the things which "are generally
things of short duration" (46). But there are other things which men
used at the stage of commercial development. "Fancy or Agreement ...
put the Value on" them "more then real Use, and the necessary Support
of Life" (46). Gold, silver, ar.:ldiamonds belong to this category of
things, and by putting the imaginary value on gold and silver men
"tacitly agree[d] in the use of Money" (50). By giving tacit consent to
the use of money, however, men also agreed to accept the consequence
nf the use of money: namely, the "disproportionate and unequal Possession
of the Earth" and elich man's possession of land beyond the limit of his
actual use of its products. Locke states:
[I]t is plain, Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal
Possession of the Earth, they having by a tacit and voluntary
consent found out a way, how a man may fairly possess more land
than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange
for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be hoarded up
without injury to anyone (50).
Locke's account of the unequal distribution of land in the pre-political
state is causal as well as justificatory., First, men tacitly agreed to
use money; hence, they legitimized the use of money. Secondly, they
enlarged their possessions by means of money. I shall elaborate the
two sides of his account, bu taking up the causal claim first.
As "different degrees of Industry were apt to give Men Possessions
in different Proportions, so this Invention of Money gave them the
opportunity to continue and enlarge them" (48). What kind of
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"opportunity" is this? Locke's answer, in short, is this: money
gave men the opportunity to engage in commerce, i.e., buying and
selling. Once this opportunity was given, some men appropriated more
land to produce more on their land, and to exchange their surplus
for money (gold and silver). Locke says:
Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and
so valuable to be hoarded up, there Men will not be apt to
enlarge their Possessions of Land ••• What would a Man value
Ten Thousand, or a Hundred Thousand Acres of excellent Land,
ready cultivated, and well stocked too with cattle, in ~
middle of the in-land Parts of America, where he had no hopes
of Commerce with other Parts of the World, to draw Money
to him by the Sale of the Product? It would not be worth
the inclosing, and we should see him give up again to the
wild Common of Nature (48).
To understand Locke's view of the relationship between the appropriation
of land and commerce, we must remember that the world he describes
in the above passage is the prototype of the 17th-century English world
where commercial agricul.ture and manufacturing thrived within the unit
of privately-owned land. His observation of 17th-century English
economy is relevant here. In Some Considerations, he describes what
goes on in some parts of England where "thriving manufactures have
erected themselves":
lTlhe land thereabout being already possessed by ••• industrious
and thriving men, they have neither need, nor will, to sell
[their landJ. In such places of manufacture, the riches of the
one not arising from the squandering and waste of another,
(as it doth in other places, where men live lazily upon the
product of the land) the industry of the people, bringing in
increase of wealth from remote parts, makes plently of money
there, without the impoverishing of their neighbours. (~,
V, 39.)
Given this model of "industrious and thriving men", it is not surprising
that Locke says that men in his pre-political world enlarged their
landed property by engaging in commerce. To put it another way, Locke
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is alluding to those "industrious and thriving men" of 17th-century
England, when he says that pre-political men "found out a way, how
a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product
of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver" (ST, 50).
Let us look at the justificatory side of Locke's account of the
unequal possessions of men. He lays down the following sequence of
events. First, each man acquired a small portion of land by his honest
labour for his use (and his family)o Secondly, men tacitly agreed to use
money as the measure of commerce. Thirdly, they engaged in a free
competition to raise the sale of their products. Fourthly, some men
with entrepreneural spirits expanded their landed property and raised
the sale of their products in order to accumulate money (gold and
silver). Other lazy loafers did not try to expand their land for the
purpose of commerce. The consequence of these events is the unequal
possessions of the earth among meno But since they have agreed to
use money, they have also agreed to its consequence. The process
leading up to the unequal possessions is "fair", and no robbery is
committed in this process.
Some might object that the accumulation of money (gold and silver)
in this sequence of events "injured" other men. Locke anticipates
this objection, and says that it did not injure other men since gold and
silver are the "metalls not spoileing or decaying in the hands of the
possessor" (50). If a man kept "a sparkling Pebble or a Diamond" "all
his Life", he "invaded not the Right of others"o He could legitimately
- -
"heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased" because these
durable things did not perish uselessly in his hands (46). This part
of Locke's story is very loose, and we cannot make it intelligible
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unless we first detect his confusion. Since Macpherson has recently
complicated this part of Locke's story, our situation is doubly
complicated. Here I shall show how Locke himself complicated his story.
He confusedly associates "injury" with the physical durability, or
non-perishability, of things. He mistakenly thinks that if a man
possesses durable goods, then for some mysterious reason he can possess
a large quantity of them without injuring other men. This is sheer
confusion on Locke's part. As we have seen, he states that whether
a man exceeds "the bounds of his just Property" or not depends on
"the perishing of any thing uselesly [sic]" in his hands. By stating this
principle, Locke conflates two entirely distinct ideas, the idea of
injury-free exchange and the idea of physical durability. Let us
recall his remark on the possession of a large quantity of "nuts".
The man who acquired a large quantity of nuts by a fair exchange "did
no injury; he wasted not the common Stock" or goods (46). Locke,
therefore, should say that no injury was committed in this act of
exchange, and no part of the common stock of privately-owned goods
was wasted. But he immediately twists this idea by making an
additional point that nobody was injured "so long as nothing
perished uselesly in his hands" (46). Yet whether a good is physically
perishable or durable is irrelevant to the idea of injuring (or not
injuring) another man. I have noted that "injury", in Locke's flexible
and informal sense, is a serious restriction on the freedom of others.
If we use "injury" in this sense, it is plain that a man can injure
-other men by "hoarding up" money. He can injure others, for instance,
by monopolizing gold and silver though gold and silver would not perish
in the hands of the monopolizer in the physical sense of "perish".
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As a mercantilist economist, Locke himself argued against a monopoly
of money supply in 17th-century England: if "bankers and scriveners,
and other such expert brokers" gain a monopoly over the supply of money,
then the rate of interest should be legally regulated to prevent the
"extorion and oppression" by monopolists (Some Considerations, Works,
V, 64; also, 5 & 8). In Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise, Locke does
not discuss any monopoly situation. But my point is that if a
monopoly injures other men, then a man's act of "hoarding" money
can injure them in spite of its physical durability. We cannot
clarify the idea of "injury" by examining the physical property of an
object (whether it can be easily damaged or not), just as we cannot
clarify the concept of "property" by examining the physical property
of an object. "Injury" is a matter of one man's relation to another,
though it may also involve physical objects. Locke should have specified
the cases where money "perishes uselessly" in a ~-physical sense.
What Locke says about the relationship of "hoarding" and "injury"
is entirely unsatisfactory. But as far as his story goes, nobody in the
commercial stage of the state of nature was able to accumulate gold and
silver to the extent that he could cause injury to other men (in the
sense of restricting their freedom seriously). Though Locke says that
each man "might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased"
(46), this has little to do with his supposed defence of the unlimited
accumulation of gold and silver. There is even a humorous tone in the
way he speaks about "heaping up" or "hoarding" gold and silver. The
main point he wants to make is that men legitimately expanded ~
landed propertl by using the legitimate means of commerce. In making
this~~in point, he also used the irrelevant and false notion that
non-perishable goods cannot injure other men.
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We now come to the very end of Locke's story of appropriation:
the settlement of property. Toward the end of Chap. 5, he adds
remarks to'show how men settled their properties. Territorial
boundaries were settled between communities, or states, or kingdoms by
"positive agreement". Within each community, individual men settled
their properties by means of positive laws. Since men form a community
(or a society) by a compact, we can say that their properties were
"settled" by that original compact. Locke himself states:
several Communities settled the Bounds of their distinct
Terriroties, and by Laws within themselves, regulated the
Properties of the private Men of their Society, and so by
Compact and Agreement, settled the Property which Labour
and Industry began (45).
Once men form a society or a community, and set up government, "the
Laws regulate the right of property, and the possession o.f land is
determined by Po.sitive co.nstitutions" (50). Thus to'settle men's
properties legitimately means to'form a Po.litical so.ciety which
regulates their pro.perties by Po.sitive laws.
This is the end o.f Lo.cke's acco.unt of appro.priatio.n. We have
seen ho.w he acco.unts fo.r the beginning, expansion, and settlement of
property; and ho.W he solves the co.mpo.undpro.blem o.f men's de jure
and de facto mode o.f converting the original community into. the proto-
17th-century world of property. I should like to'conclude my
exposition of Locke's acco.unt of appro.priatio.n by adding twO.
consideratio.ns.
First, I should like to'nota that though Lo.cke does no.t mention
"inheritance" in his acco.unt o.fappro.priatio.n, every child o.fa family
has a natural right to inherit a portion of his father's (or his
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parents') possessions (£I, 88-91, 93; ST, 190). This is not a child's
right to inherit the whole of his father's (or his parents') possessions,
but a child's right to (at least) a portion of them. Locke's point about
the natural right of inheritance is that all children of a family have
"a Title, to share in the ~roperty of their Parents [or their father],
and a Right to Inherit their Possessions" <!!" 88}. This right is
based on every child's "Right to be nourish'd and maintained by their
Parents" (89). The natural right of inheritance is worth mentioning here
for two reasons. First, Locke apparently does not encourage men to rely
on their inherited possessions. He encourages men to ~ppropriate land
and other goods from scratch. Presumably, he also expects each child
to be an independent appropriator who does not rely on his inherited
possessions. This view is consistent with the fact that Locke's natural
right of inheritance only guarantees the subsistence of every child.
Secondly, however, appropriators who expand their possessions have
certainly inherited their possessions in the first place. Locke takes
this for granted, and does not even mention it in Chap. 5. "Justice",
he says, "gives every Man a Title to the product of his honest
Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him"
(.IT, 42, emphasis added). Locke also wrote: "men thriving and getting
- -
money, by their industry" are "willing to leave their estates to their
children in land, as the surest and most lasting provision" (~
Considerations, Works, V, 39). Thus his account of appropriation is
consistent with the natural right t~ inherit the large possessions of
ancestors.
Secondly, I should like to clarify what appears to be Locke's
ambiguous claim that"in Governments the Laws regulate the right of
property, and possession of land is determined by positive constitutions"
(~, 51). I have quoted this claim without explanation. But recent
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commentators have interpreted it in divergent ways, and Locke's meaning
is not immediately clearo11 I shall try to clarify what he means in
some detail. Locke means the following: the legislative agent of a
political society has a power to make laws, in order to coordinate
the manners by which one member of that political society can transfer
his property to another member without doing violence to the unity or
the well-being of the whole society. The "regulation" of property (3,
45, 50, 120, 129, 139) does not mean a legislator's power to ~distribute
property according to h~ will (or according to the will of the majority
of the people)o It means a legislator's power to establish the
violence-free, regular modes of transfer which are beneficial to
individual property-owners and the whole society. Such regulation or
coordination is required for "the preservation of himself G..e., each
member of the society] and the rest of that Society" (129), or "the
good of the Society" (131). In the 1667 draft essay on toleration,
Locke says: "the magistrate, having a power of transferring properties
from one man to another, may establish any [mode of transfer, provided
that] they be universal, equal and without violence, and suited to the
interest and welfare of that society" (Bourne, ~, I, 183)0 In
other words, the magistrate's power to "regulate" "property" is the
power to prevent the collisions of the actions of property-owners,
and to sustain the unity and well-being of the whole society.
Three of his references to the "regulation" of property in the
Second Treatise indicate that Locke is concerned about the territorial
integrity of a commonwealth, or a political society (45, SO, 120).
In 17th-century England, land was an exchangeable commodity, and foreigners
purchased land, (See Some Considerations, ~, V, 63, for Locke's
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discussion of the price of land and foreigners' purchase of land.)
An unrestricted commercial exchange of land would create enclaves
in the territory of a political societyo Besides this concern with
the territorial integrity, however, Locke has a more general concern
when he speaks of the "regulation" or propertyo His general concern is
with the smooth functioning of a commercial society. Locke has no
intention to argue that the legislative agent of a political society ought
to restrict the voluntary exchange of property owners according to a
deliberate plano The "regulation" of the transfer of property does
involve a certain amount of coercion, but this coercion should be
minimal. This point is important because it shows that Locke's talk
about the "regulation" of property is essentially the regulation for the
sake of the smooth function of a commercial society of property owners.
He has an economic argument that given men's economic motive, the contr-
ivance of a law is generally ineffective to control their voluntary
exchange of goods: "it is impossible [Leo, ineffective or impractical]
to make a law, that shall hinder a man from giving away his money or
estate to whom he pleases" (Some Considerations, ~, V, 5). He also
has an argument from the negative character of a law, or the negative
concept of justice: The legislator "cannot in justice prescribe me
rules of preserving my health" or "cannot compel me to buy a house"
(1667 essay on toleration, Bourne, ~, I, 177)0 "No man can be
forced to be rich or healthful, whether he will or no", by "an express
law" of the magistrate (A Letter concerning Toleration, ~, VI, 23)0
In PART 2 of this chapter, I shall discuss Locke's negative concept of
justiceo Here it is sufficient to note that the "regulation" of
property is designed to facilitate the economic function of the society
of property-ownerso
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In the Second Treatise, Locke indicates that the laws which
"regulate" the transfer of property are the laws concerning
"Inheritance, Purchase" (120), or "Donation, Sale" (121)0 These
laws lay down the general conditions under which the transfer of
property should take place among the members of a given political
society. These laws, of course, presuppose that the members already
have property. Hence, Locke's remark that the "possession of land"
is "determined" by "positive constitutions" must be understood in
the following sense: the general conditions for the transfer of
land are laid down in positive laws. Locke's choice of the word
"determine" is unfortunate, because it suggests that positive laws
determine what goods (or what pieces of land) men should own. This
is not his idea. The ownership of land is not to be determined
(or changed) by positive laws. What is determined is the conflict-
free mode of transfer beneficial to all members of a particular
society. It would be ludicrous if Locke had maintained that positive
laws can create a new pattern of ownership, regardless of the pre-
existing natural modes of appropriation. Locke is not a fool who
willingly loses the fruit of his intellectual labour. He would
refuse to "spoil" the product of his intellectual "endeavour" - his
"endeavour" to show how men might come to have a property in distinct
portions of the pre-political world.
I have discussed the "regulation" of property at length,
because Locke's cursory treatment of it has caused interpretive
disputes among commentators. Some commentators have transformed
Locke into the fool I have mentioned above, or they have assumed
12that he was a fool. But the state, as a regulator of the transfer
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of property, resembles a traffic controller. A traffic controller
does not have a right to take away the automobiles which private men
already own and drive, yet he has a right to "regulate" the traffic
for the benefit of all automobile owners and drivers. The traffic
controlle~ in principle, should give maximum freedom to those who own
and drIve automobiles. The private owners of automobiles have a right
to decide where to go, whereas the controller has a right to regulate
the movement of men and their automobiles with a minimal degree of
coercion. He regulates the free traffic of men and goods by
eliminating collisions, accidents, and quarrels. This is Locke's
view of the state in a nutshell. It is precisely because the
"regulation" of (the voluntary transfer of) property is minimal that
the "regulation" is compatible with the "preservation" of property.
At the very beginning of the Second Treatise, Locke states the
following: "Political Power" is "a Right of making Laws" "for
the Regulating and Preserving of Property" (3; emphasis added).
1. 3 Locke's Purpose; or the Point of his Account of Appropriation
My detailed, analytical exposition of Locke's account of
appropriation has shown what is ~ his account, or what it is
about. But we have yet to grasp what it is for. Why did Locke
write the famous Chap. 51 More specifically, why did he try to solve
the compound problem about the conversion of the original community
into the proto-17th-century world of property? To answer this
question, we must go beyond what Locke says in Chap. 5. I suggested
earlier (at the outset of PART 1) that Locke's purpose was to
protect men's properties by positive laws against the a~bitrary
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exercise of the supreme power of the state. This is the short
answer I have given to the question why he wrote his account of
appropriation. In what follows, I shall defend and elaborate this
short answer.
Some might think that this answer is so obvious that it hardly
requires a defence. Yet many scholars and philosophers do not take
this answer to be trueo They are, in my view, what Locke calls
"Quarrelsom and Contentious" people (ST, 34). There .is, in fact,
"little room for Quarrels or Contentions~ about the point of Locke's
account of appropriationo But we must labour to grasp the mythical
features of his account. Then we can apply the proper method of
understanding a myth whic~ L~vi-Strauss has recently advocated. We
cannot understand a myth, he says, by reading it "from left to right"
"as we read a novel or a newspaper article" 0 We must read a myth as
if we would read "an orchestral score", i.eo, by reading it "as a
totality". We must be aware that "something which was written on
the first stave at the top of the page acquires meaning only if one
considers that it is part and parcel of what is written below on the
second stave". In short, we must read a myth not only from left to
" b " 13right, but vertically, from top to ottom. This is a valuable
technique we can use to understand the point of Locke's account of
appropriation. Since it is written in English, I shall not try to
read it from top to bottom (in the literal sense of "top to bottom",
as when we read Japanese or Chinese). But I shall, and we must,
read Locke's account backward as well as forward. The point of his
account of the beginning of property becomes clear only if we read his
account of the expansion of property; the point of his account of
the expansion of property becomes clear only if we read his account
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of the settlement of property; and the whole point of Chap. 5 becomes
clear only if we read the rest of the Second Treatise.
I shall clarify the point of Locke's account of appropriation
by moving back and forth within a large, hermeneutic circle. I shall
move (1) from the Second Treatise to the broader, 17th-century context;
(2) from Chap. 5 toward the end of the book; (3) from the end of the
book back to Chap. 5; and (4) within Chap. 5. These movements are
designed to clarify (1) the point of the natural right of propertYI
and natural rights in general; (2) the use Locke makes of his account
of appropriation; (3) the claim he needs to establish within Chap, 5.
and his oblique method of establishing it; and (4) the possibility of
the "internal" apprehension of his myth of appropriation. The whole
hermeneutic circle will establish, and elaborate, my claim that Locke
wrote his account of appropriation in order to defend men's properties
against the arbitrary power of the state,
(1) We can lose sight of the point of Locke's account of appropriation
because it is a self-contained account. We can also lose sight of the
point of the Second Treatise, because each of its chapters deals with
14a distinct and separate problem. Leaving aside subtle exegetical
problems, we must grasp the fundamental point of the 17th-century discourse
on property. Locke, as well as other 17th-century theorists, tried to
determine the normative relationship between the supreme power of the
state and the possessions of private citizens. Locke is not at all
interested in the property of an "Indian", He wrote his account of appro-
priation as a devi~. It is a device, or a weapon,against those who have
the supreme power of the state,
If Locke had merely wanted to argue that one man's possessions
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must be effectively' protected against his fellow-citizens, then he would
not have had to show that men legitimately acquired their possessions
in the state of nature. Hobbes claimed that every citizen has a right
over his possessions which excludes his fellow-citizens. But at
the same time he maintained that an absolute sovereign (one man or
an assembly) has a right to take any citizen's possessions
arbitrarily. For Hobbes, each man's "property" is created by a
sovereign arbitrarily, and it is protected by the absolute power
of a sovereign against the invasion of his fellow-citizens. In
Hobbes' commonwealth, each man's "property" is not at all protected
against the will and power of the sovereign himself. (See Leviathan,
XXIV, pp. 296f.; De Cive, XII, 7, et passimo) The point of
showing the pre-political origin of property, in the context of
17th-century political theories, is to limit the arbitrary power
of the state. Hobbes knew very well the doctrine of the proponents
of the "natural" right of property. In De Cive, he labelled their
doctrine "the seventh Doctrine opposite to Government". This is the
doctrine that each citizen has "such a propriety as excludes not
only the right of all the rest of his fellow subjects to the same
goods, but also of the Magistrate himself" (De Cive, XII, 7).
Hobbes illustrates this doctrine:
we are equall (say they) by nature; there is no reason why
any man should by better Right take my goods from me, then
I his from him; we know that mony [sic1 sometimes is
needfull for the defence and maintenance of the.publique;
but let them, who require it, shew us the present necessity,
and they shall willingly receive it (De Cive, XII, 7).
Hobbes' illustration of his opponents' doctrine refers to the issue of
taxation. But the crucial point is that the "natural" right of
property can shift the burden of justification, in any matter
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concerning property, to those who have the supreme power. If we have
the "natural" right of property, then we can "let them" justify the
- -
way they handle our pro~erty. From Hobbes' viewpoint, this doctrine
is false. He poses a challenge to his opponents: "Tell me '.0 how
gottest thou this propriety but from the Magistrate? thy Dominion
••• and Propriety, is just so much as he will, and shall last so long
as he pleases". It is the same with "a Family" where "each Son hath
such proper goods, and so long lasting, as seeme (sic.l good to the
Father" (De Cive, XII, 7). Those who say "let them, who require it,
shew us the present necessity, and they shall willingly receive it"
do not know that their properties are "already done from the beginning
in the very constitution of Government" (ibid.).
Hobbes' comment on the seventh doctrine against (absolute)
government highlights the point of the natural or pre-political origin
of property. As I said, the point is to limit the arbitrary power of
the state. Though Locke did not write Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise
to refute the specific claim Hobbes made in De Cive, we can illustrate
the point of Chap. 5 by referring to Hobbes' comment on the seventh
doctrine. Hobbes holds that the magistrate, or the sovereign, creates
men's properties arbitrarily. On this ground, he claims that each
man has a right of property which excludes other fellow-citizens,
while the magistrate himself can do anything with the citizens'
properties. Locke's account of appropriation, on the other hand, meets
the kind of challenge which Hobbes posed, Le., "how thy gottest
this propriety but from the magistrate"? Locke shows how "Men might
come to have a property in several parts of that which God to
mankind in common", before political societies were founded.
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Then he uses his account of pre-political appropriation to limit the
arbitrary power of the supreme, legislative agent of a commonwealth.
We shall shortly see how Locke uses his account of appropriation
to establish claims against the arbitrary power of the state. But to
facilitate the task, I shall remove one obstacle. The point of the
17th-century discourse on natural rights has been misunderstood, or
misrepresented, by popular writers. Two misunderstandings, or misrepre-
sentations, must be removed if we are to explore the relationship
between Locke's account of appropriation and his claims against the
arbitrary power of the state. First, natural rights are £2! inalienable,
according to Locke and other 17th-century theoriests of natural rights.
Jefferson, Adams et al. gave an ill-chosen, popular, and confused
expression to natural rights in the American Declaration of Independence:
"unalienable rights" (or "inherent and inalienable" rights ).15
Commentators on Locke often fall victim to a loose association of ideas,
and try to understand his concept of "natural rights" as "inalienable
. 16nghts" of one kind or another. But the inalienability of rights
is not an essential feature of Locke's concept of natural rights. Locke
himself casually speaks of each man as "giving up" his natural right
(or his natural power), and "divesting" himself of natural liberty.
Every man in the state of nature, he says, has a right (or a power)
to punish criminals. He "wholly gives up" "the Power of punishing"
when he agrees with other men to form a society (ST, 130, 128).
Every man also has a natural power to dispose of his person and his
goods as he thinks fit, within the bounds of the law of nature. But
when he enters into a society, he partially "gives up" this power
"to be regulated by Laws made by the Society, so far forth as the
preservation of himself, and the rest of that Society shall require"(129).
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(Here as well as elsewhere, Locke takes a natural right to be a species
17of power. ) These quotations make it apparent that it is wrongheaded
to treat Locke's concept of natural rights as "inalienable" (or
"unalienable") rights.
Secondly, there is another misrepresentation of the concept
of "natural rights" which is due to Bentham, and his positivist followers
such as Margaret Macdonaldo They ciriticized the concept of natural
rights by reading the French Declarati~n of the Rights of Man and of
Citizens, and other historical documents. But they cri·ticized it
without studying 17th-century theoretical writings. Consequently, they
propogated the false view that a discourse on natural rights is a
roundabout way of saying that there ought to be certain rights, though
those rights actually do not exist.l8 Those positivists were not at
all interested in understanding the past; they wanted to be polemical.
Bentham represented proponents of natural rights as conflating the
existence of rights and the reason or wish for having rights, and rep-
resented them as committing "anarchical fallacies". This representation
may have something to do with certain 18th-century Frenchmen. But his
remarks are largely irrelevant to 17th-century theorists of natural
rights. It is certainly false to say that when Locke and others claimed
that every man has natural rights, they simply meant that every man
ought to have those rights though nobody actually has those rights.
Despite a certain amount of obscurity which surrounds the
17th-century discourse on natural rights, there is one point which is
clear. Claims about natural rights are not claims about the
inalienability of rights; nor about anarchy; nor about the ideal
existence of rightso They are about the limits of the arbitrary power
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of another agent. The point of 17th-century "natural rights" is to
make another agent's power dependent on the agreement, or consent,
.. f h "An h " h . 1or perm1ss10n 0 eac man. ot er agent ere 1nc udes the state,
or a member of those who hold the supreme power of the state. To say
that a man has a natural right over X generally means two things for
17th-century theorists. (1 am simplifying the 17th-century discourse
a great deal at this point. There are different kinds of natural
rights, perfect and imperfect, exclusive and common, etc.) First,
it means that each man can do what he wills with X without obtaining
permission from another man. With the exception of Hobbes, theorists
put constraints on what each man is allowed to do. Locke says: each
man can do what he wills with himself and his possessions "within the
bounds of the Law of Nature" (g, 4). But both Locke and Hobbes agree
that each man can do what he decides to do "without asking leave, or
depending upon the Will of any other Man" (4). Hence, elaims about
a man's natural right are claims against the subordination of the
will of one man to the will of another. Secondly, if a man has a natural
right over X, then no other man can legitimately have, or use, or take
X without his prior consent or agreement. In other words, a man can
transfer his natural right only if he agrees to do so. The holder
(or owner) of a natural right is a master, whereas other men are
servants who must ask if they can have, or use, or take his natural
right (or the objects of his right). Any agent (including the state)
who wishes to have, or use, or take, the objects of my natural right
must present the evidence that I have given him the agreement or
permission that he may have, or use, or take them. Here again the
point of natural rights is to establish claims against the subordination
of the will of one man to the will of another.
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It is clear from the foregoing exposition that the point of
natural rights can be best captured if we use the owner of property
as a paradigm of the holder of natural rightso This is why Locke prefers
to use the word "property" to signify natural rights in generalo This
also explains why Grotius identified "a right" in the proper and
strict sense (i.e., "a faculty") with what civilians used to call ~
or one's own (De Jure Belli, 1, 1, 5). In Hobbes' case, a natural
"right" to all things (including another man's body) is not a right
in any proper sense of the word. It is hardly distinguishable from
the absence of a righto This is why he can defend the absolute and
arbitrary power of a sovereign. Hobbes' theory of natural "rights"
makes it difficult for us to understand the point of the 17th-century
discourse on natural rights. If we look at Hobbes alone, we cannot
say that the point of natural rights is to limit the arbitrary power
of another agent. Hobbes' "right" is almost an arbitrary power; and
he does defend the arbitrary power of a sovereign. Nevertheless, even
his theory of natural "rights" is potentially subversive to those who
wish to exercise power arbitrarilyo This is what Robert Filmer clearly
detected in Hobbes' writingso In his "Observations on Hr. Hobbes's
Leviathan", Filmer praised Hobbes for reaching right conclusions,
and complained about his "foundations". Filmer said: "I consent
with him about the rights of exercising government, but I cannot agree
to his means of acquiring itno When Filmer discussed Hobbes' doctrine
of a right of self-defence and resistance, he unfolded its implications
and treated it as "destructive to all government".19 Filmer's
abhorrence to any theory of natural rights (Hobbes', Grotius', and others')
is the clearest indication that the point of the 17th-century discourse
on natural rights is to limit the arbitrary power of another agent,
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especially the supreme agent of a commonwealth. Filmer stated the
following: the "Natural Freedom of Mankind" is "a New, Plausible and
Dangerous Opinion" (Ch. I. Patriarcha). I shall not enlarge any more
on the point of natural rights. But I should like to quote Locke's
own statement that if a man has a natural right or liberty, then no
agent can legitimately rule him without his own prior consent:
Men being, as •••, by Nature, all free, equal and independent,
no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the
Political Power of another, without his own Consent. The only
way whereby anyone divests himself of his Natural Liberty,
and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with
other Men to joyn and unite into a Community (ST, 95).
(2) I have removed two of our deeply entrenched and misguided
approaches to the 17th-century discourse on natural rights, I have
also stated the general point of the 17th-century discourse on natural
rights (in the proper sense of "rights" rather than in the improper,
Hobbsian sense of "a right to all things"). I shall now discuss the
specific manner in which Locke ~ his account of appropriation to
limit the supreme power of a commonwealth. Our question is how he
connects Chap. 5 ("Of Property") with Chap. 11 ("Of the Extent of the
Legislative Power"). The sequel to his story of pre-political
appropriation is the following: The economically developed state of
nature becomes a "very unsafe, very unsecure" place. It becomes
"full of fears and continual dangers" (ST, 123). To be sure, every
man has an exclusive right of disposal over "his own Person and
[expanded] possessions". He "hath such a right". "(Y]et the
Enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the
Invasion of others" (123). Why is the state of nature so insecure
and uncertain now? Locke answers: "the greater part [of mankind are]
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no strict Observers of Equity and Justice" (123). He rephrases this
answer as follows: "the pravity of mankind" is "such, that they had
rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men's labours than
take pains to provide for themselves" (A Letter concerning Toleration,
Works, VI, 42). Locke's characteristic legalism and moralism prevent. him
from stating any socio-economic cause of the "pravity of mankind".
The socio-economic causes are the expansion of unequal possessions,
and the scarcity of unappropriated resources introduced by the use
of money. The portion which man "carves" can no longer be "easily
seen"; men in overcrowded parts of the earth collide with each other,
and begin to invade one another's demarcated territory. What could not
happen in the primitive golden age of appropriation tends to happen:
"controversie about the Title" and the "incroachment of the Right of
others" (51). A commonwealth, and a government, are established as
an effective remedy for this controversy-ridden and economically-developed
state of nature. Locke says:
The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into
Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government,
is the Preservation of their Property [i.e., their Lives,
Liberties and Estates] (124).
The statement quoted above is all too famous. Many would
regard it as "the locus classicus for Locke's view" of the relationship
between property and government, as Peter Laslett says (note to~, 124).
Hence, most commentators stop their expositions at this point. This
is a mistake. For one thing, the quoted sentence' is almost certainly a
copy of Cicero's sentence in De Officiis.20 As such, it is not distinc-
tively Lockean, though unlike Cicero, Locke clearly indicates that
what is a man's own, or ~, or his property, consists not only of
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his estate but of his life and liberty. But more significantly, the
quoted passage says nothing about the limits· of the supreme power
of a commonwealth.
To move beyond Locke's statement about the "chief end",
we must pay special attention to the distinction which he draws
between "government" and "society" (or "community" or "commonwealth").
Unfortunately, he does not explicitly draw this distinction until he
comes to Chap. 10 of the Second Treatise ("Of the Forms of a Common-
wealth"). In the earlier chapters, Locke uses the idea of "a political
society", i.e., the idea of a society under government: or else, he
uses the term "community" or "society" without sharply distinguishing
it from "government" (e.g., "Men have so consented to make one
Community or Government" (95». But in Chap. 10, Locke draws a 'sharp
distinction between "government" on the one hand, and "society" or
"community" or "commonwealth" on the other hand. In Chap. 10, Locke
states that "the Form of Government" (e.g., a perfect democracy,
oligarchy, monarchy, etc.) depends on who (or what group of men, or
what section of the community) holds the "Supreme Power" or "the
Legislative Power" (132). A particular form of government is determined
by the "Majority" of the "Community" (132). The two terms "society"
and "community" are synonymous, and according to one remark Locke has
made (in ll, 133), "community" and "commonwealth" are also synonymous.
"By Common-wealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a
Democracy, or any Form of Government, but any Independent Community"(133).
The distinction between "government" and "community" (or its
equivalent) is designed to capture a more basic distinction between
the "supreme" or "legislative" agent and the "community" (or its
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ecpivalent). The "community" is superior to the "supreme" agent of
a commonwealth, i.e., the legislative agent, or the magistrate. The
"Community" may "dispose of it Ci.eo, the Legislative Power] again anew
into what hands they please, and 50 constitute a new Form of Government"
(132). The "Legislative" is "only a Fiduciary Power to act" for "the
trust reposed in them" by the community, or the "people" (149). As
it is clear from this, the distinction between "government" or the
"legislative" on the one hand, and "society", "community", "commonwealth",
or the "people" on the other hand, is a device to limit the "supreme"
power which may be arbitrarily exercised. The distinction is emphasized
again in Chap. 19 where Locke discusses the people's right of
"revolution", i.e., their right to alter the established legislative
agent. A similar distinction was used by Pufendorf and George Lawson
who tried to limit the power of the magistrateo21
Locke's Ciceronian statement about "the great and chief end"
concerns a two-stage process of forming "commonwealths" and "government".
First, men "unite themselves" into commonwealths, or communities, or
societies, for the effective protection of their rights. Secondly,
they "put themselves" under "government" for the effective protection
of their rights. If men unite themselves into a commonwealth and
put themselves under government, then they have formed "a political
society", i.e., a society under government. I shall first describe
Locke's account of the generation of a commonwealth (or a society, or
a communi ty )•
Each man agrees with others to form a commonwealth, or a
community, or a society. This union is accomplished by each man's
"own Consent" (95), or his "original Compact" (97), or the "original
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Agreement" (243). This is an agreement to "joyn and unite into a
Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst
another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties" (95). Each man
"gives up" his natural power of punishment to this newly formed
collective body. He "resignls] it up into the hands of the Community"
(87); he "resign[s1 it to the publick" (89); or he "give(s1 Ut] up
••• into the hands of the Society" (131). As we have already seen,
each man also gives up a minimal degree of his natural power to
dispose of his person and goods so that "uhe preservation of himself"
becomes compatible with the "preservation" or the "good" of "the Society"
(129, 131). Since the whole society is formed for the chief purpose
of the preservation of each man's rights rather than the regulation
of his rights, each man must give up only a minimal degree of his
natural power of disposal. Locke makes it abundantly clear that the
"societ,y", or the "community", or the "commonwealth", is a collective
body. It has a will of its own, which Locke identifies with "the
will and determination of the majority" of its members (96). It has
its own "Power to Act as one Body" (96), which is nothing "but the
joynt power of every Member of the Society" (135). The "judgments
of the Commonwealth ••• indeed are his own [i.e., each member's
Locke frequently speaks of the "will" andown] Judgements" (88).
"act" of one society (151, 157, 158, et passim). Everyone who has
joined this collective body is understood to have consented to the rule
of the majority, or "the greater force" of that body (96). Once every
individual has transferred his natural power of punishment to this
collective body, it "can never revert to the Individuals again, as long
as the Society lasts" (243).
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Kendall, Macpherson, and others have used a crude label
"collectivism" to designate Locke's account of the "society", or his
account of the majority rule within the society.22 In so doing they
have understood nothing, and misunderstood everything. Locke is
performing a kind of dialectical trick here. He is doing to Hobbes
what Marx does to Hegel. Locke is turning Hobbes upside down. He is
presenting a very crude account of a collective, social agent in
order to defend its members' rights against the supreme agent of a
commonwealth. Locke dialectically transforms Hobbes' account of the
united strength of a commonwealth. It is fairly clear that his
dialectical transformation derives its inspiration from Pufendorf's
earlier attempt to turn Hobbes upside down. Locke's talk about one
body, one judgement, one will, and one act of "the society" is a faint
copy of Pufendorf's personification of civitas. Pufendorf himself took
over the idea of a personified civitas from Hobbes, when he criticized
Hobbes' account of the generation of a commonwealth.23 The point of
Locke's idea of the collective society becomes clear when he discusses
the right of "revolution", i.e., the right of changing an old, arbitrary
legislative agent. Locke needs one collective body to justify the
right of "revolution".
Locke says: "the Majority have a Right to act and conclude
the rest" (96). So we naturally ask if the majority have a right to
alter the existing distribution of rights and possessions among its
members according to their will. But obviously, the majority do ~
have any such right. The "society" is established for the purpose of
the "preservation" (and minimal "regulation") of the rights of its
members. The principle of the "act" of the society, i.e., the
majority-rule principle, is a means to this end. The majority "act"
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in order to establish a legislative agent whose obligation is to
preserve (and regulate) the rights of its members. Locke is E2!
a majoritarian democrat who justifies an alteration of the existing
distribution of rights by appealing to the will of the majorityo If
he were, he would be supporting "arbitrary" government - a government
of men by the will of the majority, rather than a government of laws
which protect the rights of the members of the whole society. Locke
is a constitutionalist who claims that the majority of the people
establish (or ought to establish) a government of laws as a means to
the chief end of preserving the existing distribution of rights.
Locke's "majority" is, of course, an idealized "majority" who want
to, and ought to, preserve the rights of all members of the society,
not the real and suffering majority of the 17th-century who did not
own land. His "revolution", as I already indicated, is not a social
revolution. It is merely a restoration.ofa legal order which preserves
everyone's right, or an act of revolving back from tyranny to the rule
24of law. Thus there is no room for interpretive disputes about the
role and obligation of Locke's collective "society". Its role is to
establish or remove a legislative agent, according to the will and
judgement of the (idealized) majority. Its obligation is to preserve
men's rights. To quote Locke's own words: "the society, or Legislative
constituted by them ••• is obliged to secure every ones Property
by providing against those three defects" of the state of nature;
namely, the lack of "establish'd standing Laws, promulgated and known
to the People", the lack of "indifferent and upright Judges", and the
lack of "the force of the Conununity" which backs up the sentences of
the judges (131; also, 124-6)0
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Locke's use of the idea of the "society" makes his political
theory complex. When he discusses the "extent" of the legislative
power of a commonwealth, he tries to determine the obligations of
the legislative agent of any commonwealth by reference to the whole
society in which men have their exclusive rights (or properties).
The legislative agent manages the affairs of the whole society rather
than the affairs of a particular section of the society, by handling
the relation of right-holders. This is why Locke defines "government"
as "the establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws" (Essay,
IV, iii, 18).
Locke stipulates four obligations for those who exercise the
supreme power of a commonwealth. First, the obligation to administer
justice. Secondly, the obligation to make and execute laws for the
good of the whole society. Thirdly, the obligation to obtain the
consent of the society in matters of taxation. Fourthly, the obligation
to hold the supreme power, unless the society or the people wish to
transfer it to any other hand. (These obligations, or "bounds", of
the legislative agent are summed up in ST, 142.) Of these obligations,
the first obligation to administer justice and the third obligation to
obtain the consent of the society for taxation are derived from the
"chief end" of men's "uniting themselves into a society". The second
obligation of the legislative agent, i.e., the obligation to act for
"the public good", is a general slogan which Locke derives from the
spirit of the law of nature, i.e., "the preservation of Mankind" (135).
It has little significance, apart from the preservation and minimal
regulation of the rights and possessions of private individuals
within the collective society. In what follows, we shall concentrate
on Locke's central claim about the extent of the legislative power -
his claim about the administration of justice.
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Locke's claim about the state's obligation to administer
justice is an antithesis to the view that the supreme agent has a
right to settle an interpersonal dispute of rights arbitrarily. Locke
says:
The Legislative, or Supream Authority, cannot assume to its
self a power to Rule by extemporary Arbitrary Decrees, but
is bound to dispense Justice, and decide the Rights of the
Subject by promulgated standing Laws. and known Authoris'd
Judges (136) 0
The legislative agent, and its inferior magistrates, ought to settle
any controversy over "the Rights of the Subject" publicly, regularly,
and impartially. The administration of justice presupposes that men
have "rights". It ought to serve the chief end of their uniting into
a society, i.e., the preservation of their rights or "properties".
Locke's claim about the administration of justice can be restated as
follows: the supreme agent of a commonwealth ought to "preserve" the
rights (or "properties") of the members of the whole society, not by
his will but by positive laws and impartial judges.
Locke frequently speaks of the "preservation" of "property"
rather than "properties". This gives the impression that the
preservation of "property" is different from the preservation of-the
society of property-holders or right-holders. This is a ~ impression.
To "preserve" a man's property means to prevent another man from
invading his property, and to correct any act of invasion if it occurs.
The "preservation of property" should be rephrased as the "mutual"
preservation of "properties" (or "rights"). In fact, Locke himself
says that men unite themselves into a society for "the mutual
Preservation of their Lives, Liberties, and Estates" (123). But to
clarify the idea of mutual preservation further, we should say that
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men unite themselves into a society for the purpose of establishing
a violence-free relationship among themselves, where "violence" means
one man's violation of another's exclusive right of disposal. Locke's
claim about the legislative agent's obligation is that the agent ought
to sustain a violence-free society of right-holders by executing laws
impartially, rather than by executing his will inconstantly. If a
legislative agent fails to offer a legal protection of their rights,
it is a breach of "trust". The society, or the people,set up a
legislative agent "with this trust, that they shall be govern'd by
declared Laws" (136). Hence, the people have a right to remove an
agent who does not offer a legal protection of their rights, i.e.,
a right of "revolution" (222).
Let us consider how Locke defends his claim about the administration
of justice. First, the legislative agent does not have an arbitrary
power over men's lives, or liberties, or possessions, because the
legislative power is nothing but "the joyn't power of every Member of
the Society" transferred to a legislative agent, and because the joint
power of every member of the society is derived from each man's non-
arbitrary, limited power in the state of nature (135). In short, the
legislative power is not arbitrary because nobody has an arbitrary
power in the state of nature (135). Secondly, the legislative agent
ought to preserve the rights of the member of the whole society by laws
and judges, because men's "chief end" of forming a society is the
mutual preservation of their rights; and because positive laws and
judges alone can effectively prevent, and correct, the violation of
rights among men. Given men's passions, interests, and biassed judge-
ments, a peaceful settlement of disputes would be impossible without
"promulgated standing laws" and "known authorized judges" {124, 125,
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136). The "Laws established in that Society" are the "great instrument
and means" to achieve the great end of men's uniting into the society
(134).
I have discussed what comes after Locke's account of appropriation,
in order to arrive at the central claim he makes against the arbitrary
power of the state. Some readers might be wondering whether I have
not forgotten the original question concerning Locke's purpose of
writing his account of appropriation. I have not. The best and
safest way to understand his purpose of writing Chap. 5 is to sum up
what comes after Chap. 50 I shall briefly sum it up. First, Locke
wants to defend a government of laws, and he wants to attack a
government of willo Secondly, he tries to establish the following
central claim against a government of will: the supreme or legislative
agent of a commonwealth ought to preserve men's exclusive rights by
the impartial administration of laws. Thirdly, in order to establish
this central claim, Locke establishes another claim that men unite
themselves into a society for the chief purpose of the mutual preservation
of their exclusive rights. Their exclusive rights have definite
objects: their lives, liberties, and possessions (or estates).
Notice that the preservation of a right presupposes a right. Fourthly,
therefore, Locke establishes another claim that each man has an
exclusive right of disposal over his "life, liberty, and possessions",
before the formation of a society (a fortiori, a political society).
In other words, he tries to establish the claim that every man's
"life, liberty, and possessions" are his "property", independently
of any social or political authority. If he can establish this claim
about "natural rights'~ then he can limit the arbitrary power of another
agent including the society and the supreme agent of a commonwealth.
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As we have seen, this is the -point of "natural rights". Locke's
individual men voluntarily give up their natural power of punishment
(and a minimal degree of their power of disposal) to the majority of
the society first, and then to the legislative agent of a commonwealth.
But the principle of his political theory is simple. Men who have
"natural rights" over their lives, liberties, and possessions (or men
who have a "property in" their persons and goods) permit another agent
to rule, as long as it serves their purpose.
(3) Let us consider how Locke tries to establish the claim that
every man has an exclusive right of disposal over his life, liberty
and possessions, independently of any social or political authority.
This claim, however, is ambiguous. We need to make the claim more
specific. According to Locke's account of pre-political appropriation,
men's possessions change their size. Primitive mea have no possessions
in the first place, and they acquire their possessions by their honest
labour. At the end of the legitimate pre-political process of
acquisition and exchange, men have the unequal and disproportionate
possessions of the proto-17th-century kindo Since men's possessions
change their size depending on their economic activities, the question
naturally arises as to what Locke precisely means by his tripartite
formula of property, i.e., "lives, liberties, and possessions (or
estates)o" In fact, his tripartite formula means one thing before
Chap. 5, and it means quite another thing after Chap. 5.
In Chap. 2 of the Second Treatise, Locke speaks of every man's
"Life", "Health", "Liberty", and "Possessions" as the objects which
nobody else ought to harm (6). Everyone's "possessions" here means
the minimal possessions which tend to "the Preservation of [his] Life" (6).
76
In Locke's view, "my Horse or Coat" counts as my minimal possessions.
Together with my life and liberty, those minimal possessions constitute
my minimal "property" which nobody can take arbitrarily. In the state
of nature prior to appropriation, "I may kill a Thief" who invades
my minimal property; I have a right of war, or a right of self-
defence, or "a liberty to kill the aggressor" (19). As I noted in the
beginning of this chapter, every man has a minimal "property", or an
exclusive right of disposal over his life, liberty, and the minimal
possessions he needs for his subsistence. Everyone has this right
simply by virtue of the natural status God granted to e'fery member
25of the human species.
But "property", according to Locke's preferred usage, signifies
a larger, exclusive domain of disposal (i.e.~ control). This larger
domain is said to consist of each man's "life, liberty and possessions
{or estate)". With the exception of a new word "estate", the components
of "property" appear to be the same. Yet what Locke means by
"possessions" after Chap. 5 is significantly different from what he
means by the same word before Chap. 5. After Chap. 5, he means by it
those possessions which men enjoy in the 17th-century political society.
They are disproportionately expanded possessions of men. And it is
those 17th-century possessions that Locke wants to defend against the
arbitrary power of the state. For this purpose, Locke tries to
establish the claim that every man has a natural, exclusive right of
disposal over his 17th-century possessions, just as he has a natural,
exclusive right of disposal over his life and liberty. He establishes
this claim by an oblique method.
As we have seen, it is Locke's view that every man
has an exclusive right of disposal over his "life and liberty"
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(aad health, and minimal possessions) independently of any social or
political authority. But he needs to include men's 17th-century
"possessions" in his list of men's enlarged property, "lives, liberties
and possessions"o In the beginning of Chapo 5, Locke restates the
claim that every man's "life and liberty" are his "property"o By using
a different locution, he makes the same point: every man has "a property
in" his "person" (ST, 27).26 This is the premise of his account of
appropriation. Within Chap. 5, he tries to show the following: men
have exclusive rights of disposal over their proto-17th-century possessions
independently of any social or political authority, because they have
converted the original community of things by the legitimate pre-social
and pre-political means of acquisition and exchange. Thus Locke
establishes the claim that men's proto-~7th-century possessions, as well
as their lives and liberties, are their "properties" independently of
any social or political authority.
Men's "proto-17th-century" possessions, strictly speaking,
are ~ identical with their "17th-century" possessions. This is why
I have said that Locke's account of appropriation is an oblique attempt
to establish men's exclusive rights over their 17th-century possessions.
I used the expression "the proto-17th-century" world of property earlier
(Sect.. 1. 1 above). It is the world where men can hoard as much gold
and silver as they please without injuring anyone; and it is the world
of growing commerce where men possess unequal and disproportionate portions
of the earth. Though this proto-17th-century world has main features
of the 17th-century world of property. Locke's account of appropriation
does not present it as the world which existed in the 17th century.
In Chap. 5, the proto-17th-century world is presented as the world which
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emerged in the remote past, prior to the formation of political
societies in different parts of the world. The "proto-17th-century
world" is, indeed, a peculiar world. It is the 17th-century world of
property which Locke transports to the remote, pre-political past
by his power of imagination. This peculiar world is Locke's own
invention. In other words, it is "a theoretical entity". It is
precisely because this world is a theoretical entity that it is
difficult to grasp the point of his account of appropriation.
Let us take a close look at Locke's oblique manner of talking
about 17th-century possessions. If the point of Locke's account of
appropriation is to establish a claim about men's 17th-century
possessions, why is it that he writes about the remote past - "the
beginning of the world" first, and then the proto-17th-century world
which supposedly emerged in the remote past? One might answer this
question by saying that Locke is interested in offering a "conjectural
hisotry" of the development of economy and property in the remote
pasto He does offer a "conjectural history" of property of a kind.
But his interest in factual investigations is limited, as far as
Chap. 5 is concerned. (Here I am using the expression "conjectural
history" in Dugald Stewart's sense, with his emphasis that it is an
f 1 . . i d t f . 1· 27)aid to actua ~nvest~gat ons an a proto- ype 0 a SOC1a SC1ence.
The reason why Locke speaks about the remote past is two-fold. First,
the original community of things existed in the beginning of the world.
Secondly, if he uses the model of the remote past, he can easily
establish the claim that each man was able to appropriate a portion
of the world by labour without injuring anyone. In other words,
Locke can make use of the circumstances of abundance, low productivity,
and low consumption, to drive home the point that each man's labour was
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a practicable and legitimate mode of acquiring external goods as his
property. For these reasons (rather than the reason of his historical
curiosity) Locke adopts the remote past as the setting for the beginning
of property. This procedure in turn forces him to present the proto-
17th-century world of expanding property as a world of the remote past.
He is forced to sustain the continuity of his narrative. Besides, as
we have seen (Sect. 1. 1 above), he assumes that men did not stay in
the state of nature very long. Thus we can read the whole of Locke's
account of appropriation in the manner of an inflexible historian.
~e can read it as a history of appropriation,!r2! the remotest past
when God gave the world to mankind in common !2 the remote pre-political
past when political societies were founded in different parts of the
world.
As long as we adopt this historical or chronological reading,
there remains a gap between the remote past and the 17th century. We
might fill the gap by imagining that appropriation continues in a
similar fashion after the formation of political societies, and assuming
that Locke did not write this sequel but left it to the imagination
of his readers. The historical reading of Chap. 5,combined with this
solution to the chronological gap, may appear to be an intellectually
respectable reading. I admit that we cannot entirely brush aside this
reading. Up to a certain point, Locke invites us to treat his account
in this way. However, this reading is one-sided. It is based on the
false assumption that he wrote his account primarily as a historian.
Above all, it does ~ enable us to grasp the point of his accounto
As 1 emphasized in Sect. 1. 1 above, his account is primarily a story,
an extended metaphor, or a myth. Locke wrote it as a believer and an
articulator of his beliefs, rather than a chronologist of events.
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In order to grasp the point of his myth, we must apply Levi-Strauss'
technique of reading it backward, with the understanding that Locke's
aim is to establish the claim that men have natural, exclusive rights
of disposal over their 17th-century possessions. By reading it
backward, we can clearly see how Locke projects the features of the
17th-century world of property to the "beginning of the world"; and
to the successive pre-political worlds of property. By this technique
of disclo£ure, we can turn his oblique account of 17th-century appropriation
into a straight-forward account.
To disc10se the "meaning" of Locke's myth, we must note that
he tacitly appeals to an ad hoc hypothesis in Chap. 5 which conflicts
with his assumption that men stayed in the state of nature only for a
short while. This ad hoc hypothesis is the following: men did not
come to form political societies until the 17th century. This
hypothesis might appear ridiculous. But the "political societies"
might mean the political societies as they ought to exist, not the
political societies as they really existed in the past. (Strictly
speaking, therefore, ~his hypothesis reflects Locke's deeply-held
belief that a "political society" in the proper sense of the word
emerged in 17th-century England. What is really ad hoc is the way
Locke conflates some ideal political societies of the 17th century
and some real political societies of the past.) Men "settle" their
properties in the ideal political societies where positive laws
"preserve" and "regulate" them. Locke's scattered remarks about the
settlement of property towards the end of Chap. 5 are his defence of
one feature of 17th-century England, i.e., the growth of the rule
of law. No historian would insist that primitive political societies
in the remote past were founded on the principle of the rule of law
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(which protects men's properties). Here is one example of Locke's
projection of the 17th-century world. Another example of his
projection is the proto-17th-century world of expanding property.
I have already explained this. As far as its features are concerned,
the world of expanding property is a copy of the 17th-century world.
17th-century English readers would have had no difficulty associating
the unequal expansion of landed property with their world of expanding
property. They knew their real "industrious and thriving men". Finally
Locke projects a feature of the 17th-century world to the remotest
past. The isolated individual labourers acquire their properties
by their own labour. Indians, hunters, and gatherers, and cultivators
appear in Locke's story. Are they really taken from the past? Locke
takes them from the past. But he transforms them into fictitional
characters. In the real past, land was acquired by various violent
means (conquest and the forceful occupation of every description);
and it was cultivated by cooperative labour. The isolated labourers,
d h L k'· • 28Indians, hunters, an gat erers, are oc e s ~nvent~on. Locke's
account of appropriation is a fiction about pre-political appropriation,
though it contains ~ historically sound judgements (e.g., about
the low productivity and consumption of primitive economy, and the
difficult material condition for human life in the remote past, etc.).
We can thus detect Locke's projection of the 17th-century
world of property into the remote, pre-political past. A conscientious
reader of his account of appropriation, at this point, is bound to be
puzzled. If we read his account from left to right, we can treat it
as a history of appropriation in the remote past. If this is the case,
his account cannot be an account of 17th-century appropriation at the
same time. On the other hand, if it is an account of 17th-century
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appropriation,then it cannot be a history of the remote past at the
same time. This is a genuine puzzle to which Locke offers no solution.
Incredible as it may seem, he wants to maintain a logically impossible
position. He holds that men agreed to form political socieities in
the remote past ~ in the 17th century at the same time; that they
expanded their properties by engaging in commerce in the remote past
and in the 17th century at the same time; and that they began to have
a property in the exte rna1 world by their labour in the remotest past
~ in the 17th century at the same time. This intellectual obscurity
is a consequence of the two incompatible views Locke holds. First, men
come to have 17th-century possessions as their property in the pre-political
world; and secondly, the pre-political world began with the remotest
past when God created the world and gave to mankind in common, and ended
in the remote past. This obscurity cannot be removed by any intellectual
or logical method. However, Locke removes this obsurity by enchanting
his readers.
(4) 17th-century readers of Locke's account of appropriation can
easily grasp the point of his account because it enchants them from the
starto The charm of his story lies in the fact that it makes 17th-century
readers feel that they are a part of the story he tells about the
beginning, expansion, and settlement of property. For this reason, they
can grasp the "meaning" of his story from an "internal" viewpoint. They
can grasp it without making a special effort to read it backward. 17th
century-readers believed in God and His grant of the world (to mankind
in common, or to Adam exclusively), so that they could understand
Locke's statement of the original community in the opening paragraph
without asking an intellectual question about the precise time when God
granted the world. The second paragraph of Chap. 5 makes mention of
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"the wild Indian, who knows no Inclosure" (26). The Indian is an
American Indian as perceived by a 17th-century Englishman, so his readers
can imagine the 17th-century American Continent. From the start Locke
invites his readers to imagine their world of property, ioeo, their 17th-
world. In "the beginning all the World was America" (49) - this
statement expresses Locke's view that his readers only need to think
of their world to think of the remotest past. In the middle of his account,
Locke addresses the question how "the Property of labour should be able
to over=ball.ance the Community of Land" (40)0 No reade.rwould be
tempted to treat Locke's comments on this question as a 17th-century
illustration of what happened in the abstract, remote past. His comments
are clearly intended for those readers who are impressed by the rapid
expansion of privately-owned land and the concomitant diminution of
common land in 17th-century England. Sections 40-43 of Chap. 5 make
them forget that Locke's account of appropriation had something to do
with the remote pasto Without any doubt, they would feel that Locke
is discussing their appropriation at this point. As I have noted
already, Locke's further reference to the disproportionate portions of
the earth suggests to his readers that he is speaking about the
"industrious and thriving men" of the 17th-century. Consequently,
his readers would feel that their landed property have expanded
legitimately before a political society was formed. Finally, Locke
enchants his readers completely by telling them that they agreed to
form political societies to settle their properties. Thus the.moral
of Locke's account of appropriation is crystal clear to those who lived
in the 17th century and wanted their properties to be legally protected
against the arbitrary power of government. His story drives home
the point that they have natural, exclusive rights of disposal over their
84
current possessions. Though Locke's account of appropriation is an
intellectually obscure construct, it can convey to them the unambiguous
message that their current possessions have legitimately arisen from
the original community of things. In other words, one can apprehend the
"meaning" of Locke's myth by taking the attractive p'artand discarding
the rest.
(5) The Confirmation of Locke's Purpose: Let me summarize my detailed
discussion. Since Locke's account of appropriation is a myth, I have
taken special care to clarify its point. First, I have shown that the
point of natural rights in the 17th-century context was to limit the
arbitrary power of "another" agent including the state «1) above).
Secondly, I have shown how Locke uses the claim that men's "lives,
liberties, and possessions" are their "property". He uses it to
establish claims against the arbitrary power of the state - above all,
to establish the claim that the state ought to administer justice to
preserve a peaceful society of right-holders «2) above). Thirdly, I
have shown that Locke tries to establish the claim that men have
exclusive rights of disposal over their current possessions, independently
of any social or political authority. He uses an oblique method here.
His method is oblique and obscure because he uses the model of the
"proto-17th-century" world, the world which seems to have existed long ago
despite its typically 17th-century features. «3) above). Fourthly,
I have shown that it was not difficult for Locke's contemporaries to
understand the point of his story of appropriation, despite its intellectual
obscurity «4) above). To sum up, then, what Locke does is the following;
In Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise, he obliquely establishes the
legitimacy of the possessions which men had in their late 17th-century
economic societyo Locke establishes their pre-political legitimacy
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in order to claim that the state ought to preserve their possessions
(as well as their lives and liberties) by means of laws and judges.
I have treated Locke's account of appropriation as a device
against the arbitrary power of the state, and a device for a
constitutional government (or a government of laws). My exposition
is solidly based on what Locke actually said, and in this respect
it differs from those exciting interpretations which commentators
have provided in recent years. Now I should like to conclude by.
making two clarificatory remarks on my own exposition.
First, I have said that Locke's account of appropriation is
what Hobbes would regard as a "doctrine opposite to government", a
doctrine opposed to arbitrary or absolute government. This does not
mean, however, that Locke did not intend to defend one man's possessions
against the invasion of his fellow-citizens. Of course, he argued
that each man's possessions ought to be protected against his fellow-
citizens. But the important point is that he could have maintained
this position without granting each man a natural (or pre-political)
right of property. Hobbes indeed argued that the absolute sovereign
should protect each citizen's possessions against the violation of his
fellow-citizens. Locke's account of appropriation is an account of
pre-political appropriation. He discussed pre-political appropriation,
because he wanted to defend each man's possessions not only against
the violence of his fellow-citizens but also against his magistrate.
Secondly, when I say that Locke's purpose is to protect men's
properties (or a society of right-holders) by laws, 1 also affirm that
he is trying to defend the smooth function of a modern economic society
against arbitrary intervention. Locke's account of appropriation is
based on his observation of the active side of the 17th-century
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English economy. According to his idealized picture of England,
each man acquires his property by his labour, exchanges his property
voluntarily, and expands his property by the use of money. The state,
then, ought to enforce the laws which preserve the smooth function of
this economic society as much as possible. This is clear from what
I have sai~ about the "regulation" of the transfer of property
(Sect. 1. 2 above). It will become clearer, when we come to consider
the negative character of laws. I make this point here, in order to
avoid the mistaken view that "a government of laws" has nothing to do
with the economic society based on labour and commerce. It should be
noted that the wage-relationship is contractual and pre-political
(g,85). "Promises and Bargains for Truck" are said to be "binding"
in the state of nature (ST, 14). These natural economic relationshipS
are not discussed, but presupposed, in Locke's account of appropriation.
In short, his talk about the "preservation" of "property" implies the
preservation of the economic society where each man acquires his property
by his labour, and expands it by means of commerce.
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_PART 2. Locke's Theory of the State, with Particular ~eference to
his Concept of Justice
In Part 2, I shall discuss Locke's theory of the "bounds"
(or "extent") of the supreme power of the state. I have already touched
upon his theory by discussing his claim about the administration of
justice (PART 1, Sect. 10 3)0 What I attempt to do below is to
provide a more elaborate exposition of Locke's theory of the "bounds"
of the supreme power of the state. My primary task is to provide a
more elaborate exposition of Locke's claim about the administration of
justice. I shall undertake this task by clarifying his concept of
justice, and its connections with other concepts such as "property",
"law", and "cha rdty"; My secondary task is to discuss, briefly, two
other bounds of the supreme power of the state - the bound of "the public
good", and the bound of legitimate taxation.
2. 1 Locke's Concept of Justice: A Reconstructive Analysis
Locke's claim about the administration of justice, as we have
seen, is the following: "The Legislative, or Supream Authority" JIll
bound to dispense Justice, and decide the Rights of the Subject ~
promulgated standing Laws, and known Authoris'd Judges" <.g, 136).
He rephrases this obligation as follows: those who hold "the Legislative
Power of every Conunonwe.alth, in all Forms of Government" ought to
"govern by promulgated establish'd Laws, not to be varied in particular
Gases, but to have one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at
Court, and the Country Man at Plough" (142). It is clear, then, that
the administration of justice, according to Locke, means the settlement
of disputes among right-holders in accordance with promulgated equal
laws and the decision of authorized. impartial jUdges. We can also
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say that the administration of "justice" is the impartial administration
of "law" for the sake of the peaceful settlement of disputeso This
concept of justice is a familiar concept associated with "a court"o It
is the concept of "corrective justice". Locke has this concept of
justice, and he has a predominantly judicial concept of the state.
Since Locke does not use the word "justice" very often, we
tend to forget that the concept of corrective justice is of central
importance to his political theory. As we shall see later, "corrective
justice" is to be distinguished from "distributive justice"o We also
tend to neglect his predominantly judicial concept of the state,
because the supreme power of the state is said to be the "legislative"
power rather than the judicial powero In what follows, I shall analyze
L~eke's concept of corrective justice in detail. I shall also show
that he has a predominantly judicial concept of the stateo
2. 11 Justice as the Practical Negation of Injustice
My analysis of Locke's concept of justice is reconstructive.
He does not analyze the concept of justice he uses, nor does he use
the word "justice" very often. So any analysis of his concept of
justice is bound to be reconstructive. My reconstruction is based on
Locke's own writings, and the major theoretical writings from which he
derived certain elements of his concept of justice. The concept of
justice is a complex concept which embodies several ingredients. The
best way to approach Locke's concept of justice is to discuss its
opposite first - his concept of injustice. Quite a few theorists
try to clarify the concept of justice in terms of the concept of
29injustice (e.g., John Stuart Mill). I shall take thts indirect
appro~cho When all things are considered, this seems to be
the best way to clarify Locke's concept of justice.
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To put it in a Hegelian fashion: injustice is a negation of
another man's property, and justice is a negation of the negation. This
negation of the negation is not an immediate negation of the negation of
another man's property. In other words, it is not a simple retaliation.
Rather, justice is a continuous process of avoiding and correcting the
occurrence of injustice. To put it more analytically: to "administer
justice" is to prevent and correct the acts of injustice by means of
laws and judges, whereas to "perform a just act" is to avoid the
injustice one might commit or to correct the injustice one has committed.
If this view can be ascribed to Locke, then we can affirm that justice
- whether it is the administration of justice or the act of justice -
is the practical negation of injustice. Justice is the avoidance,. and
correction, of injustice •.
Let me substantiate what I have said above. First, what is
inl~stice? Locke gives an unequivocal answer in the Essay. In commenting
on the demonstrable certainty of the proposition "Where there is no Property,
there is no Injustice", he says that "property" is "a right to any thing"
while "injustice" means "the Invasion or Violation of that right"
(IV, iii, 18). Every studellt of Locke knows this definition of injustice.
But we must note two additional points here. First, Locke is careless in
defining "property" as "a right to any thing". Property, in his own
view, is an exclusive right of disposal over an object. (The "object"
is a man's person, or his external object.) The common "right" of
everyone to an indefinite portion of the world is not "property".
Leibniz, who knew jurisprudence, rightly pointed out that Locke's
definition is contrary to the ordinary meaning of "property" as an
"exclusive right" (emphasis in the original).30 What Locke wanted
to say is that "injustice" is the violation of "property", where property
means "an exclusive right" over anything. In Some Thoughts concerning
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Education, he stated: "children cannot well comprehend what injustice
is, till they understand property, and how particular persons come by
it" (Works, IX, 101). In this context, he defined "property" as "what
is theirs by a peculiar right exclusive of others" (~.).
The second point we should note about Locke's definition of
injustice is the following: "injustice" is the invasion or violation of
one man's exclusive right (of disposal) by another man. This appears
to be a trivial point because we usually take it for granted that a man
cannot violate his own right. But this point is worth noting. It
reminds us of the fact that Locke, like most theorists, treats the concept
of injustice (hence, the concept of justice) as an other-directed concept.
The concepts of justice and injustice are inter-subjective concepts.
To use Hobbes' expression: "Justice" and "Injustice" are "Qualities,
that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude" (Leviathan, Ch. XIII,
188). Locke briefly discusses how to teach children a just conduct,
and refers to "justice" as a "great social virtue" (Works, IX, 101;
emphasis added). The father, or the tutor,of children ought to make
them realize "what little advantage they are like to make, by possessing
unjustly of what is another's" (ibid., 102; emphasis added). A careful
reading of Locke's writings reveals that he habitually indicates the
other-directedness, or intersubjectivity, as a key component of the
concepts of justice and injustice. For instance, thieves and villains
are said to "keep Faith and Rules of Justice one with another" (Essay,
I, iii, 2; emphasis added). Though they keep faith and rules of
justice only for the sake of convenience, they do so "among themselves"
because "Justice and Truth are the common ties of Society" (!..Qi9.,
emphasis added). There is, of course, nothing novel about the
intersubjectivity of Locke's concepts of justice and injustice. All
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major theorists of justice treat justice and injustice as a matter
of one man's relation to another. The idea of "doing oneself justice"
is a mataphorical extension of the other-directed concept of justice.
(Hence, if we want to understand the core of the concept of justice,
we should not rely on the writings of a metaphorical philosopher such
31as Plato.) Locke, at any rate, does not extend the concepts of
injustice and justice to apply them to self-referential conducts.
To summarize my discussion of Locke's definition of "injustice",
"injustice" means one man's violation of another's "property" or
another's exclusive right (of disposal). The next question we must
consider is this: what is justice? As I said, justice is a complex
concept. For the sake of simplicity, we shall treat justice as a method of
negating "injustice". The negation in question is practical rather than
logical. There are two ways in which each man can "negate" injustice:
he can avoid it, or he can correct it. There is a complexity here, however.
We may treat each man as an agent or as a spectator •. If we treat a
man as an agent, then we may say that the justice of an agent is an act
of avoiding the injustice he may do to another man, or an act of
correcting the injustice ~ has done to another man. Let us call this
notion of justice "a just act". On the other hand,.if we treat a man.
as a spectator, then we may say that the justice of a spectator is to avoid
or correct the acts of injustice which take place among other men. This
" " "d'· d" " d . . t d" bjustice should be done, or 1spense ,or a m1n1S ere y
an impartial spectator. For the lack of a better name, we may call this
justice "the justice of a spectator", or "the administration of justice",
and distinguish it from "the justice of an agent" (or "a just act").
The distinction I have drawn between the two kinds of justice
32is not common. The distinction is mine, and it is an expository device.
Locke uses the word" justice" in such phrases as "do justice" on an
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offender <.§!, 6), "administer justice" (20), "dispense justice" (136),
and "the administration of Justice" (219). His usage, therefore,
suggests that his concept of "justice" is closely connected with "the
justice of a spectator" rather than "the justice of an agent". In so
far as we respect Locke's use of the word "justice", we are bound to say
that he is almost exclusively concerned about the spectator's prevention
and correction of the violation of one man's property by another.
However, the idea of "a just act" can be found in Locke's writings.
In fact, this idea is of crucial importance to the understanding of
the tradition of classical liberalism. So we shall not take a fetishistic
attitude toward Locke's word "justice". Instead, we shall probe
into his concept of justice by considering the agent who regulates his
actions as well as the spectator who regulates the actions of others.
I shall freely use the writings of other theorists to clarify the point
of Locke's scattered remarks about justice. We should not presume that
his thought about justice derived from a single historical source. Nor
should we expect that he had a perfectly coherent idea about justice.
In fact, a careful reading of Locke's writings suggests that he simply
absorbed certain elements of the complex concept of justice from
more than once source, without taking the trouble to make his thought
about justice perfectly coherent.
2. 12 A Just Act, or the Justice of an Agent
Locke is one of the few modern theorists who discussed the
justice of an agent without using the word "justice". His predecessors
such as Hobbes and Grotius discussed in detail what an agent's just
action is. So did his successors such as Hume and Smith. Nevertheless,
Locke expressed the modern idea of a just act when he spoke of the
"preservation of property". If a just act is the opposite of an unjust
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act, and if an unjust act is the violation of another man's property,
then it follows that one man's just act is his non-violation - or
"preservation" - of another's property. To put it another way, a man
acts justly when he abstains from another man's property, and when
he restores what he has taken from another's property. ("Property"
here means an exclusive right of disposal in general, or any object
not necessarily a material object - of the exclusive right). What is
unique about this concept of justice? It is a negative concept. A
just act is not a positive act for another man. But it is only a
negative abstention from another man's exclusive right. It contains
what appears to be an element of "action" - a restoration of another
man's own object. Yet this restoration presupposes. the taking, borrowing,
or using of another man's own object. The basic idea remains the same:
abstain from another man's exclusive right, or leave it intact.
We shall shortly see that Locke shares this typically modern,
narrow concept of justice. But since his remarks on the justice of.an
agent are scattered in his writings, I shall first identify the tradition
of this narrow, negative concept of justice. The first modern theorist
who clearly formulated the narrow, negative concept of justice is Hugo
Grotius. But the narrow, negative concept of justice can be traced back
to Cicero and other ancient writers whom Grotius quotes. After Locke,
Hume and Smith develop their theories of justice by taking Grotius' narrow,
negative concept of justice as a point of departure. Let me first
survey what Cicero, Grotius, Hume and Smith say about the concept of justice.
I shall identify characteristic features of the concept of justice which
figures in this modern Ciceronian tradition. Once those features are
identified, it becomes easy to see that Locke has the same concept of
a just act, despite the fact that he does not use the word "justice" to
designate this act.
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(A) Cicero and Modern Ciceronians
In De Officiis, Cicero makes a number of remarks about the virtue
of justice. He distinguishes "justice" from the virtues such as "prudence",
"magnanimity" and "temperance". "Justice", as a general virtue distinct from
these other virtues, is the following:
a care to maintain that society and mutual intercourse which is
between them; to render to every man what is his due; and to
stand to 9~e's words in all promises and bargains,(Bk. I,
Sect. V.)
"Justice" is a social virtue, or a virtue which concerns the maintenance of
human socie ty , "To render to ever'yman what is his due" (suum cuique:
tribuere) is a famous maxim which expresses the core of the concept of
justice. Cicero interprets it negatively. He emphasizes that the first
requirement of justice is negative: "no one should do any hurt to another,
unless by way of reasonable and just retribution for some injury received
from him" (Bk. I, Sect. VII; also, Sect. X). Each particular man has
acquired his personal possessions by one method or another, and "it is
but just that each should hold what is now his own". If "anyone
endeavour to take away from him" what is now his own, "he directly breaks
in on common justice" (Bk. I, Sect. VII).34 rhus suum cuique tribuere
is "to abstain from any other man' s own thing", or "to leave every man in
the quiet enjoyment of his own goods". The first duty of a governor,
according to Cicero, is to render everyone his own external goods;
i.e., "to take care ••• that each individual be secured in the quiet
enjoyment of his own, and that private men be not dispossessed of what
they have, under a pretence of serving and taking care of the public".35
Besides giving the negative interpretation of suum cuique tribuere,
Cicero divides the virtue of maintaining society into two kinds. He
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divides it into the negative virtue of justice, and the positive virtue
of "beneficence, which may also be called either bounty or liberality". 36
Cicero further divides beneficence or liberality into two kinds: helping
others by our labour and industry, and helping them by money (Bk. II,
Sect. XV). For our purpose, it is sufficient to note that both kinds of
liberality are the positive virtues of giving others what we have, for the
benefit of others. By contrast, the virtue of justice is a negative
virtue of not taking from others what they have, for our benefit.
Whereas Cicero presents his view of justice informally, Grotius
tries to offer a conceptually rigorous formulation of the negative concept
of justice. Well-informed historians of the modern theory of natural
~ights and natural law - Jean Barbeyrac, Adam 'Smith, and Henry Sidgwick
37agree that Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis is an epoch-making work.
But even those well-informed historians do not tell us very much about
Grotius' significance in the history of the concept of justice. His
significance lies in his attempt to formulate an unequivocally negative
concept of justice, in opposition to Aristotle's idea of distributive
justice. He provides a conceptually rigorous version of Cicero's negative
interpretation of suum cuigue tribuere by making use of the idea of a
"right" in the proper and strict sense. Justice in the proper and strict
sense is based on a "right" in the proper and strict sense. But the
Aristotelian notion of "distributive justice", according to Grotius,
rests on an imperfect kind of "right", or a "right" in the improper and
extended sense of the word. Let us see what he says in some detail.
In his discussion of the different senses of "jus", Grotius-
stipulates the second sense of jus as follows: jus in the second sense
"signifies a moral Quality in any person, sufficient to enable him justly
to have or to do something" (De Jure Belli, 1, 1, 4). Jus in this sense
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38can be translated as "right". There are two kinds of jus taken as
"a moral quality" (or "a right"). One is a perfect moral quality called
"faculty", while the other is an imperfect moral quality called "aptitude".
The difference between the two types of rights consists primarily in this:
If a man has a perfect right (or "faculty") over an object, then he can
justly demand this object from others on his own authority and can use
force to protect or restore it. By contrast, "aptitude" or an imperfect
right to an object cannot be protected by force against others. Other
men cannot be justly punished for not respecting a man's imperfect right.39
According to Grotius, each man's "faculty" rather than "aptitude" is the
"Right properly and strictly taken" (1, 1, 5). This "right" in the proper
and strict sense is what civilians used to call ~, or "that Right
which a man hath of his own" (1, 1, 5). It follows, then, that "~
cuigue tribuere" presupposes each man's "faculty" or his perfect right.
The Stoic maxim of justice thus comes to mean: ".Abstain from what another
man has by his perfect right (and restore what you have taken from him
to him}."
Justice, understood in this narrow and negative way, is "Justice
strictly taken" (1, 1, 8). Grotius calls this strict sense of justice
"Expletive Justice". The label comes from the idea that if someone returns
an object of another man's prefect right to him, he performs the obligation
which he ought to have performed all along (just as he would!!ll an empty
space of another man's own library by returning his book to him).40 The
restoring of another man's own object is an apparently positive act, but
it is the performance of the negative obligation of abstention in disguise.
Grotius insists that this is the "justice" in the proper and strict sense.
Aristotle's "distributive justice" rests on each man's imperfect right
97
("aptitude", or "worthiness", or "fittingness"), and it is "justice" in
an extended and somehow improper sense of the word. Grotius does not
provide any closely reasoned argument to establish the insiguificb3ce of
"distributive justice". But he associates the virtue of distributive
justice with positive virtues which benefit others - such virtues as
"marcy, liberality, and State Providence" (1, 1, 8). He also quotes
Xenophon's story of Cyrus, in order to stress that the administration
of justice ultimately ought to respect each man's perfect right and
"expletive justice" rather than his imperfect right ("aptitude" or
"fittingness") and "distributive justice". In Grotius' view, it is wrong
to assign a long coat to a tall boy and a short coat to a short boy, if
the tall boy has violently exchanged his own short coat for the short boy's
long coat. Distributive justice must give way to expletive justice - or
"justice" in the proper and strict sense of the word. To sum up Grotius'
negative concept of justice: Justice in the proper sense presupposes
another man's "faculty" or his perfect right. A just act essentially means
an act of abstaining from what another man already has by his perfect
right. Grotius emphasizes these points in his famous Prolegomena to
De Jure Belli ac Pacis. "Justice" "wholly consists in abstaining from what
is another mans", whereas "Injustice" is "nothing else but the detention
of another mans Right" (Prolegomena, 44). He quotes Porphyry's definition
of justice in his Annotation: "ut abstineatur alienis, negue noceatur non
nocentibus", or "to abstain from what is anothers, and not to harm them that
are harmless". We have already seen that this is also the core of Cicero's
idea of justice. Finally, there is Grotius' more extensive statement on
"justice" (in the proper sense) and a "right" (in the proper sense):
Now this very conservation of Society, as it is agreeable to
humane understanding, ••• is the foundation of that which is
properly called Right. From whence ariseth our abstinence
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from that which is anothers, and our restoring of that which
we have detained, together with the full profits we have made of
it: As also our obligation to perform our promises, our
satisfaction for damages done unto others through our default,
and the merit of punishment among men (Pl'olegomena, S).
This passage is a modern equivalent of Cicero's extensive definition of the
general virtue of "justice" (quoted earlier). It contains a reference to
the obligation to keep promises, just as Cicero's extensive definition does.
But the core of the concept of justice, as we have seen, is to abstain
from what is another man's own (alieni abstinentia).
I shall make one final remark about the historical significance of
Grotius' negative concept of justice. I have stated that his "expletive
justice" is opposed to Aristotle's "distributive justice". But we should
also note that Grotius' "expletive justice" is, in fact, his own version
of Aristotle's "corrective justice" (De Jure Belli, 1, 1, 8, 1). Let us
recall that Aristotle divided (partial) justice into "distributive justice"
(dianemetikon dikaion) and "corrective justice" (diorthotikon dikaion).
Aristotle considered "corrective justice" from the viewpoint of the
rectification of an "inequality" that arises between those who interact,
or the restoration of "equilibrium" or "a median between loss and gain".41
Grotius, by contrast, emphasizes that the rectification of one's violation
of another's (perfect) right is a matter of filling the empty space of the
victim which ought to be filled. Hence, we can offer the following
description of Grotius' achievement: Grotius transforms Aristotle's
"corrective justice" into his "expletive justice" by using the idea of a
perfect right or "faculty", and then elevates the transformed concept
- -
of "corrective justice" above Aristotle's "distributive justice".
For a further identification of the modern Ciceronian tradition
of justice, I shall briefly discuss Hume and Smith. I shall omit
Pufendorf since his discussion of justice and injustice (though not "injury")
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is more Aristotelian than Ciceronian.42 Hume's relationship to Cicero's
De Officiis and Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis is very interesting,
though most of Hume commentators ignore - or remain ignorant of - his
relationship to Cicero and Grotius. I shall state in one paragraph what
philosophical commentators (like J.L. Mackie and J. Harrison) do not say
. b k 43an a 00 0 I shall also clarify, in one paragraph, the points which
historical scholars (like D. Forbes and K. Haakonssen) have failed to
- 44clarify in a book. My short remarks in this paragraph, therefore,
are valuable. Let us concentrate on the much neglected Grotius-Hume
connection. Hume explicitly states that his account of the origin of
justice is, in outline, similar to what Grotius hinted at (ENQ, 307, n, 1).
In his letter to Hutcheson (17 Sept. 1739), he mentions Grotius and
Pufendorfo In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume asks the following question:
"Wherein consists this honesty and justice, which you find in restoring a loan,
and abstaining from the property of others?" (THN, 480). "Restoration"
and "abstention" suggest that Hume's idea of justice, as well as his
account of the origin of justice, derived from Grotius' De Jure Belli ac
Pacis. This conjecture turns into a conviction when we read a passage
of the Treatise carefully. At one point, Hume speaks of "a sense of
duty in abstaining from that object, and restoring it to the first possessor"
(!illh 527). Then he says: "These actions are properly what we call
justice." To put it more precisely, the acts of abstaining from the object
of another man, and restoring it to him, are what Grotius calls "justice"
in the proper sense of the word. In the same paragraph, Hume remarks
that "this quality, which we call property" "vanishes upon a more accurate
inspection into the subject, when consider'd a-part from our moral
sentiments" (527). Here he is alluding to, and rejecting, the view
of Grotius and Pufendorf that a right is a "moral quality". One
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cautionary remark may be added here. Hume transforms Grotius' concept
of justice not only by dropping the notion of a moral quality, but
by restricting the application of the concept to external possessions.
Grotius' concept applies to what is another man's own "thing", where
a "thing" includes a man's life, liberty, or action. But Hume's concept
of justice (or a just act) is an abstention from the external possessions
of another man. In this respect, his concept is narrower than Grotius'.
As for the Hume-Cicero connection, I shall only make one point. Hume
divides social virtues into "benevolence" and "justice". This division,
which is conspicuous in the second Enquiry, is unambiguously Ciceronian.
Justice, unlike benevolence, is a negative virtue. Hume calls it "the
cautious, jealous virtue of justice" (ENQ, 184).
Adam Smith nicely summarizes the modern Ciceronian tradition of
justice. It is he who has used the memorable phrase "negative virtue"
in discussing the concept of justice. Unlike Hume, Smith holds that justice
concerns the "person" of a man (i.e., his body and his liberty) and his
"reputation" as well as his "possessions". He expresses the negative
concept of justice as follows:
Mere just~ce is, upon most oc~asions, but a negative virtue, and
only hinders us from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely
abstains from violating either the person, or the estate, or the
reputation of his neighbours, has surely little positive merit.
He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called
justice, and does every thing which his equals can with propriety
force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. He
may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and
doing nothing. (TMS, II, ii, 1, 9.)
Smith's exposition is clear. As is often the ~ase with his exposition,
it contains the hint which we can develop to criticize the very concept
that he is trying to elucidate. But what concerns us is the point that a
man's just act, according to Smith, is his act of abstaining from hurting
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or injuring his neighbours.
By "injury" he means the violation. of another man's "perfect
rights". By "perfect rights", he means "those which we have a title to
demand and if refused to compel an other to perform". "Imperfect rights"
are "those which correspond to those duties which ought to be performed
to us by others but which we have no title to compel them to perform"
(b!, (A), i, 14). In drawing this distinction, Smith follows in the
footsteps of Hutcheson, Pufendorf, and Grotius. In Smith's view, then,
a just act is an act of abstaining from violating another man's perfect
rights, or an act of refraining from taking the objects of another man's
perfect rights. This is why he says that the "object of Justice" (or
the object of the administration of Justice) is "the security from injury"
(W, (B), 5); namely "the maintaining men in what are called their
perfect rights" (W, (A), i, 1; i, 9). A man "merely as a man" has
perfect rights over his person (i.e., his body and liberty), his
reputation, and his estate, so that he can be "injured" in these three
respects (W, (A), i, 12; LJ, (B), 7). Thus another man can act justly
toward him. by not injuring him in those respects.
The negative virtue of justice which presupposes men's perfect
rights, says Smith, corresponds to what "Aristotle and the schoolmen
call commutative justice", and what "Grotius calls the justitia expletrix"
(~, VII, ii, 1, 10). Strictly speaking, the term "commutative justice"
is Thomas Aquinas' invention. He introduced the term to broaden or make
flexible Aristotle's concept of "corrective justice" (diorthotikon dikaion).45
But this subtle point does not concern us. Smith is merely drawing
attention to the distinction Grotius has emphasized - the distinction
between "expletive justice" and "distributive justice" (or what Grotius
calls "attributive justice"). Distributive justice, according to Smith,
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presupposes men's imperfect rights. "Distributive justice" does not
properly belong to "jurisprudence", though it remains a part of "a system
of moralls" (LJ, (A), i, 15). The reason for this is that one who violates
another man's imperfect rights (hence, distributive justice) cannot be
forced to respect another man's imperfect rights, whereas he can be forced
to respect another's perfect rights (hence, commutative justice). Smith
is making what is essentially Grotius' pointo Each man has an imperfect
right to demand friendship, charity, generosity, or gratitude. To put
it generally, each man has a "right" to "beneficence" though this "right"
is ~ the strict right which other men can be forced to respect. For
instance, "a beggar is an object of our charity and may be said to have
a right to demand it" in "a metaphoricall sense" or in the imprefect ::;ense
of a right (LJ, (A), i, 15). But even if a man is not charitable to
a beggar, he cannot be punished by the force of a law. Similarly, a man
who remains ungrateful to his benefactor is guilty of "the blackest
ingratitude", yet it is improper to "oblige him by force to perform
what in gratitude he ought to perform" ('g!§, II, ii, 1, 3). For he "does
no positive hurt to any body." "He only does not do that good which in
propriety he ought to have done" (ibid.)o Smith clarifies the distinction
between "commutative justice" and "distributive justice" (or between
"perfect rights" and "imperfect rights", or between law and morals) by
contrasting the positive virtue of "beneficence" with the negative virtue
of "justice". "Beneficence" is always free, it cannot be extorted by
force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment", whereas "the observance
(of justice] is not left to the freedom of our own wills". The virtue
of justice "may be extorted by force", and the violation of perfect rights
- "injury" - "exposes to resentment, and consequently to punishment
(.!l!2., II , ii , 1, 3- 5) •
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The modern Ciceronian concept of justice,which I have clarified
by reference to Grotius, Hume and Smith, has at least two features. First,
the virtue of justice is a negative virtue. A just act is an act of
abstaining from another manls right, or refraining from hurting or injuring
another man. It is an act to avoid positive harm, and as such it is
opposed to those acts which promote positive good - the acts of beneficence,
benevolence, bounty, charity, and liberality. The negative virtue of
justice makes social life tolerable and minimally peaceful, though it may
not make it positively comfortable. Secondly, modern Ciceronians do not
take "distributive justice" seriously. For them, "justice" in the proper or
most significant sense is what Aristotle called "corrective justice".
Of course, modern theorists do not produce the exact copy of Aristotlels
concept of "corrective justice", or his concept of "ddst.r Ibutdve justice".
Grotius and Smith transform Aristotle's "corrective justice" by linking it
to the idea of "perfect rights"; and Hume transforms Grotiusl version of
"ccr rectIve justice" by abolishing the idea of perfect moral qualities and
linking justice to external possessions alone. But despite the complex
historical change which Aristotle's two-fold division of justice underwent,
his division of justice remains useful for us. Aristotle's "distributive
justice" (dianemetikon dikaion) concerns what pertains to the community as
common yet divisible by allotment among its members. Distributive justice,
says Aristotle, can be found in "the distribution of honors, of material
goods, or of anything else that can be divided among those who have
46a share in the political system". This type of justice, according to
Grotius, Hume and Smith, is quite unimportant. Some may point out -
rightly - that Hume did not exclude the question of distributive justice
from his jurisprudence. But he made a significant remark that the question
of distributive justice is "frivolous". 47 What is truly important to
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modem Ciceronians is "corrective justice" (or its variants). This
justice rectifies or remedies the injuries (or inequalities) which
arise in dealings (or interactions) between private individuals. Private
individuals are presumed to have certain objects as their "own" - or
at least, as their de facto possessions (according to Hume) - prior
to their public interactions.48 They "deal with" one another (or
"interact" with one another) either voluntarily or involuntarily. One
may hire or buy or steal goods from another; one may praise or defame
or murder another. In the process of transaction, injuries (or "inequalities",
as Aristotle says) may arise. Nobody ought to injure another man, and
if one has injured another, it ought to be corrected or rectified or
ad-just-ed. This is the "corrective justice" to which modern Ciceronians
at~ach tremendous significance. It is the justice of private right-
holders who may violate one another's rights.
(B) Locke
Having finished a somewhat long preliminary, we now return
to Locke's texts. Locke does use the negative concept of a just act. He
interprets suum cuigue tribuere negatively, translating "suum" (Grotius'
"faculty" or "perfect rights") into his word "property". Though his
concept of justice is by no means a clear-cut concept, it centers around
the question of avoiding the violation of another's exclusive right
rather than the question of having a fair share of the common stock.
II' ' .. t "Lfb lit" "b t" dFurthermore, he opposes Justlce 0 1 era y, oun y , an
"charity". Let us see these Ciceronian features of Locke's concept of
justice by pulling together his scattered remarks from his writings.
I shall begin with a passage of the First Treatise where Locke
", ." 'th"h Ltv"contrasts Justlce Wl carl y :
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As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of his honest
Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to
him; So Charity gives every Man a Title to the so much of another's
Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has no
means to subsist otherwise (!I, 42).
Unless we read this passage carefully, we are likely to misunderstand it.
A man who already owns "plenty" ought to do a positive act of charity.
Justice, insofar as it is intelligible as the just act of an agent, is
to leave intact the right which everyone else alreadY has over "the product
of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended
to him". Locke's phraseology - "Jus tice gives every Man a Title" - might
suggest that it is just to (re)distribute external goods to everyone
according to an independently conceived distributive principle. But
we should not be deceived by the word "give". Locke is merely translating
the Ciceronian maxim of suum cuigue tribuere as "giving" "every man"
what he already has as a result of his, and his ancestors', labour.
His interpretation is entirely negative. As Kant remarked, if suum cuigue
tribuere is translated "literally as 'give to each what is his own', it
would be nonsense, inasmuch as one cannot give to someone something
that he already has".49 This is a typical, classical-liberal view of
justice which Locke could endorse. Locke's negative interpretation of
suum cuigue tribuere may not be obvious to some readers. But he holds
that justice and injustice presuppose each man's own thing, or his property,
or~. This is why he says, "Where there is no Property, there is no
Injustice" (Essay, IV, iii, 18), and raises the rhetorical question,
"what justice is there where there is no personal property [1]" (!!:li,
VIII, 213).50
I shall produce more textual evidence to show that a just act, for
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Locke, is an act of abstaining from another man's exclusive right or
property. This act, as we shall also see, is opposed to positive acts
of charity, bounty, and liberality. Let us focus on A Letter concerning
Toleration where Locke contrasts "the narrow measures of bare justice"
with such positive duties as "charity, bounty, and liberality" (Works,
VI, 17). "Bare justice" demands the following: "No private person
has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his
civil enjoyments •••• All the rights that belong to him as a
man ••• are inviolably to be preserved to him. ••• No violence nor
injury is to be offered him "(Ibid.) Locke goes on to describe
"the narrow measures of justice": "abstain from violence and rapine, and
all manner of persecution" (VI, 21); "forbear violence, and abstain from
all manner of ill usage towards those from whom they have received none"
(VI, 22). What counts as "violence" in this context is an act of
"invad [ing] the civil rights and worldly goods of each other" (VI, 20).
The term "civil rights" used in A Letter concerning Toleration (VI, 20,
36, 40) is a synonym of (exclusive) "rights" or "property" of the
Second Treatise. Hence, "bare justice" is to abstain from violating
another man's property.
This bare justice is "narrow". So it is "not enough" for
ecclesiastic men to practice this negative virtue. "He that pretends
to be a successor of the apostles" "is obliged also to admonish his
hearers of the duties of peace and good-will towards all men"; "and
he ought industriously to exhort all men 000 to charity, meekness,
and toleration" (VI, 21)0 The use of force properly belongs to the
magistrate, and every man must keep within the narrow measures of bare
justice. But "charity, bounty, and liberality" must be added to our
actionso "This the Gospel enjoyns, this reason directs, and this that
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natural fellowship we are born into requires of us" (VI, 17). Of those
positive virtues, "charity" is the most important Christian virtue for
Locke. "[N]o man can be a Christian without charity, and without that
faith which works, not by force, but by love" (VI, 6). "Charity" is
"the spirit of the Gospel" (The Preface to The Reasonableness of
Christianity, Works, VII, 3), and "the morality of the gospel" exceeds
any other man-made morality including Ciceronian morality (Works, IV,
296). Another positive virtue - "liberality" or "bounty" - is, in
Locke's view, not distinctively Christian. He is inclined to treat it
as a heathen concept. Hence, in his work on education, Locke discusses
"liberality" vis-a-vis "justice" in a distinctively Ciceronian manner
(Works, IX, pp. 100f.). Locke says: Teach children "to part with what
they have, ea3ily and freely to their friends" on the one hand, and
teach them "not" to "transgress" "the rules of justice" (or teach them
to avoid injustice) on the other hand (ibid.)o
Thus it is fairly clear that for Locke, a just act is an act
of abstaining from another man's property. Justice is a negative virtue
opposed to positive virtues of charity and liberalityo A just act,
then, is equivalent to one man's "preservation" of another's property.
This preservation can be accomp1shed by the "force" of a law. On the
other hand, the failure to practice charity or liberality (or bounty)
cannot be punished legally. The contrast Locke draws between "justice"
and "charity" is unmistakably sharp. But some recent commentators
(e.g., John Dunn) have failed to grasp the opposition between "justice"
and "chadty". (For this, see CHAPTER 2, PARr 2.) It is not amiss to
stress here that Locke sharply contrasts "justice" with "charity". He
refers to Hooker's "great Maxim of Justice and Charity" (E,5). In his
discussion of "the just price", Locke distinguishes "what strict justice
" i" i 51requires" from what char ty requ res. And he mentions, in passing,
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a rule of morality which prohibits injustice and recommends charity:
"Not to take from another what is his, though we want it our selves,
but on the contrary, relieve and supply his wants" (Essay, I, iii, 19).
So far, I have clarified Locke's concept of a man's just act
in terms ·of another man's property, or his exclusive right of disposal,
rather than a law. This simple Grotian approach to Locke enables us to
translate his talk about the mutual preservation of property into a
talk about justice. Men form a political society, for the purpose of
acting justly with respect to their lives, liberties and possessions.
Locke often expresses his concept of justice in a grammatically negative
form. Nobody, he says, ought to commit injustice; or nobody "ought
to meddle with what was already improved by another's Labour"
(ST, 34). Having said this, however, I must now complicate my
exposition of Locke's concept of a just act by bringing in the idea of
a law.
A just act, according to Locke, is not only an act of abstaining
from (i.e., preserving) another man's exclusive right. It is also an
act of abiding by a law. Leaving aside the complex problem about the
relationship of a law and a right, let us confirm that Locke tried to
establish a close connection between a law and justice. Discussing
"the just price" or the just act of selling a commodity, Locke remarks:
"justice has but one measure for all men".52 He repeats the idea of
one universal measure ("all have one measure") in quoting Hooker's
maxim of justice (~, 5). We have already seen Locke's reference to the
narrow "measures" of bare justice, and his use of phrases such as a
"rule" of justice. Given his view that each man is "to govern himself
by" a "Law" (~, 63), it is not surprising that Locke treats a man's
just act in relation to a law, or a universal measure for the regulation
of actions. , ")Indeed, he explicitly states that "justice" (or 'righteousness
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means, according to the New Testament, a man's "perfect" or "exact"
"obedience" to the "law" of God (The Reasonableness of Christianity,
Works, VII, 5, 9, 10, 12, et passim). This "justice" is what Hobbes
would call "the justice of men" as distinct from "the justice of actions"
(Leviathan, XV, 206). To Locke, however, Hobbes' subtle distinction is
not important. We can ascribe to him the view that a just act is an
act of obeying a law.
If we are justified in ascribing this view to Locke, it seems
that we need to settle the following question: Is a just act an act of
abstaining from another man's property, or is it an act of obeying a
law? But in fact, there is little point in settling this question. For
a just act, according to Locke, can be defined either in terms of
"property" or in terms of a "law". The important point is that a hw
prohibits one nan from destroying, or damaging, or impairing the object
of another man's exclusive right of disposal - another man's person
(i.e., his life and liberty) or his possessions. This holds true of the
law of nature as well as the law of a commonwealth. Given this, one man
can abstain from another man's person or goods by obeying a law; or he
can obey a law by abstaining from another man's person or goods. The
law of nature, says Locke, teaches us not to "take away, or impair the
life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Lfbe r ty , Health,
Limb or Goods of another" (g,6). It prevents us "from doing hurt to
one another" (7); or it secures us "from injury, and violence" (8). It
is clear, then, that one man's abstention from another's person or goods
goes hand in hand with his obedience to the law of nature. Similarly,
the law of a commonwealth also prevents one man from injuring another,
though each man has larger possessions in a political society than in
the state of nature. Not every product of a legislature counts as
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"a law". As Locke explicitly states:
Laws provide, as much as is possible, that the goods and
health of subjects be not injured by the fraud and violence
of others; they do not guard chem from the negligence or ill-
husbandry of the possessors themselves. No man can be forced
to be rich or healthful whether he will or no (A Letter
concerning Toleration, Works, VI, 23; emphasis added).
Given this negative function of the laws of a commonwealth, one man's
abstention from another man's person or goods coincides with his
obedience to the laws. Locke himself states that "the breach of laws"
is "mostly the prejudice and diminution of another man's right" ("On
the Difference between Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, Indorsed
Excummunication", King, Life, II, 113). He also equates the punishment
of those who "violate the laws of public justice and equity, established
for the preservation of [men's rights]" with the punishment of those
who "violate any other man's rights" (A Letter concerning Toleration,
Works, VI, 10).
Thus, from a practical viewpoint, we may define Locke's "just
act" either as an act of abstaining from another man's exclusive right,
or as an obedience to the laws which preserve the objects of every
man's exclusive right.' The former definition is Grotian, while the
, h b d d A' t l' 53latter mlg t e regar e as rlS ote lane At one point in the Essay,
Locke also proposes a third definition of justice. "Justice", he
suggests tentatively, might be defined as "such a treatment of the
person or goods of another, as is according to Law" (III, xi, 9). If
this definition is applicable to the justice of an agent, then a just
act is an act of abstaining from the object of another man's exclusive
right according to the law which protects every man's right. Locke's
scattered remarks on justice are not helpful in settling the question
whether a just act should be defined in terms of another man's rights
or a universal law. I have suggested that there is little point in
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trying to settle the question. However. the lack of a precise definition
of "justice" is also a source of ambiguity. In Locke's account of
appropriation (Chap. 5 of ST), there is no law which preserves every man's
right (though there are laws or law-like measures which limit ,appropriation).
So we are forced to interpret "justice" in Locke's account of appropriation
as the non-violation of another man's property, rather than the non-violation
of a law. But Locke offers no explanation as to why in his account of
appropriation,a just act is not an obedience to a law which protects
everyone's righto Thus we must be flexible and opportunistic in
interpreting Locke's concept of justice. If there is a law which protects
everyone's right (or its object), then we may define a just act in
terms of a law or a right. And if there is no such law (as in the
developmental state of nature of Chap. 5 of ST), then we should define
. f· h 54a just act 1n terms 0 a r1g t. This flexibility, or loosness, is not
mine but Locke's. How shall we treat this loosness? We shall treat
the right-based concept of a just act as primary, and the law-based concept
as secondary. This treatment can be justified on the ground that the
right-based concept can be applied to the whole of Locke's political
theory, whereas the law-based concept is not applicable to the whole.
We shall then conclude that though a man's just act is an act of
preserving another man's exclusive right, he can also perform this act
by following a law if it is available and if it protects everyone's
right (or its object).
2. 13 The Administration of Justice, or the Justice of a Spectator
The administration of justice means here a third party's
prevention and correction of injustice among men. Locke discusses the
administration of justice in the state of nature (Chap. 2 of ~), and
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the administration of justice in the political state (Chap. 11 of §!).
In the state of nature which lacks positive laws, impartial judges, and
the collective force of men, every man has a power to execute the law
of nature. He is a judge in his own case as well as in the case of
other men. But this doctrine - "this strange Doctrine" - applies only
to the state of nature. The administration of justice properly so called
is possible only under civil government (~, 13). This is Locke's view.
Nevertheless, his comments on the (imperfect) administration of justice
in the state of nature are useful for the purpose of clarifying Locke's
concept of the administration of justice. In what follows, I shall make
use of those comments to clarify his concept of the administration of
justice in a political society.
In a sense, it is easy to state what the administration of
justice is. The administration of justice is the administration of law.
Every sensible commentator notes that "justice", in one sense of the
.5.5term, is inseperable from "law". Even though the concept of justice
is a historically-evolved complex concept, it is easy to see the
equivalence between "the administration of justice" and '.'theadministration
of law". Then we can affirm that in Locke's view, the administration
of justice (or law) is a means to a further end. This end is the
. f ' l' . ht Locke speaks of "the admd.ndst.r atIonpreservat10n 0 men s exc US1ve r1g s.
of Justice, for the securing of Mens Rights" (g, 219). The "great
end of Mens entering into Society" is "the enjoyment of their Properties
in Peace and Safety", while "the great instrument and means of that" are
"the Laws establish'd in that Society" (ST, 134). To repeat the banal
truth about Locke's claim: "the administration of justice" is the
administration of law, and its purpose is to preserve men's exclusive
rights (or "properties").
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It is equally true, however, that the purpose of the administration
of justice can be stated as the maintenance of "justice". We can say
that the administration of justice (or law) serves to maintain "justice",
or the just state of affairs. Here we are not saying that the maintenance
of law is the end of the administration of law. Given the complexity
of the concept of justice, we cannot follow the simple-minded procedure
of replacing every occurrence of the word "justice" by another word "law".
What we are saying is that the maintenance of "justice", in the sense
of the avoidance (i.e., prevention) and correction of injustice, is the
end of the administration of law. Since "injustice" is the violation
of one man's exclusive right by another man, this is simply a restatement
of the view that the "preservation" of men's exclusive rights is the
purpose of the administration of law. If we use the term "justice" to
express the purpose of the administration of law, it signifies "the
just state of affairs" in the sense of the not unjust (or injustice-free)
state of affairs, or the state of affairs where men's exclusive rights
are mutually preserved. Locke holds that the laws of a commonwealth, as
well as the law of nature, prohibit mutual injury and injustice among
men. Hence, the laws are the "great instrument" of preventing and
correcting the violation of rights among men, or of "preserVing" (or
"securing") their rights. In other words, the laws are the great
instrument to force men to perform "just acts", or to establish the
just (i.e., !!.2.! !:E-just)state of affairs. "Justice", on this view,
is the absence or elimiRat-iOR of "injustice", and a law is the effective
instrument to eliminate "injustice". Locke significantly remarks:
"Common sense, as well as common justice, requires, that the remedies
of laws and penalties should be directed against the evil that is to be
removed, whatever it be found" (Works, VI, A Second Letter concerning
114
Toleration, 94; emphasis added). The just state of affairs is
established negatively by the removal of injustice. This idea reappears
in Locke's definition of "toleration". "Toleration" is nothing but
"the removing that force" which men use "to convert" othe:c men to "any
religion" (.!.2.!i., po 62) 0
We d~ not need to trouble ourselves with a verbal question
whether "the administration of justice" is the administration of laws
for the sake of eliminating injustice, or the elimination of injustice
by means of la~s. Locke himself tends to combine the formal elements
of "justice" (impartiality, equality, regularity, and so on) with
the purpose of the administration of lawso For instance, he says that
the magistrate ought, "by the impartial execution of equal laws, to
secure unto all people in general, and to everyone of his subjects in
particular, the just [i.e., violence-free] possession of" men's
exclusive rights (Works, VI, 10)0 Here the negative interpretation of
suum cuique tribuere is combined with the formal principle of treating
like cases alike.
The administration of justice involves "punishment" and
"reparation" (g, 11)0 The two are distinct from each other, and Locke is
aware of the distinction when he speaks of the "two distinct Rights,
the one of Punishing the Crime for restraint, and preventing the like
Offence .• 0 • , the other of taking reparation" (11). In the state of
nature, everyone has the right to punish criminals. This right is also
called the "Power to Execute" "the Law of Nature" (7-9). Punishment ought
to be proportionate to the degree of a crime. Harm ought to be done
to a criminal, only to "retribute to him, so far as calm reason and
conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his Transgression" (8).
To "retribute", or to give back what is his due, to "do justice".
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"rr]t is just that he who has impaired another man's good should
suffer the diminution of his own" (King, 1!,k, II, "On the Difference
between Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, Indorsed Excommunication",
p. 113). The right to seek reparation, on the other hand, "belongs
only to the injured party" (ST, 11); it is the right to "make satisfaction
for the harm he has suffer'dll (lO). Locke does not distinguish between
"civil law" and "criminal law", but "reparation" belongs to the
former whereas "punishment" belongs to the latter.
Locke holds that in the state of nature, every man has the
right to punish criminals even if his right is not invaded. Every
one can assist an innocent victim in "recovering from the Offender"
what he has lost (lO). Thus everyone in the state of nature does
justice on everyone else, and seeks justice on behalf of everyone else.
But men in the state of nature lack "an establish'd settled known Law",
and "a known and indifferent Judge, with Authority to determine all
differences according to the established Law", and the collective power
to back the sentence of the judge (124-126). Men's passion, interests,
revenges, etc. make the state of nature unsafe and intolerable, so
they form a political society to seek the just treatment of their persons
and goods.
As it is clear from this, Locke's political society is predominantly
judicial. The state is "a high court". Aristotle long ago made the
following remark on the concept of corrective justice: "The just
as a corrective is ••• a median between loss and gain. That is the
reason why people have recourse to a judge when they are engaged in a
dispute. To go to a judge means to go to the just".56 Given this
connection between corrective justice and a judge, it is not surprising
that Locke's political society is predominantly judicial. I should like
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to end my reconstructive analysis by clarifying his judicial concept of
the state.
Who judges a controversy of rights? This is a very important
question for Lock~, and he gives different answers at different levels
of his political theory. But h~judicial concept of political society
(and also of "the society" or "the community") is unmistakable.
"Political society" is described as "a Judge on Earth, with Aurhority
to determine all the Controversies, and redress the Injuries, that may
happen to any Member of the Commonwealth; which Judge is the Legislative,
or Magistrates appointed by it" (.§I, 89; for similar statements, see 87,
88, 90, 91; 136; 19, 20, et passim). If a dispate arises between the
legislative agent and the "people" (or the "society", or "the community"),
then "the Body of the People" are "the proper Umpire" (24, 240, et passim).
It is not at all important to Locke what branch of government authorized
judges should belong to. The judiciary is not an independent branch of
government. The legislative agent is not only a law-making agent, and
but the supreme agent which can direct other powers of the commonwealth.
If necessary, the legislative agent can function as a court. Locke
says that the "Judge is the Legislative, .2!. Magistrates appointed by it"
(89). (Locke does mai.ntain that "the Legislative and Executive Power
come often to be separated (144), and assumes that judges work in the
executive branch if the two powers are separated. But the legislative
agent retains "a power ••• to resume" "the Execution of the Laws"
from those incompetent judges who do not administer justice properly.
(153). What is important to Locke is ~ the separation of powers, but
the subordination of powers.5~
Given the judicial concent of the state, its chief obligation
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is to settle disputes among private citizens equally, impartially,
and regularly. There should be "one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the
Favourite at Court, and the Country man at Plough" (142). It seems
that the idea of "our measure for all" (which I have noted earlier)
has a closer connection with the justice of a spectator, than with
the justice of an agent. The state's role in economic transactions, to~.
ought to embody the ideal of the equal standard for all. The silver
content of coin is a case in point. "The standard once settled by
public authority, the quantity of silver established under the several
denominations ... should not be altered" unless such a change is
absolutely necessary (Works, V, Further Considerations, 144). Public
authority ought to guarantee "the performance of all legal contracts",
but if the quantity of silver is altered, then it counts as "a public
failure of justice" (.!.2!.2.., 144f.). Such a change is likely to "give
one man's right and possession to another" "arbitrarily" (for instance,
a creditor receives less than "his due") without "any fault on the
ff' ,. d " (. b' dsu er1ng man s S1 e !_!_., 145). "Whether the creditor be forced
to receive less, or the debtor be forced to pay more than his contract,
the damage and injury is the same, whenever a man is defrauded of his
due" (ibid.). Thus the state ought to referee economic transactions-
to ensure no party suffers violence or fraud, by setting up a fixed
standard. Currency laws, like the law of contracts (or sales and
purchase), would count as what he calls the laws which "regulate" property
(Sect. 1. 2 above). This "regulation" is designed to facilitate the
smooth and equitable commercial transactions with minimal coercion.58
In economic transactions, as well as in non-economic transactions, the
state ought to eliminate injury or injustice by enforcing one fixed
59universal law.
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I have analyzed Locke's concept of justice above. First, I
have shown that it is the practical negation of injustice (Sect. 2. 11).
Secondly, I have shown that a just act is an act of abstaining from,
or preserving, another man's exclusive right (Sect.2. 12). A just act
also coincides with an act of obeying the universal law which prohibits
mutual injury. Thirdly, I have shown that the administration of justice
is the prevention and correction of injustice by the impartial execution
of equal laws (Sect. 2. 13). Locke stated in the Essay that the idea
of justice is a "complex" idea (III, xi, 9). Locke's idea of justice
is also complex. But I hope that my analysis has made his complex idea
less puzzling, and more intelligible.
2. 2 Other Bounds of the Supreme Power of the State
The supreme political agent, in Locke's view, has obligations
other than the obligation to administer justice. In what follows I
shall consider those other obligations, or other "bounds", of the
supreme power. In Chap. 11 of the Second Treatise, Locke discusses three
other obligations - the obligation to act for "the public good" (135,
142) or "the common good (131); the obligation to obtain "the Consent
of the People" in raising tax. (142, 138-140); and the obligation not
to transfer the law-making power to any other hand (without the consent
of the people) (141-2). I shall discuss the first two obligations, and
thereby complete an exposition of Locke's theory of the state.
The Public Good - a General Slogan
Let me first quote Locke's own statements about the supreme political
political agent's obligation to act for "the public good" or the "CODUllon
2. 21
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good". He says:
"rr]he power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them,
can never be suppos' d to extend farther than the common good"."
(g, 131)0
The legislative power "in the utmost Bounds of it is limited
to the publick. good of the Society". (135).
"~ also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately
but the good of the People." (142).
These statements sufficiently indicate that the expression "the public
good" or "the common good" is no more than a general slogan. The
legislative agent, according to Locke, ought to act for the benefit
of the whole community rather than a part of it. Locke speaks of
"the good of the whole" (143), and "the good of the people" is the good
of one collective body.
But Locke is not precise about what he means by "the public good".
At one point, he explicitly identifies "the public good" with "the
good of every particular Member of that Society, as far as by common
Rules, it can be provided for" (!I, 92). If we take this identification
seriously, then the public good is not the good of the whole society
but the good of each particular member. But on the whole, Locke means
by the "public good" the good of the whole society (of right-holders).
60L~cke's loose talk about "the public good" has puzzled some commentators.
Above all, we should avoid two misunderstandings. First,Locke
is not advocating the Benthamite principle of the greatest happiness
of the greatest number. Secondly, he is not prepared to argue for the
re-distribution of possessions on the ground of "the public good".
Historically speaking, Locke is repeating the old slogan of
constitutionalism. "The common good" is the general object of legislation
(according to Aristotle); and it is the general goal toward which a law
61coordinates human actions (according to Hooker). Locke also uses
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a similar Ciceronian maxim of the spirit of the laws: "Salus Populi,
Suprema Lex" (ST, 158).62 The crucial point, however, is this.
Locke repeats the old slogan, yet he has already poured new wine into
the old bottle. The new wine is his tripartite formula of property:
men's "lives, liberties, and possessions". Under all normal circumstances,
the legal protection of men's propert~es is compatible with, and is
the basis of, the good of the people. Hence, for all practical purposes,
what Locke means by "the public good" can be understood as the benefit of
the whole society (or every member of it) which arises from the legal
protection of men I s rights. Locke nearly identifies "the public
good" with "the preservation of the Society" (g,134-5). The latter
idea is a negative idea of sustaining a violence-free society of right-
holders. This is the basis of the public good.
The public good, or the preservation of the whole society, can
conflict with the legal protection of everyone's right. "Many accidents
may happen, wherein a strict and rigid observation·of the Laws may do
harm; (as not to pull down an innocent Man's House to stop the Fire,
when the next is burning)" (159). In the extreme circumstance where
the whole society faces imminent danger, a man's property may be taken
and destroyed at the discretion of a public agent. This discretionary
power, according to Locke, is the prerogative of an English monarch.
(159ff.). Thus the public good can override each man's property, and
the administration of justice, in the extreme circumstance. Locke's
view can be best expressed in the words of Hume: "the strict laws
of justice are suspended, in such a pressing emergence" (ENQ, 186).
Since "the public good" is a general slogan, it is not fruitful
to discuss its meaning apart from a specific context. It is idle to
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think that Locke had a certain ~latonic entity in mind when he spoke
of "the public good" or "the common good". "The public good", he says,
is "the end of all laws" (165), as well as the end of all political
activities. It is the spirit of the laws. But as we have already
seen (in Sect. 2. 12, pp. 109-10 above), the law of nature and the
laws of a commonwealth impose prohibitions and serve to prevent mutual
injury. The public good, therefore, is something that results from
the enforcement of the negative laws. In economic terms, the public
good means the wealth of the whole nation. Locke indicates this in the
following account of "the bounds of the legislative":
[The legislative agent ought to make provision] for the
security of each man's private possessions; for the peace,
riches, and public commodities of the whole people, and as
much as possible, for the increase of their. inward strength
against foreign invasions (Works, VI, A Letter concerning
Toleration, 42f.)0
Thus Locke's view is that the administration of justice is (normally)
compatible with the public good, and it is (normally) the basis of the
public good.
20 22 Taxation with the Consent of the Governed.
Locke's claim against arbitrary taxation is the following:
The legislative agent "cannot take from any Man any part of his Property"
(i.e., his possessIons or estate), without "his own Consent, ~, the
Consent of the Majority, giving it either by themselves, or their
Representatives chosen by them" (.§!, 138-40). Locke holds that
taxation is both necessary and appropriate for the support of government:
"Governments cannot be supported without great Charges, and 'tis fit
everyone who enjoys his share of the Protection, should payout of
his Estate his proportion for the maintenance of it" (140). But
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taxation is not legitimate without the "consent" of the governed,
i.e., the consent of the majority of the people in the community,
expressed either by themselves or their parliamentary representatives.
Notice that Locke equates "his own Consent" (i.e., each individual
man's consent) with "the Consent of the Majority" of the members
of the community. Once a man incorporates himself into a community
or a society, he is bound to be concluded by the will of the majority
of the community. He must accept the judgements of the majority of
the community as "his own Judgments" (88). This is why Locke
identifies each individual man's consent with the consent of the
majority. The "consent", in this context, means the agreement or
approval of the majority, expressed either "by themselves" or by
their parliamentary representatives.
Locke supports this claim in the following way. Since the
chief end of men's entering into the society is the preservation of
property, it logically follows that "the People should have Property"
rather than lose property. But to say that 1 have property implies
that "another [agent1 can[not] by right take (it] from me, when he
pleases, against my consent" (138). Therefore, those who have the supreme
power in the community cannot take away my property as they think fit,
without "my consent". Given the identity of my consent with the
consent of the majority, it is possible to establish the claim that
the legislative agent cannot take from me without the consent of
the majority of my community. Thus Locke is not advancing an individual
anarchist's claim. He states that the claim against arbitrary taxation
is relevant only to a political society with a permanent legislature,
or to a legislature with no representatives from the people (142).
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Loc~e's claim against arbitrary taxation is primarily directed
against a Hobbesian theory which allows the abso Lut.esovereign "to
dispose of the Estates of the Subject arbitrarily" (138). Like
the claim about the state's obligation to administer justice, Locke's
claim against arbitrary taxation rests on his claim about the purpose
of men's entry into a political society. Hence, it rests on his
account of pre-political appropriation.
I have reviewed the two obligations of the supreme political agent.
This completes my exposition of Locke's theory of the bounds of the
supreme power.
A Short Summary
In this chapter, I have offered a detailed exposition of the
two major ~omponents of Locke's liberal political theory. I have explored
even the most obscure regions of his thought, with the aid of historical
references. But since my exposition is scholarly and detailed, it
is appropriate to present a simple summary of what I have discussed.
I shall not use my words to summarize what I have said. Instead,
I shall let Locke speak for himself. There are three important
passages he wrote. They hang together in a quasi-historical sequence.
They clearly indicate the main points of his liberal political theory.
First, h~ speaks about the origin of property; secondly, he speaks
about the expansion of property in the age of commerce; and thirdly,
he speaks about the administration of justice. Let me quote the
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three passages:
(1) "And thus, I think, it is very easy to conce.ive without
any difficulty, how Labour could at first begin a title of
Property in the common things of Nature, and how the spending
it upon our uses bounded it." (ST, 51).
(2) "[Ilt is plain that Men have agreed to disproportionate
and unequal Possession of the Earth, they having by a
tacit and voluntary consent found out a way, how a man may
fairly P9ssess more land than he himself can use the product
of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, Gold and
SHver, which may be hoarded up without injury to anyone."
(ST, 50).
(3) "[Those who hold the supreme power of a commonwealtlU are to
govern by promulgated established Laws, not to be varied
in particular Cases, but to have one Rule for Rich and Poor,
for the Favourite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough."
(E, 142).
The commercial society of unequal possessions grew out of the prImitive
economy of labour and low consumption. Then the state's chief obligation
is to eliminate injustice from the transaction of private men, by the
impartial execution of equal laws.
This clear outline, however, has been obscured by recent
scholars. In the following chapter, we shall see how recent scholars
have understood - or !!!understood - Locke's liberalism.
NOTES to CHAPTER 1
1. Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer,
ed. Peter Laslett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949), p. 71.
2. Locke uses the word "appropriate" or "appropriation" 14 times
in 27 sections of Chapter 5. I shall list some examples of'his
use of the verb "appropriate":
"a means to appropriate them some way or other" (§I, 26).
"He that is nourished by the Acorns
appropriated them to himself" (28).
.0. has certainly
"God ... gave Authority so far to appropriate" (35).
"Men had a Right to appropriate, by their Labour, each one
to himself, as much of the things of Nature, as he could
use" (37).
"[H1e who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does
not lessen but increase the conunon stock of mankind" (l7).
The last two examples unambiguously show that "to appropriate"
means "to make (a thing) the private property of" someone: or
"to make it over to him as his own"; or "to set apart" (OED,
"appropriate", 1). -Loc.k.ecombines the preposition "to" with the verb "appropriate".
This usage seems to conform to a rather archaic use of the
verb, "to assign, or attribute as properly pertaining to; to
attribute specially or exclusively" (~, "appropriate", 7).
Locke uses the verb "appropriate" frequently, because it suits
his purpose of showing how each man divides up the common world
and makes the divided portion his property at the same time.
To appropriate a portion of the world is to "make" "it" "his
Property" (27), or "come to have" "a property" in it.
It must be noted, however, that his use of the word
"appropriate" is loose just as his use of the word "property"
is loose. The Indian who has eaten acorns has "certainly
appropriated" them to himself (28). Here Locke wants to say -
that the Indian has made the acorns "his own", or a part of
his body, or simply "his". To eat food and digest it, however,
does not necessarily imply that a man comes to have an
exclusive right of disposal (i.e., control) over that portion.
If food is digested, then it is difficult to talk about having
a right over a definite portion. At any rate, it is sufficient
to note that the verb "to appropriate", in Locke's strict
usage, means "to come to have a property in" a distinct portion
of the world.', See my related discussion of the loose images
associated with the word "property", in CHAPTER 3. Locke's
metaphor of "joining" and"annexing" seems to be connected
with one meaning of "appropriate", i.e., "to allot, annex,
125
126
or attach a thing to another as an appendage" (OED, "appropriate",
5, Obs.).
3. For a detailed discussion of the connection between jus and the
17th-century concept of "right", see my discussion in CHAPTER
3 (2. 21 A Right as a Species of Power: A Historical View).
The history of the concept of a right which I have outlined
in this paragraph is well known among historically sensitive
philosophers. See, for instance, A. MacIntyre's comment on
"rights" in After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 67; or H. L. A. Hart's remarks
on "rights" in"Bentham on Legal Rights", Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence, ed. A.W. B. Simpson (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1973); and so forth. The reader interested in my
reference to Japan in this context should read the writings of
Yukichi Fukuzawa, the leading figure in the Meiji Enlightenment
of the 1870's. He discussed, from time to time, the difficulties
of translating such modern Western ideas as "rights", "liberty",
and "socie ty"•
4. In his second Discourse, i.e., A Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality, Rousseau says: "Let us begin then by laying all
facts aside, as they do not affect the question". See!!:!!.
Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London:
Dent, 1973), p. 45. In the opening paragraph of The Social
Contract, he states: "Man is born free; and everywhere he is
in chains. ••• How did this change come about? I do not
know. What can make it legitimate? That question 1 think
I can answer". See Cole, trans • .!£!.2.., p. 156. In both
statements, we see a clear distinction between the matter of
fact and the matter of right.
5. Read the celebrated is/ought passage of the Treatise carefully:
"this ought, or ought not, expresses some nev relation or
affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and
explain'd" (.!!!i, III, i, 1, 469). Hume's "conjectural history",
which I have mentioned here, is his account of the origin of
justice and property in~, III, ii, 2. Anyone who has
difficulty understanding Hume's view on "is" and "ought" should
at least read MacIntyre, "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought''', Hume:
A Collection of Critical Essays, V. C. Chappell (Notre-Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1968). But he should ignore
most of the articles written on this subject.
6. Leszek Kolakowski. Main Currents of Marxism, (Oxford: o. U. P.,
1981), vol. 3, p. 298.
7. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
(Oxford: o. U. P. 1962), pp. 203 ff. and pp. 211ff.
Cicero's Offices: De Officiis, Laelius, Cato Maior and Select
Letters,
(London:
intro. Thomas de Quincy, Everyman's Library
J. M. Dent & Sons, 1909), Bk I, Sect. X, p. 14.
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9. This long note is devoted to a discussion of Locke's idea of
injury (sine jure or without right)o
Unlike Hobbes or Pufendorf who clarified the concept of
"injury", Locke ~ the notion of "injury" without clarifying
it. His use of the notion is informal and flexible. It is
of little use to consult what the rigorous Hobbes said about
"injury", or what the encyclopaedic Pufendorf said about it.
The best way to understand Locke's notion is to take it
informa11yo To "injure" a man is to "hurt" him. But we can
clarify it furthero
First, we should note that "injury", according to Locke,
does not presuppose the existence of an exclusive right on the
part of an injured party. A man can be said to be injured by
another man even if he does not have an exclusive right, or
"property"o This is clear from Locke's account of appropriation.
He tries to show that appropriators were able to avoid injuring
non-appropriators or late appropriators. Non-appropriators
and late appropriators do not have a "property in" external goods
(i.e., they do not have an exclusive right of disposal ove~
those goods). In the Essay, IV, iii, 18, Locke defines
"injustice" as the "invasion or violation" or property (Le.,
"a right to any thing"). But injustice is the violation of
another man's exclusive right, whereas "injury" does not
necessarily involve the violation of another man's exclusive-
right. Of course, we can say that if a man's exclusive right
or property is violated by another man, then this violation
causes injury or the first man receives an injury. Locke
himself says, for instance, that whether the aggressor who
"invades another Man's right [i.e., another man's exclusive
rightl" is a king or a villan, he can do equal "Injury" to
another man (ST, 176). But "injury" is not identical with
the violation~f another man's exclusive right.
Let us confirm, positively, what Locke meant by "injury".
He associates "injury" with "doing hurt" (E, 7), or with
"harm" (93), or "inconveniency" (91). When he says, "any
number of men" may join one community "because it injures not
the Freedom of the rest" (95), he seems to be associating
"injury" with loss of freedom. This point becomes clear in
Locke's account of appropriation. He says: in the "first
Ages of the World", everyone was able to appropriate a piece
of land by his own labour "without Injury to any Body", or
"without prejudice to any Body", or "without straitning any
body" (36). Since "any body" is a non-appropriator, or one
who has not appropriated land yet, the word "injury" here
cannot mean the violation of another man's property or his
right in the strict sense of an exclusive right. The word
"prejudice" here means "detriment", "damage", or causing
"injury" (Q!,Q, "prejudice", 1). '_'Straiten" _means "narrow
or restrict the. freedom, power, or privileges (of a person)"
(OED, "straiten", 5). These dictionary meanings confirm that
L~e operates on the sense of "injury" as harm or damage
done to another man's freedom, or a serious restriction on
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his freedom. Furthermore, Locke says in the same context that
"it was impossible for any Man 000 to intrench upon the
right of another" (36). This statement contains the word
"right", but this "right" is the "common right" another man had
in the.beginning of the world, rather than another man's exclusive
right. The idea of the common right is basically that of free
use and free accesso So we can understand "injury" in this
context as a serious restriction upon, or a damage to,another
man's freedom or free access. We can apply the same consideration
to another statement Locke makes about "injury" in Chap. 5:
"No Body could think himself injured by. the drinking of another
Man, though he took a good Draught, who had a whole River of
the same Water left him to quench his thirst" (33). According
to Locke, nobody in the state of superabundance can possibly
feel that his freedom to take water from the common river has
been restricted or damaged by another earlier appropriator.
The considerations I have given above amply justify my claim
that "injury", in Locke's view, primarily means a serious
restriction upon, or a damage to, another man's freedom. If
another man's exclusive right of disposal has been violated,
then we can say that the holder of this right has been injured
in the sense that he has been hurt, or his freedom has been
seriously restricted. The core of Locke's concept of a man's
exclusive right of disposal, or his property, is his liberty
of disposal, or his freedom of disposal. So it is appropriate
to think of an injury to the holder of an exclusive right as a
serious restriction on, or a damage to, his freedom. ,For a
detailed analysis of Locke's concept of an exclusive right of
disposal, or property in the strict sense of the word, see my
discussion in CHAPTER 3, PART 2.
Finally, I should like to mention one surprising fact.
Most commentators have not even noticed Locke's subsidiary task
in Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise was to show that appropriators
were able to avoid causing injury to others. Perhaps, this
neglect is due to the widespread polemical atmosphere created
by C. B. Macpherson and Robert Nozick. Many commentators know
Macpherson's contention about the "transcendence" of natural-
law "limitations", or Nozick's "Lockean proviso", without
having the slightest idea about what Locke was up to. Locke's
subsidiary task in Chap. 5 is guided by his concern with the
"minimum content" of any law, or his concern with (what some
might call) "a core of good sense" - namely, the avoidance of
injury. Whether he succeeds in this subsidiary task is another
matter. But the avoidance of injury is the minimum spirit of
any law. Karl Olivecrona' s learned article, "Locke's Theory
of Appropriation", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No.
96 (1974), makes mention of Locke's concern with the avoidance
of injury. But this article is an exception in the whole
Locke scholarship. Olivecrona is well acquainted with the
17th-century writings on the law of nature and natural rights.
The rest of the commentators seem to be happy, even if they
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do not see the point of the sufficiency limitation, i.eo, the
avoidance of injury. The reader interested in this happily
ignorant attitude should take a look at Jeremy Waldron, "Enough
and as Good Left for Others", P:lilosophical Quarterly, 29
(1979), pp. 319-280 Waldron devotes himself to the task of
interpreting the point of Locke's "sufficiency limitation",
and tries to save him from Macpherson and Nozick. Despite
the serious tone in which he discusses the matter, he utterly
fails to grasp the point of the so-called "sufficiency"
limitation. To repeat, it is to enable appropriators to avoid
injuring others.
100 My denial of the connecting link between Locke's assertions
about "value" in the Second Treatise and the so-called
"labour theory of value" should be taken in a qualified sense.
We must understand that economists and historians of economic
thought use the label "a labour theory of value" in a loose,
flexible manner. If we mean by a "labour theory of value" the
doctrine that labour is the sole, or primary, source of use-
value, then Locke can be said to have a version of the "labour
theory of value". But this is not the primary sense in which
economists and historians use the expression "a labour theory
of value". Usually, though not always, they mean by it a
theory which explains the relationship between the relative
value of one commodity to another and the quantity of labour
which has gone into the production of each commodity (or
commodities). A theory of this type purports to establish a
unique relationship between the relative price of each commodity
and the effort or time which the labourer(s) expended. Locke
does not have a labour theory of value in this senseo
For Locke's relationship to different senses of "the labour
theory of value", see Karen Vaughn, "John Locke and the Labor
Theory of Value", Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 2,
No.4, pp. 311-326. For Locke's theory of the determination
of prices, see Karen Vaughn, John Locke: Economist and Social
Scientist (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980),
cs. 2.
It might be thought that Locke's assertions about "value" in
the Second Treatise amount to the following ethical claim rather
than any claim of economics: each man has, or should have, a
right to own the product of his labour because (or if) he has
created almost the entire value of ito Though ~ may want to
extract a claim of this sort from Locke, he certainly cid not
make this claim in the Second Treatise, sect. 40-43. Any
literate person can understand what he wrote in those sections.
To put it simply, it is this. Since the private appropriation
of land by means of labour enables men to have agricultural
products which sell at high prices, the private appropriation
of land has proceeded rapidly and common land is growing small
in comparison. Whatever else Locke says in sects. 40-43 is
intended to illustrate or supplement this fundamental point.
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11. Though Locke's references to the "regulation" of property are
few, many commentators have discussed what he could have meant
and what he did mean (without clearly distinguishing between
the two). An interesting short history can be written about
commentators' responses to Locke's remarks on the "regulation"
of property. A few decades before Locke scholarship became
an industry, Harold Laski referred to Locke's sentence, "In
Governments, the Laws regulate the right of property, and the
possession of land is determined by positive constitutions".
Without clarifying what Locke meant, Laski made a critical
comment: "(Blut those laws, in their turn, men of property
will shape". The Rise of European Liberalism (1936, rpt.
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), p. 105. But since
Macpherson wrote a contentious and critical appraisal of Locke,
quite a few commentators have seized upon Locke's remarks
on the "regulation" of property in order to turn him into a
sensible Welfare-state liberal. Peter Laslett suggested that
"redistributive taxation, perhaps nationalization could be
justified on [Locke' sJ principles", in discussing what Locke
could have meant by the "regulation" of property. See
Laslett's Introduction to Two Treatises of Government
(Cambridge: C. U. P., 1970), pp. 103ff. This was merely a
suggestion or a hint, though it is certainly a false representation
of Locke's view. But mOre recently, scholars have come up with
wild interpretations and dressed them up in a scholarly
language. 1 shall mention one conspicuous example here. In
his supposedly scholarly book, James Tully explains Locke's
view as follows: Once men form a political society, all "the
possessions a man has in the state of nature, or shall acquire
in his commonwealth, become the possessions of the community".
The "distribution of property is now conventional and based
upon man's agreement •••• This is one of the major turning
points in Locke's argument". A Discourse on Propertt
(Cambridge: C. U. P., 1980), pp. 164f. Tully is mistaken.
See my discussion of Tully on po 196. Finally, I should like
to mention Geraint Parry's sound account of Locke's remarks
about the "regulation" of property. See Parry, John Locke
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), p. 117.
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12. See my comments in note 11 above. Tully clearly turned Locke
into the fool who willingly lost the fruit of his intellectual
labour. I shall mention one scholar who assumed that Locke was
a fool without explicitly turning him into a fool. Gordon
Schochet, referring to Locke's sentence ("in Governments the
Laws regulate the right of property •••"), makes the following
comment: it is "difficult to reconcile this doctrine with the
pre-political natural right to property". See Patriarchalism
in Political Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 253.
But what is the nature of this difficulty? Schochet does not
explain it to us. It is a difficulty for him because he does
not grasp Locke's assumption that the regulation of the transfer
of property should be minimal. Furthermore, the "natural right"
of property, from the 17th-century viewpoint, is ~ !£alienable.
Locke says that men "give up" their natural power of disposal
partially in order to "be regulated by the Laws made by the
Society" (.§!, 129). Hence, there is no theoretical difficulty
for Locke. All he has to do is to make explicit his assumption
that the "regulation" of property is minimal so that it is
compatible with the preservation of property.
13. I am quoting from Levi-Strauss' wonderful little book, Myth and
Meaning (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 44f. This
book is based on Levi-Strauss' CBe radio talk.
14. It is true of 17th-century general treatises on politics that
each chapter of a treatise is devoted to a distinct topic
(e.g., the state of nature, the origin of property, paternal
power, the origin of political society, etc.). There is
nothing unique about Locke's Two Treatises in this respect.
However, Locke is excessively concerned about the limits of
a discourse, and the limits of a segment of a discourse, when
he writes. Consequently, when he writes a chapter, he tends
not to refer to an earlier chapter of his book, or to a chapter
;hich is to appear later. Furthermore, he has a tendency to
use a new distincti on for the purpose of solving a new problem
within a particular segment of a discourse. He does not use
the same distinctions throughout his discourse (e.g., his
distinction between society and government). Unless we are
aware of Locke's preoccupation with the bounds of a discourse
(and its segments), and his habit of developing distinctions
for a particular purpose at hand, we are likely to fool
ourselves by launching premature criticism, or by calling him
"inconsistent". For his preoccupation with the bounds of a
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discourse, see my discussion in Appendix 2, III, (iii) (The
Bounds of a Discourse).
is. Various expressions are used in the Declaration of Independence
to describe "natural rights". See Carl Becke r, The Decla-ration
of Independence (New York: Vintage Books, 1922). Jefferson
submitted a rough draft of the Declaration to Franklin, which
contained the expression "rights inherent and inalienable"
(ibid., p. 142). Becker notes that there is no indication
that the Congress changed "inalienable" to "unalienable".
John Adams seems to have suggested a change from "inalienable"
to "unalienable" in the course of printing (ibid., p. 175,
n. 1).0 -
16. See Willmoore Kendall, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-
Rule (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1965),
Chap. IV, entitled "The Doctrine of Inalienable Rights".
Kendall wonders "how Locke ever got his reputation as a defender
of the notion of "inalienable" individual rights" (!ill., p, 68).
The word "inalienable", he says, "does not appear to be his"
(ibid.). Kendall struggles to solve this puzzle in Chap. IV
of his book, only to conclude that Locke's doctrine of
"inalienable" rights is "inconsistent" with "the major emphases
of his political theory" which are majoritarian and collectivist
(ibid., po 74). Kendall thus twists Locke three times. Locke
i~defender of "inalienable rights"; he is a majoritarian
collectivist; hence, he is inconsistent. Kendall could have
saved the whole trouble if he had not entertained the false
notion that Locke's natural rights are "inalienable". Quite
a few commentators seem to have a similar difficulty with
Locke's "natural rights", though they do not express their
puzzle as clearly and frankly as Kendall does.
The whole talk about "inalienable rights" is confused.
Jefferson, Adams, and others were not interested in expressing
the 17th-century concept of natural rights. Nor were they
very philosophically acute. They only gave a popular expression
to natural rights. W.D.Lamont has made a counter-proposal
that "inalienable rights" is "a contradiction in terms".
"Inalienable", if taken literally, means that "a person cannot
voluntarily divest himself of a thing; but the essence of a
right is that it can be used, unused, retained or abandoned at
will. In short, by its very nature, it is alienable". Q';Joted
from Lamont, Law and the Moral Order (Aberdeen: Aberdeen
University Press, 19B1), p, 51. Lamont aLso points out: "the
idea of a non-forfeitable right to life is rejected in many,
probably all, civilized societies" (.!E.!.2..). His position is
in fact, close to the view of natural rights taken by Hobbes,
Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke.
However, Lamont's remark that a right "by its very nature"
is "alienable" is misleading. It misleadingly suggests that
alienability rather than inalienability is the "nature" or
"essence" of a right. But Hobbes - even Hobbes - says that
"not all rights are alienable" (Leviathan, XIV, 192). What
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is important is not whether a right is alienable or inalienable.
The important issue for 17th-century theorists of natural rights
is something else. It is this. The alienability or inalien-
ability of rights is based on the operation of the-Will of an
individual man. In Hobbe's case if a man's alienation of his
right is not beneficial to himself, then he cannot consistently
will to alienate it. In this sense, "not all rights are
alienable" (~.). In Locke's case, if a man's will is bound
by the will of God not to destroy himself (not to give up his
life), then he may not and can not give up his right over his
life. "Everyone", Locke says, "is bound to preserve himself"
(~, 6). This statement means, at least in part, that the will
of each man is causally determined by God to preserve himself,
so that he is disabled to give up the object of his right.
For this, see my critical discussion of Locke's account of
the obligatory force of the law of nature in CHAPTER3 , 2. 22
(B).
17. For the relationship between "a right" and "a power", see my
discussion in CHAPTERJ, especially, Sects. 2. 21 and 2. 22.
18. See Bentham, "Anarchical Fallacies"; and MacDonald, "Natural
Rights". Both are included in Human Rights,ed. A. I. Melden
(Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970).
19~ "Observations on Mr. Hobbes's Leviathan" in Patriarcha and Other
Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer, ed. Peter Laslett (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1949), p. 239 & po 248.
20. I shall quote Cicero's sentence here from Thomas Cockman's
English translation, first published in 1699 and reproduced
in Everyman's Library (op. cit. in note 8 above). Cicero says:
the chief end and aim of men's gathering into societies,
and building of cities, (is1 that each one might freely
enjoy what is his right, without any danger or fear of
being deprived of it (Bk. II, Sect. XXII, p. 108).
Locke says that men unite themselves into "commonwealths",
rather than "cities". This is not surprising. In the Second
Treatise, he states that "commonwealth" is a word for civitas,
adding that the word like "Community" or "Citty (sic~l" is
not quite appropriate as a translation (~, 133).
We should not overrate Ciceronain influence on Locke. He
is not as Roman as Grotius, Pufendorf. or Hume. However, Locke
holds that Cicero's De Officiis is the best wort on morality
produced by "human reason" in "the heathen worldho See his
remarks on De Officiis in Works, III, 296; IX, 176; and X,
306. (The Bible, of course, is the "best book" on morality
in an unqualified sense. Cicero's work is the best of all
pagan works.)
Pufendorf also quotes a similar passage from Cicero's
21.
22.
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De 0fficiis (Bk II, Secto XXI), in De Jure Naturae et Gentium
(8. 50 2). Pufendocf quotes Cicero in the section entitled
"Citizens do not everywhere owe dominion of their possessions
to the state" (8. 5. 2). In the previous section, he quotes
Hobbes' remark on the seventh doctrine against government
(8. 5.1). Thus we can conjecture that Locke read Cicero and
Pufendorf to write Sect. 124 of the Second Treatise. Also,
though there is no evidence to suggest that Locke read
De Cive, he knew Hobbes' comment on the seventh doctrine from
Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium (8. 5. 1).
For the Lawson's distinction and its possible connection with
Locke, see Julian H. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of
Sovereignty (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1978), Chapters 3 and 4.
I am not prepared to accept Franklin's thesis about the
significance of Lawson's "influence" on Locke. But he shows
that the distinction between "community" and "government" was
important for those who tried to justify the people's right of
resistanceo
See Kendall, OPe cit., Chaps. III, VI, VII, for h~view of
Locke as the "collectivist" or "the majority-rule democrat".
His approach to political philosophy is uncompromisingly crude.
For instance, he refers to Locke's definition of "political
power" (g,3), and says the following: it is "so authoritarian
and collectivist in its bearing that no genuine individualist
(e.g., Rousseau) could conceivably accept" (Kendall, oR. cit.
p, 60) 0 The words like "authoritarian", "collectivist ,
"individualist", and even "Rousseau" are used as mere labels.
Kendall's book, which first appeared in 1941 as a monograph,
exerted pernicious influence on later scholars and commontators.
It made them forget (!) the ABC of constitutionalism. It
turned Locke into a defender of the arbitrary will of the
majority.
Macpherson inherits Kendall's discourse on Locke's collectivism,
and multiplies nonsensical claims about the relationship between
"collectivism" and "individualism"o Locke's "individualism",
says Macpherson, is "necessarily collectivism (in the sense
of asserting the supremacy of civil society over every
individual)" (Macpherson, Ope cit., p. 255). "Locke had no
hesitation in allowing individuals to hand over to civil society
all their natural rights and powers including specifically all
their possessions and land" (~., p. 256). "Locke's individual-
ism, ••• does not exclude but on the contrary demands the
supremacy of the state over the individual" (ibid.). "It was
necessary and possible) for him to develop li~tions on
government because he had first constructed the other part,
i.e., the total subordination of the individual to civil
society" (,illg_o,p. 258)0 Does Macpherson intend to justify
his right to accumulate an unlimited number of errors? Is he
trying to free scholarship from traditional, or social, or
natural-law obligations? I do not intend to examine his
errors in detailo In the text I provide the correct account
of Locke's use of the idea of a collective society, and its
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relationship to individual men's rights and positive lawsQ
Let us note that "civil society", in Locke's usage, is
equivalent to "political society" (g, Chap. 7, "Of Political
or Civil Society"). Macpherson fails to note two basic points.
First, a "political or civil society" is a "society" (or a
" ."" 1 h") dcommun1ty or a commonwea t un er government. Secondly,
the form of government (i.e., the location of the legislative
power within the society) is determined by the will of the
majority of the society (or the community, or the commonwealth,
or the people).
23. For Pufendorf's account of the generation of a civil state,
see his De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Bk 7, Ch. 2, Sects. 1-8.
His account is a critique of Hobbes'. He explicitly rejects
Hobbes' procedure of generating a commonwealth by a single
pact (7, 2, 9-12). According to Pufendorf, two pacts or
covenants are required to generate a civil state (or civitas).
First, nen in the state of nature "covenant each with each in
particular, to join into one lasting Society, and to concert
the Measures of their Welfare and Safety, by the publick Vote"
(De Jure Naturae [Bl, 7, 2, 7). Secondly, after a decree has
passed among the members of this "lasting society" about the
particular form of government, a second covenant is made
between the ruler and the ruled (7, 2, 8).
Pufendorf takes over from Hobbes the idea that a commonwealth
is an artificial man, and develops it into a complicated
doctrine of "a compound moral person". Pufendorf offers his
definition of a civil state, imitating Hobbes' "very ingenious"
definition of a commonwealth as an artificial man. A civil
state, says Pufendorf, is "a Compound Moral Person, whose Will,
united and tied together by those Covenants which before passed
among the Multitude, is deemed the Will of all; to the end,
that it may use and apply the Strength and Riches of private
Persons towards maintaining the common Peace and Security"
(De Jure Naturae [B), 7, 2, 13).
Apart from the two-covenant doctrine Pufendorf adopts, his
account of the generation of a moral compound person derives
a great deal from Hobbes' account of the union of wills in
De Cive. For instance, he says: "The only Method ••• by
which many Wills may be conceived as joined together, is •••
that each member of the Society submit his Will to the Will
of one Person, or of one Council" (7, 2, 5)0 One compound
person, he also says, is the collective agent "to which one
general Act may be ascribed, and to which certain Rights
belong, as 'tis opposed to particular Members" (7, 2, 6).
We can find in Locke traces of Pufendorf's view that a
civil state, and its rudimentary society, are compound entities.
But as is often the case with Locke, he simplifies subtle
distinctions. He prefers to think,metaphorically, that a
society is one body which must move this way or that way
(ST, 96). Locke attenuates Hobbes' and Pufendorf's talk
ab;ut the union of wills and powers because a social union,
in his view, begins more freely and easily •
•
24.
25.
26.
27.
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For the historical significance of Pufendorf's doctrine
of "a compound moral person", see Otto Gierke's discussion
in Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500.to 1800, trans.
& intro. Ernest Barker (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1934), vol. 1,
pp. 118ff. Gierke surveys how the concept of group-personality
developed within the individualistic framework of modern theories
of natural rights. Pufendorf was able to "drive firmly home
the principle that the corporate person must be conceived as
a 'subject' of rights, which willed and acted with the same
unitary quality as a single person" (ibid., p. 120) •. Gierke
rightly points out that Locke "marks but little advance" in
providing an account of collective personality (ibid., p. 128).
Locke uses the term "revolution" in the 17th-century sense of
the "revolving back" to the previous or the original constitution.
It is a "restoration", implying a return to the original
constitutional order. Many "revolutions" in England, says Locke,
have "brought us back again to our old Legislative of King, Lords,
and Commons" (ST, 223). We must understand the sense of the
Glorious "P.evolution" of 1688, in terms of a restoration of basic
constitutional forms. Locke refers to William III as the
"Great Restorer" in the Preface to the Two Treatises (rather than
as the "Great Revolutionary"). For this older sense of "revolution",
see G. Parry's discussion in John Locke (London: George Allen
and Unwin), pp. 141. Also H. Arendt, On Revolution (New York:
The Viking Press, 1965), Chap. 1.
Since Locke states this minimal right very breifly in ST, Chap.
2, many commentators usually ignore this right. Let u;-confirm
what Locke says. First, all men have freedom to "order their
Actions and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they
think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature" (ST, 4).
This statement can be rendered as follows: all men have "rights"
to dispose of their lives, liberties (or actions), and possessions.
("Possessions" here are presumed to be minimal). Secondly, "no
one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or
Possessions" (ST, 6). Since everyone has "rights" over these
minimal object~ and nobody ought to take them away or destroy
or harm them, everyone can be said to have exclusive rights of
disposal over these minimal objects. In short, everyone's
minimal objects can be called his minimal "property".
The sentence "Every man has a property in his (own) person"
is equivalent to another sentence, "Every man's life and liberty
are his property". For this equivalence, see my discussion in
CHAPTER 3, especially, PART 1, 1. 21 and 1. 22.
For Stewart's account of conjectural history, see his "Account
of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith", included in Adam Smith:
Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W.P.D. Wightman, J.C. Bryce
& 1.5. Ross (Oxford: O.U.P., 1980), pp. 292ff.
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28. Marx's remark on Ricardo and Smith can be applied to Locke as
well: "The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with
whom Smith and Ricardo begin, belongs among the unimaginative
conceits of the eighteenth-century Robinsonades". Grundrisse,
trans. M. Nicolaus, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 83.
29. J.S. MUl states: "justice, like many other moral attributes, is
best defined by its opposite" (Utilitarianism, Chap. V). See
Utilitarianism. On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative
Government, ed. H.B. Acton (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1972),
p. 39. John Stuart Mill is, in fact, just one of the many
theorists who have tried to clarify the concept of justice by its·
opposite. For an extensive list of theorists who have taken the
indirect approach to justice, see F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and
Liberty, 2nd volume, Chap. 8, note 9, pp. 162-4.
30. G.W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, abridged ed.,
trans. P. Remnant & J. Bennett (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1982), p. 384.
31. John Finnis rightly points out that "other-directedness" is one
of the main ingredients of the complex concept of justice. He
also suggests that "doing ourselves justice", and Plato's concept
of justice, are metaphorical extensions. See his Natural Law and
Natural Rights (Oxford: O.U.P., 1980), p. 161f.
32. The distinction between the "agent" and the "spectator" derives
from Hume's discussion of liberty and necessity (~, 408; and
ENQ, 94, n, 1).
33. Cicero's Offices: De Officiis. Laelius. Cato Maior and Select
Letters, intro. Thomas de Quincy (London: J.M. Dent & Sons,
1909), p. 8.
34. ~., p. 100
35. ~., p. 105.
36. ~., p. 10.
37. Barbeyrac states: Grotius "ought to be regarded as the first who
broke the Ice" in the systematic treatment of the law of nature.
See An Historical and Critical Account of the SCIENCE of MORALITY
(prefixed to the 4th English edition of Pufendorf's Of the Law
of Nature and Nations), Sect., XXIX, p. 79. Smith follows
Barbeyrac in judging Grotius' work: "Grotius seems to have been
the first who attempted to give the world any thing like a
regular system of natural jurisprudence" (g, (A), 1; also !!![,
VII, iv, 37). Sidgwick calls Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis
"the epoch-making work" in his Outlines of the History of Ethics
(London: Macmillan, 1919), p. 160.
38. Francis Kelsey's English translation of De Jure Belli ac Pacis
makes Grotius' discussion of the word ~ totally unintelligible.
For this reason, I am quoting from William Evats' 17th-century
translation. Kelsey's translation obscures Grotius' simple point
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that ~ has three senseso According to Grotius, ~means:
(1) "that which is just" in the "negative" sense of 'not unjust"
(De Jure Belli, 1, 1, 3); (2) a moral quality, perfect or
imperfect (1, 1, 4); and (3) ~,or law, or "a rule to Moral
Actions, obliging us to do which is right" (1, 1, 9)0 The second
sense of jus is what is called a "right" in English.
39. Grotius does not take the trouble to elaborate the distinction
between perfect and imperfect rights. But Pufendorf's encyclopaedia,
De Jure Naturae et Gentium, clarifies the distinction. See
De Jure Naturae et Gentiuw, 1, 1, 19; 1, 7, 7; and 1, 7, 110
Hutcheson takes over the distinction from Pufendorf, and transmits
it to Adam Smith. See b! (A), i, 14.
40. My account of Grotius' nomenclature "expletive justice" follows
Pufendorf's. Pufendorf clarifies the idea of the just filling
of an empty space:
What is owed me by a perfect right is in a sense conceived to
be already my own, and hence, so long as it is not furnished
me, I may be said to be lacking something of my own. ••• If,
therefore, I receive something due me by virtue of a perfect
right, I get nothing new, but only a thing is supplied which
was lacking, and whose place was being filled in the meantime
by an action. For example, a man who has borrowed a book
from my library does not add to my library when he returns
it, but only fills a place that was empty. (De Jure Naturae
(A], 1, 7, 11.)
41.
42.
43.
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1132a, trans. Martin Ostwald
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), p. 121.
Pufendorf's discussion of the concept of justice is academic, and
it is more faithful to Aristotle than to Cicero. He is fully
aware of the complexity of the concept of justice. He prefers
to retain the Aristotelian division of justice (universal vs.
partial, and distributive vs. corrective), without subscribing
to or developing Grotius' narrow concept of justice. He even
criticizes Grotius' division of justice, and his misrepresentation
of Aristotle's discussion of justice (De Jure Naturae, 1, 7, 9-12).
Pufendorf's disagreement with Grotius' discussion of justice,
however, is more apparent than real. Though Pufendof refuses to
restict the use of the words "justice" and "injustice" in the
manner of Grotius, he firmly holds the Ciceronian view that the
most important mutual duty of men is the duty of avoiding
"injury" or "harm" to other men (3, 1, 1-2). Pufendorf does not
call this duty the duty of "justice", though he takes it to be
t'hemost important mutual duty. "Injury", ~ccording to him, is
to be defined in terms of the violation of another man's perfect
right (1, 7, 15). Thus Pufendorf's discussion of "injury" and
the avoidance of "injury" is Ciceronian and Grotian, whereas his
discussion of "justice" and "injustice" is close toAristotle's.
J.L. Hackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1980). J. Harrison, Humets Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford
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University Press, 1981). These two books are, of course, more
"philosophical" than scholarly. Mackie and Harrison concentrate
on Hume's "arguments", without giving due consideration to his
historical background. Unfortunately, their ahistorical approach
prevents them from putting Hume's arguments in a proper perspective.
44. D. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: C.U.P.,
1978). K. Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural
Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: C.U.P.,
1981). These two books are more "scholarly" than philosophical.
Forbes and Haakonssen concentrate on Hume's historical background,
without giving due consideration to his arguments. Unfortunately
their historical approach prevents them from understanding, or
examining, the details of his arguments. Thus Duncan Forbes
drops many names - including Grotius - in discussing the historical
background of Hume's theory of justice, without sufficiently
clarifying the connection between Hume and Grotius. See Forbes,
Ope cit., chaps. 1 and 2; and compare his loose remarks on Hume
and Grotius with my precise remarks about them. Also, see note
48 below.
45. For Aquinas' introduction of the term "commutative justice", see
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: O.U.P., 1980),
p. 179. Adam Smith also says that "commutative justice" is the
nomenclature of "Aristotle and the schoolmen". He carefully adds
"and the schoolmen" to offer a historically accurate description.
It goes without saying that modern theorists often tried to use
the label "commutative justice" in a more narrow way _ as the
justice which pertains to the exchange of commodities, or "the
justice of a Contractor" (Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. XV, 208).
46. Aristotle, NichomacheanEthics, 1130b, trans. Martin Ostwald
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merriil, 1962), p. 117.
47. Hume, THN, 504, n, 1: "most of the li'Jles,which determine property
••• a;;-principally fix'd by the imagination, or the more
frivolous properties of our thought and conception". For Hume,
the most important rule is the rule concerning the stability of
possessions (i.e., the abstention from another's possessions).
This rule must be distinguished from the rules which assign
particular objects to particular persons. He says: "we must
ever distinguish between the necessity of a separation and
constancy in men's possession, and the rules, which assign particular
objects to particular persons. The first necessity is obvious,
strong and invincible: the latter may depend on a public utility
more light and frivolous, on the sentiment of private humanity
and aversion to private hardship, on positive laws, on precedents,
analogies, and very fine connexions and turns of the imagination".
(ENQ, 310, n,)
48. Without complicating the matter very much, I should like to state
that Hume rejects the view that justice presupposes each man's
"own" object prior to public interactions. A just act in the
strict sense is an act of abstaining from another man's possessions,
rather than his property;and each man's "property" arises when
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each man in a given society regularly practices the virtue of
"justice". "Property", therefore, does not exist independently
of the virtue of "justice". This is, above all, Hume's critique
of Grotius. It is also an implicit criticism of a part of Hobbes,
and Locke. See!!lli, 491 ("Those ••• who make use of the word
property" without exp LaInLng the origin of justice_ "are guilty of a very
great fallacy"); and 526f. where Hume rejects Ulpian's maxim of
justice. Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke accept Ulpian's maxim as
unproblematical. (Not a single scholar, nor a philosopher, has
discussed Hume's critique of Grotius in a clear-headed manner.
D. Forbes only dimly sees the Grotius-Hume connection. I shall
publish an article on Grotius and Hume in the near future.)
49. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 43. Kant is not
commenting on Locke. He is providing his own interpretation of
Ulpian's formula in this context, without intending to capture
Ulpian's original meaning. Kant's own translation of suum cuique
tribuere goes as follows: "Enter into a condition under which
what is his own is guaranteed to each person against everyone
else" (..!ill.).
50. Historically speaking, Hobbes rather than Locke is the first
English speaking theorist who stated the view that "where
there is no property, there is no injustice". Hobbes explicitly
derives this view from Ulpian's maxim of justice; or what he
calls "the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles" which
is a variant of Cicero's suum cuique tribuere. In Leviathan
(XV, 202), Hobbes refers to this definition: "Justice is the
constant Will of giving to every man his own". "(~lhereforeii,
says Hobbes, "where there is no Own, that is no Propriety, there
is no Injustice". Also, see De Cive, the Epistle Dedicatory.
Locke read Leviathan, though perhaps not very carefully.
Whether he obtained a clue from Hobbes or not, his "moral"
proposition - "Where there is no property, there is no injustice"
- rests on his prior acceptance of Cicero's, or Ulpian's, maxim
of justice. (Cf. my remark on Hume's attack on Ulpian's maxim
in note 48 above.)
51. See "Venditio. 95", Political Studies, Vol. XVI, No.1 (1968),
pp. 84-87. Locke sharply distinguishes between "charity" and
"strict justice" (in sales); between acting "against Justice" and
acting "against Charity"; or between "the common rule of traffic"
and "the common rule of charity". See ill2., pp. 85f.
52. "Venditio. 95", ibid., p, 85. Locke's point is that justice in
commercial exchange abolishes the difference between the rich and
the poor. The just price is "the market price at the place where
[a manl sells" (~., p. 84), and this serves as one measure for
all buyers. Locke states:
[Justice] requires that we should sell to all buyers at the
market price for if it be unjuit to sell it to a poor
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man at 10/- per bushel it is also unjust to sell it to the
rich man at 10/- per bushel, for justice has but one measure
for all men. (!2!£., p. 85.)
53. My use of the adjective "Aristotelian" here is somewhat arbitrary.
But I use it because Aristotle did emphasize the conceptual
link between "justice" and "law"o See Nichomachean Ethics,
1129b, 1130b, and especially, 1134a. In discussing the "what
is just in the political sense", Aristotle remarks:
The just in political matters is found among men who share
a common life in order that their association bring them
self-sufficiency, and who are free and equal, either
proportionately or arithmetically. ••• the just exists
only among men whose mutual relationship is regulated
by law, and law exists where injustice may occur. (Ibid.,
1134a; Martin Ostwald's translation, p. 129.) -----
Locke, of course, read Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. His explicit
reference to Aristotle's comment on (natural & legal). justice can
be found in the first essay on the law of nature (ELN, I, 113).
Aristotle's constitutionalism in his science of poITt'ics also
gets transmitted to Locke via Hooker.
54. The "law" which concerns us in this context is the law which
protects the objects each man already has as his "own", or as
the objects of his exclusive right of disposal. In Chap. 5 of
the Second Treatise, Locke does not discuss a law of this kind
though he uses t'leexpression the-"'Law of Nature". He says:
"The same Law of Nature, that does by this means give us
Property, does also bound that Property too" (.2!, 31). He also
speaks of "this original Law of Nature for the beginning of
Property" (30). Or he says: the "Law Man was under, was •••
for appropriating" (35). However, Locke's references to the
"law" ("rule" or "measure") in Chap. 5 concern the mode of
appropriation, or how they acquire external objects as the objects
of their exclusive rights. The "law" (or "rule" or "measure") in
Chapa 5 is E2l the law which preserves what each man alre~dy has
as his own. Locke's use of the phrase "the law of nature" is
informal in Chap. 5, but what I have stated above is quite clear.
55. Henry Sidgwick, being fully aware of the tremendously difficult
task of defining "justice", begins his analysis as follows:
Perhaps the first point that strikes us when we reflect
upon our .notion of Justice is its connexion with Law. There
is no doubt that just conduct is to a great extent determined
by Law, and in certain applications the two terms seem
interchangeable. Thus we speak indifferently of 'Law Courts'
and 'Courts of Justice', and when a private citizen demands
Justice, or his just rights, he commonly means to demand that
Law should be carried into effect. (The Methods of Ethics,
6th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1901), p. 265.)
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D. D. Raphael begins his analysis of the complex concept
of justice in a similar way. He observes:
The term 'justice' is used both of law and morals. In the
law, justice covers the whole field of the principles laid
down, the decisions reached in accordance with them, and the
procedures whereby the principles are applied to individual
cases. The system of law ~ justice in the legal sense of
the term. ("Conservative and Prosthetic Justice", Ch. 5,
Justice and Liberty (London: The Athlone Press, 1980),
po 74.)
Commentators who concentrate on the question of "social
justice" or "distributive justice" sometimes fail to note the
close connection between "justice" and "law".
56. Nichomachean Ethics, 1132a, Ostwald trans., pp. 121f.
57. This simple point is almost entirely negle~ted in standard
commentaries on Locke. Chap. 13 of the Second Treatise is
titled "Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth"
(emphasis mine). The legislative power is also described as
"that which has a right to direct how the Force of the Commonwealth"
(143). What is usually known as Locke's doctrine of "the
separation of powers" should be re-designated as Locke's doctrine
of the subordination of powers. Here Locke's basic idea is not
"check and balance", but one agent's directing the power of
another agent.
58. Locke's scattered remt!lrksabout the "regulation" of property,
and justice in commercial transactions, can be subsumed under
what Hobbes (and his followers) call "commutative justice".
Hobbes rephrases it as "the Justice of a Contractor" (Leviathan,
XV, 208). He uses the nomenclature "commutative justice
to desig~ate the justice which concerns buying and selling,
lending and borrowing etc.
To avoid confusion, we must note that Hobbes' "commutative
justice" is quite different from Aquinas' or Smith's. Their
concept of "commutative justice" is flexible, and it concerns
not only commercial transactions but all transactions among
private men. Aristotle's "corrective justice" may be slightly
less flexible than their concept of "commutative justice",
because of its emphasis on "correction". But just like Aquinas'
or Smith's concept of "commutative justice", it pertains to
all types of transactions or "dealings" (synallagmata) including
murder, insult, and defamation. In order to clarify Locke's
overall concept of justice, we must stick to their broader concept
of "corrective" (or "commutative") justice. I have referred to
Hobbes in this note only because his commercial concept of
commutative justice clarifies the point of Locke's scattered
remarks on justice in commercial transactions.
59. Presumably, Locke would have to modify his definition of injustice, if
he were to accommodate the view that it is unjust to break a contract.
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Instead of defining injustice strictly as one man's violation
of another's exclusive right (or "property"), he would have
to say that the breach of a contract involves the violation
of the right which another would receive if the contract were
kept. But if he holds this position, the breach of a contract
does not amount to the violation of another man's exclusive
right. Rather, it is the violation of another man s due.
60. In his book,Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth
Century (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1969), J. A. W. Gunn
discusses Locke's concept of "the common good". He also comments
on other interpreters' views of what Locke meant by "the public
good". Gunn himself suggests that we gain very little by
examining Locke's concept of "the public good". See OPe cit.,
pp. 291ff.
61. For Aristotle's view, see Politics, 1283b & 1278b. Also see
Ernest Barker's note to 1283b in his translation, The Politics
of Aristotle (Oxford: o. U. P., 1946). As for Hooker, Locke quotes
his view on the relationship between laws and the common good
in ST, 135n.; cf. Locke's own statements on the function of
law~in~, 57 & 219.
62. Locke states: "Salus Populi, Suprema Lex" (ST, 158). This
quotation was commonplace in 17th-century writings. But see
Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis, 2, 11, 3: "The
general law of rulers is this: the welfare of the people is
the supreme law". Pufendorf refers to Cicero's De Legibus here.
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"Nevertheless, this artificial Ignorance, and learned
Gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last Ages, by
the Interest and Artifice of those, who found no easier
way to that pitch of Authority and Dominion they have
attained, than by amusing the Men of Business, and
Ignorant, with hard Words, or Imploying the Ingenious
and Idle in Intricate Disputes, about unintelligible
Terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that
endless Laby rInth," (Essay, III, x, 90)
"CWlith great Art and Subtlety they did no more but
perplex and confound the signification of Words,and
thereby render Language less useful, than the real
Defects of it had made it, a Gift, which the illiterate
had not attained to." (Ibid., III, x, 10.)
'~I]t appears in all History, that these profound
Doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their
Neighbours; and brought but small Advantage to
humane Life, or the -SocLet Les, wherein they lived,"
(Ibid., III, x, 80)
*This chapter is polemical. I shall criticize recent interpretations
of Locke's liberal political theory, and condemn those who have provided
ill-conceived interpretations. I shall not criticize all recent
interpretations. But I shall criticize all major interpretations which
count as alternatives to my own exposition, or my "objective" interpretation,
of Locke's liberalism. Only a few commentators have made sensible remarks
on Locke's political theory over the past few decades. The rr.ajorityof
recent commentators are quite unreasonable. In this chapter, I shall be
using my polemical skill against that unreasonable majority. If my criticism
is successful, it will overthrow all major alternatives to my exposition
of Locke's liberal political theory. Then it will establish, beyond any
reasonable doubt, the authenticity of the exposition of Locke's liberal
*1 use the word "illiterate" in this chapter. This is not intended to
be a term of abuse. It is a descriptive term for someone who cannot
read a text (for one reason or another).
I '+ IJ
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political theory which I have offered in CHAPTER 1.
The structure of this chapter corresponds to that of the
previous chapter. This chapt~r consists of two parts. In PART 1, 1 shall
criticize recent interpretations of Locke's account of appropriation.
Though I shall discuss various interpretations (including one "popular"
view), my main targets are Macpherson's interpretation, and Laslett's.
These two interpretations are scholarly and influential. 1 shall devote
the largest space to them. I shall show, once and for all, that they
are near-illiterates who cannot satisfactorily read Locke's plain English.
There are other minor targets 1 shall attack. They are either near-
illiterates like Macpherson and Laslett, or the complete illiterates
of an academic kind. In PART 2, 1 shall criticize some recent, alternative
interpretations of Locke's concept of Justice. There are only a few
alternative interpretations, and 1 shall briefly reject them. Thus
PART 2 is much shorter than PART 1.
In the present chapter, 1 shall condemn the low standards of
recent Locke scholars. Unlike the previous chapter which is largely
expository, the following pages contain some openly condemnatory remarks.
Every polemical writing is, and ought to be, offensive. My polemics will
be offensive to those recent commentators who are on the wrong track, or
to those readers who sympathize with them. Nevertheless, my purpose
is ~ to abuse or ridicule any recent scholar. It is to reject main
alternatives to my own exposition of Locke's liberalism on intellectual
grounds. 1 shall try to keep my condemnatory remarks to the minimum. They
are at any rate based on a meticulous study of the vast secondary literature
on Locke, and a close reading of his own works. To soften my condemnatory
tone and activate my intellect, I have occasionally resorted to the
strategy of mixing frivolity with the most rigorous argument. The
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truly intelligent reader will, I hope, appreciate my frivolity.
I have written this chapter in the conviction that the mainstream
of Locke scholarship is so confused tha.t we can no longer trust the
authority of our leading Locke scholars. (Here I am speaking of those
scholars who have discussed Locke's political theory). This conviction
is essentially Lockean. Like Locke, I detest the "artificial Ignorance,
and learned Gibberish" which "prevailed mightily in these last Ages".
Like Locke, I believe that "these profound Doctors were no wiser, nor
more useful than their Neighbours; and brought but small Advantage to
humane Life", or to our intellectual life in particular. In the following
pages and my extensive notes, I shall undermine the authority of
established scholars. I shall undermine it because like Locke, I believe
that the "floating of other Mens Opinions in our brains makes us not one
jot the more knowing", and that "the taking up of another's Principles,
without examining them, [makes] not him a Philosopher" (Essay, I, iv, 23).
Whether "another" man is a scholar or a beggar, a university professor or
a male prostitute, is and ought to be a matter of indifference in our
pursuit of truth.
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PART 1. Interpretations of Locke's Account of Appropriation
There are divergent views concerning the point, or the purpose,
of Locke's account of appropriation. I shall examine five influential views
below, and reject them as false or inadequate. In criticizing those
influential views, I shall also be presenting my own view on some subtle
points of interpretation, and to this extent, elaborating what I have said
in CHAPTER 1. I shall begin with what 1 call the "popular" view of Locke's
account of appropriation. This view is the basis of all scholarly and
philosophical interpretations. It minimally expresses Locke's view of
property.
1. 1 The "popular" view is the following: Locke defended every man's
natural right of property on the ground that property is the fruit of his
1own labour. Though this view is not false, it is misleading. It inadequatel)
describes the point of Locke's account of appropriation, because it isolates
what he says about "the beginning of property" in "the beginning of the
world" from the rest of his account. It ~ yield falsehood II we make
some additional assumptions about Locke. I shall clarify a few basic
points in order to explore the possibility of falsehood.
Locke did not defend the abstract view that everyone, under
any circumstance, has a right to dispose of his goods because he
acquired them by his labour. The circumstance must be such that nobody
else would be injured by his appropriation (e.g., the circumstance of
abundant resources which obtained in the remote past or in 17th-century
America, or the circumstance of 17th-century, English economy which did
not injure anyone). Nor did Locke defend every man's property in the
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abstract sense of a natural "right of property", as the popular view mis-
leadingly suggests. What he defended was a right over the possessions
which men acquired by their labour and commerce (and additionally,
inheritance) in their 17th-century economic society. This economic
society is basically supported by the labour of men, and this basic
feature is what Locke projects to the "beginning of the world". Finally,
we should note that the popular view in question sometimes gets mixed
up with another claim that each man's labour alone legitimizes his
property (or his labour is the only legitimate pre-political means
of acquiring property). Locke clearly does ~ defend this claim.
As I said, inheritance and the voluntary use of money, as well as
each man's labour,count as the legitimate pre-political modes of
acquisition and exchange. Locke unequivocally holds that in monetary
economy, each man has a right of disposal to those goods which he
himself has ~ acquired directly by his own labour. Money, says Locke,
"by compact transfers that profit, that was the reward of one man's
labour, into another man's pocket" (Considerations. Works,V, 36).
Is the use of money tantamount to robbery? No, not in the least.
According to Locke, the use of money is based on tacit consent. He is
not a young Marx who treats money as an embodiment of alienated labour.
He also holds that the voluntary exchange of labour for wages is a
legitimate, pre-political mode of exchange. A "Free-man makes himself
a Servant to another, by selling him for a certain time, the Service
he undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages"; this exchange gives a
"Master" a temporary power over him as it is specified in "the Contract
be tween 'em" (§I, 85) 0
According to my formulation of the popular view, Locke defended
every man's natural right of property on the ground of his labour.
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This view must be understood in light of his defence of the smooth
function of modern economic societyo As Karl Marx clearly saw, Locke's
view on property is "the classical expression of bourgeois society's
ideas of right as against feudal society," and he provided "the basis
for all the ideas of the whole of subsequent English political economy ...2
We only need to add that his defence of modern bourgeois society goes
hand in hand with his claims against arbitrary government, or his claims
for a government of lawso
1. 2 I shall move on to examine recent commentators' views about the
purpose of Locke's account of appropriation. There is a philosophical
version of the "popular" view which I have examined above. Recent
philosophical commentators (such as L. Becker and J.P. Day) have claimed
that Locke has a "justificatory" theory of property, or a "labour theory
of property", which provides reasons why each man should have a right
3to own the product of his labouro On this view, Locke tried to
defend, by rational arguments, the claim that each man should have a
right to own the product of his labouro It is said that each man's
"pains", the "improvement" he brings about, or his "desert", and so
forth are the grounds of the claim that each man has a right to own
the product of his labour. This approach to Locke's account of
appropriation has arisen recently as a result of the philosophical
discussion of the grounds of Locke's ground of property. If we take
it as a description of what Locke does in Chap. 5, it is clearly
inadequate. It is true tha,tLocke makes remarks to indicate the
grounds of the ground of property. But he does so only in passing.
Moreover, as I have shown, Locke wants to show how men actually came
to have property, as well as why that particular mode of appropriation
is justifiable. His primary method of persuation is ~ rational .
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but mythical. He tries to persuade us by an enchanting story about
appropriation. Since Locke wants to establish men's rights over their
current possessions by an account of how those possessions were acquired,
it is not sufficient for him to show the grounds of the ground of each
man's property. He must also show the convergence of the legitimate
mode of appropriation and the de facto mode of appropriation in the
past. Of course, the real past is not so beautiful as Locke painted it in
Chap. 5. To drive home the point that the de facto mode of appropriation
and the de jure mode coincided, Locke cannot use any rational method
of persuation. He must give us a myth. Those philosophers who cannot
see this are bound to mistake their reconstructions for what Locke
actually does. I shall not deny that we can extract some arguments
from Locke. But he accomplishes his purpose by resorting to a myth
of the pre-political past when what ought to happen actually happened.
1. 3 The third view concerning the purpose of Locke's account of
appropriation is not very influential, but it is the view offered by
experts on Locke. John Yolton has claimed that Locke's primary task
in Chap. 5 is neither empirical nor justificatory. His primary task
is to solve a "conceptual" problem concerning "how particularization
f h 1•S •bl " 4o t e common POSS1 e. This claim, though obscurely formulated
by Yolton, has been accepted by another professional scholar, James
5Tully. Yolton vaguely thinks that Locke performed a kind of
transcendental deduction of the concept of property in Chap. 5. This
is an interesting view. But it is plainly false. Even a schoolboy can
understand that·Locke's Chap. 5 is not about the idea of property, but
about property. Why cannot Yolton see this plain truth? And why
does another professional scholar blindly follow the false path paved
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by a confused professional? In Sect. II of Appendix 2, I have examined
their claims in detail, and have shown that they are utterly confused.
I shall not repeat my criticism. Let me simply state my conclusion
here: they suffer from a philosophical disease as a resul t of taking
a particular, 19th-century brand of opium. They are addicted to the
opium of intellectuals - the neo-Kantian "foundationalist" picture of
philosophy. If we are addicted to this meta-philosophical drug, we
begin to hallucinate. We begin to see Locke's discourse on property
and government as a superstructure erected on his epistemological basis.
See my detailed discussion about this ideological inversion in Appendix
2. I have provided a complete cure for this philosophical disease.
1. 4 The fourth view is ~B.Macpherson's. It has been far more
influential than the calm neo-Kantian academism of Yolton. Macpherson's
central claim is that the "purpose", or the "achievement", of Locke's
account of appropriation is to provide "a moral foundation for bourgeois
appropriation" or "capitalist appropriation" by removing traditional
social obligations. Locke successfully justifies "the natural right
6not only to unequal property but to unlimited individual appropriation".
This is Macpherson's central claim about Locke's account of appropriation.
To this, Macpherson adds that Locke took for granted a class
differential in natural rights and rationality; and that Locke's
political state is an entirely collectivist state which demands the
total subordination of individual men to the state.
Macpherson's treatment of Locke ha3 caused a kind of horror
among those commentators who were accustomed to a more rosy picture of
Locke's "liberalism". There have been confused responses of all saets.
Some have tried to turn Locke into a sensible welfare-state liberal
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who would be willing to redistribute the existing distribution of
rights and possessions by laws. Some have stopped reading Locke's
theoretical writings, and concentrated on his personal attitude. They
have tried to vindicate Locke's genuine faith in God and charity in the
hope that this could somehow rescue Locke's account of appropriation
from Macpherson's harsh condemnation. Some, who do not want to have
anything to do with the Marxist-sounding talk about "capitalism", have
cowardly objected that it is "anachronistic" to speak about "capitalism"
in discussing Locke or the 17th century. These are panic responses
which deepened the confusion which Macpherson introduced. These responses,
as well as Macpherson's treatment of Locke, have impoverished our already
impoverished understanding of Locke and the "liberal" tradition.7
Let us concentrate on Macpherson's central claim about the
"purpose" or "achievement" of Locke's account of appropriation. His
strategy is to show that though Locke initially stipulates "natural
law limits" or "the bounds of the Law of Nature", he "removes"
"all the natural law limits" in the course of his account of appropriation.8
The limits of appropriation, says Macpherson, are the "spoilage"
limitation, the "sufficiency" limitation, and (implicitly) the "labour"
limitation. He explains how Locke transcends, or nullifies, those
limitations which he initially placed on appropriation. He thereby claims
that Locke's "astonishing achievement" - and his aim - is a justification
of "unlimited appropriation" (or "bourgeois" or "capitalist" appropriation).
Macpherson's strategy is based on the tacit assumption that
Locke should !!2l alter the "limitations" which he stipulates at the
outsetv But why not? And whose assumption is this, anyway? It is
Macpherson's assumption, and he invites us to share his assumption.
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However, there is no reason to believe that Locke shared this assumption.
He did not assume that men stayed, or ought to have stayed, within the
unchanging limits of appropriation. On the contrary, his account of
appropriation clearly suggests the contrary view that the limiting conditions
of appropriation changed, and OUbht to have changed, according to
changing economic circumstances. In this respect, Locke is a forerunner
of Adam Smith and Karl Marx who tried to explain different forms of
property in relation to different stages of economic development. Of
course, Locke's rudimentary sociology dissolves and degenerates into
his story, without becoming a part of his social science. But Locke's
"bourgeois" liberalism has more in conunon with Smith's historical
jurisprudence and Marx's historical materialism, than Macpherson realizes.
Locke does ~ hold that the juridical standard of appropriation available
at one stage of economic development (i.eo, the primitive economy of
hunters, gatherers, and peasant-like cultivators) also applies to
appropriation at another stage of economic development (i.e., the successive
economy of conunerce and conunercial agriculture). Locke has a "two-
stage" theory of society and uses it in his account of property, just
as Smith has a "four-stage" theory of society and uses it in his
jurisprudence to explain various forms of property.9
It is instructive to ask why Marx, unlike Macpherson, did not
condemn Locke for removing'the limits of appropriation. As I already
pointed out, Marx saw the historical significance of Locke's account
of appropriation. He did not drop the slightest hint that Locke should
be condemned for removing the "limits" of appropriation.10 This is
not surprising because Marx's historical materialism is a consequence
of the bourgeois, political economy for which Locke provided foundations.
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It is possible to connect Locke with Marx's famous statement. "At
a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces
of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production",
or their legal equivalent, "the property relations". Then the relations
of property "turn into" the "fetters" of the development of productive
forces.11 What happens then? And what ought to happen? Marx agrees
with Locke that an old "fetter" - or an old limit of appropriation -
was removed, and ought to be removed. Of course, while Marx applies
this logic to the whole of human history (including the present), Locke
applies this logic only to one turning point in human history, i.e.,
the transition from primitive economy to monetary economy. Money makes
it possible for men to accumulate possessions beyond their immediate
use, for metal is a lasting thing. The spoilage limitation for
appropriation (or more properly, the use/spoilage limitation) becomes
a fetter to the commercial development which is based on. the labour of
men. Hence, it must go. Neither Locke nor Smith consistently applies
the dialectic of rights and productive forces to their present-day
," " it l' ttl"bourgeol.s or cap a l.S economy. This is where Marx differs from
his undialectical predecessors.
Macpherson cannot grasp these subtle points of intellectual
history, and tries to condemn Locke on his own medieval assumption.
I wonder if he is bold enough to condemn his mentor as well, with his
confused standard of hero worship. Marx would condemn Macpherson
rather than Locke, for failing to grasp the dialectic of property
rights and economic forces - or the dialectic of jurisprudence and
political economy. But this is a side issueo The main point I wish
to bring out is the following: Macpherson artificially ascribes to
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Locke the assumption that the limits of pre-political appropriation
remained the same, and ought to remain the same, regardless of changing
economic circumstances. Let us remove this assumption, because it is
not Locke's. What remains is an artificial procedure of showing that
Locke stipulated the limits of appropriation first, and then cleverly
removed them. Locke's achievement, says Macpherson, is "astonishing".
Is it? No, what is really astonishing is Macpherson's artificial
strategy. Let us take a closer look at his artifice.
Macpherson believes, and he leads us to believe, that Locke's
"limitations" of appropriation should remain unchanged. This
deceptive belief is the product of Macpherson's own confusion. He
speaks of the "natural law limits", as I quoted earlier. He equates
these "natural law limits" with what Locke calls "the bounds of the
Law of Nature" in Chap. 2 of the Second Treatise. In his statement
of his own task, Macpherson says he wants to show that Locke's
"chapter on property .0. removes 'the bounds of the Law of Nature'
from the natural property right of the individual".12 But the three
limits of appropriation which Macpherson actually discusses are E2!
"the bounds of the Law of Nature"o Macpherson believes that Locke's
limits of appropriation (in Chap. 5 of ~) should remain unchanged,
because he conflates these limits with "the bounds of the Law of
Nature" (in Chap. 2 of ST). Now the "the bounds of the law of nature"
remain unchaged, whether a man appropriates or not. As I have made
it clear, Locke's "bounds of the law of nature" are the obligations
God imposed on every man whether he works or not, and they concern
each man's minimal sphere of disposal (i.e., control). Neither in
Chap. 5 nor anywhere else does Locke try to remove those "bounds of
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the Law of Nature". Those bounds are immovable. But the limits
of appropriation, or the "measures" of "property" (as Locke sometimes
puts it), do change, depending on the economic circumstances of the
day. Once we remove Macpherson's confusion over "the bounds of the
Law of Nature" and the limits of appropriation, we can see Locke'.s
attempt to "remove" the limits in a proper Ldght;, It is not "astonishing".
It is natural, because Locke does not wish to urge men in the commercial
age to return to the primitive economy of the past, and live within
the narrow confinement of immediately usable property. It is necessary,
because he wants to justify the mode of acquisition and exchange
appropriate to 17th-century English economic society.
Macpherson's confusion is, in part, due to Locke's loose and
"h 1 f "informal use of the expression t e aw 0 nature • "The law of
nature" in the proper and strict sense protects each man's minimal sphere
of control by prohibiting mutual injury.13 But Locke speaks of "the law
of nature" in a very loose manner, so that he sometimes means by it a
changeable juridical standard for appropriation in the state of nature.
In Chap. 5 Locke speaks of the "original Law of Nature for the beginning
of Property" which "still takes place" among civilized nations <g, 30).
This implies that the "original law of nature" may cease to be operative
when the condition of common resources changes (e.g., when fish in the
common ocean become scarce). In stipulating the use/non-spoilage limitation
for primitive appropriation, Locke also speaks of the "Law of Nature"
which "give Cs] us Property" and restricts the acquisition of property
at the same time (31). Perhaps, he should have made explicit the
assumption that the laws concerning the acquisition of property (or
appropriation) are changeable, and differ in this respect from the
158
"law of nature" in the strict sense. But it is farily clear that the
laws or rules of appropriation, in Locke's view, are changeable.
Otherwise, he would not have stated the following: "the same Rule of
Propriety, (~) that every Man should have as much as he could make
use of, would hold still in the World, without straitning any body",
if men had not invented money (36).
So much for Macpherson's artificial strategy and the confusion
related to it. Let us move on to examine his conclusion now. Did
Locke justify "unlimited" appropriation, as Macpherson claims? By
"unlimited" appropriation, Macpherson means the appropriation which
proceeds without the "sufficiency" limitation, or the "spoilage" limitation,
or the "labour" limitation. Since Locke "removes" "all" these limits,
he justifies "unlimited" appropriation! On the basis of my preliminary
discussion, we can see how misguided this procedure is. If Macpherson
is correct in pointing out that Locke has removed the three limitations,
then he should draw the following conclusion: Locke justifies the
kind of appropriation which proceeds without the three limits of
primitive appropriation. Since Macpherson mistakes the three
limitations of primitive appropriation for the a priori, natural-
law limitations of appropriation in general, he turns Locke into a
defender of "unlimited" appropriation. We might say that this is a
"bourgeois" mistake. As far as I know, no critic of Macpherson has
heen able to point this out. Critics have been too frightened by what
they took to be Macpherson's "Marxist" approach. But his approach
is in fact reminiscent of what he frequently condemns, i.e., the
"bourgeois" approach, It is he who treats Locke's limitations of
primitive appropriation as if they were a priori, ahistorical,
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sacred limitations of appropriation "in general".
Let us see more distinctly where l-lacphersongoes wrong. I
shall state, in more specific terms, what he means by saying that Locke
defends "unlimited" appropriation. What Macpherson wishes to claim,
in essence, is the following: According to Locke, men (in the commerc~ally
developed state of nature) can legitimately accumulate as much as they
please, without leaving enough for others, without spoiling the goods
they do not immediately use, and without using their own labour. How
is this appropriation possible? Macpherson's chief answer is that men can
employ the propertyless, and can legitimately exploit their labour by
offering minimal wages and keeping them at the subsistence level. This
is why Macpherson equates "unlimited" appropriation with "bourgeois" or
"capitalist" appropriation, treating the latter mode of appropriation
as an overt (rather than covert) method of exploiting the labour of
other men.
Several objections can be raised against Macpherson's picture
of Locke as a defender of "unlimited" appropriation. First, Macpherson
fails to notice that the basic principle of non-injury operates throughout
Locke's account of appropriation. The "sufficiency" limitation is only
a temporary device for the prevention of injury, which is suitable for
the primitive state of economy. In Locke's view, commercial economy
also prevents injury, as long as men acquire their goods by their
labour, or voluntary exchange, or money, and as long as they accumulate
money instead of perishable goods. As I pointed out in CHA~rER 1,
Section 1. 2, Locke has a confused notion of injury. Nevertheless,
he is eager to claim that men in the commercial state of nature are
able to avoid injuring others. This is precisely because the principle
of non-injury is the minimal requirement of any law.
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Secondly, Macpherson is wrong in thinking that Locke's account
of appropriation in Chap. 5 is an attempt to justify the exploitation
of the labour of the propertyless (i.eo, the landless). Macpherson rightly
points out that the wage-relationship, according to Locke, is pre-political.
Then he extracts from Locke's writings the observation (rather than the
justification) that labourers in 17th-century England lived at the~
subsistence level. By combining the two, Macpherson claims that Locke
justifies the natural "right to appropriate the produce of another's
labour", and removes the initial "labour" limitation (i.e., the principle
14that nobody ought to own more than the product of his own labour).
Macpherson's application of Marx's insight contributes nothing to Locke
scholarship (nor to Marxism for that matter). To begin with, Locke's
account of appropriation largely ignores wage-earners and labourers
who do not possess a portion of the earth. They remain only in the
background of his account. In Locke's view (though not in mine, nor
Macpherson's), each individual man in the state of nature expands his
landed property by engaging in commerce, rather than by employing other
men. We can say that Locke deceives us into b&lieving that the expansion
of landed property is possible without the labour of other men. Or
alternatively, we may say that Locke tacitly assumes the existence of
wage-labourers who work for landowners. In his economic writing, he
explicitly states that "without the tenant's industry, ••• an owner's
land would yield 000 little or not profit" (Considerations, Works, V,
37). But whatever his assumption may be in Chap. 5, his task is to
show how men came to appropriate distinct portions of the world, rather
than how men came to appropriate the labour of other men. As far as
Locke's own "purpose" is concerned, it has nothing to do with the
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justification of the exploitation of the labour of the propertyless.
Since Macpherson's interpretation has nothing to do with
Locke's stated purpose, he conflates his explicit "purpose" with
his "achievement", or the hidden "meaning" of his account (i.e., "the
15meaning it must have had for Locke and his contemporaries"). This
clearly indicates that Macpherson is creating a myth. Let us examine
the central pillar which supports the myth that Locke justified the
capitalist's right to appropriate the produce of propertyless labourers.
Besides using Locke's remarks on the labouring poor of 17th-century
England arbitrarily, Macpherson makes the following claim: "To Locke,
a man's labour is so unquestionably his own property that he may freely
sell it for wages". And if he sells his labour, then the man who has
16bought it acquires a right "to appropriate the produce of that labour".
Is this story not familiar? This is a feeble imitation of Marx's
more subtle account of the "dialectical reversal" of property rights,
or the "transition of the laws of property that characterise production
of commodities into laws of capitalist appropriation".17 But again,
Macpherson goes astray in the very act of following the path paved by
his mentor. Let us see!
Of the sales ofa man's labour and the wage-relationship, Locke
said the following: a "Free-man" can sell his labour to another man
(called "a Master") if he so chooses; and even if he sells his labour,
the "Master" has only "a temporary pover" as specified in the "Contract"
they voluntarily enter into. This remark (quoted earlier) contains
historical terms (e.g., "master"), but we must grasp Locke's general
theoretical position. He holdl? that each man has "a property in his
person" by nature, so that he has a right to transfer his labour temporarily
if he so chooses. Of course, it is up to him what to do with his labour.
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If he chooses to go to America to be an independent appropriator, he is
free to do so. If he chooses to remain lazy and poor, he is free to do
so. But if he chooses to work for another man, then he can exchange
his labour for wages for a limited period of time. Then the buyer acquires
a limited power over his labouro This is Locke's theoretical position.
It is simple and clearo First, each man's labour is his property,
so that he has a right to dispose of it (ioe., control or arrange it)
as he thinks fit, and nobody else has a right to take it without his
consent. Secondly, the wage-relationship is contractual, and is based
on the agreement of free, independent and (formally) equal owners of
property. The wage-earner does not own any means of production, but
he owns his labour and will own money soon. The buyer of his labour
owns means of production (especially, land).
Notice the simple point that the wage-relationship is contractual,
and a contract is binding on a "master" as well as a "servant" and a
"capitalist" as well as a "proletarian". (Here I use these labels
without discussing the uninteresting, historical question about what
Locke meant by "a servant", or what Macpherson meant by a "capitalist".
For I am now discussing the general theoretical point at issue, i.e.,
the relationship between the one who owns a means of production and
the one who does not.) If the wage-contract is binding on the capitalist
as well as the labourer, why does Macpherson look at only one side of
the exchange? Why does he not say that Locke justifies the labourer's
right to receive wages as well as the capitalist's right to receive the
produce of the labourer? The answer is clear. Macpherson has a confused
idea about the general theoretical position of a "bourgeois" theorist,
and then classifies Locke as a "bourgeois" theorist, on the basis of
his confused idea. We should not be afraid of calling Locke a
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"bourgeois" theorist. He is a first-rate bourgeois theorist who defends
the freedom of a contract; hence, the "equal" rights and obligations of
the parties who have entered into the contracto What makes a theorist
"bourgeois'" is not that he "justifies" the capitalist's "right"
to exploit propertyless 1abourerso On the contrary, a bourgeois theorist
is the one who looks at economic realities through the juridical lens
of equal, individual ownership of property, and the freedom of a contract.
His jurtdica1 mod2idoes not justify, but serves to cover up, the
economic exploitation which exists in a free-market economy. Macpherson
should have learned this from Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Programme",
or his famous comment on "Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham"
in Capital, Vol. 1, Chapo VI.
A "bourgeois" theorist defends the equal rights and duties of
contractors, and it is a whole-hearted defence. The "public authority",
says Locke, "is guarantee for the performance of all legal contracts.
(Further Considerations, Works V, 144). It is "a public failure of
justice" if the state "arbitrarily give[s] one man's right and possession
to another" contrary to their voluntary transaction, and thereby alters
the standard of formal equality (ibid., 145). A bouregois theorist not
only defends the freedom of a contract, and the equal rights of contractors.
He also believes that each man's voluntary transfer of his labour to
another man for a limited time is compatible with his right of "dispose
of" his labour (i.e., his right to control his labour). Each man's
voluntary transfer of labour is not Entfremdung - not a total "alienation"
of his labour which would result in a loss of control over what he
originally wanted to get in exchange for his labour. "I" decide what to
do with "my labour"; "r" agree with other men to use "money" as a
. . 1 d "I" k f "hi'"universal, commerc1al equ1va ent; an agree to wor or m 1n
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exchange for the wages we have agreed upon. Locke defends the voluntary
basis of social relationships so earnestly that he even claims that
"the Needy Beggar" is rightly subject to "the Rich Proprietor", not
because of "the Possession of the Lord" but because "the Consent of
the poor Man" (E,43; emphasis added). This is Locke's bourgeois formalism
(legalism & voluntarism) par excellence, rather than his deliberate
defence of the rich against the poor.
What can we say about Macpherson, then? He cannot describe
Locke as justifying the capitalist's right of appropriation. This
description is partial. He justifies the rights of those who labour as
well as the rights of those who employ the labour of other men. Locke's
theoretical position concerning the self-ownership of labour and the
freedom of a contract, by itself, does not "achieve" anyone-sided
justification, either for the capitalist or for the labourers. What
it accomplishes instead is that his beautiful theory conceals some harsh
economic realities of 17th-century England (e.g., the poverty of labourers).
It conceals them from us, from 17th-century readers, and from Locke
himself. This "achievement" is not Locke's theoretical achievement, but
the ideological function of his theory. Locke cannot even see that there
is a serious gap between economic realities (of a certain section of
17th-century England) and his own theoretical construct. Macpherson
tries to fill the gap by transforming Locke into a theorist who has
provided a "moral foundation" for aapitalist appropriation. In so doing,
he utterly misrepresents Locke's stature as a first-rate bourgeois
theorist, i.e., a theoretical defender of the equal rights of the rich
and the poor. He also misrepresents Locke's failure to fill the gap
between ugly economic realities of 17th-century England, and the beautiful
model of economic society according to which everyone has a
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property in his person and his goods, and enjoys the maximum freedom of
exchange. Macpherson's treatment of Locke is the best example of a
confused approach to the relationship between a bourgeois theory of
society and the economic reality from which it arises. Locke's account
of appropriation is modelled upon the active side of a 17th-century economic
society. Its ideological function is to make us forget the plight of
the labouring poor. Macpherson wanted to remind us of the labouring
poor of 17th-century Englando But he should not have given us a myth
of the "moral" "justification" of capitalist exploitation.
I have chosen to discuss Macpherson's interpretation of Locke
at length, because it has been influential and provoked various confused
responseso I have tried to show that it is a deeply confused interpretation.
I should like to conclude my discussion by making a few additional
remarks. First, since Macpherson does not connect Locke's account of
appropriation to his theory of the state he fails to recognize that the
point of his defence of economic freedom (as natural) is to preserve the
emerging economic order of 17th-century England by laws against the
arbitrary power of the state. His view of Locke's political state is
entirely absurdo18 Secondly, Macpherson claims a la R. H. Tawney that
Locke "undermine [slItthe "traditional view that property and labour were
social functions, and that ownership of property involved social
bH t· " 19o 19a 10ns 0 Locke does undermine this view. But this has nothing
to do with his removal of the three limits of appropriation. Even if
he had not removed the limits, he could have undermined the traditional
or medieval view about "social obligations"o Locke's account of the
beginning of property is sufficient for this purpose, because it
establishes each man's right of property independently of any social
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obligation. Finally, since I have said a number of negative things
about Macpherson (and could have said more 'by discussing his
subsidiary claim about a class differential in natural rights and
rationality), I should like to mention one positive thing. Macpherson
is one of the few commentators who have clearly understood that Locke
projects features of the 17th-century world of property into the pre-
poli tical past. "Locke' s state of nature", he rightly points out,
is "a curious mixture of historical imagination and logical abstraction
" 20 •from civil society. Well put. We only regret that Macpherson
cannot see his own interpretation of Locke as "a curious mixture" of
critical imagination and logical abstraction from the existing text.
1. 5 We now come to the last, influential view concerning the
purpose of Locke's account of appropriation. This view was first
propounded by Peter Laslett in Cambridge, England, in 1960's - almost
at the same time when Macpherson offered his interpretation of Locke in
North America. Although the two interpretations arose almost at the
same time, they are entirely different. Their differences reflect the
differences between England and America, between conservative culture
and progressive culture, or between the decline of capitalism and the
growth of capitalism. Macpherson's attempt to link Locke to capitalist
exploitation, like Leo Strauss' earlier suggestion about Locke and
the "spirit of capitalism", arose from the promised land of ever-expanding
capitalism. But in England, capitalism had been steadily declining.
Given this, nobody would expect an English scholar to produce a forward-
looking picture of John Locke. In fact, Peter Laslett did not link
Locke to the world-historical economic force of American capitalism.
He connected Locke's Two Treatises, and its Chap. 5, to a conservative
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gentleman who had lived in Kent. Laslett stated his view of Locke's
account of appropriation in his editorial notes to Chap. 5 of the
Second Treatise: "the whole chapter on property" was written "as a
direct refutation of Filmer' s works" (.21, 25n.; also 28n.).
Can this local view be true? I shall argue that it is false.
But before I begin, I should like to survey the degree of Laslett's
influence. His influence seems to be most strongly felt among historically-
minded "scholars" in British Isles, rather than "political scientists"
in North America. John Dunn was the first to repeat Laslett's view with
a slight modification of his own. He said: "Filmer forced upon him
[i.e., Locke] the necessity of demonstrating that property right in
, i 1 d' bl "1 " 21origln was not s mp y re UCl e to posltlve aw. James Tully
followed in the footsteps of his mentors, and emphasized the significance
of the connection between Filmer and Locke's Chap. 5.22 Laslett's view
was challenged by K. Olivecrona, but P. Kelly tried to meet this
challenge by strengthening Laslett's case.23 Most recently, Alan Ryan
has been puzzled by the purpose of Locke's account of appropriation.
In his recent book, he has solved his puzzle by treating Locke's account
as a reply to Filmer. Though he is acute from time to time, his
understanding of Locke has been under the influence of Laslett and Tully.
So Ryan has stated the following: "The most plausible explanation I can
offer" about the point of Chap. 5 is that "Locke knew that the most
important argument in Filmer's armoury was the claim that unless someone
had been the initial owner of everything, nobody could have come by
d' Ld 1 tLt l II 24in lVl ua 1 es.
Laslett's view has been influential. It has been accepted as
true by those scholars who are not happy with Macpherson's treatment
of Locke. But Laslett's view is false, no matter how many scholars
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may profess to support it. The fact of the matter is simple. Those
scholars who have repeated Laslett's view by modifying it here and
there are typical victims of professionalism. They have lost their
innate ability to readQ They have relied too heavily on Laslett,
and have repeated his mistake. I recommend the reader to examine
what they have written about the relationship between Filmer and Locke's
account of appropriation. The reader will soon discover that they
do not offer any argument to defend their case.
Illiteracy is a common disease among professional scholars
and scientists, and it is not surprising that quite a few Locke
scholars have become victims of this professional diseaseo But this
is not all. Laslett and his followers believe that they are offering
a genuine, scholarly alternative to Macpherson's treatment of Locke's
account of appropriation. This is more "astonishing" than Macpherson's
astonishing achievement. I believe that they have lost their sense of
reality as well as their reading ability.
Some of the scholars I have mentioned are very famous. But
I must confess that I can not find a very high standard of
scholarship in the works of those scholars who have blindly followed
Laslett's lead. I do have a certain amount of respect for Laslett,
because he has made pioneering, scholarly efforts in producing a critical
edition of the Two Treatises. He has left a valuable work, though
he has made certain errors in his Introduction and extensive notes.
But I cannot help condemning those Locke scholars who have been unable
to detect his errorso They have taken over the results of Laslett's
historical research without critical scrutiny. Are they incompetent?
Or do they lack the courage to criticize Laslett? Perhaps, I
should not ask these questionsQ But I b~lieve that students and
169
general readers w?uld be happier if they did not advance their unfounded
claims about Locke and Filmero25
Since those scholars have very little to offer in support of
Laslett's view of Locke's account of appropriation, my procedure is simple.
1 shall examine what Laslett said, and show that his clatm is unfounded.
If 1 can show this, then 1 can undermine the basis of all other claims
So 1 shall cnncentrate on Laslett, and give a quick glance at some extra
cLad.ms j, By this method, I shall show that Locke's purpose is not to
refute Filmer, nor to meet his challenge.
In his notes to Chap. 5, Laslett makes a few remarks to suggest
that Locke tried to write his account of appropriation as a refutation of,
or in response to, Filmero Laslett refers to the opening paragraph of
Chapo 5 where Locke alludes to Filmer and formulates his own task. Laslett
specifically refers to lines 16-19 of sect. 25 where Locke says, "But I
shall endeavour to shew, how Men might come to have a property ••• without
any express Compact of all the Commoners" (25). He says: "This sentence
confirms that this par~graph [i.e., secto 25], and the whole chapter on
property which follows, were written with Filmer's works in mind, and as
a direct refutation of them" (25 n) , Why does this sentence confirm Locke t s"
intention to refute Filmer's works? The reason is that Filmer "raised
the difficulty that original communism could not give way to private property
without the universal consent of mankind". Laslett indicates that Locke
had in mind a particular passage of Filmer's tract, his "OBSERVATIONS UPON
H. GROTIUS IE JURE BELLI ET PACIS". Laslett himself has edited Filmer's works,
where we find the following statement made by Filmer against Grotius:
Certainly it was a rare felicity, that all the men in the world
at one instant of time should agree together in one mind to
change the natural community of all things into private dominion:
for without such a unanimous consent it was not possible: for
if but one man in the world has dissented, the alteration had
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been unjust, because that men by the law of nature had a right
to the common use of all things in the world; so that to have
given a propriety of anyone thing to any other, had been t026have robbed him of his right to the common use of all things.
Laslett assumes that the difficulty Filmer points out in the above passage
is the "very great difficulty" that Locke mentions in the opening paragraph.
According to Laslett, therefore, Locke's task in Chap_ 5 is to provide
"a direct refutation" of Filmer's view concerning the incompatibility
of the original community and property. His task is to show that Filmer
is wrong in thinking that the original community cannot be converted into
the world of property without a historically implausible,universal consent
of men.
What shall we say about Laslett's understanding of the opening
paragraph of Chap. 5, and its relationship to Filmer? It is seriously
distorted by Laslett's prior belief that Locke must have been eager to
refute Filmer. To begin with, it is absurd to speak about "a direct
refutation of Filmer's worksu. Locke directly refutes Filmer's views in
the First Treatise, by quoting his passages exactlY and extensively. In
Cha~5 of the Second Treatise, however, there is not a single direct
quotation from "Filmer's works". Locke only mentions, in the opening
paragraph and in sect. 39, the view that God originally gave the world
to Adam as his exclusive property. The name "Filmer" is not even mentioned.
We cannot possibly describe Chap. 5 as "a direct refutation of Filmer's
works", since Locke does not directly attack any specific point Filmer
raised. But we shall be charitable to Laslett on this point. We shall
take him to be advancing a weaker claim that Locke tried to respond to
Filmer's criticism, or his challenge, in Chap. 5. What Laslett really
wants to say is something like this: Locke's account, though it is not
a direct refutation, is still an attempt to overcome the difficulty he
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pointed out to him.
Leaving aside the verbal point about "a direct refutation", let
us consider whether Laslett is justified in claiming that Locke responded
to Filmer's criticism of Grotius' compact theory of the origin of prop-
erty. Let us suppose that Locke read Filmer's tracts before he wrote
Chap. 5027 But this alone does not justify the claim that Locke's
account of appropriation is a critical response to Filmer's criticism
of Grotius. Before Locke wrote Chap.5, he read not only Filmer's tracts
but other theorists' works. Laslett's claim is based upon the conjecture
that the "very great difficulty" Locke mentions is the specific difficulty
Filmer raised against Grotiuso There are two objections to this
conjecture. First, in Chap. 5, Locke does £2! dispute Filmer's claim,
i.e., the claim that the legitimate conversion of community into
property is impossible because it requires a historically implausible,
universal consent of men. Locke himself does £2! assume that a universal
consent is required for the legitimate conversion of community into
property. On the other hand, Filmer's criticism of Grotius has a force
only if we assume a universal consent is the sole basis of the legitimate
conversion of community into property. Locke explicitly denies the
necessity of such a universal consent: "if such a consent as that was
necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding the Plenty God had given
him" <§I, 28)0 Given this view, there is no reason to believe that
Filmer's criticism of Grotius was a challenge Locke had to meet in
Chap. 5.
Secondly, let us recall what I said earlier in my detailed
account of Locke's formulation of the problem of the origin of property_
In Sec. 1. 1 of CHAPTER 1, I pointed out what Locke calls "a
very great difficulty" is a general difficulty of giving ·a coherent
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account of explaining the origin of property upon the assumption of the
original community of things. Locke's point is the following: although
we may readily grant the existence of the original community of things,
"some" find it difficult to understand or explain how each man's exclusive
property could arise from the original community. (In his own words:
"this [i.e., the original community] being supposed, it seems to some
a very great difficulty, how anyone should ever come to have a Property
in any thing" (25).) As Locke's text stands, we cannot equate this
general difficulty with the specific difficulty raised by Filmer, such
as the hi~toricity of a universal consent, or the necessity of a
universal consent as the basis of legitimate conversion. In fact, it
is even arguable that Filmer is excluded from "some" who find it difficult
to explain the origin of pr0perty. From the very beginning of Chap. 5,
Locke takes it for granted that God gave the world to mankind in common.
"Some" are those who share this assumption with Locke. This is fairly
clear from what he says. Natural reason and revelation confirm the
existence of the original C,Ommunity of things. "But this being supposed,"
"it seems to some a very great difficulty" to explain the origin of
property. Filmer does not share this assumption. He is the one who
rejects the assumption, contrary to natural reason and revelation.
Laslett's identification of "a very great difficulty" is wrong.
He connects it with Filmer's objection to Grotius, without offering any
reason. He does so, because Locke also mentions Filmer's view in the
opening paragraph. But here again, Laslett is misled by his own belief
that Locke tried to refute, or answer, Filmer in Chap. 5. He forgets
the simple point that Locke can mention Filmer's view (or anyone
else's view for that matter) without intending to refute it, or even
taking it seriously. Locke certainly does not take Filmer's alternative
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premise seriously. He quickly dismisses it by appealing to biblical
evidence in the First Treatise (FT, 24, 29, 30, 40). Of course, he
does not have to reject this false premise again in Chap. 5. Neither
Filmer's objection to Grotius nor Filmer's own premise poses a serious
challenge to Locke. Why does Locke mention Filmer's view in the opening
paragraph, then? The answer is that Locke wants to make it clear to his
readers that his account is the very opposite of what Filmer stands for
(i.e., Adam's original, private dominion and absolute monarchy).
Elsewhere in the Second Treatise, Locke contrasts his own view of
freedom with Filmer's view (22; 57), or his own view of taxation with
.Hobbes' view (138). This does not mean that Filmer's view of freedom,
or Hobbes' view of taxation, posed a serious "challenge" to Locke's
political theory. Locke contrasts what he takes to be true with what
he takes to be false., in order to clarify his position. 28 The same holds
true of what he says in the opening paragraph of Chap. 5. He mentions
Filmer's alternative premise and conclusion as a false solution to, or
a false dissolution of, the prima facie difficulty of offering a coherent
account of the origin of property. Then he announces that he will
"endeavour" to offer a true solution to the prima facie difficulty of
"some", i.e., his own account of the origin of property. (The "difficulty"
is only prima facie. It is not difficult for Locke to show the origin
of property. "Some" may have a difficulty; but as Locke expresses
himself freely and triumphantly at the very end of his account, "it is
very easie" for him "to conceive'" how labour began property (51).
Laslett has no rational argument to justify his treatment of
Locke's account of appropriation. It is bizarre to claim that Locke's
statement of his own task ("I shall endeavour to shew ••• ") "confirms"
his intention to refute, or answer, Filmer's challenge. Filmer offers
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nothing which Locke needs to refute, or take seriously, in Chap. 5. But
"rational argument" is not the end of the matter. Laslett is a
professional historian, and he appeals to the higher court of history.
He wishes to maintain something like the following position: even if
Locke's account is not a reply to Filmer, it developed out of his
attempt to refute or answer Filmer. Given Laslett's professional competence,
we naturally expect him to win his case in the higher court of history.
Hany Locke scholars believe that he has won. But they have forgotten
the proverb, "Even Homer sometimes nods". If Homer does, a fortiori
Laslett does. In fact, Laslett not only nods, but enjoys a deep,
dogmatic slumber. Let me wake him up now.
What facts support Laslett's claim about the development of
Locke's account of appropriation? Laslett refers to one "fact" which
could make his assertion credible. In his note to sect. 28, ST, Laslett
refers to Jean Barbeyrac, the French legal theorist who ·translated and
annotated Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium. Barbeyrac remarks,
says Laslett, that "Locke's discussion [of the origin of property] grew
out of his refutation of Filmer" (28 n ,}, Since Barbeyrac was a great
admirer of Locke as well as the best 18th-century commentator on Grotius
and Pufendorf, his remark certainly deserves attention. But alas! This
remark is Laslett's own invention. In note 3 to Bk. 4, Ch. 4, Sect. 4,
of De Jure Naturae etGentium [81, Barbeyrac mentions Filmer' s view that
God originally gave the world to Adam as his exclusive property. He
says: "An English Knight, named Robert Filmer, maintains it [i.e., this
view] with a great deal of Heat ••• to prove the absolute Power which
he attributes to Sovereigns, and which, as he pretends, has come down
by Succession from the Authority of ~ •••0" Barbeyrac continues:
"But Hr. ~ (sic.]" "has confu.ted that Book Patriarcha", and "answers
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judiciously" that God gave the world to Adam "in a common Right with all
Mankind". This is all. Barbeyrac merely offers a short summary of
the First Treatise. He is not at all suggesting that Locke's account of
appropriation "grew out of his refutation of Filmer".
Laslett's misuse of Barbeyrac is not accidental. It is a symptom
of his deep, dogmatic slumber. He believes that Locke's own political
theory (of the Second Treatise) developed out of his refutation of Filmer's
doctrine of absolute monarchy. This is Laslett's deeply-held, groundless
belief. This belief, together with the intensity of his historical
research, must have caused a kind of hallucination. I shall shortly return
to Laslett's groundless belief. But let us first ask whether he has more
historical facts which can support his claim about the development of
Locke's account of appropriation. Since Laslett's claim is obscurely
formulated, we shall analyze it into two parts. First, Locke's account of
appropriation developed out of his refutation of Filmer's claim about
Adam's original, private domi~ion. Laslett does not explicitly state this
view, but his reference to Barbeyrac shows his tacit commitment to it.
Secondly, Locke's account of appropriation developed out of his refutation,
or reply to, Filmer's criticism of Grotius' compact theory. We have seen
that Barbeyrac's note supports neither of these claims. We now ask what
else can support them.
As to the first claim, our answer is clear. Laslett's own historical
research undermines it, so that he cannot possibly defend it. Laslett has
contributed to Locke scholarship by showing that Locke had composed a
substantial portion of the Second Treatise before he attempted a refutation
of Filmer in the First Treatise. His discussion of the earlier composition
of the Second Treatise is solid, and it is free from the kind of hallucination
which he suffers on other occasions. (See his Introduction, pp. 58 ff.)
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He himself draws special attention to the chronological priority of
the Second Treatise in the Forward to the Second Edition (1967):
the First Treatise was written after, not before the Second00.. If this claim is in fact justifiable, it has very
considerable consequences for the general interpretation of
Locke's book and of Locke's attitudeo •••
It is somewhat disconcerting, therefore, to read scholarly
accounts of the book ••• which continue to assert that
Locke, having dealt with Sir Robert Filmer in the First
Treatise, went on to his Second (po XV; emphasis in the
original)o
Let us congratulate Laslett. He has established his claim about the
earlier composition of the Second Treatiseo But he is wrong in
B£! rejecting the view that Locke's account of appropriation developed
out of his refutation of Filmer's claim about Adam's origina~ private
dominion. Locke refuted it in the First Treatise, in the work which he
wrote after the Second Treatise. What is really "disconcerting" is
that Laalett himself continues to assume that Locke refuted Filmer's
claim about Adam's original dominion first, and then "went on" to
develop his own account of appropriation. Laslett himself fails to
see one of the "very considerable consequences"o Chronologically speaking,
Locke wrote a substant LaI portion of Chap. 5 first, and then went on to
write a brief refutation of Filmer's claim. We shall, therefore, reject
the first part of Laslett's historical claim.
Next we shall reject the second part of his historical claim,
i·.e., the view that Locke's account of appropriation developed out of
his refutation of, or reply to, Filmer's criticism of Grotiuse We have
already seen that there is no reason that Locke should respond to Filmer's
criticism of Grotius seriouslye If there is no reason, then there must
be something wrong with the historical account which portrays Locke's Chap.
5 as a response to Filmere Without repeating my criticism of Laslett's
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understanding of the opening paragraph of Chap. 5, I shall criticize
Laslett's historical understanding of the Second Treatise on historical
grounds. His historical underst~nding of the Second Treatise is the
general viewpoint from which he advances his particular claim about
the connection between Locke's Chap. 5 and Filmer's criticism of Grotius.
Though Laslett offers no rational argument to establish the supposed
connection, he tries to persuade us by writing a peculiar, historical
account of the origin of the Second Treatise. He maintains that Locke
began to write the Second Treatise with the object of refuting the views
which Filmer had expressed in his tracts. In his note to sect. 22 of
the Second Treatise, Laslett states that it was written "against his
[i.e., Filmer's1 tracts" whereas the First Treatise was written "against
Patriarcha". According to Laslett, Locke "originally planned" the
Second Treatise as a critical reply to Filmer's tracts (Laslett's
Introduction, p. 59). In fact, he had a 1679 collection of Filmer's
tracts (p. 58). But the reply he prepared in the Second Treatise was
"insufficient because it left out of account the most important work of
the man he was criticizing", namely, Patriarcha published in 1680 (p, 59).
So Locke decided to write the First Treatise in order to execute his
original plan on a full scale. This historical account, peculiar as it
is, is consistent with Las1ett's own claim about the chronological priority
of the Second Treatise. It also supports the view that Locke developed
his account of appropriation by responding to Filmer's "OBSERVATIONS"
on Grotius. Therefore, it is very important t~ see that Laslett's
historical account of the Second Treatise is a fairy-tale of his own
creation.
What little bird has told Las1ett that Locke wrote the Second
Treatise in order to refute what Filmer bad written in his tracts?
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Laslett does not have sufficient evidence to establish his claim about
Locke's intention to write the Second Treatise. He quotes Locke's
short remark on Filmer from his notebook ("Filmer to resolve the
conscience")(p. 58). He also says that Locke mentions Filmer's name
in three places of the Second Treatise and refers to Filmers tracts at
one point in the Second Treatise, (§I, 22n.)0 But what else? Laslett
refers to Locke's quotation from Filmer's "OBSERVATIONS" on Hobbes.
This quotation can be found in one of Locke's early notebookso Laslett
makes an interesting comment: "We may believe if we wish that the train
of thought which gave rise to Two Treatises departed" from Locke's
quotation from Filmer's critical remarks on Hobbes. (Laslett's Introduction,
p, 33)0 Well, Laslett may believe it. But since he says, "we may
believe if we wish", we. do not need to believe. it. A sober, literate
person would find it extremely difficult to believe what Laslett says.
Isn't it strange that Locke explicitly refers to Filmer's tracts only once
in the Second Treatise (ST, 22) if his intention is to refute, or respond
to, his tracts? Isn't it also strange that Locke mentions Filmer's name
only three times in the book (1, 22, 61)1 Why does Locke quote small
fractions of Filmer's tracts in his notebooks, without discussing his
tracts critically or without even expressing his intention to criticize
them? And after all, doesn't Locke criticize Filmer's tracts in the
First Treatise? We do not need to be puzzled. Locke's references and
allusions to Filmer in the Second Treatise are mere additions to the political
theory which he developed independently of Filmer. And his quotations
from Filmer's tracts in his notebooks merely register those parts of his
tracts which Locke read at different stageso
Laslett's "historical" account of the origin of the Second Treatise
is acceptable only to those who have already decided to accept it. Such
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a decision is arbitrary, however. We would then have to ignore several
important, historical facts about the Second Treatise. I shall mention
two of them here, to show that Laslett's account is indeed a fairy-tale.
(What I say below is elaborated in Appendix 2, Sect. III, (i), and Appendix 1.
For details, see these appendices.) First, the Second Treatise has a
distinctive title of its own - "An ESSAY Concerning the True Original,
Extent, and End OF Civil Government". The separate title indicates that
it is an independent, theoretical work dealing with a general branch of
politics, not a polemical work against this or that theorist. Laslett
dismisses the significance of the separate title of the Second Treatise
by offering the most frivolous reason that it was "inserted" in the course
of printing. Olivecrona has objected that if it was inserted, the separate
29title might have been important rather than unimportant. This is a cute
objection, though it is not decisive. I have a historical objection which
compels everyone to accept the significance of the title of the Second
Treatise. The theme of Locke's political theory - the origin, end, and
extent of civil government - can be traced back to his early writings such
as his draft essay of 1667 titled "An Essay concerning Toleration" (Bourne,
!::.ili, I, 174 ff.); his paper "On the Difference between Civil and Eccles-
iastical Power, Indorsed Communication, Dated 1673-4" (King, Life, II,
108 ff.); and even his Two Tracts on Government (1660-62). The theme
of the origin, end, and extent of civil government has a counterpart in
Locke's epistemology - the "origin, certainty, and extent" of human
knowledge. The latter theme dates back to 1671. Thus Laslett is entirely
wrong in dismissing the significance of the title of the Second Treatise.
We must treat it as a general, independent theoretical work. And as I
have already said, Locke wrote a substantial portion of it before he attempted
to refute Filmer's doctrine of absolute monarchy.
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Secondly, Locke's own political theory developed side by side
with his theory of toleration. We have good pieces of evidence for this,
whereas we have no solid evidence for Laslett's view that Locke's
political theory grew out of his refutation of Filmer. I refer to two
of Locke's writings 1 have quoted above. Locke's 1667 draft essay on
toleration, and his paper on the difference between civil and ecclesiastical
power, contain his parallel analysis of political power and ecclesiastical
power. They also contain rudiments of Locke's mature political theory
of the Second Treatise. By 1667, he had basic ingredients of his own
political theory, though he probably had not developed an account of
appropriation. The development of his own political theory is thus
independent of his attempt to refute Filmer's tracts. Locke developed
it not by refuting the view of this or that theorist, but by trying to
set limits to the supreme power of a commonwealth. Similarly, he tried
to set limits to the power of church, and the power of understanding,
Besides these two basic facts, there are other facts and
considerations which bring into relief the artificiality of Laslett's
"historical" account of the origin of the Second Treatise. Unless we
are already influenced by Laslett's rumour about the Filmer-Locke
connection, it is obvious that the contents of the Second Treatise are
almost entirely independent of Filmer's critical remarks on Hobbes,
Grotius, Milton, etc. Locke's references and allusions to Filmer in
the Second Treatise are ornaments which he later added to his own
discourse on the origin, end, and extent of civil government. Moreover
his references and allusions are not necessarily to Filmer's tracts.
It is likely that Locke had a passage of Patriarcha in mind when he
mentioned Filmer's view in the opening paragraph of Chap. 5 ("1 will
not content myself to answer •••" (25». There is no chronological
181
problem here. Locke must have added that portion ("I will not content
myself to answer •••" (25» to what he had already written, when or
- . 30after Patriarcha was publIshed. Locke's references and allusions to
Filmer in the Second Treatise serve to define his position clearly, and
they also help him to present two independent treatises in the form of
a single discourse on property and government. (Consider the function
of Chap. 1 of ST.)
Another relevant point, entirely neglected by Laslett and his
followers, is that Locke never treats Filmer as an intellectually
challenging or respectable opponent in the Two Treatises. In the Preface,
Locke explains why he took "the pains to shew his mistakes, Inconsistencies,
~a~n~d~w~a~n~t~o~f~~~~S~c~r~i~p~t~u~r~e~-~p~r~o~o~f~s".It is nly because Filmer's followers
launched a degenerate, propaganda campaign for absolute monarchy by
"crying up his Books, and espousing his Dcotrine" (p. 156). From Locke's
viewpoint, Filmer's doctrine of absolute monarchy is intellectually
worthless. His refutation of it in the First Treatise clearly shows that
Locke is utterly contemptuous of what Filmer says. He repeatedly states
that Filmer's doctrine is an "incoherent" bundle of "plausible", yet
"senseless", English sentences. (See Preface: Locke speaks of Filmer's
"doubtful Expressions", "so much glib Nonsence Csic J put together in
well sounding English". Also, see FT: 1, 7, 14, 19-22, 31, 44, 63, 67,
et passim, for similar remarks). Given Locke's contemptuous and alovf
attitude toward Filmer's writings, it is unlikely that he took Filmer as
a serious, intellectual opponent. It is presumptuous to think that
Locke needed to fight a dialectical battle with ~ilmer's tracts, in order
to develop his own political theory. He must have regarded ~ilmer's tracts
and Patriarcha as politically influential, intellectual rubbish.
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These considerations inevitably lead us to reject Laslett's
"historical" picture of the Second Treatise as a fairy-tale. Let us
abandon this picture. Once we abandon it, Laslett's historical claim
about Locke's Chap. 5 and Pilmer's tracts appears in a new light.
It is highly implausible that Locke's account of appropriation developed
out of his refutation of, or his response to, Pilmer's critical comments
on Grotius. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to determine
the origin and development of Locke's ideas about appropriation. But
I have discredited the "historical" picture of the Second Treatise which
Laslett secretly uses to connect Locke's Chap. 5 with Pilmer's tracts.
With the removal of this picture, Laslett's historical claim about Chap.
5 becomes highly implausible and arbitrary. Nobody knows how Locke
developed his ideas about the origin of property. My own conjecture is
that Locke developed his ideas of appropriation by "meditation", rather
than by "reading" or refuting the views of others. Politics, as Locke
stated in 1703, is "a subject" which "require [sJ more meditation than
reading" (Works, X, 308). In firmly rejecting the authority of books
and the influence of others, Locke follows in the footsteps of Descartes
31and Hobbes. Of course, he knew the views of Hobbes, GrotiusJ Pufendorf,
and Filmer on the question of the origin of property. But it is likely
that he persistently followed the policy of independent thinking. What
James Tyrrell said about Locke's composition of An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding is likely to be true of his composition of the
Second Treatise and its Chap. 5: "you utterly refused to reade any bookes
b· " th t " i ht t t k th ."upon that su Ject so a you m g no a e any 0 er mens not10ns
(Correspondence, IV, 36). This conjecture is consitent with my outline
of the real (and largely unknown) origin of the Second Treatise, and
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it is far more reasonable than Laslett's fanciful talk about Chap. 5
and Filmer's tracts.
Let me summarize my critical discussion of Laslett. I have
examined his tacit assumptions as well as his explicit statements. I
have criticized him on historical as well as rational grounds. Our
conclusion can be stated in two parts. First, as it stands, Locke's
account of appropriation is not a refutation of, nor a response to,
Filmer. Secondly, in all probability, his account of appropriation
developed independently of Filmer. (The word "Filmer" In these two
propositions can be taken to include Filmer's own view of Adam's
original dominion and his criticism of Grotius).
Now that 1 have shown that Laslett's claim is unfounded,
1 can easily destroy the rest of academic claims advanced by his
followers. Let us consider what Dunn, Tully, Kelly, and Ryan have
to say about the relationship between Locke and Filmerg
First, John Dunn claims that Filmer "forced" Locke to "demonstrate"
that the origin of property "was not simply reducible to positive law"
.
(quoted earlier). Dunn repeats Laslett's Claim by speaking of Filmer as
"forcing" Locke to demonstrate the origin of property. But he adds
an ad hoc invention of his own by connecting Filmer with "positive law".
But why "positive law"? Filmer does not claim that property is the
product of "positive law". The only reason Dunn states this is that
Locke speaks of "positive law" in Chap. 5. Dunn offers no justification
for his claim. He cannot, even if he tries. His claim is an
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improvisation on the main theme which Laslett initially composed.
,
Secondly, Tully emphasizes that Locke had an "intention to
continue his refutation of Filmer" in Chap. 5.32 Notice the word
"continue". This indica~es his false assumption that Locke wrote the
First Treatise first, and then continued to refute Filmer in the Second
'freatise. Tully also creates a number of fairy-tales about "John
Locke and his Adversaries" (the subtitle of his book). One of them is
int~resting,and deserves to be mentioned here. Tully refers to Barbeyrac's
note on Filmer's Patriarcha and Locke, just as Laslett did before him.
But while Laslett used it to defend the false claim about the origin
of Locke's account of appropriation, Tully uses it to create a "historical"
link between Filmer and Pufendorf. According to Tully, Pufendorf "says
that Filmer is mistaken in supposing that God granted Adam a right of
• It 33 fprivate domin10n. 0 course, Pufendorf does not say this. It is
only Barbeyrac who later adds a note to Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et
Gentium, and explains Filmer's view. Tully, however, seriously believes'
that Pufendorf wrote a "reply" to Filmer's Patriarcha. It is amazing
- and amusing, too - that Tully radically changes the chronological
order of the events which took place in the past. Pufendorf's work was
first published in 1672; a substantial portion of Locke's Second Treatise
was probably written around 1679; Filmer's Patriarcha appeared in 1680;
Locke's First Treatise was quickly written after the publication of
Patriarcha; and finally, Barbeyrac added extensive notes to Pufendorf's
work in his French translation (1706). Given this sequence of events,
Locke must travel in a TIME MACHINE to "continue" his refutation of Filmer
in the Second Treatise. Pufendorf must be capable of ESP to "reply"
to Filmer's Patriarcha. Tully's work is self-consciously "historical",
I Du Ijust like Laslett s or nn s. We shall call their "historical" approach
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Cambridge Historical Revisionism (£tl!).
£tl! seems to have an Irish branch. Patrick Kelly, who has
written a review of Laslett's second edition of the Two Treatises for
a historical journal in Ireland, defends Laslett's view of the historical
connection between Locke's Chap. 5 and Filmer's criticism of Grotius.
This is perhaps the most serious of all attempts that have been made by
Laslett's followers to keep his fairy-tale intact. Kelly sanctifies Laslett's
fairy-tale by using one of Locke's manuscripts. In order to prove that
Laslett was right, Kelly uses a short manuscript piece titled "Morality".34
It is not dated, but it was probably written sometime between 1676 and
1679. It contains Locke's brief and tentative outline of a Hobbesian
compact theory of the origin of property. Kelly claims that Locke
abandoned this compact theory because he read Filmer's powerful criticism
of Grotius' compact theory. I shall leave aside the interesting question
whether Locke really took his Hobbesian compact theory seriously, or he
merely experimented with it and jotted down his thought. It is sufficient
for my purpose to show that Kelly creates just another fiction.
Kelly refers to sect. 28 of the Second Treatise where Locke
denies that "the consent of all Mankind" is required for the legitimate
acquisition of property. This denial, in Kelly's view, implies the
abandonment of Locke's earlier compact theory. In denying the necessity
of a universal consent, says Kelly, Locke is responding to Filmer's criticism
35 ,of Grotius. This view is a variant of Laslett s. Kelly connects the
passage of Filmer's works (which Laslett pointed out) with sect. 28 of
the Second Treatise, instead of connecting it with the opening paragraph
of Chap. 5. But Kelly is wrong. Filmer's criticism of Grotius is that
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a universal consent of men is "a rare felicity" in our history. Locke
does ~ respond to this criticism in sect. 28. Filmer, Grotius, and
Pufendorf assume that the legitimate conversion of communi~y into
property requires a universal consent. Locke responds to ~ general
assumption; and he rejects it without much polemical heat. ("Han
had starved, notwithstanding the Plenty God had given him" if such
"a consent ••• was necessary" (28).)
Kelly also suggests that Filmer raised another "extraordinarily
powerful objection" to Grotius, which forced Locke to give up his early
compact theory. This objection, stated in Filmer's "OBSERVATIONS" on
Grotius, is that if property can be created by a voluntary agreement of
our ancestors, then we should be able to resume our natural liberty at
any time to destroy the existing system of property and government.
This objection, says Kelly, forced Locke to abandon his earlier compact
theory of the origin of property. It revealed the "radical", anarchistic
implications of the compact theory, and such radicalism was clearly
, " " 36 ,unacceptable to Locke s Whig ideology • What a plausible story.
But does Kelly offer any argument, or empirical evidence, to establish
the credibility of this story? NOe He offers nothing. This is just another
,misjudgement. It rests on the untenable assumption that Filmer was
an important figure for the development of Locke's political ideas.
Kelly offers nothing to show that this untenable Cambridge assumption
is, in fact, tenable. Filmer's objection presumes that a natural
right and voluntarily created property are akin to arbitrary power; and
that the dissolution of government is ipso facto the dissolution of
propertyo Locke does not share these presumptions, so there is no
reason to believe that he felt the force of Filmer's objection to Grotius.
Locke could have pointed out that this objection typically shows Filmer's
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habit of conflating subtle distinctions - distinctions between types of
compacts, or the distinction between a natural right and arbitrary power.
There is no reason to believe that this objection, or any other objection
of Filmer's, forced Locke to abandon his earlier compact theory of the
origin of property. Whether Locke took his earlier theory seriously
or not, no historical evidence suggests that his own ideas about property
developed as a response to Filmer.
Finally, let us look, at what Alan Ryan says about the point
of Chap , 5. I quoted earlier Ryan's "most plausible explanation" of
why Locke wrote Chap. 5. Locke knew, he says, "the most important
argument in Filmer's armoury". It is the argument, or the claim, that
"unless someone had been the initial owner of everything, nobody could
have come by individual titles". Whose argument is this? This is not
Filmer's. Or if it is meant to be his, it is a badly formulated version.
It is doubtful whether Ryan ever read Filmer's works. Locke certainly
knew the claim that since Adam was the initial owner of the world,
"none of his Posterity had any right to possess anything but by his
Grant or Permission, or by Succession from him" (quoted by from Filmer
by Locke in FT, 21). This is Filmer's claim, and Locke knew it. Of
course, Locke knew another claim of Filmer's that if the original
community of things had existed, then nobody could have come by property
without a historically implausible, universal consent. Perhaps, Ryan
has tried to condense 2ilmer's two claims into one in his formulation
of the "most important argument in Filmer's armoury". But in that case,
he has obscured Filmer's position by speaking of "individual titles" in
an indefinite manner. Filmer holds that a monarch permits his subjects
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to use and possess portions of his property (his territory, his crops,
etc.). Each subject has a kind of "right" or "title". It is a right
granted by a monarch, and can be taken away by the monarch. On the
other hand, Filmer does E£! hold that men could come to have exclusive
rights of disposal over goods, or property, by converting the original
community. These are the basic points obscured in Ryan's formulation of
Filmer's argument.
I should like to end my critical discussion of Laslett and his
school by offerin~ a Humean obiter dictum. Suppose that we run over
libraries, and take in our hand any volume of Laslett or his historical
revisionist school. Let us ask: Does it contain any abstract reasoning
concerning the arguments of Locke and Filmer? No. Does it contain any
experimental reasoning concerning the facts about Locke and Filmer?
No. Commit it then to the flames!!! It contains nothing but
sophistry and illusion.
1. 6 A Summary. I have examined one "popular" view of Locke's account
of appropriation, and the four interpretations which philosophers and
scholars have recently provided. The popular view is no more than a
slogan. It is misleading, and it can yield falsehood if it is combined
with some false assumptions of our own (e.g., the assumption that labour
is the sole basis of legitimate property). Nevertheless, it also contains
all seeds of truth. As long as we do not add various false assumptions
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of our own, and as long as we locate it firmly in the context of Locke's
writings, it is harmless to say that Locke defended every man's natural
right of property on the ground that property is the fruit of his own
labour. By comparison, the four recent interpretations I have examined
bear the mark of learned artificiality. They conceal tremendous ignorance
and illiteracy. They are worse than the popular view, and positively
harmful. Let me sum up what they are.
The second view - the philosophical interpretation offered by
Becker and Day and others - is based on the false assumption that Locke's
primary weapon in Chap. 5 is a rational argument. While the popular
view can only yield falsehood, the philosophical interpretation is based on
the false assumption. I grant that those philosophers who regard Locke
as providing rational arguments about the grounds of the ground of
property are excused for their mistake, to the extent that they are
deliberately using Locke's ideas for the purpose of their own philosophical
discussion. As a matter of fact, however, philosophical interpreters of
Locke are usually not satisfied with the humble task of using his ideas
for their own purpose. They also believe that they can give a satisfactory
exposition of Locke's account of appropriation if they present his
"arguments". In this, they are utterly mistaken. The role of rational
argument is very limited in Locke's account of appropriation, and it is
subordinate to the larger plot of his story. In short, they mistake
what is secondary (i.e., Locke's remarks on the grounds of the ground of
property and his use of rational arguments) for what is primary (i.e.,
his belief about the ground of property, and his skill of writing a story).
The third view - the neo-Kantian academic reading of Yolton
(and Tully) - is worse than the second philosophical interpretation. It
turns Locke's account of property upside down. It produces a completely
inverted picture of Locke according to which he no longer discusses
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property, but only the idea of property. In short, they mistake what is
absent (i.e., Locke's discussion of the idea of property) for what is
present (ioe., his discussion of property)o
The fourth interpretation propounded by Macpherson, and the fifth
interpretation by Laslett, are two of the most influential interpretations
todayo Their great influence, however, has nothing to do with the
truth of their claimso I have shown that their central claims are
false. Their interpretations remain influential not because they are
committed to truth, but because they are inventive and imaginative. They
are not at all afraid to create fairy-tales or to make exaggerated
false statementso It is their bold commitment to fictions which makes
their interpretations exciting and influential. Besides, many of today's
intellectuals are not bright enough to detect their inventions, while
prospective intellectuals in universities (i.e., students) are constantly
brainwashed by the reading list which highly recommends Macpherson's and
Laslett's commentaries on Locke to the exclusion of Locke's own works.
I am not impressed by their imaginative constructions, or by their
influence. But since their inventions have pernicious effects on those
who want to understand or evaluate Locke, I have examined them in detail.
To recapitulate my account of Macpherson's artifice: Macpherson
treats the "limits" of appropriation as the immutable, natural-law limits,
whereas Locke treats them as the limits of primitive appropriation. He
shows how Locke performs the astonishing task of removing those limits,
whereas there is nothing astonishing about Locke's attempt to explain
and justify the transition from primitive economy to the commercial
economy which resembles the 17th-century English economy. One of the
limits is the "labour" limitation. Locke's removal of this limitation,
according to Macpherson, is an attempt to justify the capitalist's right of
exploitationo But in fact, it is only an attempt to explain and justify
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the transition from the primitive appropriation solely based on each man's
labour to the commercial (or "capitalist") mode of appropriation based
on each man's labour, money, and the freedom of a contract. Macpherson
thinks that Locke makes the wage-contract pre-political in order to
justify the capitalist's right of exploitation, whereas Locke's point
is to defend the formally equal rights of the employer and the employed
(against arbitrary government). Macpherson's errors are countless, and
we can go on listing them ad infinitum. It is as if ~ had a strong need
to justify his unlimited right of accumulation. Nevertheless, his invention
is so novel that it has fascinated many intelligent men. ~ven Isaiah
Berlin was deceived by Macpherson. In his review of Macpherson's book,
Berlin confesses that he had the "wonderfully exhilarating" sensation
of "sailing in intellectually first-class waters". 37 "Intellectually
first-class waters"? We must make allowance for the fact that Berlin is
a great admirer of fictions, as well as a historian of ideas. Macpherson's
work, properly speaking, causes in us the sensation of sailing in the
first-class waters of imaginative fictions.
One of Macpherson's great inventions, or his basic intellectual
errors, must be restated here. He holds that a bourgeois theorist justifies
capitalist exploitation on moral grounds. His basic mistake is to use
this distorted picture of a bourgeois theorist in order to fill the
apparent gap between a part of the 17th-century economic reality (i.e.,
the impoverished condition of the labouring mass) and Locke's theoretical
claims in the Second Treatise. Consequently, Macpherson fails to see that
Locke is a bourgeois theorist in the true sense of the word. Locke's
theory does not discuss, let alone tries to justify, the fact of economic
exploitation which lies under the juridical fiction of the freedom of a
contract. He consistently defends the formally equal rights of all
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against arbitrary government. In short, Macpherson confuses his own ideology
about a bourgeois theorist with the claims of the real bourgeois theorist.
Laslett is no less inventive. His historical imagination creates
Locke's target: Robert Filmer. I have shown that Locke's account of
appropriation neither is, nor arose out of, his refutation of Filmer.
Laslett's basic error is to treat the Second Treatise as a work against
Filmer. Since his own historical research established the chronological
priority of the Second Treatise to the First Treatise, we should be
allowed to conjecture the historical origin of Laslett's deep-seated prejudice.
Laslett had edited Filmer's works before he edited Locke's. He had been
interested in Filmer before he approached Locke. Perhaps, his historical
research on the social structure of 17th-century England had initially led
him to study and edit Filmer's works. At any rate, it is fairly clear
that Laslett edited the Two Treatises with a strong interest in Filmer.
He must have persistently searched for any remark of Locke's which is
relevant to Filmer. Laslett's editorial notes to the Second Treatise are
full of the statements to the effect that Locke had "clearly" "Filmer in
mind" (in writing this or that paragraph). These statements appear in his
notes to Chap. S, and many other Chapters, of the Second Treatise.
In indicating the connection between Filmer and Locke's Second
Treatise, Laslett confirms his old deep-seated prejudice; forgets one
of the conclusions of his own historical research; and takes Locke's
additional, clarificatory remarks (or even his gesture) as the evidence
of his intention to "refute" Filmer's tracts.
Despite his errors, Laslett has provided a wealth of information
for later scholars. In this respect, his contribution is genuine. Yet
his followers have perpetuated his errors in their peda~tic writings.
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I have quoted passages from Locke's Essay at the beginning of this chapter.
Locke condemns those "profound Doctors" who spread "artificial Ignorance,
and learned Gibberish". They have "a Gift, which the illiterate had not
attained to". I have quoted these words, especially for those "scholars"
who have blindly followed in the footsteps of Laslett and reduced
themselves to the unfortunate status of pedantic illiterates.
It is a scandal of Locke scholarship that as an interpretation
becomes more and more scholarly, it becomes less and less defensible.
Even if we allow for the role of imagination in the writing of a history,
it is clear th~t we cannot take seriously the recent academic discussions
of Locke's account of appropriation whicI-.:masquerade as "historical"
discussions. We shall abandon ~ and the three other recent interpretations.
As long as we have the average reading ability of an adult, we can read
Locke on our own and develop the popular view in a more sound manner.
I have undertaken the
task of what Nietzsche called a "subterranean man" - one who tunnels and
mines and undermines. I have exposed the prejudice of the learned, and
undermined their authority. So it is not amiss to celebrate my achievement
with the words of Nietzsche: "it is a prejudice of the learned that we now
know better than any other age" (Daybreak, Bk. 1, Sect. 2, emphasis in
the original).
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PART 2. Interpretations of Locke's Concept of Justice
My condemnation of Locke scholars is not over. I must criticize
their interpretations of Locke's concept of justice. My discussion will
be brief, because most commentators have neglected his concept of
justice or misinterpreted what he meant by "justice".
Richard Cox discusses what he takes to be Locke's "diverse treatment
of justice"~ and pulls together his scattered remarks on divine justice
and civil justice. Cox's discussion, however, is too diffuse, and does
not clarify what is distinctive about Locke's view of justice (or the
, dm' i ' f' , ) 38state s a 1n strat10n 0 Just1ce. Raymond Polin similarly conducts
a diffuse discussion in his article "Justice in Locke's Philosophy", without
clarifying Locke's view of justice. He only discusses Locke's political
philosophy in general, without clarifying the negativity of Locke's
39concept of justice or its relatiDn to his claims about property. These
two entirely inadequate discussions of Locke's concept of justice have been
further confused by John Dunn's attempt to trace the idea of justice in
Locke's various writings. In his article, "Justice and the Interpretation
of Locke's Poli tical Theory", Dunn surveys the occurrence of the wor d
"justice" in Locke's writings and explores some· ideas· associated with the
idea of justice {e.g., property, or charity)o Just like his predecessors,
however, he fails to clarify Locke's concept of justice and makes confused
remarks. For instance, Dunn says that there is "nothing remarkable about
the reduction of justice to the guarantee of property", and misleadingly
suggests that justice has nothing to do with men's lives or liberties
40(as opposed to their possessions). He fails to grasp Locke's concept
of corrective justice and confuses it with an altcgether different concept
, 41 Itof distributive Justice. He also discusses the link between "justice
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and "charity", without even understanding that it is a contrast between
negative legality and positive morality.42 Given these, we musF
say that Dunn's discussion of Locke's treatment of justice has turned
his predecessors' vagueness into a recognizable confusion.
These confused and inadequate discussions are the background
from which the most recent, extensive, and scholarly discussion of Locke's
view of justice has arisen. This discussion is James Tully's. It is contained
in his book, A Discourse on Property. Since Tully's discussion of Locke's
view of justice arises from the confused background and his confused
"historical" method, we naturally expect that it will be deeply confused.
We shall see that this natural expectation is legitimate. I shall take
up Tully's deeply confused discussion below. I shall thereby finish
my criticism and condemnation of scholars who have recently discussed
Locke's political theory.
Tully ascribes to Locke the view that the state has an obligation
to "distribute to each member the civil rights to life, to the liberty of
preserving himself and others, and to the requisite goods or 'means of
it,.,,43 He refers to Locke's passage about "the duty of the civil
magistrate" in A Letter concerning Toleration,. and mistakenly believes
that Locke has a theory of distributive justice. I have quoted Locke's
passage at beginning of CHAPTER 1, in order to show that he has the concept
of corrective justice, rather than that of distributive (or re-distributive)
justice. Tully's basic error is to ascribe to Locke the view that the
state has an obligation to distribute properties in accordance with an
independently available set of natural criteria. Let us see more closely
how Tully commits his error. He presents one of the central claims of
his book as follows:
According to Locke's argument, if men agreed to private property
in land it would be purely conventional and it would be justified
196
only if it were a prudential means of bringing about a just
distribution of property in accordance with the natural right
to the produce of one's labour and the three claim rights
[to life, liberty, and the possessions required for the
preservation of life). If it did not conduce to this end it
would lose its justification and would have to be abolhahed,
either by legislation, or failing that, by revolution.
This passage, like sp many others in Tully's book, is based Upon his
misuse of a number of quotations from Locke and his abuse of historical
references. First of all, Tully forcibly extracts the following view
from Locke: once men form a political society, their "possessions"
become the·possessions of the community", and government acquires a
power to "determine the possessions of lands". "The distribution of
property (in political society] is now conventional and based upon man's
agreement to enter political society. ,,45 This is not Locke's view, but
only Tully's misuse or misunderstanding of sect. 120 of the Second Treatise.
Secondly, Tully adds another mistaken notion that the political state,
according to Locke, has a power and an obligation to redistribute men's
possessions in accordance with the natural criteria (spelled out in the
above passage). How does he try to support this mistaken view? Again,
Tully uses his peculiar method of science fiction. He makes
use of Locke's sentences and other historical references obscurely and
arbitrarily, in order to create Locke's theory of distributive justice.
Moreover, he appeals to diverse historical sources. It looks as if he
were trying to distract our attention, and prevent us from detecting his
invention. His invention is more obscure than ingenious. I shall try
to pick out a few claims Tully makes in support of his construction.
"The fundamental principle of justice", says Tully, is "to each the
products of his honest industry (I. 42)".46 Now in sect. 42 of the
First Treatise, Locke says: "Justice gives every Man a Title to the product
of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended
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to him". According to Locke's story of appropriation, men's 17th-century
possessions are the consequences of the fair acquisition of their
ancestors. Tully should not perform a curious barber job of cutting
certain bits of Locke's sentence. He also appeals to Pufendorf's
discussion of the concept of justice in a most peculiar way. "The society
Locke envisages", says Tully, "is adumbrated by Pufendorf in his discussion
of distrirbutive justice (1. 7. 9. )".47 This time Pufendorf needs a
TIME MACHINE to "adumbrate" Locke's view of "the society". But Tully
goes on to appeal to historical references. He refers to Locke's letter
to Molyneux on 19 January 1694 in which he states that "everyone ••• is
bound to labour for the public good, as far as he is able, or else he has
no right to eat" (\lorks, IX, 332).48 But clearly this letter does not support
the view that the state has an obligation to redistribute man's possessions.
On the contrary, Locke is expressing the belief that everyone has an
obligation to acquire his bread by his own labour, without relying on the
labour of others. By appealing to these references, Tully tries to
convince us that Locke's political state has an obligation to redistribute
men's properties. But this merely reveals Tully's own inability to
understand Locke's concept of justice, and the point of his mythical story
of appropriation. Locke's own view is that the state ought to preserve
men's properties, and regulate the free exchange of their properties
minimally, by administering justice. "Justice", or the administration
of justice, is the effective instrument for the preservation and minimal
regulation of men's properties. To repeat the point I have made in
CHAPTER 1, Locke is trying to defend men's 17th-century possessions against
arbitrary government. He is not defending an ideal distribution of property
against men's actual possessions, nor is he criticizing the latter in
terms of the former. Tully utterly fails to understand this, and holds
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that Locke worked out "the normative framework in terms of which a system
of property relations is assessed".49
I have briefly criticized some confused discussions of Locke's
account of justice. To take up Tully's book at the very end of this
chapter is neither arbitrary nor inappropriateo As I pointed out in
PART 1, his book represents the disaster of CHR (Cambridge Historical
Revisionism)o But it has a larger historical significance: it symbolizes~
deep-seated confusion of recent Locke scholarship. I should like to
end my critical discussion of recent interpretations of Locke, by
commenting on this confusion ..
As it is fairly clear from my comments on Tully in this chapter,
his various claims rest either on a' dubious practice or accept~ng
various claims of other scholars uncritically; or on the equally dubious
use of quotations from Locke and other historical writings. I have
examined Tully's book carefully, and have reached the conclusion that it
is probably one of the worst books on Locke's political theory written
by a 20th-century scholar. The reader can find reasons for this
judgement, not only in this chapter but elsewhere in this dissertation. 50
Surprisingly, however, two world-famous Locke scholars have enthusiastically
welcomed Tully's book. John Dunn has commented: Tully's book is
"the best and the most important piece of extended analysis of Locke's
political theory on the issue of property to have been produced by a
twentiety-century scholar" (quoted from the dust-jacket of TUllY's book).
John Yolton offers an equally laudatory comment: "There is no comparable
study anywhere in any language. We badly need to have this careful,
scholarly examination of that important concept in Locke's political
philosophy, property" (quoted from the dust-jacket). Since Tully
expresses his indebtedness to Dunn and Yolton in his acknowledgements, it
is understandable that the two established scholars have offered the most
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laudatory comments. I also understand that Dunn and Yolton wanted to
encourage a young scholar; and that the advertisement of a book is almost
•
always an exaggeration. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that they
evaluate Tully's book without critically examining its contents.
Though it is a scholarly book, it is unfortunately based on the
confusion of the past few dacades , In praising this book, theref'itllf,Dunn and
Yolton have endorsed the confusion of recent Locke scholarship (of which
they are a part). They do not know that Tully's book should be regarded
as a climax of the chaos of present-day Locke scholarship. Without this
recognition on their part, however, it would be impossible to remove the
present-day chaos from Locke scholarship, or to establish any reliable
51scholarly standard within Locke scholarshipo
I should like to add one final- remark to qualify the destructive
project of this chapter. My criticism and condemnation extend to many
recent commentators. But this should not be taken to imply that all
recent commentators are illiterates, or near-illiterates at best. As I
have briefly indicated in the beginning of this chapter, there are a few
who have developed sound interpretations of Locke's account of appropriation
and his account of justice. K. Olivecrona and G. Parry are two of those
exceptional commentators. I have not examined their views, because they
are more or less correct and defensible (if not in every detail).52 Their
works shine like precious metals, in the middle of the muddled and contentious
interpretations of other commentators. But my own exposition of Locke
in the previous chapter preserves positive elements of their interpretations,
while it is free from their small errors and all gross errors of other
commentators.
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I have presented my own exposition in CHAPTER 1; and I have
destroyed all major alternatives to that exposition in CHAPTER 2. These
two chapters, taken together, dialectically transcend all recent
interpretations. My next task is to examine Locke himself, rather than
his confused interpreterso I shall undertake this task in the following
two chapterso I shall begin with a critical and historical examination
of the most neglected part of Locke's political theory - his concept of
propertyo
NOTES to CHAPTER 2
1. This popular view can be found everywhere. It is a combination
of two ideas. First, Locke is a defender of "natural rights"
(whatever that means); and secondly, he holds that a natural
right of property "arises from" or "is derived from" or "based
upon" each man's labour (whatever that means). This popular
view is the minimal core of any sophisticated understanding
But since the expressions such as "natural rights" and "arise
from" remain undefined, I call it the "popular view".
This "popular view" can yield a number of mutually
incompatible interpretations as to what Locke tried to defend.
It merely expresses the minimal core of Locke's account of
appropriation, without explaining what he argued for or what
he argued against. For a useful, historical discussion of various
uses of Locke's minimal-core notion, see Richard Schlatter,
Private Property: The History of an Idea (New York: Russell .
& Russell, 1973), Chaps. 8 -10.
2. Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part I, trans. E. Burns
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969), p. 367.
3. Ri hts: Philoso hical Foundations (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977 , Chap. 4. J.P. Day, Locke on
Property", Philosophical Quarterly, XVI, 64 (1966); rpt, in Life,
Liberty and Propertl' ed. G.J. Schochet (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1971).
R. Nozick's Anarchy. State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books,
1974) stimulated recent philosophical commentators to think about
the philosophical foundations of the so-called" labour theory
of property". ~., pp. 174ff.
4. J. Yolton, John Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding
(Cambridge: C.U.P., 1970), p, 187.
5. J. Tully, A Discourse on Propertl (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1980), p. 3
and p, 100.
60 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
(Oxford: O.U.P., 1962), p. 221.
7. The vast, secondary literature on Locke in recent years embodies
the confused responses which I have illustrated in this paragraph.
Specimens of these confusad responses can be found in the writings
of the Cambridge trio of Locke scholars - Laslett, Dunn and
Tully. See Laslett's Introduction to the Two Treatises, pp. 103ff.;
Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account
of the Argument of the Two Treatises.of Government (Cambridge:
CoU.P., 1969), Chaps. 16-19; and Tully, opo cit., pp. 136 ff.,
p. 142f., et passimo
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I should like to add a few remarks on the confused responses.
I have discussed the confused picture of Locke as a welfare-state
liberal in note 11, CHAPTER 1. This is the first type of confused
responseo Secondly, Dunn typifies the attempt to concentrate on
Locke's personal attitude, especially his religious views. He
does not take his major writings on politics seriously •..This
is a misguided approach to Locke's political theory. As an
alternative to Macpherson's picture of Locke, Dunn presents the
view that Locke's political theory is an elaboration of Calvinist
social values, the core of which is the doctrine of the calling.
(Dunn, Ope cit., Chap. 19). I hope everyone can see that this
is a monsterous inventiono This thesis, as well as Dunn's talk
about the significance of religious or theological foundations
for Locke's political theory, makes me wonder whether Macpherson
drove him mado Nowhere did Locke claim that social and political
institutions can be justified if, and to the extent that, they
facilitate each man's fulfilment of his divinely ordained calling.
Did Dunn have a chance to read Locke'. A Letter concerning Toleration?
There Locke states, not just once but again ana aga1n, that
political affairs of this world are distinct from religious
or theological affairs of the next world. The "whole jurisdiction
of the magistrate", says Locke, "reaches only to these civil
concernments", and "all civil power, right and dominion, is
bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things".
It "neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the
salvation of souls" (~ VI, 10). Locke's political theory,
which developed side by side with his theory of toleration, has
nothing to do with "Calvinist social values" or "the doctrine of
calling". As far as Locke's personal attitude, as distinct from
his theory, is concerned, he was born in a Puritan family. But
Dunn has merely avoided discussing Cranston's view that "Westminster
(School] did purge Locke of the unquestioning Puritan faith in
which he had grown up" (Cranston, Life, p. 19). It seems that
Dunn has borrowed his idea from We~without studying Locke's
theoretical writings, or his life.
The third type of confused response is to say that a talk
about "capitalism" is "anachronistic". The charge of anachronism
is a serious one only if we have a solid chronology of capitalism,
together with a clearly defined set of criteria for describing
something as "capitalism". We should note that both Marx and
Weber found the important beginnings of the capitalist mode
of production in 16th-century Western Europe. To quote from
Marx: "The starting-point of the development that gave rise to
the wage-labourer as well as to the capitalist, was the servitude
of the labourer. ••• To understand its march, we need not to
go back very far. Although we come across the first beginnings
of capitalist production as early as the 14th or 15th century,
sporadically, in certain towns of the Mediterranean, the capitalistic
era dates from the 16th century" (Capital, Vol. 1 (New York:
International Publishers, 1967), p. 715). Given the orthodox
chronology of capitalism, established by Marx and Weber, it is
not surprising that Macpherson uses the label "capitalist" in his
discussion of Locke. In fact, Macpherson's talk about "capitalism"
is not in any way extravagant, if we compare it with a recent
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Cambridge historian's conclusion: "England was just as 'capitalist'
in 1250 as it was in 1550 or 1750". This historian is Alan
Macfarlane. He has reached this conclusion after a careful study
of patterns of ownership in England. He adopts the criteria of
"capitalism" which Marx, Weber and other economic historians
habitually use (i.e., the existence of a developed market, the
mobility of labour, the treatment of land as a commodity, etc).
By these criteria, he concludes that England in 1250 was "capitalist".
A.Macfarlane, The Ori ins of En lish Individualism (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1978. His conclusion, which I have quoted,
can be found on p. 195 of this book.
Now Macpherson does not spell out his criteria of "capitalism"
in any detailed way. However, he adopts one crucial, Marxian
criterion of the capitalist mode of production: each man's
labour-power is a commodity. This criterion is presumed in his
discussion of Locke. We can certainly conduct disputes about
various chronologies of capitalism. But given the criteria of
adopted by Marx, Weber, and many economic hist~rians it is not
improper to use the label like "capitalist" in our discussion
of Locke (provided we know what we are talking about).
8. Macpherson, Ope cit., p. 199. He speaks of "Locke's purpose"
(p. 197) and Locke's "achievement" (p. 199, p. 220), without
distinguishing between the two. The expressions such as
"natural law limits" and "limitations" are Macpherson's, rather
than Locke's. The phrase "the bounds of the Law of Nature" is
a quotation from Locke. These points are relevant to my criticism
of Macpherson's interpretation, so they are worth confirming here.
9.. Adam Smith's account of the modes of acquiring and transferring
property ("occupation", "accession", "prescription", "succession",
and "tradition") can be found in his Lectures on Jurisprudence,
ed. R.L. Meek, D.O. Raphael, P.G. Stein (Oxford: O.U.P., 1978),
pp. 13. Smith explicitly states that the modes, or rules, of
acquisition "vary considerably according to the state or age
society is in at that time". "There are four distinct states
which mankind pass thro:- 1st, the Age of Hunters; 2ndly, the
Age of Shepherds; 3dly, the Age of Agriculture; and 4thly, the
Age of Commerce". Ibid., p. 14.
Smith's theory of the "four stages" of society has been made
famous by Ronald Meek and others, and its relationship to Marx's
historical meterialism has been explored. I suggest that the
rudiments of Smith's theory of the "four stages" can be found
in Locke's story of appropriation.
10, In his brief discussion of Locke's account of property in
Theories of Surplus Value, Marx speaks of the limits of
property just as Macpherson does. It is fairly clear Macpherson
is indebted to Marx for developing his interpretation of Locke.
"One limit to property", says Marx, is "the limit of personal
labour" while "the other [limit] is that a man should not amass
more things than he can use". Then Marx observes, without
showing any sign of condemnation or astonishment: "The latter
limit however is extended by exchange of perishable products for
11.
12.,
13.
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money". (Quoted from Eo Burns' English Translation of Theories
of Surplus Value, Part I, P. 366.)
Marx, The Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy, trans., S.W. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1970), p. 21. Many readers would find my comparison of Locke
with Marx interesting. My comparison, however, is a limited
one. I am not at all suggesting that ~here is an overall
similarity between their social and political theories. L~cke's
individuals, after appropriating resources, form a political
society as they think fit. On the other hand, Marx's men, in the
process of the social production of their existence, enter into
definite social relationships, independently of their will. This
is.one of the most striking differences. However, I have offered
a valid, limited comparison in order to put an end to the fuss
Macpherson has made, andothers continue to make.
Macpherson, Ope cit., p. 199.
What Locke calls "the law of nature" in the Second Treatise has
two important features. First, its spirit or general slogan
is the "Preservation of all Mankind" (ST, 7; 135). God, the
maker of the law of nature, commands everyone to preserve himself
and the rest of mankind. Secondly, Locke's idea of "preservation"
is an essentially negative idea of leaving oneself or others
unharmed. The spirit of the law of nature can be negatively
~pressed as a set of prohibitions. Na.nely, "Man" has "not
Liberty to destroy himself", and "no one ought to harm another
in his Life, Hea Lth, Liberty, or [iiiinimallPossessions" (ST, 6;
emphasis added). The latter is the fundamental precept which
prohibits mutual injury. Locke also adds the precept that nobody
ought to destroy any lower "creature" purposelessly (6).
Some positive obligations (e.g., the obligation of charity)
may also be included among the obligations of the law of nature.
However, positive precepts are ~ the core of a system of the
law of nature. For Locke's distinction between positive precepts
(or obligations) and negative ones, see Correspondence, I, 559;
and ELN, VII, 193 ff. tie says: "all negative precepts are always
to b;--;beyed", and "positive commands only sometimes". (Correspondenct
I, 559.)
14. Macpherson, OPe cit., pp. 214-220.
15. What Macpherson actually does is to make imaginative use of Locke
to create a new fiction. But he writes as if he were a historian,
When Locke's assumptions are understood as presented here,
his doctrine of property appears in a new light, or, rather,
is restored to the meanin it must have had for Locke and his
contemporaries (~., p. 220; emphasis adde •
16. ~., p. 215.
17. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, Chap. XXIV, Sect. 1, pp. 579 ff;
205
especially, pp. 583 fo (Page number are those of the edition
referred to in note 7 above. )
18. See my comment on Macpherson's absurd claims about Locke's
absolutist state in CHAPTER 1, note 22.
19~ Macpherson, Ope cit., p. 221.
20. ~., po 209; cfo p, 217.
21. Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (1969), p. 66.
22. Tully, A Discourse on Property (1980), pp. 96 ff. et passim.
23. OUvecrona, "Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on
the origin of Property", Journal of the History of Ideas,
XXXV, 2 (1974), p. 221; and "A Note on Locke and Filmer",
The Locke Newsletter No. 7 (1976), ppo 83-93. P. Kelly,
"Locke and Filmer: Was Laslett so Wrong after a1l1" The Locke
Newsletter, No. 8 (1977), ppo 77-91.
My own view of the relationship between Locke and Filmer
resembles Olivecrona's, though 1 have developed it independently.
24. Ryan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1984), po 27.
25. Their c.\ a h\f~ used to be confined to a small intellectual circle
of Locke scholars, lecturers in universities, and postgraduate
students. But recently, John Dunn's Locke appeared in the
Past Masters series (Oxford: O.U.P., 1984).
Let me quote what Dunn says in the above-
mentioned book about Locke's account of appropriation: Locke
"sets himself to answer fully the main critical thrust of
Filmer's attack on Grotius" (ibid., po 37). This is a, -reproduction of Laslett s unfounded olaim'. Dunn also repeats
Laslett's (false) view that the Second Treatise, as well as
the First Treatise, is Locke's polemical work against Filmer.
He typically speaks of "Locke's response" to "the challenge of
Filmer", in discussing Locke's own political theory (ibid.,
pp. 32; pp. 44). Anyone who explains Locke's own pol~al
theory (of the Second Treatise) as a "response" to Filmer's
"challenge" makes a desperate attempt to conceal the radical
gap and disconnectedness that exist between Filmer's political
doctrine and Locke's theory of the origin, end, and extent of
civil government. Locke did ~ take Filmer as posing a serious
intellectual challenge, either in the First Treatise, or in the
Second Treatise. But Dunn, who can only copy Laslett's approach
to Locke's political theory, claims that the Two Treatises is
"a product of Locke's own imaginative response to the challenge
of Filmer" (~., p, 33). Notice that one adjective "imaginative'
is conveniently used to cover up the radical gap that exists
between the contents of the Second Treatise and Filmer's writings.
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Dunn's little book, Locke, also recommends his disciple's book.
Tully's A Discource on Property is listed as the "best" book on
Locke's account of property (~., p. 93). It is disconcerting
to find that an easily available, introductory book on Locke
presents local rumours of Cambridge as true statements, and further
recommends one of the worst books on Locke's account of property
as the "bes ttlbook.
26. Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer, ed.
Peter Laslett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949), p. 273.
27. Laslett has produced the evidence that Locke read the 1679 Collection
of Filmer's tracts in the year of its appearance. See Laslett's
Introduction to the Two Treatises, p. 58. Laslett further assumes
that Locke wrote Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise in 1679 after (rather
than before) he read Filmer's criticism ~f Grotius. I shall grant
this assumption, though it can be challenged.
28. Laslett fails to recognize Locke's method of contrasting his own
view with his opponent's. Let us take one specific passage from
Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise. In sect. 39, Locke sums up his
account of the beginning of property as follows:
And thus, without supposing any private Dominion, and property
in Adam, over all the World, exclusive of all other Men, which
can~way be proved, nor any ones Property be made out from it;
but supposing the World given as it was to the children of Men
in common, we see how labour could make Men distinct titles to
several parcels of it •••• (~, 39.)
In this passage, Locke contrasts his own premise of the original
community of things with Filmer's premise of Adam's original,
private dominion. This contrast pressuposes the falsehood of
Filmer's premise. Locke says that Filmer's premise "can no way be
proved" to be true. But Laslett fails to recognise Locke's method
of contrasting truth with falsehood, and remarks that the above
passage is "directed against Filmer" (39 n.). What Laslett
means is that Sect. 39 reveals Locke's intention to "refute"
Filmer. Yet everyone can see that the above passage clarifies
Locke's own position in opposition to Filmer's alternative.
29. Olivecrona, "A Note on Locke and Filmer", The Locke Newsletter,
No.7 (1976), p. 85.
30. In CHAPTER 1, I have quoted a passage from Patriarcha where Filmer
argues for the rejection of Grotius' notion of the original
community of things, and the adoption of his alternative premise.
(See CHAPTER 1: Secto 1. 1 and note 10) The passage I have quoted
there is likely to be the one Locke had in mind when he wrote lines
10-16 of Sect. 25, Chap_ 5, ~ ("I will not content myself to
answer, ••_, exclusive of all the rest of his Posterity".)
In my discussion of Locke's formulation of the problem of Chap. 5,
I have analyzed Sect. 25 and marked lines 10-16 as Passage (iii).
Compare Passage (iii) with the passage which I quoted from Patriarcha,
and confirm that Locke is likely to be alluding to Patriarchal
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Olivecrona has already suggested that lines 10-16 were probably
inserted after the publication of Patriarcha. See Olivecrona,
"An Insertiol1 in Para. 25 of the Second Treatise of Government?"
The Locke Newsletter, No. 6 (1975), pp. 63-66. His suggestion is
based on his well-developed ability to read Locke's English (a
rarity. among Locke scholars today!) and his conjecture that
Filmer's small tracts would not have caused him to add lines
10-16. However, he was not able to point out the particular passage
of Patriarcha Locke had in mind. I have pointed out the passage
in question. From now on, Olivecrona shall not fight a lonely
battle against Laslett and his followers!
31. For Locke's view of the relationship between "thinking" and "reading",
see his comments on "reading" in his Conduct of Understanding,
Works, III, sect. 20. There he says: "Reading furnishes the
mind only with materials of knowledge"; it is "thinking" that
"makes what we read ours". It is "not enough to cram ourselves
with a great load of collections; unless we chew them over again,
they will not give us strength and nourishment". We can tum
materials into knowledge "only by our own meditation, and examining
the reach, force, and coherence of what is said".
Locke's suggestion concerning "reading" seems commonsensical. But
this must be understood against the background of his policy of
independent thinking, and of the anti-scholastic trend in modern
philosophy. Locke's anti-scholastic remarks abound in the Essay.
I have quoted a few samples at the beginning of CHAPTER 2. He
detested the "floating of other Mens Opinions in our brains
(Essay, I, iv, 23). Locke's policy of independent thinking is
similar to Descartes', and Hobbes'. Locke's philosophical thinking
began when he encountered Descartes' works. Madam Masham
reports: "The first books (as Mr. Locke himself has told me) which
gave him a relish of philosophical studies were those of Descartes.
He was 'rejoiced in reading of these" (Cranston, Life, 100). To
say the least, he enjoyed Descarte's individuali;tIC mode of
thinking. Locke quoted a statement from Hobbes' Leviathan: wrong
definitions give rise to "false tenets and senseless Tenets" and
Hmake those men that take their instruction from the authority
of books, and not from their meditation, to be •••. below the
condition of ignorant men". This is the only extant, direct
quotation from Hobbes that can be found in the entire Lockean
corpus. (For this information, see Laslett's Introduction to the
Two Treatises, p. 74. This direct quotation is found on the flyleaf
of a volume in Locke's library, not in his notebook.) Locke certainly
agrees with Hobbes and Descartes that public language and public
knowledge are corrupt, and that each private individual must
"meditate" independently of scholastic rubbish (i.e., "books").
32. Tully, A Discourse on Property (1984), p. 96.
33. In this paragraph, I tease Tully in a frivolous manner. But I do
not wish to misrepresent his view. In this note, I try to be
pedantic and quote his own sentences exactly. First, on p. 75
of A Discourse on Property, Tully says:
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He [i.e., Pufendorf] says Filmer is mistaken in supposing that
God granted Adam a right of private dominion. Because 'Property
denotes an Exclusion of the Right of others to the thing
enjoyed' it cannot 'be understood, 'till the World was furnished
with more than one Inhabitant' (4, 4, 3).
I have quoted a part of this passage in the text.
As we can see, Tully quotes Pufendorf's words from(4, 4, 3)
of De Jure Naturae et Gentium. But the problem is that Pufendorf
does not mention Filmer in this particular place, nor in any other
part of his encyclopaedic. work. To solve this difficulty, Tully
takes a second step. He adds the following explanatory note:
"Although Pufendorf does not mention (Filmer] by name, Barbeyrac
suggests that the critique refers to an 'English knight, named
Robert Filmer' (49 4, 3n)" (Tully, opo cit., p. 178, n, 9).
Thus in Tully's view, Pufendorf criticized Filmer's view in Bk , 4,
Cho 4, Sect. 3 of De Jure Naturae et Gentium without mentioning
his name, yet Barbeyrac knew Pufendorf's allusion to Filmer •
..
34. Locke's manuscript piece "Morality" was published in The Locke
Newsletter, No.5. (1974), pp. 26-8.
35. Kelly, "Locke and Filmer: Was Laslett so Wrong after all 1" The
Locke Newsletter, No.8 (1977), pp. 82 f.
36. ~., pp. 84 f.
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37. Isaiah Berlin, "Hobbes, Locke and Professor Macpherson",
Political Quarterly 35 (1964), p. 468. Berlin's remark, quoted
here, concerns Macpherson's book as a whole. My criticism of
Macpherson is restricted to his treatment of Locke.
38. Richard Cox, "Justice as the Basis of Political Order in Locke",
Nomos VI: Justice, edo C.J. Friedrich & J.W. Chapman (New York:
Aldine-Atherton Press, 1963).
39. Raymond Polin, "Justice in Locke's Philosophy" in the same Nomos
volume cited above (in note 38).
40. John Dunn, "Justice and the Interpretation of Locke's Political
Theory", Political Studies, Vol. XVI, No.1 (1968), p. 77.
41. Dunn does not even mention "corrective justice". He vaguely
associates Locke's concept of justice with the distribution of
property. See !2!£., pp. 76, 79, & 80.
A part of Dunn's confusion arises from his strategy. He searches for
Locke's use of the adjective "just", or his idea of the "just"
distribution of goods. It never occurs to him that there is a
close relationship between the noun "justice" and another noun
"law". For Dunn's preoccupation with the adjective "just", see
ibid., p. 80 in particular. Why doesn't Dunn discuss "law"?
'Heis completely confused about the role of "positive laws" in
Locke's political theory. Dunn says "since property right is in
fact a function of positive law 0.0, this would seem to mean that all
positive law property-distributions are necessarily. just". Having
stated this un-Lockean view, he denies it in a lukewarm manner.
"Locke seems never to have adopted such an obsequious posture
(ibid. p. 80)0 Then Dunn continues to wonder how "positive laws"
a;;-rinked to "property" (~., p. 81). Given his deep-seated
confusion about the ABC of Locke's political theory, we cannot
possibly expect him to clarify Locke's view of the relationship
between "justice" and "law"o
42. For Dunn's obscure remarks about the relationship between "justice"
and "charity", see ~., po 81 ff. He does not grasp the
fundamental point that the "magistrate" (or the supreme, legislative
agent) ought to dispense "justice", without practicing "charity"
to any particular section of the whole community. "Charity" has
nothing to do with Locke's political theory. It is a positive
Christian virtue based on love, and h~political theory is
independent of his appeal to "love" or "charity". Locke is not
a .Feuerbach of the 17th century!
Dunn concedes, at one point: "Justice and Charity, it is true,
are no longer equivalent" (ibid., p. 82). At bottom, he seems
to be inclined to establish the equivalence of "justice" and
"charity". Yet he quickly adds his characteristic "but", and
goes on to muddle himself. In the end, of course, he discusses
his favourite work, The Reasonableness of Christianity. What on
earth does Dunn want to say? Nothing in particular. He just wants
to save Locke from Macpherson's interpretation by talking about
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"charity" (or "justice") in an obscure manner. Perhaps, he wants
to say that Locke emphasized the significance of "the duty of charity".
Of course, Locke emphasized this. Who would deny this? But the
important point is that Locke emphasized it as a positive, Christian
moral virtue. It is distinct from the negative virtue of justice,
or from the administration of justice. To repeat, "charity"
has nothing to do with Locke's political theory. As I have shown
in PART 2 of CHAPTER 1, Locke contrasts "justice" with "charity".
Cf. my comment on Dunn's confusion about the political and
the religious in note 7 above.
43. Tully, A Discourse of Property (1980), p. 166.
44. !ill., p. 168.
!ill., pp. 164f.
.!E.!.!!. , p. 167 •
!ill., p. 168.
45.
46.
47.
48. Ibid.
49. ~., p. 169.
50. My critical comments on Tully can be found in CHAPTER 1, note 11;
CHAPTER 2, PART 1 & BART 2; CHAPTER 3, note 13 and the text it
refers to; CHAPTER 3, note 15 and the text it refers to; and
Appendix 2, Sect. II (iii).
The best way to evaluate Tully's book is to examine the way
in which he uses Locke's sentences, historical references, and
the claims of other scholars. His use is entirely arbitrary;
it is an abuse. First, Tully misreports what Locke actually
says. For this, see J.L. Mackie's review mentioned below in
note 51. Secondly, he uses historical references to forge connections.
As we have seen in this chapter, Tully misuses or abuses Pufendorf
and Barbeyrac. But he also abuses Barbeyrac's discourse on the
science of morality, to forge a connection between Locke's political
theory and his epistemology. For this, see Appendix 2, Sect. II (iii).
Thirdly, he embraces various claims of "famous" scholars and
philosophers I.'N"I";4'I'y~ He agrees with Yolton that Locke's
account of appropriation is a "conceptual" inquiry. He agrees
with Laslett that it is a refutation of Filmer. He agrees with
Dunn that "[w)hen men enter society, what their 'property now
is what the legal rules specify'" (.!ill., p. 168). These fuee
which Tull takes u on trust are false and dee 1 confused.
or falsehood of a claim does not interest him in the
least. Oh, here is another one. Tully quotes Mackie's remark out of
context, and uses it arbitrarily to support the indefensible claim
that men's possessions in the community are owned by the community
(.!ill., pp. 164f.).
211
51. Dunn and Yolton jointly rhapsodized over Tully's book. This is a
symptom of the widespread corruption of intellect among Locke
scholars. But not all scholars and philosophers are corrupt, or
blind. I should like to mention the late J.L. Mackie here. The
acute, critical, and impartial Mackie reviewed Tully's book. Though
he welcomed the book with some enthusiasm, he rightly pointed out
that "there are a number of passages where what Locke says is
either misreported or pretty clearly misunderstood". See Mackie's
review in Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 32 (1982), p. 92. Mackie
also listed some of the innumerable instances of Tully's misuse
or misunderstanding of Locke's passages (ibid., pp. 92f.). It is
a great pleasure to read Mackie's critical discussion of Tully's
book. Nevertheless, even the judicious Mackie at one point wrote
in favour of Tully's interpretation of Locke as a proponent of a
theory of distributive justice: Tully's interpretation is not only
"challenging" or "exciting", but "also at least nearer to the truth
than that to which it is opposed" (ibid., p. 92). Mackie here treats
Tully's interpretation as being opp~ to Macpherson's. Pace
Mackie, I must say that there is no question of verisimilitude here.
Tully is simply wrong. Locke's mythical story of appropriation
abolishes the gap between men's present possessions and their
legitimate possessions, so that according to Locke's political theory
of the Second Treatise, there is no room for the question whether
the state ought to re-distribute men's possessions according to their
legitimate possessions. Hackie actually does not accept the
substance of Tully's interpretation. So there is no good reason for
his judgement that Tully's interpretation is "nearer to the truth"
than Macpherson's. When a new interpretation is given, even the most
sensible philosopher becomes excited. After the death of the
judicious Mackie, there seem to be very few reliable judges in the-
republic of letters.
As far as I am concerned, I shall regard any new exciting
interpretation in the future as an imaginative fiction. Truth,
we must admit, is very boring. This is why CHAPTER 1 of this
dissertation is boring. What excites us is almost always falsehood
or a fiction. Indeed, the falsehoods of many recent commentators have
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excited me to perform the task of refutation in CHAPTER 2.
52. K.Olivecrona's article, "Locke's Theory of Appropriation",
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 96 (1974), contains
the best exposition of Locke's account of appropriation available
in English. I have corrected his Hegelian error in Appendix 3,
Sect. (i). Olivecrona also mentions the Stoic maxim of justice
("suum cuigue tribuere"), and takes note of its negative
interpretation (~., pp. 222f.).
For G. Parry's exposition of Locke's account of appropriation,
and his discussion of Locke's concept of justice, see John Locke
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), pp. 49 ff. and pp. 115 ff.
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CHAPTER 3
LOCKE'S CONCEPT OF PROPERTY:
A Critical and Historical Analysis
"Some gross and confused Conceptions Men indeed
ordinarily have, to which they apply the common
Words of their Language, and such a loose use of
their words serves them well enough in their
ordinary Discourses and Affairs. But this is
not sufficient for philosophical Enquiries.
Knowledge and Reasoning require precise determin-
ate Ideas." (Essay, III, x, 22.)
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical and
historical analysis of Locke's concept of property. In PART 1 of this
chapter, I shall determine the meaning, or the strict sense, of "property"
by separating it from various loose images Locke attached to it. In
PART 2, I shall analyze Locke's concept of property. The word "concept"
should be understood in a special sense here. By Locke's "concept" of
property, I shall mean his understanding of how men and objects are
related when an object is a particular man's "property" in the strict
sense. My analysis in PART 2 presupposes the conclusion of PART 1,
because Locke's "concep t" of property presupposes the de termina te,
strict sense of the word "property".
In PART 1, I shall isolate the strict sense of "property" from
Locke's loose images. By a careful reconstruction, I shall show that
"property" in the strict sense is "an exclusive right of disposal", or
the "object(s)" of this right. In Locke's view, such items as a man's
life, liberty, and possessions (or his person and goods) can become the
objects of his exclusive right of disposal. In PART 2, I shall present
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a detailed analysis of Locke's understanding of how men and objects hang
together when a man has "an exclusive right of disposal" over an object.
This is an analysis of what it is for a man to have this peculiar right
over an object; or what it is for an object to be a man's "property".
Locke apparently treats the relationship of a man to his "property" as
if it were a simple, two-term relationship. But in fact, this
apparently simple relationship conceals a definite structure of Locke's
concept of property. Its structure is ego-centric or agent-centred.
I shall explain what this structure is. I shall thereby clarify and
examine Locke's philosophical assumptions about the nature of the
peculiar entity called "property", or "an exclusive right of disposal".
Hy discussion in this chapter deals with the minutest details
of the sense(s) of "property", and the concept of property. It also
tries to combine historical scholarship with philosophical criticism.
To the best of my knowledge, nobody has offered a satisfactory analysis
of Locke's concept of property yet. Hy analysis is the first major
attempt in the whole history of Locke scholarship.
I have written Appendix 3 in order to supplement my analysis of
the ego-centric structure of Locke's concept of property. This
Appendix should be read in conjunction with PART 2 of this chapter. It
surveys 20th-century scholars' inadequate understandings of the ego-
centric structure of Locke's concept of property. It also tries to
show that his concept of property is strongly ego-centric or agent-
centred, in comparison with the concepts of property which other 17th-
century theorists (Hobbes, Grotius, Pufendorf) formulated. See
Appendix 3: Locke's Ego-Centric Concept of Property, with Special
Reference to 20th-Cantury Commentators and 17th-century Theorists.
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Before I proceed, I should like to make one cautionary remark.
Questions about the strict meaning of the word "property" and the
"concept" of property (in the way I defined the term "concept") are not
the questions which Locke himself discussed in the Two Treatises.
Those questions which I shall discuss below must be distinguished,
above all, from questions about the historical or conjectural origin of
property, or about the moral justification of the acquisition of
property. The latter questions are relevant to Locke's account of
appropriation in Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise. It is one thing to
ask what the word "property" means, and what specific relationship of
men and objects holds when a particular object is said to be someone's
"property". But it is quite another thing to ask how men acquired
(or could have acquired, or might have acquired) property, and whether
there is any moral justification for the property so acquired. These
are Locke's questions, which are certainly distinct from my questions in
this chapter. The difference between Locke's questions and mine is
plain. But it is worth stating that they are different because the
answers to my questions must be extracted from Locke's text, and
because intelligent Locke scholars have conflated questions about the
meaning/concept of property and questions about the origin/justification
of the acquisition of property. (For notable examples of this
conflation, see my discussion on Milam, Yolton, and Tully in Appendix 2,
Sect. II, (i), (ii) and (iii); also my comment on Olivecrona in
Appendix 3, Sect. (i).)
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PART 1. Images and a Reconstruction of the Meaning
1. 1 Images of "Property": Locke's Confused Imagination
"Another great abuse of Words is, Inconstancy
in the use of them. It is hard to find a
Discourse WTitten of any Subject, especially
of Controversie, wherein one shall not observe,
if he read with attention, the same Words
••• used sometimes for one Collection of
simple Ideas, and sometimes for another, which
is a perfect abuse of Language."
(Essay, III, x,S.)
Since the middle of the 18th century, philosophically acute
critics have pointed out that a loose succession of images dominates
Locke's account of appropriation. Francis Hutcheson commented on his
account of appropriation, as one of the earliest critics: "The
difficulties upon this subject arise from some confused imagination
that property is some physical quality or relation produced by some
1action of men". 8efore Hutcheson wrote this sentence, Hume had made
a famous remark: "We cannot be said to join our labour to any thing
but in a figurative sense. Properly speaking, we only make an
al tera tion on it by our labour" (]:g!, 505f.,n,}, 80th criticisms
have one thing in common: Locke's account of appropriation suffers
from an image, or a metaphor, about property. In fact, as Geraint
Parry has recently pointed out, Locke is ready to exploit a number of
incompatible images to defend the privacy and exclusiveness of
2property.
Two images are particularly important: the image of
property as a man's peculiar quality, and the image of joining this
quality to an external object. Locke combines these images and gives
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h i 1 f " . t· "a metap or ca account 0 appropr1a 10n • According to this meta-
phorical account, a man converts a portion of the external world into
"his property" by joining his peculiar quality to that portion of the
external world. This peculiar quality is called "something that is
his own", and it is identified as "his property".
Locke's account of appropriation in Chapter 5 of the Second
Treatise is loose and unphilosophical, to the extent that it relies on
a succession of images associated with the idea of property. In what
follows, I shall point out that Locke does rely on a loose succession of
images, and fails to base his account of appropriation on a clear-cut,
rigorous concept of property. His use of images must be detected,
and it should be treated as unphilosophical. I shall criticize his
unphilosophical, popular exploitation of images in order to distinguish
what is frivolous in his discourse on property from what is more solid
and philosophical. Later, I shall rescue the solid part. But for
the moment, I shall try to show that Locke is guilty of the inconstant
use of the word "property", and the "perfect abuse of Language".
Locke's remark on "another great abuse of Words", quoted above, is true.
It is, indeed, "hard to find a Discourse" "especially of Controversie",
where we do not find the inconstant use of words.
Let us draw attention to the most famous, and most frequently
cited, passage in the Second Treatise. This is the passage which has
been always quoted by his commentators. It has been criticized on
innumerable occasions by those who have subtler minds than Locke's.
It even appears that the sole charm of this hundred-times-criticized
passage lies in its obscurity, or the vanity of theorists who can
seize upon any obscurity to show their superiority. I shall quote the
passage in full, dividing it into four parts:
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(1) "Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common
to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own
Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.
(2) "The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may
say, are properly his.
(3) "Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour
with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed
from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common
right of other Men.
(4) "For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the
Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is
once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good
left in cOllmon for others."
(~, 27, quoted in full.)
Philosophically-minded critics in recent years have typically claimed
that given (1) and (2), it does not logically follow that every man has
a property in the external object with which he has mixed his labour.3
A milder version of this criticism is that Locke does not present any
good reason, in the passage quoted above, to show why a man's act of
mixing his labour with a common object should justify his having a
. h b i 4property 1n t at 0 Ject. It is true that the conclusion does not
deductively follow from (1) and (2). It is also true that the above
passage contains no good reason for our ascription of a property right
to the object with which a man has mixed his labour. However, I shall
first identify what Locke is doing in writing the famous paragraph.
He is not deducing the proposition about a particular right from the
propositions about a prior right. Nor is he trying, in the above
passage, to offer a closely reasoned argument to justify our ascription
of a property right to the object with which a man has mixed his labour.
What Locke is doing is simple. He is describing a specific, compact-
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independent and injury-free, method of appropriation, and thereby
claiming that there l! a specific method of appropriation which does
not depend on the explicit compact of all men and avoids injuring any
other man. The primary objective of Locke's Chapter 5 is to show how
each man comes to have a property in a definite portion of the God-given
world of common things (independently of the explicit compact of all
men and without injuring any other man). It is to show what is the
specific method, or mode, of appropriation, i.eo, of coming to have a
property in the God-given world of common thingso In the paragraph
which immediately precedes the passage I have quoted, Locke states
that since God has given the external world of common goods "for the
use of Men", "there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them
some way or other" (ST, 26). The main point of the quoted passage,
therefore, is that a man's act of labour rather than anything else is
the specific method of appropriation. This method of appropriation
is independent of the universal, explicit compact. It also avoids
causing injury to any other man, as long as '~here there is enough,
and as good left in conmon for others".
In trying to show that a man's act of labouring is the
specific, compact-independent and injury-free, method of appropriation,
Locke makes use of various images of "property". His use of various
images appears as an ambiguous use of the word "property". Strictly
speaking, to say that a man has a property in something means that a
man has an exclusive right to dispose of it; and to say that something
is a man's property means that it is the object of his exclusive right
of disposal. (For this strict meaning, see my discussion below in
1. 2.) Nevertheless, Locke deviates from this strict meaning, and
makes use of the images which suggest entirely different kinds of
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privacy and exclusiveness. Let us see how this deviation takes place,
by referring to the famous passage I have quoted in full.
Locke first equivocates when he asserts (2): the labour of a
man's body, and the work of his hand, "we may say", are "properly
his". The meaning of this sentence is ambiguous between (a) a man has
an exclusive right to dispose of his labour-power, and (b) the labour-
power and the operation of his hand belong to, or reside in, his body
in an exclusive manner. The idea (b) is the idea of physical
exclusion, which is in fact distinct from the idea of an exclusive
right. Locke obviously thinks that each man's body is biologically
separate from another man's body, and the working of his body is
confined to a single body and inseparable from it. He says that
nobody denies that a man's "nourishment is his", and strengthens the
image of exclusiveness on the basis of physical intransmissibility
(g, 28). In claiming that the "nourishment" (or digestion) of
apples is "his", Locke simply conflates the idea of physical exclusion
with the idea of an exclusive right, i.e., the right whose object is
not the object of another man's right. It is one thing to claim that
nobody has a right to another man's body or his bodily function. But
it is quite another to claim that the nourishment or digestion is the
function of his body, given the normal biological function of a human
body. One is a normative claim, whereas the other is a description
5of how a manes body normally works.
The equivocation noted above is not very serious, given
Locke's premise that every man has a property in his person. This
premise entails that every man has a right to dispose of (i.e., control)
his body to the exclusion of others. But there is another equivocation
which is more seriously misleading. Locke claims, in (3) of the
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quoted passage, that a man joins, or annexes, "something that is his
own" to an external coamon object by the act of labouring. He
elsewhere speaks of a man's annexation of "something that was his
Property" (ST, 32). He also says that the "labour that was mine • ••
hath fixed my Property in" external goods (28). Thus according to
Locke's usage, "something that is his own" is equivalent to (the
object of) "his property". But the word "property" in this context
is ambiguous because Locke associates "property" with the peculiar or
distinctive quality of each man. What is "fixed" (or "annexed" or
"joined") to an external common object is not so much the object of a
man's exclusive right of disposal, as the peculiar quality which he
possesses as a distinct individual. This is confirmed by the
following redescription of a man's annexation of his "property" to
external objects through labour:
That labour put a distinction between them and
common. That added something to them more than
Nature, the common Mother of all, had done; and
so they became his private right (~, 28).
What is this "something", which in Locke's view counts as a man's
"property"? Various interpretations of this "something" are
available. It can be a man's labour-power; or his industriousness
and pains (34); or his "Invention and Arts" (44); and so forth.
However we may interpret it, it is fairly clear that Locke associates
"property" with some peculiar quality or power of each individual man
insofar as he relies on the metaphor of "fixing" ("annexing",
"joining", or "adding"). Up to a point, then, Locke's account of
appropriation in Chapter 5 rests on the metaphorical idea that a man's
act of "appropriating" the world (or coming to have "a property in"
it) is an act of attaching his quality to a portion of the world by a
quasi-chemical process of mixing his labour with it.
223
There seem to be several causes which induced Locke to adopt
this metaphorical idea. First, the word "property" is often used in
the sense of "quality", as we say that whiteness is the "property" of
wax. Secondly, one of the older meanings of the word "appropriate"
is "To allot, annex, or attach a thing to another as an appendage"
(~, "appropriate", S). Thirdly, two of Locke's predecessors,
Grotius and Pufendorf, conceived of "a right" as a man's moral
"quality", and their talk about a "quality" probably strengthened the
associative link between "property" and "quality".6 Fourthly, it is
customary for a man to "fix" his fence in a particular plot of land, or
to "attach" his label to a book, in order to indicate or claim that the
external object so marked is his property. These seem to be the main
causes which induced Locke to use, uncritically and illegitimately, the
metaphorical idea that "appropriation" is a man's act of annexing his
peculiar quality to a portion of the external world.
Why is it illegitimate to use this metaphorical idea? This
idea involves a shift in the meaning of the word "property". What
Locke attempts to do in Chapter S, strictly speaking, is to provide an
account of how each man comes to have an exclusive right of disposal
over a portion of the God-given world of common things. This follows
from the strict meaning of "property" which I have already indicated
(and also from the strict meaning of "appropriation" as coming to have
an exclusive right of disposal over a portion of the external world).
Locke's task, strictly speaking, is ~ to provide an account of how
each man has "fixed" his peculiar (or distinctive, or exclusive)
"quality" in a portion of the external world. Suppose that a man
attaches his peculiar quality to external objects by the act of
labouring, as Locke suggests. But it remains necessary to explain
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why each man has, or should have, an exclusive right to dispose of
this peculiar portion of the world. It is frivolous to claim that he
has an exclusive right of disposal over this portion of the external
world because he has fixed his peculiar quality in it by his labour
i.e., because a man "hath by this labour something annexed to it,
that excludes the comnon right of other Men" (g, 27). This claim
simply presupposes that if an external object embodies a peculiar
quality of a man's own, this object counts as his "property" in the
strict sense of the object of his exclusive right of disposalo Yet
this presupposition itself needs justification, because the fixation
of a peculiar personal quality in an external object has no conceptual
link with a man's having a particular kind of right over the object.
Why, one might ask, is it not the case that a man acquires a right
of usufruct to the object rather than an exclusive right of disposal
over it? And why is it not the case that a man loses his peculiar
quality (e.g., his sweat) in the vast ocean of natural products
without ever acquiring an exclusive right of disposal? By insisting
that a man has "fixed" his "property" in external goods, Locke merely
avoids answering these questions. Insofar as he relies on the
metaphor of "fixing" ("joining", "annexing", or "adding"), the metaphor
makes it superfluous to explain why a man should have a particular
right over the peculiarly transformed object.
It is futile to appeal to the metaphor where an argument is
needed. Locke might wish to convey the image that the peculiarly
transformed object assumes the "colour" of a man's distinctive quality,
or it "embodies" that quality. But it is very easy to discredit
Locke's use of this image. We can use this image in a number of ways,
even to dis-justify a man's exclusive right of disposal over the
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peculiarly transformed object. For example, we can say: since
the peculiarly transformed object is a faint copy of a man's original
peculiar quality, he only has a right to share the object with other
men, or a right to borrow it from the creator of the previously common
object. I do not intend this to be an argument, but it is a metaphor
which is at least as good as the metaphor of llfixing" his "property"
in external objects. My point is that Locke's fixing metaphor
cannot substitute an argument which defends the claim that a man
should have an exclusive right of disposal over the goods which he has
transformed by his labour.
There is no denying that Locke tries to defend this claim in
Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise in a variety of ways. One line of
defence is to argue that a man should have an exclusive right of
disposal over the laboured-on objects, because his labour involves
great efforts (i.e., "pains") which ought to be rewarded (g, 30, 34,
et passim). Another line of defence Locke takes is that a system of
exclusive rights of disposal, based on each man's labour, improves the
general standard of life for all (37). These and other justificatory
arguments can be extracted from Locke's account of appropriation, and
they can be spelled out independently of his use of the fixing
metaphor. Thus it is wrong to say that his account of appropriation
consists solely of his fixing metaphor and equivocation. However, it
is equally wrong to deny that Locke also relies on the metaphor in the
famous passage (ST, 27) and other places. His use of loose images,
and his equivocation, are what I have criticized above.
When Locke confidently claims that the "labour that was mine
000 hath fixed my Property in them" (28), he writes as a victim of
what Hume calls "the frivolous propensity of the imagination" (.!!!2"
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224). Our mind, Hume warns us, has "a great propensity to spread
itself on external objects" (!!:!2_, 167); and children, poets, and
peripatetic philosophers do not take the trouble to restrain their
propensity to project their emotions onto external objects (~,
224f.). In parallel fashion, Locke's labourer spreads the image of
"property" - his peculiar quality - upon external objects 0 And Locke
himself does forget, from time to time, to restrain his propensity
to conflate the image of property and the meaning of property, a
labourer's act of spreading his quality over external objects and his
coming to have an exclusive right of disposal over those objects.
This sort of conflation is pardonable in certain cases. As Hume put
it, we must "pardon children, because of their age" and "poets"
because of their profession to follow "the suggestions of their
fancy" (~, 225). Yet if philosophers cannot restrain their
propensity to follow the suggestions of their fancy, it is their fatal
weakness. "But what excuse shall we find to justify our philosophers
in so signal a weakness?" (~, 225.) This is Hume's remark on
peripatetic philosophers who passionately talked about the sympathies,
antipathies and horrors of a vacuum. Mutatis mutandis, this remark
applies to Locke's popular exploitation of images in his account of
appropriation.
Without overemphasizing Locke's weakness, his vulnerability
to conflate the image of property and the meaning of property, I
should like to conclude that Locke's account of appropriation does
rest, up to a certain point, on his unphilosophical exploitation of
images. The criticism, made by Hutcheson and Hume long ago, is valid.
Yet Locke is not entirely an unfortunate victim of "the frivolous
property of the imagination". Since I have exposed the frivolous
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part of Locke's account of appropriation, I shall move on to discuss
the more solid part of his discourse on property. In the following
section (1.2 below), I shall reconstruct.!!!! meaning of "property".
The meaning, or the strict meaning, of "property" is my reconstruction,
to the extent that I deliberately purge Locke of his loose images.
I shall simply discard Locke's loose images and treat them as if they
were non-existent. But the following discussion is not arbitrary,
since I shall try to determine what Locke meant by "property" by
considering what he said in the whole of the Second Treatise rather
than a few sentences of Chapter 5. It will turn out that Locke, on
the whole, knew what he was talking about when he used the word
"property".
1.2 A Reconstruction of the Meaning of "Property"
"Though in the continuation of a Discourse
or the pursuit of an Argument, there be
hardly room to digress into a particular
Definition, as often as a Man varies the
significance of any Term; yet the import
of the Discourse will, for the most part,
if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently
lead candid and intelligent Readers, into the
true meaning of it: but where that is not
sufficient to guide the Reader, there it
concerns the Writer to explain his meaning,
and shew in what sense he there uses that
Termo" (Essay, III, xi, 27.)
The passage quoted above contains Locke's considered judgement
about how an author should convey the "true meaning" of his discourse,
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and remedy his vulnerability to the imperfection and abuse of words.
In writing the Second Treatise, a discourse on property and government,
Locke does indeed try to convey its true meaning by occasionally
explaining the sense in which he uses the term "property". He says
he intends to use the word "Property" as a "general Name" for men's
"Lives, Liberties and Estates" (.2,!, 123), or to refer to "that Property
which Men have in their Persons as well as Goodsll (173). This remark
is intended to help intelligent readers grasp the IItrue meaning" of
the whole discourse on property and government. But the remark
baffles us. Does the word "property" ~ "lives, liberties, and
estates"? Is this a broader sense of "property" whereas there is
another sense of "property" as "estates" or "possessions"? We must
settle our initial questions in order to reconstruct the meaning of
"property" successfully.
We should distinguish between the "internal" use of a word and
the "external" meaning of the word. Locke uses the word "property"
as a general name for men's lives, liberties and estates within his
discourse, and this particular use is dictated by the purpose of the
discourse. This is the "internal" use of the word "property", and
the purpose of Locke's discourse in the Second Treatise (its "true
meaning" or "import") is to establish claims against any arbitrary
governmental power over men's lives, liberties and estates, and advance
claims for the government which legally protects men's lives,
liberties and estates. But since Locke uses the word "property" in
order to write a discourse for a particular purpose, he can be said
to know the meaning of the word "property" independently of the
discourse he himself wrote. This meaning is the "external" meaning
of the word "property". This "external" meaning is what I intend to
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reconstruct. This meaning, properly reconstructed, is this:
"property" means either a man's exclusive right of disposal, or any
object of this right. In the Essay, Locke defines "property" as
"a right to any thing", "injustice" as "the Invasion or Violation of
that right"; he thereby claims that the proposition "Where there is
no Property, there is no Injustice" is a moral proposition capable of
demonstration (Essay, IV, iii, 18). The definition of "property" as
"a right to any thing" is a simplified definition of the external
meaning of "property", ioe., a simplification of "an exclusive right
of disposal".
Once we distinguish the internal use of the word "property"
from its external meaning, we do not need to trouble ourselves with
the question whether "property" means a man's "Life , Uberty, and
possessions". It is permissible to say that given Locke's discourse
on property and government in the Second Treatise, "property" is or
"means" a man's "life, liberty, and possessions" (or men's "lives,
liberties, and possessions (or estates)")o Strictly speaking,
however, this is Locke's use of the word "property" for the purpose
of his discourse. It is his "internal" use. From the viewpoint of
the "external" meaning of the word "property", what Locke does in the
Second Treatise is the following. Throughout the Second Treatise,
Locke puts forward a summary of his substantive claim that certain
objects count as one's property. For instance, when he states that
men's "Lives, Liberties and Estates ••• I call by the general Name,
Property" (g, 123), he is claiming that those objects count as
"property" given the independent meaning of "property". 17th-century
social philosophers - Hobbes, Grotius, Pufendorf, et al - claimed
that certain objects, material and immaterial, are our "own" objects.
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They enumerated the objects which they took to be our "own", either by
b . 7nature or y conventlon. Locke similarly enumerates a man's "own"
objects in the Second Treatise, by explaining his internal use of the
word "property", or by simply using the phrase "life, liberty, and
possessions" in place of the word "property".
It is customary for scholars and commentators to distinguish
between Locke's "broad" and "narrow" sense of "property". According
to this customary division, property in the "broad" sense refers to
one's "life, liberty, and possessions (or estate)" whereas property
in the "narrow" sense refers to one's "possessions" (or "estate")
alone. It is also customarily observed that "property" means one's
right over one's life, liberty and possessions on the one hand, and
one's right over one's possessions on the other hand. The customary
division of this sort is based on the false assumption that Locke only
speaks about "property" in the "narrow" sense in Chapter 5 of the
Second Treatise, "Of Property". But he certainly claims in Chapter 5
that "every man has a Property in his own Person" (27). The customary
division drawn by 20th-century commentators is useful only because it
serves to prevent our confusion. It is of no use to our understanding
of Locke's internal use of the word "property", or his external
i f· t 8mean ng 0 1. The so-called two "senses" of property have nothing
to do with the internal use Locke explained, or the external meaning
he presupposed. Furthermore, the currently popular two-sense doctrine
of "property" ascribes to Locke the view that he "extended" our
ordinary sense of property (i.e., "property" as a man's possessions) to
encompass such objects as a man's "life and liberty". This is to put
the matter upside down.9 For Locke, a man's "life and liberty" (and
also his minimal possessions, or the possessions required for his self-
preservation) count as his "property" from the beginning (g,6).
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Locke shows in Chapter 5 how each man's exclusive private domain,
consisting of his "life and liberty" or his "person", comes to be
enlarged to incorporate external possessions. A man's possessions
increase over time, according to Locke's account of appropriation.
So what he means by "possessions" in Chapter 2 of the Second Treatise
differs from what he means by "possessions" in or after Chapter 5.
But throughout the Second Treatise, a man's life, liberty and
possessions are claimed to constitute his "property". This is
sufficient to show that it is wrong to attempt to understand Locke's
internal use, or his external meaning, of "property" by means of the
two-sense doctrine.
These are preliminary remarks which settle our initial
questions. In what follows, I shall reconstruct what I have called
the "external" meaning of "property". If each man's "life, liberty,
and possessions" count as his "property", then the word "property" has
a meaning independent of its referents such as "life", "liberty", and
"possessions". The easiest way to explain this independent meaning
is to replace the word "property" by some other expressions Locke uses.
So I shall begin by picking out his equivalent expressions. The
following discussion will also show the way in which Locke uses his
external meaning internally.
10 21 . f "P "The Mean1ng 0 roperty: An Enlarged View
Locke uses various expressions to indicate the external
meaning of the word "property". A man's "property" is "a part of
him, that another can no longer have any right to" (ST, 26). It is
what is "properly his", or "something that is his own" (27). Or it
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is "something" that is "his own", such that "another hars] no Title
to" it (32). Or it is that which "another can [notJ by right take 00.
[as) he pleases" or against the owner's "consent;" (138). From these
we can infer that "property" means what is one's "own", where this ownness
implies that no other man has a right to it (without the consent of the
owner) • To put it formally:
X is A's property = X is A's own, so that no other man has a right
to X (without A's consent)o
The crucial point is that if X is A's property or A's own, then it
implies that no other man has "a right to" X, ioeo, a right to take or
use X. The exclusiveness of someone's property is a part of the
meaning of an object's being his "property"o Locke comments on the
education of children, and states that they .should "form distinct
notions of property" and "know what is theirs by a peculiar right
exclusive of others" (Some Thoughts concerning Education, Works, IX,
101) .. Thus "X is A's property" means: X is what is A's by a
peculiar right exclusive of others.
As we have seen, Locke claims that each man's life, liberty,
and possessions are his "property" .. This means that each man's life,
liberty and possessions are his "own", implying that no other man has
a right to them. If each man's life (hence, his body) is his own,
then the labour-power of his body is also his own. This is why Locke
says that the "Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may
say, are properly his" (g,27).
The locution of the form "X is A's property" is only one of
the locutions Locke employs in talking about property. This locution
may be called Locution f (f for property). Another important locution
is of the following type: "A has a property in X". To cite examples:
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Every man has "a Property in" "his own Person" (27). Men might
"come to have" "a property in" "several parts of that which God gave
to Mankind in common" (25). "He that gathered a Hundred Bushels of
Acorns or Apples, had thereby a Property in them" (46). Instead of
saying that men's lives, liberties and possessions are their "property",
Locke says:
By Property I must be understood here, as in other
places, to mean that Property which Men have in their
Persons as well as Goods (173, emphasis added).
The sentences I have cited have one conunon feature: the word "property"
is followed by "in" 0 I shall call this locution Locution PI (f for
property, and! for in)o Locution fl is more legalistic than
Locution Po It is based on the legalistic way of dividing all
entities into persons and things. "x" (in "A has a property in X")
ranges over A's person, ~ a definite portion of external goods, ~
both. But it does ~ range over any other kind of entity. For
this reason, we can establish the relationship between Locution P
and Locution PI as follows.
A has "a property in"
his person and goods. =
A's life, liberty, and
possessions are his "property".
A has "a property in"
his goods. =
A's possessions are
his "property".
A has "a property in"
his person. =
A's life and liberty
are his "property".
The first equation clearly holds because as I have quoted already,
Locke calls "lives, liberties, and estates" "by the general Name,
Property" on the one hand, whereas he says that the general meaning of
"property" is "that Property which Men have in their Persons as well
as Goods". The second equation obviously holds. Hence, the third
equation follows. To say that every man has Itaproperty in" his
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person means that his life and liberty are his "property".
The expression "a property in" can be replaced by "an exclusive
right of disposal over" or "an exclusive right to dispose of". It is
an exclusive right in the sense that if A has "a property in X", no
other man has a right to use or take X (without A's consent). This
is fairly clear from what I have said about Locution P. But let us
confirm it. Locke says: "every Man has a Property in his own Person.
This (i.e., his own person] no Body has any Right to but himself" <g,
27)0 He rephrases "a property in" things as "a private Dominion,
exclusive of the rest of Mankind, in" them (26)0 He also paraphrases
the proposition that every man has a property in his person in the
following way:
Every Man is born with 0.. a Right: ••• A Right
of Freedom to his Person, which no other Man has a
Power over, but the free Disposal of it lies in
himself (190).
From these we can conclude that it is legitimate to translate "a property
in" into "an exclusive right of disposal over" or "an exclusive right to
dispose of".
We are now in a position to break the barrier between Locution ~
and Locution !!,o "A has a property in X" means "A has an exclusive
right of disposal over X", and "X" is A's person or a definite portion
of external goods. "y is A's property (or A's own)" means "A has an
exclusive right of disposal over y", and "y" is paradigmatically A's
life, liberty, or possessions. A's life includes A's labour, health,
and limb. A's possessions include A's estate, but typically "A's
possessions" is synonymous with "A's estate" according to Locke. What
is common to the two locutions concerning "property" is the idea that
A has an exclusive right to dispose of "his" "objects", whether those
235
"objects" are material or not. Those objects are identifiable as
"his", and this identification is presumably possible independently
of our identification of them as "his property''o The word "property",
as Locke uses it, refers to any (material or immaterial) object of each
man's exclusive right of disposal.
exclusive right of disposal itself.
There are two problematic notions which require brief comments.
Or else, it refers to his
First, "disposal" can mean a number of things. But in Locke's view,
it can be replaced by "control" or "arrangement", where "control" or
"arrangement" is taken to include "transfer". (For a detailed
discussion of "disposal", see my discussion in 2. 22 (A).). Secondly,
a man's "person" refers to any of his "objects" except his possessions
(or his estate, or his goods). Given the trinity of a man's "life,
liberty, and possessions", and the comparison of Locution PI and
Locution !" his "person" paradigmatically refers to his "life and
liberty"o This interpretation of the meaning of his "person" will be
justified in the following section.
1. 22 The Meaning of "a Property in his Person": A Local View
In this section I shall give additional considerations to
Locke's proposition that "every man has a property in his own person".
In the previous section, I have suggested that this proposition can be
translated into another sentence, "every man has an exclusive right to
dispose of his life and liberty". I do not hold that this is the
only acceptable translation. We could also say that every man has an
exclusive right to dispose of his body and his actions. As I said
before, Locution PI (having "a property in" X) is based on the
legalistic division of entities into persons and things. So Locke
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does not say that a man has "a property inn his actions. Nevertheless,
he describes man as "Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions or
Labour of it" (g, 44)0 So we may as well render na property in his
person" as "an exclusive right to dispose of his body (or his life) and
his actions". (The term "action", however, is an elusive one in the
10Second Treatise. )
I shall argue below that we should, indeed, understand Locke's
proposition about "a property in his own person" by the method of
translation I have proposed. There are false alternatives we should
rejecto We must reject at the outset J.P. Day's claim that Locke's
proposition is simply non-sensical. Day points out (correctly) that
the language of ownership is grammatically "irreflexive", and argues
(falsely) that Locke's proposition is just as nonsensical as the
proposition of the form "A owns A". He says that the sentence
"every man has a property in his own person" is just as nonsensical as
"Fido owns Fido, this dog owns this dog", and the like.11 Here we
must note that it is not Locke but Day, the "linguistic" philosopher
par excellence, who is talking nonsense. Locke does not hold the view
that the language of ownership or property is strictly reflexive;
this is why he says that every ~ has a property in his person. Nor
did Locke have time to engage in a childish language-game when he was
alive; his "person" was in danger when he was in exile. What Locke
does in the Second Treatise is not to play the childish language-game
of the Oxford origin (i.eo, "Fido owns Fido"), but to play the legal
language-game of the 17th-century natural-law tradition.
The 17th-century discourse on natural law and natural rights
employs a predominantly legal vocabulary. Since Locke regarded
Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium as "the best book" on natural
law and natural rights (Works, III, 296), we should briefly look at a
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part of Pufendorf's complex classification of legal (or moral)
entities. Pufendorf classifies "powers" into different groups. One
way of classifying "powers" - the "powers" man has, according to
Pufendorf, are virtually indistinguishable from his "rights" - is to
classify them according to the "objects" of powers. He says:
with regard to objects, most kinds of power can
be classified into four groups. For powers
concern either persons or things, and both these
according as they are one's own or another's
(De Jure Naturae [A], 19 li 19).
Pufendorf's four kinds of power are: power over one's' own person (and
actions), power over one's own things, power over the persons of other
men, and power over the things of other men. He gives four names to
these powers: "liberty", "ownership", "command" and "easement" (1, 1,
19)0 The idea underlying this classification is that each man has
two basic entities, his person and his things. These are the two
basic entities which each man has a power, or a right, to dispose of.
Locke inherits Pufendorf's legalistic division of a man's
entities into his person and his things. What is important about
his use of the word "person" in the Second Treatise, however, is that
he uses the word simply because the Second Treatise is a legal, or at
least quasi-legal, discourse. The word "person" is a legal term.
As Locke puts it, it is "a Forensick Term" which is applicable "only
to intelligent Agents capable of a law" (Essay, II, xxvii, 26). The
substantive meaning of this "forensic term" can be determined, if it
can be determined at all, not by our effort to discover what entity
this "person" is, but by the substantive legal theory which
constitutes this entity. It is futile to engage in some wild
speculation as to whether Locke's term "person" in the Second Treatise
should be taken to refer to this or that personal quality, or what
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attributes constitute personhoo~ ~ver and above Locke's substantive
legal discourse. Locke constantly puts a man's person in contrast
with a man's things (or a man's possessions): eog., "0.0 dispose of
their [i.e., men's] Possessions, and Persons" (_g, 4); "dispose of
his [i.e., a man's) Person or Possessions" (6); "By the same Act 000
whereby anyone unites his Person ••0 to any Commonwealth 000 he unites
his Possession" (120); every man is a "Lord of his own Person and
Possessions" (123); the conqueror who has a right over ItaMan's
Person" does not thereby have a right over "his Estate" (182)0
Like Pufendorf, Locke speaks of the person of a man in
contrast with the thing of a man. He holds that it is intelligible
to speak of a man as having a right to dispose of his person as well
as his thingso Yet Locke does not reify the entity called "person"
beyond his substantive legal discourse. When he says that every man
has "a property in" "his own person", he simply adopts the legalis tic
manner of writing. Its substantive meaning, or the referent of the
"person" of a man, can only be determined by the matter of his discourse
rather than its manner. Given the matter of Locke's legalistic theory
of the Second Treatise, we can say that the "person" of a man refers
to his "life and liberty", or his body and actions.
I believe that this nominalistic interpretation of Locke's
talk about "person" is correct. There is another line of inter-
pretation provided by John Yolton and James Tully. Yolton has
suggested the following: liThe concept of person is fundamental for •••
rightful appropriation". Just as Locke says in the Essay "we own our
actions", he claims in the Second Treatise that "we own our persons" or
"every man has a Property in his own person".l2 Yolton's parallelism
between "owning" actions and "owning" persons is false, because Locke
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never speaks of a man as "owning" his person in the Second Treatise.
Tully, however, takes Yolton's parallelism seriously, and links
Locke's discussion of personal identity in the Essay with the idea of
having "a property in his own person". By taking a long, dubious
route, Tully reaches an irrelevant conclusion: "the identity of a
person is consciousness of thought and action, and the thought and
action are his workmanship"; ergo, every man has a property in his
13person. Both Yolton and Tully are misguided. They are simply
misguided by a caprice of the English language. What Locke actually
says in the Essay is that the same person is the being who "appropriate [es1
Actions and their Merit", and "owns and imputes to it self past
Actions" (II, xxvii, 26)0 The word "own" in this context simply means
the following: "To acknowledge (something) in relation to oneself"
(~, "own", 5), or "To acknowledge as due to oneself, to hold as
deserved or meri ted" (Q_!Q, "own", 6b). It has nothing whatsoever to
do with the meaning of "property" in the sentence, "every man has
a Property in his own person".
Contra Yolton and Tully, I maintain that "the concept of
person" is utterly insignificant for Locke's Second Treatise. What is
significant is his concept of man as the "proprietor" of his person.
It is not a person who disposes of a man; it is a man who disposes of
14his person. T t Lo k th d " " 1o repea, c e uses e war person mere y as a
"forensic" term in the Second Treatise. This use is conspicuous in
Chapter 16 ("Of Conquest") where Locke contrasts "the Persons of the
Conquered" with the estates of the conquered (193), or in Chapter 18
("Of Tyranny") where he discusses a king's legal status ("the Person
of the Prince" (205), or "the King's Person" (206». Locke's
suggestion that "person" is a forensic term must be taken with caution,
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however. Although he consistently uses the word as a forensic term
in the Second Treatise, he himself fails to do so in the Essay. When
he discusses "personal identity" in the Essay, he states: "Person
stands for ••• a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and
reflection tetc.]" (Essay, II, xxvii, 9). This statement betrays
his own suggestion that the word "person" is a forensic term. As an
anonymous critic pointed out long ago, if Locke were to use the word
strictly as a forensic term, he would have to state a la Cicero that
the word stands for the character or legal mask of an intelligent being
rather than an intelligent being itself. (For the anonymous critic's
learned comments, see "Appendix to Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion
concerning Personal Identity", Works, III, 199-201.)
I shall now clear up altogether the muddled thinking of Yolton
and Tully, and Locke's additional confusion. In the Essay, Locke does
not use the word "person" as a forensic term though he himself suggests
that it is "a forensic term". But in the Second Treatise, he simply
follows the conventionally legalistic manner of writing, and
consequently uses the word "person" as "a forensic term". As far as
Locke's proposition "every man has a property in his own person" is
concerned, it substantively means the following: every man has an
exclusive right to dispose of his life and liberty (or his body and
actions; or his life, health, limb and labour). The crucial verb
for Locke's concept of property is not "to own", as Yolton and Tully
assume. It is "to dispose (of)", meaning "control" or "arrange".
I. 23 A Reconstruction Completed: An Overall View
We can state the conclusion of our discussions in 1. 21 and
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1. 22 very briefly. "Property" means (externally) an exclusive
right of disposal, or the object over which a man has the exclusive
right of disposalo According to Locke's (internal) use of the word
"property", a man has an exclusive right of disposal over the following
objects: his person (ioeo, his life, health, limb, and liberty; or
his body, actions, and labour), and his goods (ioe., his possessions
or es tate) 0
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PART 2 An Analysis of Locke's Concept of Property
In PART 2 I shall analyze Locke's concept of propertYD By
his "concept" of property, I shall mean his understanding of how men and
objects are related when a particular object is said to be a man's
"property" in the strict sense of the wordo According to the strict
meaning of "property" which I have reconstructed in PART 1, if a man's
person or possessions are his "property", it means that those objects
are the objects of his "exclusive right of disposal". So we can say,
at the simplest level, that a man in this case is related to his objects
by his "exclusive right of disposal"o As long as we treat a man's
exclusive right of disposal" as a single peculiar entity, we can
represent the structure of Locke's concept of property by the simple
two-term relationshipo In fact, Locke himself uses this representation
frequentlyo A man is related to his person or things, by having "a
property in" them. What I attempt to do below is to analyze this
simple representation of Locke's concept of property, and show that he
arranges men and objects in a definite, though complicated, way when he
says that a man has a property in his person or thingso
The primary purpose of my analysis is to clarify Locke's
philosophical assumptions about "property", or "an exclusive right of
disposal". In order to facilitate the clarificatory task and make it
valuable, I shall also give some historical and critical considerations
in the course of my exposition. Locke's philosophical assumptions are
eo ipso what he took for granted rather than what he tried to explaino
Hence, my analysis is reconstructiveo I shall trace a complex web of
ideas, in order to explain the specific arrangement of men and objects
which Locke calls a man's "property in" his objects. This specific
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arrangement or concatenation may be called the structure of property,
and insofar as we can find this structure in Locke's thought, it may
be called the structure of his concept of property. Since my analysis
deals with a complex web of ideas which can be found in the Second
Treatise, the Essay, and other works, I shall begin by outlining what
I take to be the structure of Locke's concept of property.
call this structure "ego-centric" or "agent-centred".
I shall
2. I The Ego-Centric Structure of Property: An Outline
The ego-centric concept, or the agent-centred concept, of
property may be initially explained by reference to a superficially
similar, yet deeply opposed, concept of property. M1ether property pre_
supposes the existence of an ego or not, ther~ is a concept of property
which takes the existence of other men very seriously. Critics of ~he
institution of private property frequently claim that property is "a
right to exclude others". Property, conceived as a right to exclude
others, is a right against other men by virtue of which a man can
effectively use, or possess, or control his objects. This is not
Locke's concept. Commentators on Locke, like Macpherson and Tully,
mistake this other-directed concept for Locke's own concept of
property.1S Let us consider the situation where a man has "an
exclusive right of disposal" over his objects (e.g., his body, actions,
possessions, etc.). As I indicated in section 1. 21 above, the
epithet "exclusive" serves to show that no other man has lIaright to"
the objects of his right of disposal. A man's exclusive right of
disposal over X is not his right to exclude any other man from his
disposal of X, but his right to dispose of X to the exclusion of the
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right of any other man to X. To say that X is A's property means
that A has a right to dispose of X such that no other man has "a right
to" X. The given situation can then be analyzed into two relations:
A's having a right of disposal over X, and nobody else's having a
right to X. Locke considers the latter relation to be a peculiar
nature of A's right of disposal over X. But we can best outline the
ego-centric structure of his concept of property by treating the two
relations separately. I shall separate them, keeping in mind that a
man's "property" for Locke is a conglomeration of these two relations
and the entities involved (a man, a right of disposal, his objects,
the right of other men)o
The core of Locke's concept of property is the view that a
man has "a right of disposal" over his objects. If we add to this
core the view that no other man has "a right tollhis objects, we
acquire Locke's concept of property. Locke's idea of a right being
"exclusive" is parasitic on the core of his concept of property, since
his point about an lIexclusive" right is that the objects of a man's
right of disposal solely belong to him, or he is the sole legitimate
disposer of those objects. Though the idea of exclusiveness is an
indispensable part of Locke's concept of property, it is only a layer
added to the core notion that a man has "a right of disposal" over his
objects. In speaking of the "core" and its additional "layer", I am
deliberately using the spatial metaphors. The way Locke arranges
men and objects to form a concept of property is predominantly spatial,
and it can be best captured by a conscious use of spatial metaphors.
I now outline the structure of Locke's concept of property by
first looking at its core, and then turning to its fringe. Its
structure is called "ego-centric" or "agent-centred", because Locke
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takes the mind of each man - the "agent" in the proper sense of the
word - as the indispensable, constitutive element of each man's
"property". Locke conceives of a. man's "property" by linking his objects
and other men ultimately to this central decision-making agent.
First, the core of Locke's concept of property is structured as follows.
He understands a man's right to dispose of his objects in terms of
his liberty (i.e., power) to dispose of them within the bounds of the
laws he is under. A liberty to dispose of his objects is a non-
normative liberty of action concerning the disposal (i.e., control or
arrangement) of his objects, whereas the legitimate sphere of his
actions is delimited by the laws binding on him. Since a man's non-
normative liberty of action is his power, or ability, to do or forbear
from doing any particular action according to the direction of his
mind, his "right of disposal" over X is his power, or ability, to do or
forbear from doing any particular action concerning the disposal of X,
within the bounds of the laws. As we shall see later, the legitimate
sphere of actions delimited by the laws is minimally fixed by the
criterion of the avoidance of injury to other men.
-.
We shall also see
that Locke ambiguously links a man's non-normative liberty (i.e., his
power or ability) to the norms laid down by a law-maker. Leaving the
details aside, however, we should note that the core of Locke's
concept of property can be represented as follows: a man can control
or arrange his objects according to the direction of his mind (i.e.,
his rational will), provided that he does not injure other men. This
core is an extension of the idea that a man can move his hand if he so
chooses, and he can stop moving it if he so chooses. The idea is
extended to the idea of a man's ability to control the objects external
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to his body (e.g., apples, a plot of land), according to the direction
of his mind. This ability of each man is further linked to the norm of
not injuring other men, which is the minimal norm of all laws. It is
also each man's mind, or its power of "understanding", which enables
him to understand the bounds of the laws he is under. Thus the mind
of each man remains the most important entity that constitutes the core
of Locke's concept of property, or the sphere of a man's right of
disposal.
Secondly, each man's legitimate sphere of disposal can be said
to be "exclusive" in the sense that no other man has "a right to" the
objects within his legitimate sphere of disposal. Another man's
"right to" those objects, in contrast with each man's "property in"
them, is his rightful claim to the use of those objects. Paradigmatically,
it is the "coumon right" which everyone other than the holder of the
right of disposal may direct to those definite objects. The common
right as such is everyone's rightful claim to the use of an indefinite
object as his due, or his right of access to an indefinite object as
his due. A's right of disposal over X can be said to be "exclusive"
in the sense that no other man has this right, or any ~her rightfwl claim,
to X. Due to the absence of any rightful claim on the part of all
men other than A, A is the sole legitimate disposer (i.e., controller
or arranger) of his objects. Other men may exist outside the
legitimate sphere of A's disposal, but they may not. But A can
imagine others to exist just as Robinson Crusoe imagines others to
exist. This concept in any case does ~ presuppose the real existence
of other men. It is an ego-centric concept in a fUll-blooded sense.
Locke.s concept remains coherent even if other men exist only in the
imagination of the legitimate disposer. Finally, the agent who is
247
the legitimate disposer of his objects has a power to permit others to
use his objects if he so chooses. This suspension of exclusion
emanates from the act of his free will, or his consent. This, again,
is the act of his mind.-
The ego-centric structure of Locke's concept of property is
"Cartesianll in spirit, in that the mind of each man is the most
important element in the whole constellation of entities which make up
a man's IIproperty". It is true that Locke's view on the relationship
between a body and a mind is un-Cartesian. He holds that matter might
think, and even suggests that the mind can be spatially located.
Locke is ~ committed to the metaphysical view that the mind exists
as a mental substance outside the material world. Instead, he holds
the moderately sceptical view that the mind is probably a mental
16substance. But despite his un-Cartesian view of the mind-body
relationship, Locke is Cartesian in spirit when he treats the mind
rather than the body as the truly active being in man. In the Essay
Locke claims that "man" is the "agent" who holds powers (of under-
standing and will) together, and exercises them as he thinks fit,
rather than the patient who is at the mercy of the powers outside
him. When he advances this claim, what he calls IImanll is simply
another name for his "mind". "rA] 11 different Powers", says Locke,
are held together "in the Mind, or in the Man", so that it is the
mind or the man who "exterts them as he thinks fit" (Essay, II,
xxi, 18). Whether a man dances or sings, it is "the Mind that
operates, and exerts these Powers; it is the Man that does the Action,
it is the Agent that has power" (Ibid.). Locke inquires into the
difficult question concerning what determines the will, ioe., what
determines "the general power of directing, to this or that particular
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direction" (II, xxi, 29)0 His answer, though complicated, ultimately
affirms his fundamental position that it is "the mind" or "the Agent
17it self" that determines the operation of the will. It is this
"mind" which is located at the centre of the whole conglomeration of
entities making up a man's "property", or his "exclusive right of
disposal" over his objectso
The ego-centric structure of Locke's concept of property can
be summarily expressed by a new version of Descartes' maxim, cogito ergo
~o We can replace "sum" by "meum", and say - in awkward Latin -
that cogito ergo meumo (A normal Latin sentence would run as follows:
cogito ergo meum id esto) By adapting Descartes' maxim to represent
the structure of Locke's concept of property, I do not mean to suggest
that an external good becomes a man's "property" by thinkingo Nothing
is further from my intention to suggest this un-Lockean idea. As
everyone knows, Locke holds that an external good becomes a man's
"property" by his "labour" (at least, in the beginning of the world).
As far as a man's appropriation of external goods is concerned, Locke's
true maxim is laboro ergo meum id esto The somewhat awkward Latin
sentence, cogito ergo meum, is intended to capture the structure of
Locke's concept of property, rather than his view of how a man acquires
external goods and makes them his "property"o Regardless of the manner
by which external goods become a man's "property", .!! any object (an
external good, or any internal object - a man's body, actions, labour,
limb, or health) is to be called his "property", ~ it mus t be
presupposed that a man exists as a thinking beingo Locke's concept
of property collapses if we remove a man's mind from the conglomeration
of entities which he calls a man's "property"o If we remove the mind,
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then we remove the central decision-making agent which is the
presupposition of a man's liberty of action. If a man's liberty of
action is impossible, then his liberty to dispose of his objects is
also impossible. If his liberty of disposal is impossible, then his
right of disposal is impossible because this "right" is nothing but his
liberty plUS the normative bounds of his actions. Hence by removing
the mind, we remove the core of Locke's concept of property, i.e., a
man's right to dispose of his objects. In order to call an object a
man's "property" in Locke's strict sense, we must presuppose that each
man has the mind capable of directing and organizing his affairs. Such
a mind is the necessary condition for the coherence of Locke's concept
of property. In this sense, we can attribute to him the new version
of Descartes' maxim, cogito ergo meum (id est), without implying that
physically demanding labour is not required for appropriation.
In what follows I shall elaborate the ego-centric structure of
Locke's concept of property which I hawe outlined above. The points
I have made above will be defended, elaborated, and qualified on the
basis of a careful reading of the writings of Locke and other l7th-
century theorists. The analysis I intend to offer is unprecedented
in the whole 20th-century literature on Locke, as far as I am aware.
I should like to warn the reader at this point that the
following analysis is very long and detailed. It is somewhat pedantic,
though I hope it is also accurate and perceptive. I shall begin by
elucidating the ~ of Locke's ego-centric concept of property (Sect.
2. 2, pp. 250ff.). Then I shall move on to clarify the fringe of his
ego-centric concept (Sect. 2. 3, pp. 302ff.). At the end, I shall
add general concluding remarks to suggest that we should abandon
Locke's concept of property.
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2. 2 The Core of Locke's Ego- Centric Concept;
Right of Disposal
or a Man's
Now we shall try to clarify the ~ of Locke's concept of
property, by isolating it from its fringe and analyzing it. Since
Locke does not analyze his concept of property in the Second Treatise
and his account of appropriation in Chapter 5 simply makes use of the
unanalyzed concept of property, the following discussion is bound to
be reconstructiveo I shall proceed as carefully as possible, and I
shall respect what Locke actually says as much as possible.
I must state at the outset that I shall introduce a new
locution Locke employs in the Second Treatiseo This locution, used in
Chapters 2 and 6 rather than in Chapter 5 of the book, is a complex and
compressed locution which explains what it is for a man to have a right
to dispose of his objects. I shall call this locution Locution 1h,
for the reason that it combines the concept of (positive) "!iberty"
and the concept of "law". It takes the following form: "A has a
liberty to dispose of X according to his will, within the bounds (or
permission) of the laws he is under" (g, 57, 58, 59; also, 4). This
locution is descriptive of what it means to say that A has a right to
dispose of X. Locke haphazardly lists the items or objects which fill
"X'. of Locution LL: "his Person, Actions, Possessions" (57) or "his
Actions and Possessions" (59). Unlike Locution f! which is strictly
based on the division of all entities into a man's person and a man's
things, the term "actions" appears as one of the disposable objects.
Locke's use of the term "actions" is confusing, however. He also uses
it to refer to the manifest result of an agent's execution of his
decision concerning what he will do with his "person", or his "actions",
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or his "possessions". In this latter sense of "actions", Locke speaks
of the regulation of his "Actions" (58), or a man's capacity to "keep
his Ac tions wi thin the Bounds of" a law (59) 0
The word "a liberty" of Locution 1.!::. is a positive lLber ty, It
is a "power"o Locution LL indicates that a man has a power to dispose
of his "objects" within the normative constraints imposed by a law-maker.
Though Locke is explicit about this, his flexible use of the word "a
liberty" (or "freedom") unfortunately obscures it. To make his talk
about "a liberty" (or "freedom") intelligible, we should distinguish
three senses of freedom: the state of freedom, positive liberty, and
negative Lfbe r ty , Positive liberty is what each man has as "a power";
negative liberty is a man's freedom from the arbitrary interference of
another man; and the state of freedom is the state where every man
is positively and negatively freeo
in the negative sense when he says:
Locke uses the word "liberty"
"Liberty is to be free from
res traint and violence from others" <g, 57) 0 Each man's negative
liberty is secured by a lawo The protection of negative liberty is
the primary function of a lawo This is why Locke claims: "where there
is no Law, there is no Freedom" (i.eo, no state of freedom) <g, 57);
or the "Natural Liberty of Manu is "to have only the Law of Nature for
his Rule" without taking another man's will as a guide for his actions
(22)0 A man's positive liberty is his "power"o Locke states that
a man's positive liberty in the state of nature is the "Power" "to do
whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others
within the permission of the Law of Nature" <.§!, 128; 129). This
positive liberty, qua power, belongs to each man and is distinct from
a law whether it is the law of nature, or the law of a commonwealth.
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This power, as we shall see later, is non-normative insofar as Locke
treats it as a particular species of a man's liberty of actions, and
it is normative insofar as he thinks that it is the power to be
exercised within the specific constraints of a law. Finally, the
state of freedom is the state where everyone is positively and
negatively free under the rule of lawo Locke's description of the
natural state of freedom is the following:
a State of perfect Freedom to order their [i.e.,
meni~ Actions, and dispose of their Possessions,
and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds
of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the Will of any other Man (2!, 4).
Locke's talk about liberty, or freedom, has puzzled some commentators.
His famous maxim, "where there is no Law, there is no Freedom", has
been sometimes misinterpreted to mean that a manos liberty l!
obedience to a lawo Though Locke is partly to blame (because he does
not distinguish the three senses of liberty as 1 have done above), a
full explication of his maxim is the followingo The state of freedom
is impossible without a law, primarily because each man's negative
freedom can only be secured by a law, and secondarily because each man
has (and is allowed to exercise) a positive liberty within the specific
constraints of a law.
Since the word "a liberty" which appears in Locution LL is
"a power", 1 shall henceforth use the words "a liberty" and "a power"
interchangeably in dealing with Locution ~o 1 have said that
Locution ~ explains the core of Locke's concept of property, ioeo, a
man's having a right to dispose of his "objects". This is a plausible
suggestion though in his account of appropriation, Locke simply uses
Locution P or Locution Elo Take, for instance, the statement that
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a man has a property in his person; i.e., he has a right to dispose of
his person to the exclusion of the rightful claim of any other man.
The core of this statement, his having a right to dispose of his person,
can be plausibly rendered as his having a liberty, or power, to dispose
of it within the bounds of the laws. Why does the notion of a law come
in? The reason is that a "right" is the power which each man has
within the bounds of the laws. In stating that every man has "a
property in his own person", Locke certainly does ~ imply that every
man has a liberty, or power, to destroy himself. Suicide is prohibited
by the law of nature (ST, 6), and voluntary slavery is also prohibited
(23). It is plausible to suggest, therefore, "a right" of disposal is
a man's power of disposal within the constraints of a law. Take
another instance where Locke apparently equates "power" with "a right".
He says that "Political Power" is "a Right of making Laws" (g, 3).
Does Locke merely conflate "power" and "a right" here, as some
commentators have suggested? A more sophisticated way of treating this
apparent conflation is to unders tand that Ita right", according to
Locke, is the power of an agent placed under specific normative
constraints (constraints of a law, or law-like constraints). If we
understand this suppressed premise, then we can see that the power of a
supreme political agent is called Itaright" when it is placed under
some normative constraints (e.g., the political agent's obligation to
protect everyone's right of property by a law).
In trying to explain the core of Locke's concept of property by
using Locution~, I shall be defending at the same time the view that
"a right" (of disposal), according to Locke, is paradigmatically a man's
power or his positive liberty. To state this view more precisely,
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a right is an agent's power modified by specific constraints (or
obligations) of a law. Since Locke does not systematically explain
what it means to have "a rightll, this view is not immediately apparent.
But our ascription of this view to Locke can be justified, and it is
important to show that it is justifiable if we are to believe that
Locution LL is descriptive of "a right" of disposal. So before I use
Locution LL to elucidate the core of Locke's concept of property, I
shall offer a justification. My justification is historical.
2. 21 A Right as a Species of Power: A Historical View
To those who have first-hand acquaintance with the 17th-century
literature on natural rights, it might appear superfluous to justify
the view that "a right" is paradigmatically a man's power (or his
liberty) of one kind or another. Anyone who reads Suarez, Grotius,
Hobbes, Spinoza, or Pufendorf with a philosophical spirit is bound to be
struck by their attempts to assimilate lIaright" to "a power" of one
kind or another. However, a myth prevails among 20th-century
intellectuals and scholars that Locke is an exception in the modern
tradition of natural rights. It is believed that he "derived"
natural rights from the law of nature; or he took the law of nature as
the IIfoundation" of natural rights; or he thought of the law of
nature as "embodying" natural rights, or conferring rights on each man
h h 1 f t· h 18in the way t at t e ru e 0 a game crea es r1g ts. This is a myth
which rests on the tremendous lack of historical sense. This myth has
been perpetuated by university lecturers, authors of popular books on
political theory, and even Locke scholars. This myth is just as
pernicious as another myth that theorists of natural rights and the
law of nature are "rationalists", pure and simple, who derived
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everything from self-evident principles. The truth about Locke is
this. He gives the name "a right" to the power, or positive liberty,
which each man has under the specific constraints of a law. He
certainly did not derive this concept of a right from self-evident
principles. Rather, Locke took from his predecessors the idea that a
right is a species of power.
To destroy the myth and establish the truth, I shall take a
historical approach to the concept of a right. A historical approach is
useful since Lockeas actual use of the word "a right" is very loose, and
we gain very little by relying on his inconstant usage. Furthermore,
the word he uses most frequently is "property" or "a property", and I
cannot rely on his use of the word IIpropertyllsince I am at the moment
trying to analyze his concept of property. The 17th-century word
"a rightll is an English word which does not have any equivalent
expression in the legalistic culture of the Romans. Ye t the La tin
term IIjus" (or "ius") can be taken as a theoretical ancestor of the
concept of "a rightll. A monumentous change took place in the
meaning - or the primary meaning - of the ambiguous term "jus". The
change is most clearly noticeable in the 17th century. This change
is so conspicuous in the 17th century that we should regard this century
as marking a "watershed" in the history of the concept of "jus".
John Finnis has recently provided a brief, yet accurate, account of
this watershed. The gist of his account is that whereas for Thomas
Aquinas, the primary meaning of "jus" was "the just thing itself"
(i.eo, the objectively just or fair state of affairs), 17th-century
theorists converted "~" into an individualized, power-like entity.
This power-like entity was called, in English, "a right" 0 19 I shall
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endorse Finnis' brief account. But I shall provide a more elaborate
historical account to show that Locke belongs to the modern tradition
which tried to assimilate "a right" (or "Jus") to a manws power (or
his liberty). Like his predecessors, Locke individualized and
subjectivized what used to be (primarily) the objectively just or fair.
Neither the space nor my competence allows me to discuss Suarez or
Spinoza below. But I shall deal with Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf
who assimilated "a right" to a man's power, and at the same time held
the doctrine of the bifurcation of "a law" (~) and "a right" (~).
The modern movement to assimilate "a right" to the power which a man
possesses goes hand in hand with the doctrine that the right (~) of
nature is (at least, conceptually) distinct from the law (~) of
nature. Spinoza seems to be an exception, yet this doctrine is held
by Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf and Locke in one form or another. Locke's
version of the doctrine of the bifurcation of a law and a right is a
mitigated version like Pufendorf's, in that it maintains that "a right"
after all is a manDs power consistent with a law (or modified by a
law). This is why it is difficult to grasp Locke's view that a right
is a species of power, and this is why it is easy to misinterpret him
to be saying that a right derives from a law. My historical account,
I hope, will eradicate this academic myth of the 20th century.
I shall begin with a theorist who attempted, for the first time
in the history of the West, to subjectivize the just state of affairs
by stipulating a particular definition of jus and excluding others.
This theorist lived in the 15th century, but it so happens that his
definition of jus instantly shows that Locke's Locution ~ is an
explication of "a right" (of disposal). For this reason, and for the
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reason that he seems to be the first theorist to formulate the power-like
concept of a right, I shall take him as a starting point. He is a
French nominalist, named Jean Gerson. In 1402, he wrote:
~ is a dispositional facultas or power, appropriate
to someone and in accordance with the dictates of
right reason.20
This definition curiously resembles the way Locke combines "a liberty"
(or a power) with "the bounds of the laws" in Locution ll. To see
this, we only need to replace "in accordance with the dictates of right
reasonll by IIwithin the bounds of the laws a man is under". Locke says
that a "liberty" (or a power) is something God gave to each man "as
properly belongingll to him (!I, 58) just as Gerson says that "a
dispositional facultas or power" is appropriate to each man. Although
it is unlikely that Locke read the writing of this obscure French jurist,
this confirms that Locution LL is Locke's definition or explication of
what "a right" is.
Let us now jump to the 17th century, the heyday of the power-
like concept of a right, and see what Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf
say. In De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Bk I, Ch. 1, Sects. 2-9, Grotius
distinguishes three different senses of jus. (Unfortunately, Francis
Kelsey's English translation, published in 1925, makes Grotius'
discussion of "jus" utterly unintelligible. I shall quote from
Wo Evats' 17th-century English translation (1682).) Of the three
senses of jus, the third sense is equivalent to ~, a law. Grotius
defines lex as "a rule to Moral Actions, obliging us to do that which
is right" (1, 1, 9). As Pufendorf later points out in De Jure
Naturae ([A], 1, 6, 4), Grotius holds that the "law of nature does not
create right but merely points out a right already existing" because
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lex is defined in terms of "that which is right". What, then is a
right? Partly following his predecessor, the Spanish Jesuit Fo Suarez,
Grotius declares that a right (jus) "properly and strictly taken" is a
man's "Faculty" (De Jure Belli, 1, 1, 5). By "Faculty" (facultas),
he means the perfect right or the perfect "moral Quality in any person,
sufficient to enable him justly to have or to do something" (1, 1, 4).
This contrasts with the imperfect right or the imperfect moral quality
which Grotius calls "Aptitude". The difference between the two types
of right is the following. The faculty enables its possessor to act
justly on his own authority without asking permission, and enables him
to punish violators of the objects of his faculty, whereas "aptitude"
is merely a right to receive some fitting benefits and rewards from
others (relying on the authority of others). Grotius further states
that there are three types of "faculty" or perfect rights: power
(potestas) over oneself or others, dominion (dominium), and the faculty
of demanding the payment of a debt (1, 1, 5). It is clear from these
that a right in the proper or strict sense (i.e., a perfect right, or
faculty) is the moral power each man has over various "objects".
The movement on the Continent has a parallel in England.
Hobbes' statement about the opposition between a right and a law, ~
and lex, is famous:
[TheoristsJ use to confound Jus, and Lex,
Right and~; yet they ought to be~stinguished;
because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to
forbeare; Whereas LAW, de termineth, and bindeth to
one of them; so thar-Law, and Right, differ as
much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and
the same matter are inconsistent (Leviathan, XIV,
189) •
Hobbes' version of the doctrine of the bifurcation of jus and lex is
extreme. Unlike Grotius (or Pufendorf, or Locke), he is not satisfied
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with distinguishing the meaning of jus from that of ~. Jus and lex
are incompatible. Hobbes explicitly states that the right of nature
is "the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself,
for the preservation of his Nature" (~.). Since "liberty", for
Hobbes, properly means the absence of external impediments, his concept
of a right seems unrelated to a man's power. Yet this is only super-
fidally true. After all, if an external impediment is absent, a man
is able to use his power. Hence, a manQs ability to use his power (or
his power to use his power) comes to be identified as the right of
nature. In fact, Hobbes frequently identifies a right with a power.
His political philosophy, and his whole philosophy, are about "power".
When he says that the power of a man is "his present means, to obtain
some further apparent Good" (Leviathan, Ch. 10), and goes on to speak
about "natural" and "civil" power, the distinction between "a right"
and "power" is minimal (to say the least). As Leo Strauss pointed out,
a comparison of Hobbes' Latin texts with English texts shows that he
used the word "power" ambiguously - to denote potentia (de facto, or
physical power), or potestas (de jure power, or ~), or botho2l
Pufendorf, who extensively comments on Grotius and Hobbes in
his magnum opus, also warns us not to conflate jus and ~ (De Jure
Naturae, 1, 1, 20; l~ 6, 3). He takes over the idea of "moral
qualities" from Grotius, and develops it. A right, power, obligations
are all moral qualitieso "Power" (potestas) is defined as "that by
which a man is able to do something legally and with a moral effect" of
imposing obligations on others (ibid. [A], 1, 1, 19). Pufendorf
holds that "a right" (one sense of jus) is virtually indistinguishable
from "power" (1. 1. 20). He expounds the view that a right is a manQs
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posi tive liberty - which is a species of "power" - res trained by a law.
Let us first look at the passage where Pufendorf comments on the
ambiguous term "jus":
since a man has the power to do everything that is
within his natural abilities, except what is forbidden
by law, it has become customary to speak as if one had
a right, by virtue of some law, to do whatever is not
denied in that lawo [But] the word 'right' ('jus')
in this usage, means merely liberty, while the word
law (lexJ denotes some bond by which our natural
liberty is restrained (1, 6, 3)0
This passage contains a few important points which need clarifyingo
Pufendorf is commenting on one particular use of the word "jus", the
word which can mean a right, a law or a body of laws, and several
other things. One sense of "jus" can be rendered as "a right", which
according to Pufendorf is virtually indistinguishable from "power"o
So a natural right, for him, is the "power" a man has lito do everything
that is within his natural abilities, except what is forbidden by law".
~, taken in this sense of "a right" or "power", simply means
"liberty" rather than "a law", whereas the word "law" denotes a
restraint on "liberty"o This point is not Hobbesian, as we shall see
shortly. Apart from this point, Pufendorf says that we customarily
talk "as ifII one had a right "by virtue of some law". This is the
second point worthy of note.
Let me clarify these two points, for it can greatly facilitate
our understanding of Locke's view of a right, liberty and a law. The
customary talk Pufendorf has in mind is of the following type: "this
or that action is right 'by the law of God '" His point
is that this expression misleads us to believe that we have certain
rights by virtue of some law. On the true view, a natural right is a
natural liberty, or a natural power, provided that a man's natural
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liberty is understood as compatible with the law of natureo Pufendorf
launches an extensive critique of Hobbeso and Spinoza's concepts of a
natural right or a natural liberty (De Jure Naturae, 2, 2, 3-9)0 The
gist of his critique is that man, unlike beasts, gains true benefits by
regulating his conduct by a law and reason rather than by acting on an
impulse or desire in a law-less mannero The state of nature, therefore,
is a state of "peace" rather than a state of "war". Since "a natural
state presupposes the use of reason, any obligation which reason pOints
out cannot, and must not, be separated from it" (2, 2, 9). Pufendorf
makes his positive claims in the chapter titled ItIt does not suit Man
to Live without Laws" (2, 1)0 His main claim is that "the term 'the
natural liberty of man' 000 should under all circumstances be understood
as something conditioned by a certain restraint of sound reason and
natural law" (2, 1, 8)0 In the state of nature, he says, men "may use
their own judgement and decision, provided, of course, that it is
framed on [the] law (of nature]" (2, 2, 3).
Pufendorf's picture of the state of nature anticipates Lockeos
in that the "natural liberty" of man is restrained by the law of nature
which each man can understand, and that it is a state of peace rather
than a state of war. Most important of all, Pufendorf achieves
rapprochement between a law-less liberty of Hobbesian man and the
obligations of a law, by granting man an ability to judge, or decide,
or reason.
Pufendorf's successor is Locke, and now I shall discuss him
without breaking a historical continuityo I shall take a look at his
early Essays on the Law of Nature where he clearly states that lIa right"
is founded on a liberty, and is conceptually distinct from a law.
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In his first essay on the law of nature (lex naturae), Locke
states:
This law (haec lex, ioeo, lex naturae or the law
of nature] 000 ought to be distinguished from
natural right: for right is grounded in the fact
that we have the free use of a thing, whereas
law is what enjoins or forbids the dOing of a
thing (~, I, 111).
This passage contains three important points. First, a law (~) is
what imposes obligations (or prohibitions). Secondly, the basis of
a right (~) is that we have the free use of a thing. Locke's Latin
sentence runs as follows: "jus enim in eo positum est Quod alicujus rei
liberum habemus usumll• This can be rendered literally: For a right
is placed on that, that we have the free use of a thing. In more
readable English: For the basis of a right is that we have the free
use of a thing. The free use of a thing, or a liberty, should not be
taken as the absence of an external impediment or a legal constraint.
In the eighth essay, Locke explicitly rejects the view held by Carneades
and Hobbes that "each person is at liberty to do what he himself,
according to circumstances, judges to be of advantage to him" <B::!!,
VIII, 207). Locke also says, echoing Pufendorf, that "utility is not
the basis of the law or the ground of obligation, but the consequence
of obedience to it" (~, VIII, 215).
The third point to note about the above passage is that a law
(lex) ought to be distinguished from a right (jus). This is a
conceptual point worth making, since Locke is writing in Latin and
dealing with the ambiguous term "jus"o This, again, is not a
Hobbesian point. Locke does not hold that a law is .!!lcompatible wi th
a right. Like Pufendorf, he maintains that a right is a man's liberty,
or power, under the restraints of a law.
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The sharp distinction Locke draws between a law and a right
does ~ presuppose that a right is identical with a liberty per se.
If it did, then we could not claim that a right, according to Locke,
is a man's liberty consistent with the bounds of a law. What he says
above is that a law and a right ought to be sharply distinguished
because a right is based, or founded, or "posited" (positum), on a man's
liberty, and because a law restrains this liberty. The distinction
between a law and a right rests on the idea that a liberty is, in some
sense, the basis of a right. A man's liberty, which can be said to
be the "basis" of a right, is his liberty as it is considered in
isolation from a law, or its obligations. It is not clear whether
Locke is thinking of a liberty - or the free use of a "thing" - as a
power in Essays on the Law of Nature. It is not surprising that he
did actually think of a man's liberty as a power, since Grotius and
Pufendorf had clearly conceived of libertas as a species·of potestas
(De Jure Belli, 1, 1, 5; De Jure Naturae, 1, 1, 19). At any rate,
a man's liberty or his free use of "a thing" corresponds to his
liberty of disposal in the Second Treatise, and insofar as this power
is considered apart from any specific obligation of a law, it can be
said to be the basis or source of a right. (To avoid misunderstanding,
a remark should be made about "the free use of a thing". A thing,
~, in this context, is not a physical thing but an abstract thing.
The original Latin contains "alicujus" as well, meaning "some". Hence,
Locke is asserting that a right rests on our having the free use of
some thing, or something. If "some thing", or "something", is taken
to include one's action, then Locke can be taken to mean that a right
rests on our freely doing something.)
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A man's liberty, in Locke's mature and youthful view, should
be properly restrained by a lawo No man should use his liberty
beyond a legal constrainto We can say that his liberty, or his
power, is the basis of his right in the sense that his liberty is
potentially a righto When a man is placed under the restraints of a
law, his liberty or power is called his "right"o To define "a right",
it is a man's liberty or power placed under the restraints of a lawo
Whereas the basis of a man's right is the liberty or power he has
independently of any obligation of a law, his right!! his liberty or
power modified by the obligations of a law.
On this interpretation, a man has a liberty or power
independently of the law which is binding on himo This liberty or
power is the permanent possibility of a man's righto Yet a man's
liberty cannot be called his "right" unless it is modified by a
normative constrainto A full justification of this interpretation
would require a careful examination of what Locke claims when he uses
Locution LL ("A has a liberty to dispose of X according to his own
will, within the bounds (or permission) of the laws he is under").
But it is sufficient to note for the moment that a man's right,
according to Locke, is his liberty "under" the laws binding on himo
My historical account has shown that Lockeis predecessors attempted to
assimilate a man's right to the power of one kind or another which he
possesses. It has also shown that a right, according to Locke, is
"based" or "posited" on a man's liberty per se. Given his view that
a man should not abuse his liberty or use his liberty beyond the
constraints of a law, we can claim with sufficient historical
justification that "a right", according to Locke, is a man's liberty
or power under the constraints of a lawo
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2. 22 An Anatomy of a Man's Right of Disposal: A Critical Analysis
We can now examine the core of Locke's ego-centric concept of
property by analyzing his Locution ~. The core - A's "right of
disposal" over X - can be represented by his Locution !f.. This complex
locution contains two unit-ideas. First, A has "a liberty to dispose
of X, according to his own will". Let us call this idea the idea of
a man's liberty of disposal. Secondly, a superior being - God or the
legislative agent of a coamonweal th - has set "bounds" to the actions of
men. Let us call this idea the idea of the bounds of a law. Locke
combines these two unit-ideas in an obscure way. In what follows, I
shall attempt to clarify each unit-idea separately «~) and (B) below).
Then I shall discuss the obscure manner in which Locke combines the
two unit-ideas, ·aJldgo on .to criticize his concept of a right of disposal (C).
His combination of a man's liberty of disposal and the bounds of a law
looks complicated, but he makes a simple mistake. He holds that a
.right is a .pecies of a man' s ncn-normatd veabi 11ty to control his
actions.
(A) A Man's Liberty of Disposal
Let us begin by clarifying the first unit-idea, the idea of a
man's liberty of disposal. Three points should be noted about this
Uberty. First, it is a power; but since "power" is synonymous with
"ability" and "faculty", this liberty is a man's ability. Locke states
in the Essay that "Faculty, Ability, and Power" are nothing "but
different names of the same" thing (II, xxi, 20). Secondly, the focal
meaning of disposal is "control" or "arrangement". And thirdly, a
man's liberty of disposal over X is a particular species of his non-
normative liberty of action.
elaborating.
The second and third points need
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A dictionary typically explains the meaning of "to dispose of
x" by reference to a variety of activities which count as the activities
of disposing of X: controlling, arranging, managing, transferring,
selling, or destroying Xo But it is not fruitful to treat these
various activities as equally representative of the various aspects of
Locke's idea of disposalo Nor is it wise to rely on our modern, loose
association of ideaso To "dispose of" an object, according to Locke,
is not to "get rid of" ito He certainly did not think of those PAN AM
passengers who throw their empty plates and cups into a "waste disposal""
Locke's use of the phrase "to dispose of" is old-fashioned. It has a
definite focal meaning though it may allow for some flexibility. His
focal meaning reflects the Latin root of the verb "to dispose", i"e.,
disponere which means "to place here and there", or "to arrange" (~-:
in different directions + ponere: to put}o The expression "to dispose
of", as Locke uses it, is closest in meaning to the following:
To make a disposition, ordering, or arrangement of;
to do what one will with; to order, control, regulate,
manage (~, "dispose of", 8a)"
A man's liberty to dispose of his "objects", in Locke's view, is his
liberty or power to control or arrange them according to the order
which the man issues himself. Locke speaks of a man as having "a
Liberty" to "dispose, and order" "as he lists, his Person, Actions,
Possessions" (E,57; also, 4). His point is that if a man is mature
and rational, he has a power to control or arrange his "objects" by
himself, without the help (or intervention) of a monarch, a governor, a
father, or a relative. When Locke describes "Man" as "Master of
himself" (E, 44) or "Master of his own Lifell (E, 172), or "mas ter of
his own liberty" (F. Tract, 124), or a lIfree disposer of his own actionsll
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(F. Tract, 156), he does not mean that each man has an arbitrary or
absolute power over his life and liberty. What Locke means is that
each man has a power to dispose of "his life" and "liberty", iae., a
power to arrange, control, regulate, or manage his body and actionso
The focal meaning of LockeQs "disposal" can be best expressed
as "control" or "arrangement". But the words like "control" and
"arrangement" can also mean many thingso In Locke's case, the idea
of "disposal" includes "transfer"o He does not separate a right (or
a liberty) of transfer from a right (or a liberty) of disposalo In
Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise, he says that a pre-political owner of
external goods transfers a part of his goods to another man freely
(~, 46). He assumes that a liberty of transfer is a part of a
complex liberty of disposal. The etymology of the verb "dispose"
(~-ponere) - to put objects in different directions - is helpful
here. A manDs act of transferring an object as he thinks fit is an
act of arranging it as he thinks fit. Pufendorf clearly states that
the power of transfer or alienation stems from "the nature of full
dominion" or property in the full sense of the word (De Jure Naturae [A],
4, 9, 1).
A man's liberty of disposal, says Locke, is a man's liberty to
dispose of his objects "as he thinks fit" (g, 4, 128, 129), or "as he
lists" (57), or "according to his own will" (58, 59; cf. 22). It is
better to say "according to the direction of his mind", where his
"mind" is taken to have the power of understanding as well as the power
of will. For Locke holds that the man who controls his objects
"according to his own will" should be able to direct his will by the
power of "understanding". The child who "has not Understanding of his
own to direct his ~" does not "have any Will of his own to follow";
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in that case, "He that understands for him, must !!!l!. for him too" (58).
An idiot or lunatic is "never let loose to the disposure of his own
Will (because he knows no bounds to it, has not Understanding, its
proper Guide)" (60). A manos liberty of disposal is conditional on
his having the power of understanding or "reason". The "Freedom 000
of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own Will, is grounded on
his having Reason" (63)0 The power of "reason" or "understanding" is
the precondition for a manos having a liberty of disposal (ioeo, control
or arrangement), and this power is what God has given to him:
God having given Man an Understanding to direct his
Actions, has allowed him a freedom of WlII, and
liberty of Acting, as properly belong thereunto,
within the bounds of that Law he is under (58).
This passage indiscriminately conjoins such distinct notions as freedom
of will, freedom of action, and the bounds of a lawo By the "liberty
of Acting" Locke means a man's liberty of disposal, his abd lLty to
control or arrange his objects "according to his own will" or "as he
thinks fit"o
I have used the expression "according to the direction of his
mind", in order to indicate the existing connection between a man's
liberty of disposal and his liberty of action in general. In the Essay,
Locke defines a man's liberty of action in general: "Liberty" is "a
Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to
the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is
preferr'd to the other" (II, xxi, 8)0 A man's liberty of disposal in
Locution ~ is a particular species of this general liberty. A man's
liberty of disposal is his power to do or forbear any particular action
concerning the disposal (ioeo, control and arrangement) of his objects
(ioeo, his person, actions, and possessions), according to the determin-
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ation or thought of the mind. It is a power to do, or forbear from
doing, what a man wills with his person, or actions, or possessions
(provided he directs his will by his understanding). By contrast, the
"liberty" which Locke discusses in the Essay (II, xxi) is a man's power
to do, or forbear from doing, anything he wills (provided he directs
his Will by his understanding). A man may will any action, whether
the action concerns his "objects" or noto His "actions" may be the
"Actions of the Mind" (e.g., consideration and assent), or the "Actions
of the Body" (eog., running and speaking), or the "Actions of both
together" (eogo, revenge and murder) (II, xxU, 10). Thus a man's
"liberty" in the Essay is more general than a man's "liberty" of
disposal in the Second Treatise. Yet in both cases, a man's "liberty"
is his power or his ability. It is his ability to do, or forbear from
doing, a particular action in accordance with the direction of his
mind.
Some commentators might suspect that I have forged a connection
between a man's "liberty" of action in the Essay and his "liberty" of
disposal in the Second Treatise. This suspicion is natural, partly
because Locke does not explicitly refer to the Essay when he discusses
"liberty" in the Second Treatise, and partly because commentators who
try to link the two works are usually guilty of fabricating connectionso22
So I shall try to justify the claim that a man's "liberty" of disposal
in the Second Treatise is a species of the general "liberty" of action
which Locke discusses in the Essay.
Let us first take a close look at what Locke means by "liberty"
in the Essay, II, xxio His account of liberty is long, tortuous, and
not altogether coherent. On one interpretation, even his definition of
"liberty" is ambiguouso I have already quoted his definition of "liberty"
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which contains the expression "the determination or thought of the mind".
One might argue that Locke ambiguously identifies "the determination or
thought of the mind". On the one hand, he identifies "the determin-
ation or thought of the mind" as "volition", or what a man wills, or
the exercise of the power of will (II, xxi, 9; 15; 23; 27; 29)0
The first edition of the Essay indeed contains the following simple
definition of "liberty": "liberty" is "a Power to act, or not to act,
in conformity to Volition" (1st ed ,, II, xxt , 46; quoted from
NidditchOs critical ed., note to II, xxi, 78). On the other hand,
however, Locke's extended account of "liberty" eventually establishes
or seems to establish - a different identity of "the determination or
thought of the mind". From section 47 of the chapter on power onwards,
Locke repeatedly claims that a man is a free agent because, and insofar
as, he is able to cut off the heteronomous determination of his will
(i.e., the determination of his will by his desire) by the power of
"judgement" or "understanding". The mind has a "power to suspend the
execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after
another". So the mind is "at liberty to consider the objects" of its
desires, and to "examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others.
In this lies the liberty Man has" (II, xxi, 47). Locke continues in
this vein, and makes the following famous statement:
we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular
desire, and keep it from determining the will, and
engaging us in action. This is standing-stIll, where
we are not sufficiently assured of the way: Examination
is consulting a guide. The determination of the will
upon enquiry is following the direction of that Gu~
And he that has a power to act, or not to act according
as such determination directs, is a free &jent (II, xxi, 50).
It now seems that Locke redefines "liberty". A man+s "liberty" no
longer seems to be a power to do or forbear any particular action
according to his will. In the end, Locke seems to accept a more complex
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concept of liberty which incorporates the notion of "judgement" or
"understanding". A man's "liberty", he seems to say, is his power to
do or forbear any particular action according to what he wills "upon
enguiry"; or according to what he wills after "due examination"; or
according to what he wills in collaboration with his understanding ..
It is not my intention to claim that Locke merely conflated the
two distinct senses of liberty in the Essayo There is an ambiguity in
the way he uses the word "liberty", and it is important to note this
ambiguity to provide a sensitive interpretation of his account of
liberty.. What I attempt to do now is to state what is unambiguous,
and try to remove Locke's ambiguity as much as possible. What is
unambiguous is that a man's liberty, according to Locke, is his power
to determine or control his action by the powers of his mind. A free
agent, in his view, is a self-determining agent. It is the agent who
has a power to act, or not to act, "according to the determination or
thought of the mind" (or "according as the Mind directs" (II, xxi, 71» ..
No matter how the mind's powers - the will and the understanding -
operate to produce a particular decision or command, a man's liberty is
a power to carry out this decision or command. So far there is no
ambiguity. To be "under the determination of some [thing] other than
himself" is the "want of liberty" (48). To be a free agent is to be
able to determine himself by the direction of his mind. Given Locke's
careless and flexible use of the word "liberty", we cannot settle once
and for all whether he wants to define it by reference to "the will" and
"the understanding", or "the will" alone. But on the whole, his view
can be stated as follows.. We may define "liberty" as "a power to act,
or not to act, according as he wills"; but if we so define it, we must
add a significant proviso that an intelligent human being ought to
272
improve this liberty by using the power of "understanding"o This
improved liberty is what Locke calls "true Liberty" (50), or "the
liberty of intellectual Beings" (52), or "the end and use of our
Liberty" (48)0 It is the liberty subject to "the conduct of Reason";
it is the liberty placed under "that restraint of Examination and
Judgment, which keeps us from chusing or doing the worse" (50) 0 A
liberty without this proper restraint, says Locke, is the liberty "to
play the Fool" (50) 0 This is the liberty to follow the will which is
completely determined by desireso This is a "liberty" only in the
nominal sense, since a man's will is determined by something other than
hfmse l f , It is an entirely worthless "liberty"o A man's "true
liberty", or his liberty as an intelligent being, is based on the
autonomy of his will secured by the power of "understanding"o The
role of "understanding" is to make the will independent of any particular
desire, at least temporarily. This liberating role of the power of
"understanding" is "the source of all [true] liberty", and the liberation
of the will achieved by this power is misleadingly called "Free will"
(47)0 According to Locke, the power of "understanding" is absolutely
essential to a manls "true liberty" which he frequently describes as
"liberty" instead of "true liberty": "without Understanding, Liberty ou
would signify nothing" (67); or "no Agent" is "capable of Liberty, but
in consequence of Thought and Judgment" (71)0 Locke uses the word
"liberty" rather than "true liberty" in this context, but he is clearly
talking about "true" or valuable liberty. Despite his careless use of
the word "liberty", we can sum up his view as follows: our crude
liberty, ioeo, our power to act, or not to act, in conformity to our
will, becomes our "true" liberty only if we can "hold our wills
undetermined, till we have examinvd the good and evil of what we desire"
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(52), hence, only if we can determine what we will by the power of under-
d" 23stan 1ng. As it is clear from this, the root idea of our "true" or
valuable liberty is a power of self-determination, i.e., a power to
control an action by our own decision.
We can now turn to Locke's account of a "liberty" of disposal in
the Second Treatise. He describes a man's "liberty" of disposal as a
"power" (§I, 128-9), but this alone does not sufficiently justify the
claim that the liberty of disposal is a species of the general liberty
of the Essay. Locke's Locution LL links a man's liberty of disposal
to the bounds which a legislator has set to the actions of men. A man's
liberty, gua power, belongs to him, though he may be allowed to exercise
this power only within specific normative limits. Later we shall see
the intricate connections between each man's power and the bounds of a
law (pp. 288f£.). But here we shall confirm that a liberty of disposal is a
species of the 'liberty Locke discusses in the Essay. I have already
drawn attention to Locke's statement in the Second Treatise that the
"Freedom of ••• of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own Will,
is grounded on his having Reason" (g,63).
-, "Acting" in this context
means "disposing of his Property [i.e., his person, actions, and
possessions]" (59). "Acting according to his own will" means, in this
context, doing what he wills with his person, actions, and possessions.
We have seen that a man's "understanding", according to the Second
Treatise, is the "proper Guide" which "directs" his will and his actions
(ll, 60, 58). To quote another statement from the Second Treatise:
To turn him loose to an unrestrained Liberty, before he has
Reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the priviledge
of his Nature, to be free; but to thrust him out amongst
Brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much
beneath that of a Man, as theirs (![, 63).
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The "unrestrain'd Liberty" which Locke speaks of here is a man's liberty
to dispose of his "objects" according to his will, without any restraint
of "reason" or "understanding"o This unrestrained liberty is a
species of the unrestrained, general liberty of action mentioned in the
Essay, ioeo, the liberty to "play the fool"o In both the Essay and the
Second Treatise, Locke emphasizes that a man should regulate or direct
the operation of his will (hence, his actions) by the power of "under-
standing" or "reason"o In both works, he emphasizes that "Government
of our Passions" is "the right improvement of Liberty" (Essay, II, xxi,
53)0 Why does he emphasize the same point that the role of "understand-
ing" is to improve an agenes crude liberty? The answer is that a man's
liberty of disposal is a particular species of the general liberty of
action discussed in the Essayo A man's liberty of disposal is his
power to do, or not to do, any particular action concerning the
arrangement or control of his "objects", according to the direction of
his mindo
This is a simple point to graspo But we may fail to notice
it, because Locke combines the idea of a man's liberty of disposal with
that of "the bounds of the laws he is under" in the Second Treatise.
Given this combination, we feel that a man's liberty of disposal has
something to do with the laws, whereas his liberty of action has
nothing to do with the laws. Yet this is a deceptive appearance.
First, a man's liberty of disposal is his power, just as his liberty of
action is his powero Qua power, each man's liberty is conceivable
independently of the normative bounds which are set to the exercise of
power, i.eo, the actions of each agento Secondly, each man makes a
better use of his crude "liberty" by consulting an objective norm, a law,
whether his crude "liberty" is his general liberty of actions or his
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specific liberty of disposal. The second pOint can easily escape our
notice. The point is that each manas power of understanding enables
him to consider the bounds which a superior law-maker has set to his
actions • In the Second Treatise, Locke says that the power of under-
standing (or "reason") "instruct[s]" each man "in that Law he is to
govern himself by, and makers] him know how far he is left to the
freedom of his own will" (.21:, 63)0 Whereas the power of understanding
is the subjective "guide" for his actions, the law binding on him and
others equally is the objective "guide" for their actions. Each man,
according to Locke, comes to have a "true" liberty of disposal by
directing his will by his "understanding", iDeo, by the power which
enables him to understand the bounds of the laws he is under. In his
account of the general liberty of action, on the other hand, Locke
hardly mentions the relationship of a law to the improvement of each
man's liberty. He is almost exclusively concerned about the liberating
role of each man's subjective guide, "understanding". But in discussing
"How Men come to chuse ill", Locke does mention the relationship between
each man's choice and the law of nature:
The eternal Law and Nature of things must not be alter'd to
comply with his ill-order'd choiceo If the neglect or abuse of
the Liberty he had, to examine what would really and truly make
for his Happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on
it, must be imputed to his own election. He had a Power to
suspend his [heteronomous] determination: It was given him, that
he might examine, and take care of his own Happiness, and look
that he were not deceivedo (Essay, II, xxi, 56.)
Thus a man's general liberty of action, as well as his specific liberty
of disposal, is linked to the law which properly restrains his actions.
To be exact, the law does not limit the power of an agent as such. It
limits the exercise of his power, or the actions of an agent. It is
the device by which each agent can properly improve his crude liberty.
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The restraint which the power of understanding places on each manws
general liberty of action is the "proper" restraint. It does not
diminish his true liberty but "improves" his crude liberty of following
his heteronomously determined will (Essay, II, xxi, 48). Likewise,
the restraint which a law places on each man's crude liberty is the
"proper" restrainto "Law in its true Notion, is not so much the-'
Limitation as ~he direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his
proper Interest" (ST, 57)0 In Locke's view, the power of "understanding"
mediates each man's crude liberty and an objective law; it is an ability
to adjust his crude liberty to the normo This makes his idea of "true"
liberty obscure, since "true" liberty comes to have a tacit reference
to the law whereas it was originally conceived as a norm-independent,
improved exercise of power, or else a norm-independent, improved powero
I shall leave aside the obscurity here. I simply take note of the
fact that LockeRs account of a manos liberty of disposal in the Second
Treatise is continuous, and consistent, with his account of liberty in
the Essayo The reason for this is that the former liberty is a
particular species of the latter liberty.
I should like to add a historical remark to my account of the
connecting link between Lockews two liberties. Locke used his
individualistic, non-normative notion of a manQs liberty of action in
his political theory, just as his predecessors (e.go, Hobbes and
Pufendorf) used their individualistic, non-normative notions of the
liberty of action in their political theories. A ~an's liberty of
action, as Locke conceived of it, is "individualistic" in the sense
that it is his power over ~ action rather than another man's. It is
"non-normative" in the sense that a man has this power as his ability
apart from an objective law, though he may exercise it within the
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bounds of the law. Hobbes used his general notion of "liberty" (of
action) to clarify his notions of natural liberty and the liberty of
the subject (Leviathan, Chso XIV & XXI)o Pufendorf maintained that
the "natural liberty" of man ought to be properly limited by the law of
nature (De Jure Naturae, 2, 1)0 By this, he meant that a man;s
"liberty in general" - his "internal facu1 ty to do or avoid whatever any
one wishes" after some deliberation - should be used within the bounds
of the law of nature (!2!2.. CA], 2, 1, 2). Like Locke, Pufendorf
held that "liberty" is a "faculty" or power. Then he. applied the
general notion of liberty of action to the state of nature. I have
already hinted that Locke was indebted to him for developing a non-
Hobbesian doctrine of the bifurcation of a law and a liberty (Section
2. 21 above). But there is another interesting connection between
Locke and Pufendorf. Locke;s account of "true" liberty in the Essay
is derived from Pufendorf's discussion of "human actions" in De Officio
Hominis et Civis. What Locke regards as the actions of "a free agent"
in the "true" sense is what Pufendorf calls "human actions", i.e., the
actions which proceed from a man's God-given faculties of "understanding"
and "will". It is fairly clear that Locke took from Pufendorf the idea
that the mind has a power to suspend the execution of a particular desire.
He elaborated it in the Essay. This connection, hitherto unknown to
Locke scholars, becomes apparent if we compare Locke's account of "true"
liberty in the Essay with 17th-century or 18th-century English trans-
lations of Pufendorf which make use of the vocabulary of "human under-
standing". Those early English translations indicate how Locke might
have rendered Pufendorf's Latin.24 For the purpose of our present
discussion, we should note that like Locke, Pufendorf treated "human
actions" (i.e., free actions) as arising from the internal faculties of
each man in the first instance. He then combined the idea of free
actions with another distinct idea of a law, or the norm of human
actions, because he had an additional thought that human actions should
25conform to the norm set by a superior being.
(B) The Bounds of a Law
The second unit-idea of Locke's Locution ~ is the following
idea: a superior being (i.e., a law-maker) has set "bounds" to the
actions of men. To clarify this idea, we need to pull together Locke's
remarks about a law, a law-maker, the obligatory force of a law, and the
basic precept of a law. His remarks are scattered through his various
writings, and they form a more or less coherent whole which deserves the
name "Locke's philosophy of law". What I offer below is an exposition
of basic elements of his philosophy of law.
Unless Locke specifically talks about definite precepts of a law
(or contents of a law), we should understand what he calls "a law" (or
"lex") not as a collection of specific rules, but as the decree of a
superior being. Locke's talk about "a law" (or "lex") is permeated by
the Teutonic idea that a law is what a superior has "laid down" for the
actions of men, or it is what a superior has "set" to the actions of men.
This is apparent in Locke's definitions of the law of nature and the law
of a commonwealth. The law of nature is that part of the law of God
which is knowable by the proper use of our natural faculties, and this
is the "Law which God has set to the actions of Men" (Essay, II, xxviii, 8).
The "Civil Law" is the "Rule set by the Commonwealth to the Actions of
those, who belong to it" (II, xxviii, 9). Locke states his general
concept of a law in the way that it applies to the law of a commonwealth
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as well as the law of nature: a law is "the decree of a superior willI!;
it "lays down what is and what is not to be done"; and it "creat Iesl
an obligation" (!!ili, I, 111 & 113). Here Locke inherits from Pufendorf
the view that a law is "a decree by which a superior obUges a subject
to conform his acts to his own prescription" (De Officio Hominis, 1, 2, 2;
also, De Jure Naturae, 1, 6, 4).
In Locke's view as well as Pufendorf's, a law presupposes the
existence of a superior being. Locke calls this pre-existing superior
being "a law-maker". He repeatedly emphasizes that our knowledge of
the existence of a law-maker is a necessary condition for our having an
obligation to obey his law. Without a notion of "a Law-Maker", "it is
impossible to have a Notion of a Law, and an Obligation to observe it"
(Essay, I, iv, 8). A "law ••• always supposes a law-maker", and
without a law-maker we cannot establish substantive morality, i.e., the
morality capable of "an obligation" rather than demonstration ("Of
Ethics in general", King, ~, II, 133). Without a law-maker, men
are "under no obligation". Although philosophers in the past claimed
to have derived specific rules of conduct by a rational method, their
rules "could never rise to the force of a law, that mankind could with
certainty depend on" unless there was a law-maker in the first place
(Reasonableness, Works, VII, 140ff.).
The concept of a law-maker is of crucial importance to Locke's
philosophy of law, because the obligatory force of a law arises from the
pre-existing law-maker. itA law-maker" should not be defined as an
agent who makes a law; rather, a law should be defined as the manifest-
ation of the will of a law-maker. How, then, does Locke define the
term "a law-maker"? His definition is two-fold. First, "a law-maker"
is "some superior power to which he [i.e., any man] is rightly subject"
(~, IV, 153). Secondly, "a law-maker" is "some superior power to
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which we are necessarily subject" (!!ili, IV, 155)0 Thus "a law-maker"
is a superior agent to whom men are rightly and necessarily subject.
To restate it, "a law-maker" is a superior agent who has a right and
causal power over the actions of meno Notice that a "rightll and a
"causal power" go togethero God, who is the Maker of the law of
nature, IIhas a just and inevitable command over us" (~, IV, 155;
emphasis added)o Or "we are eo 0 subject to Him in perfect justice and
by utmost necessity" (!!ili, VI, 187; emphasis added)o
tries to prove the supremacy of God by appealing to the idea that His
Locke in fact
causal power is infinitely greater than that of human beings. Unlike
men, God has a power to create the whole universe, and to "bring us
into the world, maintain us, and take us away" "at his will" (!!:!, IV,
153 & 155; VI, 187) 0
Him026
Hence, we are rightly and necessarily subject to
Locke traces the origin of the obligatory force of a law to a
pre-existing law-maker, i.eo, a pre-existing superior agent who has a
right and power over us. He says:
no one can oblige or binds us to do anything, unless
he has right and power over us; and indeed, when he
commands what he wishes should be done and what should
not be done, he only makes use of his right. Hence
that bond [ioeo, the obligation of a law] derives from
the lordship and command which any superior has over us
and our actions, and in so far as we are subject to
another we are so far under an obligation (ELN, VI,
181 & 183). ---
Our obligation to do, or not to do, a particular action arises because a
superior agent makes use of the "right" (J.1!!.), "power" (potestas),
"lordship" (dominium), and "command" (imperium) which he already has
over our actions. What specific actions we ought to perform, or not to
perform, depends on the will of this superior agent. We are obliged,
or bound, by his will to do (or not to do) certain things. The IIfirst
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thing needed for the knowledge of any la~', Locke says, is the
knowledge there is a superior being to whom we are subject
(~, IV, 155; also, 151)0 The "second" thing we need for the
knowledge of any law is the knowledge that this superior being "wills"
or "intends" us to do something (!!ili, IV, 157; also, 151) 0 The third
thing we need to know is ~ this superior specifically wills ,Le., what
particular actions he intends us to perform or not to perform (~, IV,
Hence, in order to have the knowledge of any law, we need to
know that there is a superior agent having a right and power over us,
and that he wills us to do (or avoid) particular actions. This
epistemological claim has a counterpart in Locke's philosophy of law:
"nothing else is required to impose an obligation but the authority and
rightful power of the one who commands [ioeo, a law-maker] and the
disclosure of his will" such that "anyone can understand it who is
willing to apply diligent study and to direct his mind to the knowledge
of it" (~, VI, 187)0 In other words, a law is binding on our actions
because there exists a superior who has a right and power over our
actions, and he has promulgated his will clearly. This is the gist
of what is sometimes called Locke's "voluntarist" theory of obligation.
A more appropriate label would be Locke's "superior will" theory of
obligation, since it presupposes a hierarchy of beings.27
Locke i s "superior will" theory of obligation applies to the law
of nature. Mutatis mutandis, it applies to the law of a commonwealth
as well. The legislative agent of a commonwealth is "a common Superior
on Earth" (g,19), and it has a right and power over the actions of
the members of the commonwealth. Yet the law of a commonwealth is
binding on its members not because it expresses the will of the legis-
lative agent, but because it expresses the will of lithe people" {or lithe
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society", or "the conmunity")o This "will" is the will of the "majority"
of the people, because within a united community the "majority" has a
right to conclude the rest of the people by its "will and determination"
(~, 95-99). Following Richard Hooker, Locke claims that nobody can
acquire the legislative power without "the consent of the Society" (134).
Once the legislative power is "established by the Majority" of the
society, it has "the declaring 000 of that Will" (212). The laws of
a commonwealth are "the declaring of the pub lick Will", or "the Will
of the Society" (212, 214)0
My exposition of LockeDs concepts of a law, a law-maker, and
the binding force of a law helps us understand what he meant by "the
bounds of a 1aw"0 The bounds of a law are the obligations which a
superior agent (God or the legislative agent of a commonwealth) has
imposed on the actions of men. But these "bounds" or "obligations"
are, in Locke's view, not sharply distinct from the superior agent's
causal power to determine the actions of meno Just as the right of a
superior and his causal power are combined in Locke's concept of a law-
maker, "a law" and the enforcement of a law are inextricably linked:
"where-ever we suppose a Law [we mus t] suppose also some Reward or
Punishment annexed to that Law" (Essay, II, xxvii, 5)0 The reason why
a law and the enforcement of a law are inextricably linked is that it
is "utterly in vain, to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man,
without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil, to determine
his Will" (ibid.). One of the bounds of the law of nature, which Locke-
states in the Second Treatise, is this: "Everyone 0•• is bound to
preserve himself" (~, 6) 0 This statement is ambiguous between (a)
"Everyone is determined by the will of God to preserve himself", and
(b) "In spite of everyone's ability to do what he wills, God does not
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permit him to destroy himself". Locke also says that nobody has a
"Liberty to destroy himself" (6), but this statement is also ambiguous
between (a) "Nobody can destroy himself", and (b) "Nobody is permitted
by God to des troy himself" 0 The fundamental precept of the law of
nature is the principle of non-harm or non-injury: liNo one ought to
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions [which
sustain his life]" (6)0 Everyone ought to abstain from harming, or
injuring,another man because God - "one Omnipotent, and infinitely
wise Maker" - sent all men "into the World by his order and about his
business". They are llmade to last during his, not one anothers
Pleasure" (6)0 Here again, it seems that God~s will causally
determines the operation of each man's will on the one hand, while on
the other hand God does not permit any man to harm any other mano
In speaking of the "bounds" of a law, Locke mixes the notion
of what we cannot do with the notion of what we may not (i.e., are not
permitted to) do. He does not distinguish between the "must" of
causal necessity and the "must" of moral (or legal) obligation. Locke
is conspicuously insensitive to the distinction between causal necessity
and moral (or legal) obligation, when he tries to prove, by using a
version of the argument from design, that God has set a law to the
actions of men. In the first essay on the law of Nature, Locke states
that "it is in obedience to His will [ioe., God's will) that all living
beings have their own laws of birth and life", and move regularly (~,
I, 109). It is "by His order that the heaven revolves in unbroken
rotation, the earth stands fast and the stars shine, and it is He who has
set bounds even to the wild sea and prescribed to every kind of plants
the manner and periods of germination and growth" (tbid., emphasis
added)o Here Locke takes the validity of the argument from design for
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granted. The "bounds" are set by God to all things, the whole of his
creation of which human beings are a part. This is a clear-cut case
where Locke does not distinguish between causal necessity and moral (or
legal) obligation. Locke's discussion of the law of a commonwealth
similarly ignores the distinction between men's being determined (or
forced) to act and their having an obligation to act. The law of any
commonwealth serves to protect each man's life, liberty and possessions
(which he has acquired by his labour, commercial exchange, and inheritance)
from the violence of other men. Hence, like the law of nature, the law
of a commonwealth embodies the basic precept of non-injury. But Locke
also holds that the legislative agent in any commonwealth should not
coerce individual men except for the purpose of preventing (or redressing)
injuries:
Will the magistrate provide by an express law, that
[a man] shall not become poor or sick? Laws provide,
as much as is possible, that the goods and health of
subjects be not injured by the fraud or violence of
others •••• No man can be forced to be rich or
healthful, whether he will or no. (A Letter concerning
Toleration, Works, VI, 23.)
Is Locke thinking of the effect of the enforcement of a law vis-a-vis
the obligation of a law? No. For he asks whether the subjects of a
conmomsea lth "shall •• 0 all be obliged by law to become merchants, or
musicians", while he is discussing the question of "compelling men" to
certain actions (~o, 24, emphasis added). Determination (or compul-
sion, or coercion) is not treated as distinct from the obligation of a
law.
The word "obligation" etymologically relates to the notions of
"a tie", "a bond", and "binding force". The Latin root of the verb
"oblige" is "obligare", meaning "to tie to" (~+ ligare = to + to bind).
Hence, it is natural to associate legal (or moral) obligation with causal
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necessity. But it is a vulgar mistake if we conflate the two in our
philosophical discussion. This vulgar mistake has been committed by
many philosophers and legal theorists, and Locke is just one of them.
What Locke fails to see is this. A man's obligation is opposed to his
"liberty" in ~ sense, but not to his "liberty" in another sense. His
obligation to do X is opposed to his being permitted to do, or not to
do, X. On the other hand, his obligation to do X is ~ opposed to his
ability to do, or not to do, X. Take a man's ability to harm, or not
to harm, another man, for instance. If a law obliges every man not to
harm another man, it presupposes that every man has an ability to harm,
or not to harm, another man (according to his decision). Under the law
which prohibits mutual harm, each man ~ harm another man though he is
~ permitted to do so. A man's obligation to avoid harming another
man does not deprive his liberty in the sense of his ability. If a
man's obligation to do X implies that he is causally determined to do X,
then we cannot praise him for fulfilling his obligation. Nor can we
punish him for failing to fulfil his obligation. In fact, there would
be no need for reward or punl shment if everyone were "bound to"
follow the will of a law-maker. This is a paradox for Locke, because
he holds that a law is "in vain" without reward and punishment. What
he should have done is to distinguish between the two types of liberty,
and correspondingly, between causal necessity and legal (or moral)
obligation. Locke sometimes speaks of the "permission" (or "allowance")
of a law (~, 57, 59, 128). This suggests that he also thought of a
man's obligation in terms of a law-maker's right to grant, or refuse,
permission, rather than his causal power. Yet as we have seen, Locke
is insufficiently aware of the distinction between causal necessity and
legal (or moral) obligation.
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Historically speaking, Locke ambiguously repeated Hobbes'
unambiguous mistake. Hobbes clearly identified the obligation of
a law with the determination of an action (Leviathan, XIV, 189 & 191).
Though Locke did not completely identify one with the other, he did not
sharply distinguish "obligation" from causal necessity. In this
respect, Locke learned little or nothing from Pufendorf's sophisticated
account of obligation. Pufendorf distinguished "obligation" from
"coercion", or the determination of "the will by an external force"
(De Jure Naturae rAJ, 1, 6, 5). He also rejected the definitions of
obligation, offered by Cumberland and the Roman lawyers, which
assimilated obligation to causal necessity. Instead, he held that
an "obligation 0.. can in no way so bind the will that it cannot
o •• go contrary to it" (~.). According to Pufendorf, a man can
"receive an obligationll because "he has a will which can turn to one
side or the other, and so can adapt itself to a moral rule", and
because he is IInot free from the power of a ~uperiortl in a moral,
rather than causal, sense (ibid., 1, 6, 6 & 1, 6, 8; also De Officio
Hominis, 1, 2, 4). His accouut of obligation is subtle, and is not
28altogether free from ambiguity. Nevertheless, it is nearer to the
truth than Hobbes' account because he clearly sees that IIproperly
speaking", causal "necessi ty" is distinct from "ob Idga tLon" (De Jure
Naturae (AJ, 1, 6, 8).
Perhaps, Hooker's theory of law is another source of Locke's
obscure notion of the bounds of a law. Hooker's theory is teleological
rather than deontological. It deals with how different kinds of
29beings IIwork" or operate for a preconceived end. Nevertheless,
Hooker's teleological concept of nature minimizes the difference between
prescriptive laws and physical laws. This might have contributed,
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indirectly, to Locke's conflation of obligation and causal necessity.
(See Locke's use of Hooker in the first essay on the law of nature,
!1!, I, 117.) Locke stated that the judicious Hooker had offered the
"true notions of laws in general" (Works, X, 308). But we cannot
defend Hooker's teleological theory of lawo Hume has successfully
exposed the arbitrariness of any teleological understanding of nature,
30in his attack on the argument from design. Mill's attack on
Montesquieu's confusion of physical laws and prescriptive laws
31applies, with equal force, to Hooker's confusion.
Leaving aside the historcal considerations, we may sum up
Locke's obscurity as follows. According to Locke, a law not only
guides but determines human actions. But he is not aware that a law
can be said to "determine" human actions only in the sense that the
enforcement of a law has an effect on human actions. If an obligation
to do X is effectively imposed on men with re~ard and punishment, then
this effective imposition does produce in human actions a tendency to
do X (or a tendency to fulfil the obligation to do X). To say this,
however, is merely to point out the truism that the effective imposition
of an obligation produces an effect on humaq actions. It does not
follow from this that a man's having an obligation to do X is, or-
implies, his being determined to do X (or his being determined to
fulfill the obligation to do X). Locke has an unanalyzed notion of
the "binding force" of a law~ But a law-maker's power to cause men to
do X must be distinguished from their obligation to do X. Their
obligation to do X presupposes their ability to do X, or not to do
X, according to their choice.
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(C) !\ Critique of ~ock.e's Ego-Centric Concept of a Right
Locution ~ is descriptive of a man's right of disposal, or
the core of his exclusive right of disposal. However, it is not
clear how each man' s ~'11berty" of disposal is connected with the
"bounds" of a law. "In what foLlovs ,"I shall first try to clarify
th~s obscure ccnaec tf en beweea a liberty ilIJda law. 'l'beQ I shall
go on to cr~tici3e locke's concept of a right of disposal.
We have already seen the ambiguities of the unit-ideas which
make up Locution LL. Although each man's "liberty" of disposal is a
species of his non-normative liberty of action, Locke leaves the
definition of a non-normative liberty somewhat ambiguous. Also, the idea
of the "bounds" of a law conflates the idea of legal obligation per se
and the idea of the causal efficacy of the imposition of an obligation.
Given these ambiguities, it is possible to interpret Locke's Locution
1h in more than one way. Let us consider the following sentence:
a man has "a liberty (or a power) to dispose of X according to his will,
within the bounds (or permission) of the laws he is under". Does this
mean that a man has an ability to control X according to his will, while
he also has an abilitt to keep his actions within the bounds of the
laws? Or does it mean that he has an ability to control X according to
his will, though the force of the laws disables him from doing certain
things? Or does it mean that he has an ability to control X according
to his will, while he ought to exercise this ability within the bounds
of the laws? Or does it mean that he has an ability to control X according
to his will, while he is allowed to exercise this ability with the bounds?
Locke would not give a negative answer to any of these question. He gives
an affirmative answer to everyone of them. This is why Locution ~
- and Locke's idea of a right of disposal - remains so ambiguous.
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Our concern here is to clarify Locke's concept of a right
(of disposal). He may be asserting a number of things when he uses
Locution LL. But it is unlikely that he would treat a right of
disposal as a mixture of a man's ability to dispose of an object ~
his ability to keep his actions within the bounds of a law. Locke may
say that a man's ability to understand a law, and regulate his actions,
is a precondition for his true liberty or his right. But he would not
say that a right of disposal ~ an ability combined with another ability.
What is a right if it is not an ability combined with another ability?
We must clarify what specific relationship holds between a man's liberty
(or his ability) and the bounds of the laws, when his liberty is called
a "right" (of disposal). But Locke never clarifies this relationship.
We are now entering into the most obscure region of his thought.
Let us first concentrate on what is central to his idea of a
law and his idea of a liberty and discard what is peripheral to them.
What is central to Locke can be stated in terms of the negative function
of laws and the sphere of free actions which the laws protect. The basic
function of the laws, as we have seen (in Sect. (B) above), is to
-.prevent one man from injuring another. The bounds of the laws protect
each man's sphere of free actions (i.e., self-determined actions) from
the violence of others. Within this protected sphere, each man has
a liberty to control his objects according to his will. If he chooses
to do X to his object, he can do X. If he chooses not to do X to his
object, he can stop doing X. Where the laws do not impose any prohibition
(to prevent mutual injury), each man can do what he wills (without worrying
about the possibility of injuring others). This is what Locke means
by a "Liberty to folloW my own Will in all things, where the Rule
prescribes not" (g, 22; also 57). What is central to Locke's Locution
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!:1. is that each man is able to do, or refrain from doing, what he
wills, without injuring other men. The central feature of his concept
of a right (of disposal) fs that a man's right is his: ability to .follow
his will,under the circumstances where his actions do not injure others.
To avoid misunderstanding, let us note that Locke is not
satisfied with the view that each man is "left free" to do (or refrain
from doing) what he wills. He would not reject this view, since a
law does not impose an obligation on every human action and leaves
many actions "free" in the sense of !!.2! imposing obligations. Locke
expresses the idea of being left free, by his phraseology, "within the
allowance (or permission) of the laws". The meaning of "being left
free" may correspond to Locke's compound sense of the "bounds" of a
law. Namely, "being left free" may be taken to mean being permitted
by a law-maker to do (or not to do) certain things, ~ being !!.2!
causally determined to do (or not to do) certain things.32 Nevertheless,
freedom of this type is what Locke would call the "liberty" placed "in
an indifferency, antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Understanding",
or liberty "in a state of darkness" (Essay, ll, xxi, 71). The liberty
of disposal is a positive liberty, or an ability to determine one's
actions. It is !hi! liberty that is combined with the laws which
prevent mutual injury.
1 have replaced the idea of the "bounds" of a law by the idea
of the circumstances of non-injury. This replacement enables us to
see what is central to Locke's concept of a right. In Chap. 5 of the Second
Treatise, Locke uses the concept of property (hence, of an exclusive
right of disposal) and· tries to show how each mah appropriates
without injur1ng others. He tries to link the concept of property
with the minimal requirement of all laws - the avoidance of injury.
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In Locke's considered view, "injury" means a serious restriction on
another man's freedom, or a damage done to another man's freedom.
(See my comment in CHAPTER 1, note 9, pp. 127.) So if a man's right
of disposal is his liberty or ability to follow his will under the
circumstances where he does not injure others, then we can say that
his right of disposal is his ability to follow his will in the way
compatible with another man's ability to follow his will.
Let us be a little more exact, however. Though we have captured
what is central to Locke's idea of Cl right of disposal, the contents
of the will of a law-maker cannot be exhaustively expressed in terms
of the minimal principle of non-injury. God prohibits not only mutual
injury but self-destruction and the purposeless destruction of lower
creatures (~, 6). The bounds of the laws, in other words, are not
identical with the prohibition of mutual injury. To be exact, we must
say that a man's right of disposal is his ability to follow his will
in the way that following his will is compatible with the will of a
law-maker.
With this preLiminary.clarification, let us try to settle the
ambiguities which arise from the combination of the idea of a liberty
and that of a law. A man's right of disposal can be seen as his
liberty to fol~ow his will under ·complex circumstances. It seems
that Locke has at least three kinds of circumstances in mind. First,
a man loses a certain amount of power or ability, due to the greater
causal power of a law-maker. A man's right of disposal, then, is
his ability (to follow his will) under the circumstances where
a law-maker disables him from doing certain actions. Secondly, a
law-maker allows or pe~mits him to use his ability as he thinks fit•.
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Then a man's right of disposal is his ability to follow his will
where a law-maker imposes no obligation, or where he grants permission.
Thirdly, a man ought to exercise his ability in accordance with the will
of a law-maker, if he has laid down any specific obligation. In this
case, his right of disposal is his ability to follow his will without
violating the obligations a law-maker has imposed. Locke does not tell
us precisely what he means by a "right". But the best way to understand
the idea of a man's right of disposal is the following: it is a man's
ability to follow his will under the above-mentioned three circumstances.
The dialectic of a man's non-normative liberty and the bounds
of a law looks very complicated. But it should not prevent us from
detecting the obscurity of Locke's concept of a right. He uses a
confused concept of a right of disposal. A man's right of disposal is
a species of power or liberty. Furthermore, it is a species of non-
normative liberty of action, i.e., a man's dispositional ability to do,
or not to do, what his mind commands. It is true that a man's right
is not simply an ability to do what he wills. As we have seen, it is
an ability to be used in certain manners. Yet this does not alter Locke's
-,
view that a man's right is his ability to follow his will. This is a
confused concept of a right. He inherited it from his predecessors
those modern theorists who had tried to assimilate a right to a power
(Gerson, Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf). The modern tendency to assimilate
a right to a man's power is a tendency to stretch the concept of a right
inwards, towards a man's body or his mind. By this inward stretch,
modern theorists turn a right ~nto an occult quality. If their
concept of a right is somewhat intelligible, this is because they stretch
the concept of a right twice. After they stretch it inwards, they
stretch it outwards again, and try to connect the individualized occult
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quality with an intersubjective norm, a law. Let us be specific. We
shall consider Locke's idea of a right. As I said, he holds that a
man's right is his ability to follow his will., or his ability to 6Ct
according to the direction·of bis mind. A right is stretched inMards here.
This inward stretch makes a right unintelligible. I shall consider this
problem. Though Locke also tries to make a right intelligible by
stretching the introverted concept of a right outwards, I shall ignore
this second desparate step for the moment. Let us consider the
situation where a man's right is his ability to do, or not to do,
what he wills (or what his mind directs).
Trivial examples can refute this introverted notion of a right.
What is a man's "right" to dispose of his "arm", according to this
introverted view? It is his ability to perform, or refrain from performing,
any particular action concerning the disposal of his arm, according to
the direction of his mind. This statement is long, but I hope it is
intelligible. If he wants to move his arm, he can; if he wants to stop
the movement of his arm, he can; if he wants to Kiva it away,
he can; and so forth. But what would happen if he ceased to be able
to move his arm? Someone else could seize him by the arm, or his arm
might be paralyzed. Would he cease to have a right to do what he wills
with his arm, as soon as I held his arm? No. Something is wrong with
the introverted view which equates a right with a liberty of action.
I shall offer one more example. Suppose that a man drinks Scotch in
his house and gets totally drunk. He loses his will-power, his
"understanding", and his ability to organize his actions according to
"the direction of his mind". Would he lose a right to .dispose of his
house and his possessions? He is no longer "a free agent" in Locke's
sense (i.e., a self-determining agent). If his right is a species of
294
his general, non-normative liberty of action, then his right should
disappear as soon as his mind loses control over his actions (or the
objects 1f his actions). So if the introverted view is correct, we
can go into his house while he is drunk or asleep and we can take
all his possessions without violating his right. We cannot violate
the right which has disappeared. These trivial examples show that
there is something terribly wrong with the view that a right is a man's
ability to follow his will, or his ability to control his actions
according to the direction of his mind. A right does not come into
existence because a man's mind gains control over his actions. Nor
does a right go out of existence because his mind loses control over
his actions. The existence or non-existence of a right is independent
of the mind's command over his actions. Some 20th-century libertarians
openly assert that a man's right of ownership is his ability to control
his body and actions by the mind. They equate the right of ownership
with a man's non-normative liberty of action, i.e., his power to do,
or refrain from doing, what he wills.33 They openly make the mistake
which Locke tacitly makes. A man's right is ~ his ability to control
his actions by his mind. A liberty of action is the power which anyone
can have, whether he has a right or not. It has nothing to do with
the idea of a right. To use a conventional expression, all rights are
social - social in the ~ sense that all rights presuppose an
interpersonal rule which regulates the actions of men. A man's right,
by definition, is something that another man ought not to invade. If
this is the case, a man's right embodies or presupposes the rule that
another man ought not to invade it. No matter how diligently we analyze
the relationship between a man's mind and his actions, we do not get
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anything like the idea of a right of disposal. To get the idea of a
right, we must look at the relationship between one man's actions and
another's. We must look at a system of rights, or a rule-governed
institution where one man respects another's person or goods. It is
by virtue of this institution that a man's right of disposal continues
to exist even when his "mind" loses control over his actions.
I am now criticizing the view that a man's right (of disposal)
is his liberty of action, where "a liberty of action" is taken to mean
a man's power or ability to do, or forbear from doing, any particular
action according to the direction of his mind. This liberty has no
conceptual link with a law, though Locke himself accidentally links
it with a law. This libe~ty is simply- the mind's power to control or
organize actions. Consider the following situation: A professional
thief breaks into a rich man's house. He is such an experienced thief
that every action is in his command. He knows when to move forward,
when to turn around, etc., and he does everything according to his
decision. His mind is always alert, and his action follows the direction
of his mind. If he chooses to steal cash, he can; if he chooses to stop
stealing cash, he can (because he can easily steal gold instead); etc.
This thief's mind, like the mind of any other man, is the decision-making
agent. according to the libertarian way of looking at actions. As long
as this thief is well trained, and has a power to control his actions,
he has a liberty of action. But he does E2E have a right to do what he does;
nor.doe~ be have a right' to the goods he has acquired. He is a law-breaker,
and has a perfect liberty of action.
I do not want to multiply fictitious examples, but it is
libertarians who come up with a fictitious example such as "Robinson
296
Crusoe". They say: Crusoe has a right of disposal (or ownership)
over his body, his actions, and his land, in the sense that he can
control them according to the direction of his mind. It is natural
for them to say this. For there is no interpersonal rule on Crusoe's
island (according to their secular version of Robinson Crusoe); Crusoe
encounters nobody; he is supposed to encounter his body, his actions,
and his land; and libertarians themselves ~ to defend a right of
disposal.by their favourite example of Robinson Crusoe. However,
if they affirm that Crusoe's right of disposal is his power to control
his body, his actions, and his land according to the direction of his
mind, then they are condemned to abolish his right on the grounds of
the weak power of his mind. Whenever Crusoe stumbles on a rock, he
loses his power to control the movement of his body and thereby loses
his right to dispose of his body. Whenever he falls ill and his mind can
not control his own-actions - there is no Friday to look after him,
incidentally - he is condemned to lose his right of disposal over
his cottage and his land. In short, the quasi-Cartesian maxim "cogito
ergo meum (id est)" is palpably false. We cannot advance a single step
,
in our philosophical discourse on rights unless we abandon this foolish
maxim.
My criticism is directed against the equation of a right with a
non-normative liberty~ ~It is a valid criticism of Locke's idea of a right,
though his idea is more complex. Locke's labourer has a right to dispose
of his body, his actions, and his land in the sense that he can control
them according to the direction of his mind, in the way consistent with
the will of God (i.e., the law of nature). God prohibits mutual injury
and violence among men, a man's destruction of himself, and his purposeless
destruction of lower creatures. Given these norms, Locke's "right" of
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disposal might appear to be a clear-cut normative concept. But this
is not the case. Locke's concept of a right of disposal is a normative
concept in a very limited, special sense, and in many cases it is
indistinguishable from a man's dispositional ability (i.e., liberty)
to follow his will. Two points need to be confirmed. First, Locke's
concept of a right of :isposal is normative in the sense that this
"right" is a mE.I1'sdispositional ability (to control his actions)
~nder the norms laid by a superior law-maker. He holds that the
exercise of this ability should be properly restrained by the laws,
and in this sense a man's ability is no rmat.Lve, The ability itself
is a natural ability rather t han any special, nou-natura l ability.
Secondly, where a law leaves actions free or where a law is silent,
a man's right of disposal is Lndd stLngu Lshab Le from his lib~rty
of disposal. If a right of disposal is a man's liberty of disposal
-.
within the bounds of a law, and if there is no bound set tc a particular
type of actions, then a man's liberty to act (or not to act) in accordance
wi th his decision becomes indistinguishable fr·(lI'TIhis "right". Thus
we can affirm that under the circumstances where.a law does not impose
any obligation or prohibition, a man's right of disposal is idenUtal
with his ability to organize his actions (with respect to his objects
of disposal). So we can see that Locke has the concept of a right
which I have attacked, i.e., a right as an introverted, non-normative
liberty. There is no point in calling the mind's·power over actions
"a right". Locke emphasizes that man can cut off the heteronomous
determination of his will by the power of understanding (pp. 270ff.).
But the mind often fails to control actions (bodily or mental actions),
and even if it does effectively control certain actions, this has
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nothing to do with a right. For a right, as I said, implies that it
ought not to be violated by other men. But there is nothing in the
nature of a man's non-normative liberty of action which imposes this
obligation upon the actions of other men. An inter sUbjective norm is
required for the imposition of an obligation. But even if we consider
the combination of a non-normative liberty with a law as Locke does, it
is wrong to give the name "a right" to this liberty as long as we
consider this liberty from the viewpoint of an agent. It is correct
to say that an agent's liberty is his right because, and insofar as,
a law prescribes to others that they ought not to violate his liberty.
But it is a mistake to say that the liberty an agent possesses, and
exercises within the bounds of a law, is his right. This liberty
remains an agent's natural ability, and does not miraculouslY turn into
a normative entity once its exercise it curbed. A Karate expert has
an ability to kill another man (according to the direction of his mind),
and Locke might say that he ought to use this ability within the bounds
of a law. But in this case, his ability to kill another man under the
legal restraints is not,his right. On the contrary, if his ability is
restrained by a law, then it preserves another man's right (to life).
This example shows how futile it is to stretch outwards the concept of
a right which has already been stretched inwards. Pufendorf and Locke,
as we saw in Sect. 2. 21, try to make each man's liberty compatible with
a law. This is an attempt to avoid Hobbes' position that each man's
natural liberty (or natural right) is his arbitrary power, i.e., his power
to do whatever he wills. Their strategy is to connect each man to a
law by saying that he has a power of "reason" or "understanding", Le.,
a power to know the law and a power to regulate actions. This outward
stretch shows us that there is a difference between arbitrary power and
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"true" libertyu But this does not give us any intelligible concept of
a right.
From his predecessors, Locke uncritically took over the idea
that a right is a species of the power which an agent possesses. This
idea, however, is not based any serious philosophical consideration.
It is rather an invention of the modern age. Just as Desc~~tea invented the
mind, modern theorists of natural' rights invented the subjective right,
or the ego-centric right which is hardly distinguishable from an agent's
dispositional abilitYe I have reviewed earlier (pp. 257-62 above) their
statements about jus and~, and what jus is. They are more or less
declarations, rather than explanations. Their declarations reflect
the growing individualism of .themodern age. If we ascribe a certain
faculty or power to,each man, and call it a right, then we can treat
him as a possessor of an inviolable entity. Hence, there is a good
pragmatic reason for promoting the idea of the ego-centric right, if
we want to defend the dignity of each individual man. However, as
we have seen, the idea in question' is quite obscure. 'At least,
Locke's version of the ego-centric right of disposal is quite obscure.
Since he is the least formal and least systematic of all major theorists
of natural rights, we may expect that other theorists had given a
solid philosophical account of this peculiar idea. Yet there seems
to be no such account. This idea was invented wi~hout any serious
thought behind it, for the pragmatic purpose of defending an independent
individual. To illustrate this, I should like to mention the fact that
Grotius introduced his concept of "faculty" (a right in the strict sense)
without explaining the connection between this concept and his Stoic
ideal of social harmony. In the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac Pacis,
he states that man's sociability, or his propensity to conserve a social
union, is the origin of a right in the strict sense: "this very conservation
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of Society... is the foundation [fons: fountain, spring, source]
of that which is properly called Right" (Prolegomena, 8). Stlthe nowhere
explains how the individualistic, possessory right arises from man's
sociability. This is a clear indication of the fact that Grotius is
interested in using the then novel idea of a subjective right, rather
than explaining the status of this right in detail.
My criticism against Locke in this section is implicitly a
criticism against the whole tradition of natural rights which tried
to separate an agent's power from an inter subjective norm, and
assimilated a right to the agent's power. A non-normative right,
however, is a contradiction in terms. The modern tradition of natural,
subjective, and ego-centric rights may serve a practical purpose because
it asserts that each man ~ rights. Yet we must remember that mere
assertions do not amount to any philosophy. If we follow this tradition
blindly, we will end up shouting loudly (like Robert Nozick) that
we ~ rights. But those who shout can never explain where those rights
come from, and it is the height of folly to look inside to discover the
source of rights a la Descartes.
I do not need to develop an alternative concept of a right
here. I have already suggested that a right presupposes an interpersonal
rule, and that a'man's right over X owes its existence to the rule which
prohibits other men to take X. This suggestion is not new, but at least
as old as Hume. It is Hume who criticized the notion of a subjective,
ego-centric right, in his discussion of justice and property. He
presented the view that the concept of a'right (or property) is just
as intersubjective as the concept of justice: "Those ••• who make use
of the word property, or right, ••• before they have explain'd the
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origin of justice ••• are guilty of a very gross fallacy" (THN, 491).
Property "vanishes" .like one of "the imaginary quali ties of the
peripatetic philosophy" if it is considered "a-part from our moral
sentiments"; and property consists in the "influence" which the
"external relations" of a physical object to its possessor has
"on the mind and actions" of other men (THN, 527). Hume's approach
to the concept of a right has inspired my criticism of Locke. It
is worth noting that his interpersonal or institutional perspective
arose at the time when the Cartesian ego fell into pieces. In the
Appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume confessed that he could
not discover "the principle of connexion" - the principle which combines
successive states of consciousness to form the idea of "self" (633ff.).
We have seen Locke's peculiar, inward stretch of the concept of a right.
I have rejected this Cartesian view of a right without confessing
any metaphysical bewilderment.
* * * * *
In Sections CA), (B) and CC) above, I have performed an anatomy
of Locke's concept of a right of disposal. To review it briefly, it
consists of two unit-ideas "a man's liberty of disposal" and "the
bounds of a law". Both ideas are ambiguous. Their combination is
supposed to make up "a right of disposal", yet this combination does
not amount to any intellibible concept of a right.
Next we shall explore the outer layer of Locke's concept of
property. Our question is what it means to say that "a right of
disposal" is exclusive.
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2. 3 The Fringe of Locke's Ego-Centric Concept; or the Exclusiveness
of a Man's Right of Disposal
As 1 indicated earlier, Locke's concept of property is "an
exclusive right of disposal" over X in the sense of a right to dispose
of X to the exclusion of the right of any other man to X. 1 also
indicated that the exclusive right in this sense is different from
the exclusive right in the sense of the right to exclude others
(Sect. 2. 1, p. 243, above). In what follows, 1 shall discuss the
exclusiveness which is characteristic of Locke's concept of property.
Let me begin by stressing that Locke's "exclusive right" is !!2! a right
to exclude others, but a right of exclusive disposal.
For the sake of illustration, let us consider the sentence,
"He owns his land" (or "His land is his property"). (Note that
"His land is his property" is not tautologicaf. r· take up' this sentence
here, because the sentence of this form is a paradigm of Locke's talk
about property. "His" land can be understood as the land he uses, the
land he cultivates, the land he possesses, etc. In short, a definite
relationship other than the relationship of property holds between
a particular portion of land and himself.) According to Locke's
concept of property, "He owns his land" can be translated as follows:
(a) He has a right to dispose of his land, without
anyone else having a right to it.
If we take property to be a right to exclude others, then we will
translate the same sentence as follows:
(b) He has a right to exclude any other man from using,
or taking, his land.
The difference between (a) and (b) can be brought into relief, if we
ask a simple question "What right does he have?" Locke says that he
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has a right to dispose of his land, adding that nobody else has a right
to his land. Those who assert (b), by contrast, say that he has a right
to exclude others, adding that by virtue of this right he can effectively
use, possess, or control a particular piece of land. The difference
between a right of disposal and a right of exclusion is so striking
that even the laziest mind can understand it. It makes us wonder why
so many intelligent commentators on Locke have failed to understand it.
The contrast between Locke's concept of property and "a right
to exclude others" is useful. A right to exclude others presupposes
the real existence of other men, and it is the right directed against
others. This idea is closely connected with the view that man is a
social being, a being among other beings. One man's property is a right
to exclude others who already exist in "society" in the broadest sense of
a mode of living together. But Locke's concept is completely different
from this concept, the other-directed concept of property (which mayor
may not presuppose an ego as the indispensable core). In his view,
each man's mind is linked to his objects (his person, or his goods, qr a
portion of the world he is about to appropriate), and also to the bounds
of a law. Then those objects "exclude" other men in the sense that
they do not have any right to those objects. The holder of the right
of disposal does not exclude other men~ Other men simply do ~ have
a rightful claim to the objects of a particular man's right of disposal.
In order to avoid misunderstanding, we should perhaps designate
Locke's concept of property as "a right of exclusive disposal" rather
than "an exclusive right of disposal". For it is a right to dispose
of an object exclusively, i.e., to the exclusion of any other man.
But we shall stick to the expression "an exclusive right of disposal".
The point is that it means the absence of a right on the part of others.
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\ll:lat.1 have saLd above can be confirmed by Locke's text.
There is no textual evidence to support the view that property,
according to Locke, is a right to exclude others. What he says is that
property (in the state of nature) is "a private Dominion, exclusive
of the rest of Mankind" (ST, 26); and that property (in political
society) is someone's object "by peculiar right exclusive of others"
(Works, IX, 101). These statements simply confirm that property is a
right to dispose of an object to the exclusion of the right
of others. Locke frequently speaks of a man's liberty to "dispose of"
various objects, but he does not even hint that a man has a liberty
to exclude others. In fact, the general idea of a right against
others is alien to Locke's political theory. The only right that
might appear to fall under this general idea is the natural right (or
power) to _punish criminals. He says that it is one man's "Power over
another" man (g,8). But this power is "the Exec.utive Power of the
Law of Nature" (13). The power of punishment is not properly a power
against others, but the power to enforce the just order among men.
It is only a power against those who violate the rights of others and,
the law of nature.
Having made these preliminary remarks, I shall now clarify
the idea of an exclusive right. There are ~hree points I should like to
make. First, the exclusive right of a particular man is opposed to the
common right of everyone. Secondly, thE holder of an exclusive right
can willingly suspend the exclusion of other men so that they may acquire
it- right. ThJ!rdly, each man can have an exclusive right even if no other
man exists in the world.
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2. 31 The Exclusive Right of a Particular Man versus the Common
Right of Every Man
In offering an exposition of Locke's account of appropriation,
I have discussed the common right of everyone and its logical relationship
to the exclusive right of a particular man (pp. 24-6). I shall try not to
repeat what I said. The distinction between the exclusive right and
the common right was frequently used in 17th-century writings. Basically,
the distinction captures the idea that certain things belong "exclusively"
(or "properly") to one man, whereas other things are "common" to all
men. Though theorists had divergent views about the precise sense of
"property" and "community", they agreed that a distinction can be
usefully drawn between proper things and common things. "Things"
here are immaterial as well as material objects. This can be shown by
a brief historical survey.
I shall glance at the 17th-century contrast between the
exclusive right of a particular man and the common right of every man.
Hobbes states: "Before the yoke of Civill Society was undertaken, no
man had any proper Right; all things were common to all men" .(De Cive,
nI, 7). He also spea~s of "things held in propriety". Of those things,
the "dearest" are a man's "own life, & limbs; and in the next degree
... those that concern conjuga11 affection; and after them riches and
means of living" (Leviathan, XXX, 382f.). Grotius also contrasts
things proper with- things common: "Some things are ours by a Right
common with all Mankind, and some things are ours, in our own particular
Right" (De Jure Belli, 2, 2, 1). Unlike Hobbes, Grotius holds that
certain things are "by nature" proper to a man, or tlaman's own". He
enumerates those things: "his Life, ••• his Limbs, his Reputation, his
honour, and his peculiar actions" (~., 2, 17, 2, 1; also, 1, 2, 1, 5).
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Pufendorf adds a further distinction to the distinction between "proper"
and "common", by speaking of "positive" conununity and "negative" conununity
(ge Jure Naturae, 4, 4, 2). This, however, does not concern us. Pufendorf
follows Grotius in listing certain objects as our "own" - exclusiv~ly or prop-
erly ours - by nature: "our Life, our Bodies, our Members, our Chastity,
our Reputation and our Liberty" (~[B], 3, 1, 1). Finally, Leibniz
contrasts a man's "exclusive right to a thing" with things held "in
common", when he comments on Locke's definition of "property".34
Given this historical background, it is not surprising that
" ""th th" "" h fLocke contrasts property W1 e common r1g t 0 everyone. In
his account of appropriation, he typically indicates the contrast
by two locutions, "a property in" and "a right to". It is as if Locke
had translated the difference between "a real right" and "a personal
right", or ius in re and jus ad rem. Let us clarify the 'relationship
between the two rights. As I said in CHAPTER 1 (pp. 25f.), the common
right of everyone is a right to take, and make use of, an indefinite
part of the external world of goodso Hence, it is not accurate to
say that an exclusive right is incompatible with a common right.
A particular man can have "a property in" x., while at the same time
every other human being retains his "common right" with respect to the
whole class of external goods minus the X portion. To clarify the
relationship between the two rights, we must take into account the object
of a right rather than a right in the abstract. The relationship is
simple: if a particular man has "a property in" X (i.e., an exclusive
right over X), then no other man has "a right to" X (or no other man
has a right of free access to Xc or X is not the object of the common
right of everyone else). This is a logical rather than a causal relation-
ship. Locke himself presents this logical relationship in his account
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of appropriation, as if it were a causal relationship. This is because
in Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise, he discusses how particular men
come to have "a property in" the external world and how the "common
right" of everyone goes out of existence , Locke says: if a man has
acquired "a property in" a natural object by his labour, then he has
annexed something to it with the consequence that this "something"
excludes the common right of other Men" (E, 27). "The Fruit, or
Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian" must be regarded as, or
must become, the object of his exclusive right so that "another can
no longer have any right to it" (26). If we isolate the logical
relationship from these and other statements of Locke's, we can
express it as follows, A.I s having "a property in" X is incompatible
wi th any other man I shaving "a right to" }C.
Now we have clarified the opposition between the exclusive
right of a particular man and the common right of everyone. It is
clear from what I have said above that the exclusiveness of the
exclusive right consists in the absence of a right on the part
of others, rather than in the supposed right to exclude others.,
The point of Locke's use of the idea of an exclusive right is
to emphasize that whoever holds an exclusive right over X is
the!2l! legitimate controller of ~ i.e., the legitimate controller
of X without anyone else having a right to X~.
Before I end this discussion about the contrast between the
exclusive right of a particular man and the common right of everyone,
I should like to make one remark to avoid misunderstanding. Though
I have explained the status of the exclusive right by reference to
the common right, it is a mistake to think that a man's exclusive
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right is simply opposed to the common right of everyone else, and
is compatible with other rights. If A has an exclusive right over
X, then others do not have any rightful claim to X (unless A himself
has conferred a certain right to another man by a contract, for instance).
I have focused on the contrast between the exclusive right and the
common right because it is the 17th-century distinction, and it
plays an important role in Locke's account of appropriation. Nevertheless,
a man's exclusive right over X excludes any right or claim that another
may make with respect to X. The common right primarily (if not solely) means
everyone's primitive right to make use of a part of the external world.
Even if this right is completely extinguished in a certain part of the civilized
world, each man's exclusive right will remain exclusive without excluding
the common right. Also, a man's exclusive right over "his person",
strictly speaking, is not opposed to the common right of everyone.
The reason is that the common right is the right to an indefinite portion
of the external world. So when Locke says, "every Han has a Property in
his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself," he is not
speaking about "the common right" in the strict sense of the phrase.
"
2. 32 The Willing Suspension of Exclusion
One man's exclusion of other men may be considered either
from the viewpoint of the society where they live together, or from the
viewpoint of the agent who has a right of disposal over his objects.
Locke takes the latter viewpoint, and he maintains that the holder of
an exclusive right can suspend the exclu~ion of other men by the
power of his mind.
Let us consider the suspension of exclusion. To say
that a man has an exclusive right over X does not imply that other men
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can never acquire a right to X. Other men can acquire a right to X
with the consent of the holder of the exclusive right. But the crucial
point is that other men can acquire a right to X only with the prior
consent of the holder of the exclusive right. Locke says: "1 have
truly no Property in that, which another can by right take from me,
when he pleases against my consent" C.§!_,138). This statement logically
follows from his concept of property. A man's property in X is his
right to dispose of X to the exclusion of the rightful claim of any
other man, where "his right to dispose of X" means his liberty to dispose
of X according to his will within the bounds of a law. Hence, if A
has an exclusive right over X, another man can acquire a right to X
only with A's prior consent or voluntary agreement. The agent, or
the mind, decides whether another man should have a right to the objects
which lie within the sphere of its control. Thus the holder of an
exclusive right can suspend exclusion willingly, i.e., by exercising
one of the powers of the mind - the will.
2. 33 The Unnecessary Existence of Other Men
An interesting feature of Locke's concept of an exclusive right
Cof disposal) is that those who are excluded do not have to exist in
reality. If property is a right to exclude others, then this concept of
property requires that other men exist. The concept becomes idle if others
do not exist. But Locke's concept is different. He holds: a man's
"exclusive right of disposal" over X is his right to dispose of X, while
~nother man who may exist does not have any right to X. Even if there
is nobody other than the man who has a right of disposal, this concept
remains coherent. Locke wants to say that he alone has a right of
disposal, whether there exists any other human being in the world or not.
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Locke's idea of exclusiveness - hence, his concept of property - remains
coherent even if only one man exists in the world. The existence
of other men is not necessary for the coherence of his concept of an
exclusive right (of disposal) • Let us see that this is, in fact, Locke's
view.
It is worth noting that according to Locke's account of appro-
priation, each man comes to have "a property in" a defini te portion of
the common world simply by mixing his labour with it. The whole process
by which a man comes to have a property in a portion of the world takes
place, and completes itself, without the presence of other men. Let
us be clear about this point. Locke says:
He that gathered a Hundred Bushels of Acorn~ or Apples, had
thereby a Property in them; they were his Goods as soon as
gathered (~, 46).
And 'tis plain, if the first gathering made them not his,
nothing else could (28).
As we can see, a man establishes "a property in" acorns or apples ~
soon as he picks them up, and without encountering any other human being.
We have seen in PART I of this chapter that Locke makes use of the notion
"
that "nourishment is his". Locke's notion of appropriation is linke.d
to the intimate bodily function of a man, while his concept of property is
connected with a man's mind. The presence of other men is not required
for appropriation, and given that appropriation presupposes the concept
of property, the presence (or real existence) of other men is not required
for the concept of property.
A man's appropriation, his coming to have a property in a
portion of the external world, began in the beginning of the world
"when Men were ••• in danger to be lost, by wandering from their Company,
in the then vast Wilderness of the Earth" (ST, 36). Locke's appropriator
311
is a Robinson Crusoe who "carved" a "Portion" "to himself" (51), though
this Crusoe is placed on the vast American Continent rather than a small
island off the coast of America. Locke's Crusoe does not meet another
human being until after he has acquired "a property in" a portion of
the world. Though this is a familiar plot in all Robinsonades' romances,
it reveals an important feature of Locke's concept of property. To push
Locke's assumption to its logical concLusi.ont even if all inhabi t ant s
of the first ages of the world other than one individual appropriator
(named "Crusoe") are shipwrecked, it makes sense to describe him as
having "a property in" his person and coming to have "a pr.operty in"
a portion of the external world. In Locke's view, each man can have
an exclusive right of disposal even if no other man exists in the world.
One striking feature of his account of appropriation is the unreality
of the existence of other men. Locke describes appropriation from the
viewpoint of an agent (i.e., an appropriator), and forms the agent-centred
concept of property which does not necessarily refer to an9ther existing
human being. Certainly, men meet each other as legitimate disposers
of goods in the commercially developed state of nature. But prior to
this stage of the world, each man is separate from others. Each man seems
to think that other men may exist somewhere in the world, or that they
may come into being in the future. Other men, in short, are potentially
existing men. Or perhaps, they are the human beings each independent man
imagines to exist. Robinson Crusoe imagines other men to exist some-
where in the world. Whether the existence of other men is probable or
imagined, it is clear that the real existence (or non-existence) of
other men does not matter to Locke's concept of an exclusive right of
disposal. If other men happen to exist, then they do not have a right
to what Crusoe has already acquired by his labour.
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Thus Locke's concept of property is ego-centric in a fu1l_
blooded sense. As we have seen, each man's mind is the indispensable
core of his concept of property. But this ego-centricity is only one
phase of his ego-centric concept. The other phase is that other men
are not indispensable but dispensable. The existence of other men is
an a,ccidental feature of the world, and Locke's concept of property
remains coherent and intelligible whether other men exist or not. This
full-blooded ego-centricity, one might say, is a universal feature of
the modern concept of private property. Yet the truth is that other
modern theorists, whether they take a man's mind as an indispensable
core of a right or not, tend to treat the existence of other men more
seriously than Locke. Pufendorf is a good example. He maintained that
since property implies "an exclusion of others" (i.e., other men who
really exist in the world rather than those who probably, or are imagined
to, exist), the concept of property is ~ "intelligible before more
thai'!one man has corneinto being". It follows that Adam, the first
man on the earth, could not possibly have property: "the right of Adam
to things was different from that of dominion which is now established
among men" (De Jure Naturae [A], 4, 4, 3). Hobbes and Grotius also
held the un-Locke an view that one man's property presupposes the real
existence or presence of others. These modern theorists had an ego-
centric concept of a right, and assimilated a right to an agent9s
power. But they did not develop a fUl1-bloode~, ego-centric concept
like Locke's. (In Appendix 3, Sect. (H), I have tried to show that
Locke is unique among modern theorists in providing a strongly ego-
centric concept.) Furthermore, if we look at 18th-century theorists,
we discover that the great Scottish trio - Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith
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discussed one man's property and rights in relation to other men.
Locke's strongly ego-centric concept of property is by no means the
universal, modern concept of'property, though today's libertarians may
elevate his concept to the status of ~ concept of property.
Given Locke's concept of property, it is intelligible to say
that the first inhabitant on the earth has "a property in" this-or
that object. As we have seen, the exclusion bf other men means that
other men, who mayor may not exist, do not have a rig~t to the object
of a man's right of disposal. This is a highly attenuated notion of
exclusion. If other, men did not exist, then it would be pointless to
say that a particular man has "an exclusive right of disposal". In
that case, his "exclusive right of disposal" would be identical wi th "
his "right of disposal". In fact, the exclusiveness of property
can be treated as a "fringe" of Locke's concept of property, precisely
because other men are not present in the neighbourhodd of each individual
appropriator(according to his account of appropriation).
Prom what I said above, ~t should be clear that Locke's concept
of property is often indistinguishable from the everyday notion of
possessions. The ordinary notion of possessions can be represented
as a two-term relationship between the possessor and external objects.
LockeYs concept of property, strictly speaking, cannot be represented
as a two-term relationship. For it must refer to "other men", as well
as the owner and the owned. However, since those other men mayor may
not exist in Locke's view, his concept of property collapses into
the ordinary notion of possessions very easily. The circumstance of
superabundance portrayed in Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise virtually
abolishes the distinction between the triadic relationship of property
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and the two-term relationship of possession. In the sparsely populated
_aJieawith superabundant resourcea;: one's neighbours can be treated as non-
existent for practical purposes. Hence, a man's property becomes
indistinguishable from his possessions. In fact, Locke does not dis-
tinguish between property and possessions in his account of appropriation.
2. 4 Concluding Remarks
We have come in full circle. We started with the observation
that though Locke seems to treat property as a simple two-term relation-
ship, there is a definite arrangement of entities hidden under the
simple representation. Then we ~a1yzed this arrangement -the ego-
centricity of Locke's concept of property - by taking a close look at
its core (i.e., a man's right of disposal) and its fringe (i.e., the
exclusiveness of a man's right of disposal). Now we have ended our
discussion by affirming that his concept of property tends to collapse
into our ordinary notion of possessions.
In concluding this analysis, I should like to consider briefly
whether we should retain Locke's concept of property or not. First of
all, we should not assume that there is an eternal, Platonic entity
called ~ concept of property. There are 'various historically evolved
concepts. Some-of them are-confused while· others are not ·c.onfused. B~t even
the most confused concept generally turns out to be useful for a limited
purpose. Without making a futile attempt to look for the eternal concept
of property, we should ask what use and abuse can be made of Locke's
concept of property. My central criticism was d~rected against his view
that a man's right of disposal is a species of non-normative liberty of
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action. In my view, a right presupposes a rule-governed institution
which regulates the actions of men. A right is not a man's ability
to do, or not to do, what he wills (with the aid of understanding).
Nor is it based upon this ability. Rather, a right arises from one
man's regulation of his conduct toward other men. This is a Humean
view which can be defended.
Though my criticism has exposed the fact that Locke has a
confused concept of "a right of disposal" (hence, of "an exclusive right
of disposal"), we should note that his attempt to bring 'inthe idea of
a man's natural ability is not altogether misguided. On the contrary,
as long as we rely on the informal, ordinary notion of "property", his
attempt can be justified. B}rthe ordinary notion, I mean "possessions".
Etymologically, the word "possession" (pos-sessio) suggests the idea
of sitting in power. The ordinary notion of "possession(s)" is, indeed,
closel y linked with the idea of "power" or "ability". Hume commented
on this ordinary notion: "We are said to be in possession of any thing
not only when we immediately touch .it, but also when we are so situated
with respect to it, as to have it in our power to use it; and may move,
alter, or destroy it, according to our present pleasure or advantage."
(~, 506.) Here Hume expresses more clearly than Locke what he
wanted to express: If we want to move it, we can; if we want to alter
it,.we can; and if we want to destroy it, we can. Hume states that
the relation of a possessor to his object is "a speties of cause and
effect" (~.). In Locke's terminology, this is a species of an agent's
power or liberty. He equated "property" with "possessions", and given
this equation, it is understandable why he used 'aman's power as the
core of his concept of property. Given the fact that we do, from time
to time, use the word "property" in the sense of "possessions", we
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cannot dismiss Locke's attempt to describe the core of the concept of
property by Locution!:!:. Insofar as we equate "property" with "possessions",
his concept seems to capture what we mean by "property".
On the other hand, however, "property" can be distinguished
from "possessions" in many contexts. Typically, property is associated
with de jure possessions or legitimate possessions, or with a right of
property, whereas possessions are taken to be de facto possessions.
Perhaps Locke· would try to explain the distinction between "property"
and "possessions" by appealing to the legitimate method.of acquisition
and exchange, if he were challenged to explain it. But in the Second
Treatise, he simply does not draw a distinction between the two. Suppose,
for the sake of argument, that Locke states that possessions acquired
by a legitimate means are "property". But this does not help us under-
stand what it means to "have a property in" a portion of the world. He
might say two things: first, each man has. a Uberty to dispose of his
goods within the bounds of the laws he is under; and secondly, those
goods which have been legitimately .acquired are called "property".
Yet he cannot relate the two claims to form a new concept of property
which is free from my criticism.
Locke's concept of property can be usefully used if we mean by
"property" "possession(s)". But it is utterly useless and misleading
if we use it in our discourse on what it means to have a right of
disposal over certain objects. For it conflates a man's natural
ability with his right, and makes each man's right dependent on his
mind. If we wish to have a sound institutional analysis of property,
we must develop a relational or triadic concept of property. I have
already referred to Hume, and it is not amiss to quote his definition
of property to indicate the right direction in which we should move.
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Property may be defined, says Hume, as "such a relation betwixt a person
and an object as permits him, but forbids any other, the free use and
possession of it, without violating the laws of justice and moral equity"
(THN. 310). This definition reveals the triad of one man, an object,
and another man. Hume also offers a definition of property as the
material possessions of a special kind: "Our property is nothing but
those goods, whose constant possession is estab1ish'd by the laws of
society; that is, by the laws of justice." (THN, 491.) Here the constant-
possession of goods means one man's possession of goods without another
man's interference, or the possession of those goods from which other men
regularly abstain. An agent's liberty is.incorporated into the notion
of "possession". But property is defined by ref'erence to the conduct of
other men restrained by conventional rules, rather than an agent's
power to do or not to do certain actions. These statements mark the end
of ego-centric concepts of a right in the history of modern jurisprudence.
Thomas Aquinas' "jus" - the objectively just state of affairs - begins to
emerge in a completely secular dress.
NOTES to CHAPTER 3
I. F. Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy (Glasgow:
R. & A. Foulis, 1755), p. 318.
2. G. Parry, John Locke (London:
p. 50. Also, see his comment
1!ili!, p. 51.
George Allen & Unwin, 1978),
on Locke's "mixing" metaphor,
3. For the criticism which shows the non-deducibility of Locke's
conclusion, see Plamenatz and Day. Plamenatz, Man and
Society (London: Longman, 1963), vol. 1, p. 245; J. P. Day,
"Locke on Property", Life, Liberty, and PropertY,ed.,
G. Schochet (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1971), pp. 109f.
4. Most of the criticisms made by philosophers are of this type.
Robert Nozick raised a question which has attracted other
philosophical commentators: "But why isn't mixing what I own
with what I don't own a way of losing what I own rather than a
way of gaining what I don't?" Anarchy, State, and Utopia
(New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. l74f. Lawrence Becker
tries very hard to extract from Locke possible answers to this
question. He critically and somewhat tortuously reformulates
them. See Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), Chapter 4.
5. It is easy to miss Locke's conflation of physical exclusiveness
and an exclusive right. In ST, 28, Locke asks when the acorns
(or apples) an Indian gathers-nbegin to be his" (i.e., his
property). In this connection, he evokes the idea of physical
exclusiveness by saying that "the nourishment is his". Locke
is not the first to associate the exclusiveness of property
with the "nourishment" a man gains from food. Samuel
Rutherford's Lex, Rex (1644), the literature of the Puritan
Revolution which expresses the Presbyterian Principles of
Resistance, contains the following passage which Locke might
have read:
it is morally impossible that there should
not be a distinction between meum and tuum ••••
the division of things ••• is~s far~ural,
that the heat that I have from my own coat and
cloak, and the nourishment from my own meat,
are physically incommunicable to any.
This passage is quoted from Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty
(London: Biddles Limited for J. Mo Dent, 1974), p. 208.
It goes without saying that the idea of an exclusive right
is distinct from the idea of physical intransimissibility.
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It is certainly conceivable that a man has a right over
another man's "heat" or "nourishment". One man can
conceivably have a right over another's body, or a part of his
body, as it happens under slavery; hence, also a right over
another man's "heat" or "nourishment". Locke, of course,
claims that every man has a property in his person. Though
this claim entails that every man has a right over his body,
it does not alter the fact that Locke does conflate an
exclusive right with physical exclusiveness in !I, 28.
6. For Grotius' and Pufendorf's concept of "a right" as "a moral
quali ty", see section 2. 21 of this chapter and Appendix 3.
7. I have quoted their lists of our "own" objects in section 2. 31
of this chapter.
8. Such leading commentators as Laslett, Macpherson and Viner
have been influential in drawing the distinction between the
"broad" (or "extended") sense of "property" and the "narrow"
sense. See Laslett's Introduction to his Two Treatises,
PPo 101fo, and his notes to !I, 27 & 87; Macpherson's comment
in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford:
00 Uo Po, 1962), po 198; and Viner's review of Macpherson's
book in The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,
29 (1963), pp. 554ff. Chronologically speaking, Jacob Viner
appears to be the first scholar in recent years who has drawn
particular attention to the "two" senses of property. He
awakened Laslett in this matter, as Laslett says in his
Introduction, pp. 101f., note. Macpherson, in turn, seems
to be indebted to Laslett. (For this, see Viner, ~. £!l.,
p. 556.) Though Viner is undoubtedly a historically acute
scholar, the emphasis he placed on the distinction between
the two senses has fixed the minds of successive Locke scholars.
Consequently, the distinction has become a "customary" division,
and we are no longer able to see clearly what Locke himself
meant by "property", or how he used this word in the Second
Treatise.
9. Olivecrona has rightly pointed out the pitfall of the
Viner-Las lett-Macpherson doctrine of the two senses of
"property". He says: "But it is turning things upside down
to say that the meaning is 'extended' when life and liberty
are comprised within a person's property". See Olivecrona,
"Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin
of Property", Journal of the History of Ideas, XXXV, 2 (1974),
p. 220.
10. See my comment in section 2. 2.of this chapter, 2nd paragraph.
11. Day, "Locke on Property", OPe cit., p. 118.
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12. Yolton, Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding
(Cambridge: Co U. Po, 1970), p. 189.
13. Tully, A Discourse on Property (Cambridge: C. Uo P., 1980),
p. 1090 Tully's extensive discussion on "personal identity"
and "a·property in a man's person" is deeply confused, and
he is not even sure of the purpose of his own discussion.
He does not see whether he is clarifying the meaning of the
sentence, "I have a property in my person", or explaining
why I have a property in my person.
14. I emphasize this point, because recent philosophers who try
to rescue "human rights" by certain conceptions of personhood
have a tendency to focus on Locke's concept of "person".
Melden believes that Locke's concept of person is important
for his political theory, and fails to see that his political
theory is shaped by a particular, normative concept of "man"
rather than any normative concept of "person". See Melden's
discussion of the Second Treatise in his Rights and Persons
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), Chapter 7.
The literature on Locke seems to be filled with false
statements of the following type:
Locke, has certain natural rights.
~ who has natural rights.
every person, according to
But it is, of course, a
15. In his critical account of the "narrowness" of the modern,
Western concept of property, Macpherson claims that it is
largely "an invention of·the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries". Its narrowness consists in the identification of
property with a "right to exclude others". Then he goes on to
characterize Locke's concept of property as "exclusion",
without even noticing the difference between a right to exclude
others and a right of exclusive disposal. Macpherson,
jfmocratic Theort: Essaxs in Retrieval (Oxford: O. U. Po, 1913),say VI, pp. 12 , 136, et passIm.
Tully distinguishes between an "exclusive" right and an
"inclusive" right in order to elucidate Locke's concept of
property. Though he correctly identifies Locke's locution
"a property in" as indicative of an "exclusive" right, he
misinterprets the meaning of Locke's "exclusive" right. He
illustrates its feature as "a right to exclude others from using
the same seat at the same time" (Tully, OPe cit., p. 68).
Neither Macpherson nor Tully is sufficiently aware of the
ego-centric structure of Locke's concept of property.
16. Locke's view on the mind-body relationship can be best
characterized as an epistemology-oriented, moderately sceptical
view. His scattered remarks in the EssaX might give us the
impression that he is merely confused. For instance, he says
that it is "probable" that a single consciousness is annexed
to one individual substance (II, xxvii, 25). This implies
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that the mind is probably a mental substance. But the mind
is said to be mobile, which implies that it can be located in
space (II, xxiii, 19). There is also a famous passage in
IV, iii, 6 where Locke claims that God can endow "matter"
with the ability to think. However, Locke's position comes
to be clearly defined in his controversy with Stillingfleet.
He clearly expresses two views: the soul, or the mind, is
probably an immaterial substance, and we cannot demonstrate
that matter cannot think. (For Locke's reply to Stilling-
fleet, see Works IV, 457-83.)
These views must be treated as the product of Locke's
moderate scepticism, or his epistemological reasonableness.
In the Essay, he repeatedly suggests that we should be content
with our limited knowledge, and our ignorance in metaphysical
problems. See, for instance, his remark that we should be
"satisfied with our Notion of immaterial Spirit", as much as
"our Notion of Body" (II, xxiii, 32).
17. Locke briefly states his fundamental position at the beginning
of his inquiry: "To the Question, what is it determines the
Will? The true and proper Answer is, The mind. For that
which determines the general power of directing, to this or
that particular direction, is nothing but the Agent it self
Exercising the power it has, that particular way". (Essay,
II, xxi, 29). Then he goes on to discuss the heteronomous
determination of the will by "uneasiness" at length (30-46).
However, he suddenly reverts to his fundamental position -
namely, the defence of the agent's autonomous determination of
will - by bringing in the power of understanding. Locke states:
the greatest, and most pressing [uneasiness J should
determine the !!!l to the next action; and so it
does for the most part, but not always. For the
mind having in most cases, as is evident in
Experience, a power to suspend the execution and
satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all,
one after another, is at liberty to consider the
objects of them; examine them on all sides, and
weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty
Man has ••• (II, xxi, 47).
Strictly speaking, Locke is inconsistent in holding that the
will is "not always" determined heteronomously, and claiming
" " . -that the mind in most cases suspends the heteronomous
determination of the will. Yet as Locke repeatedly claims
from II, xxi, 47 onwards, his central point is that a man's
"understanding" makes him a self-determining (i.e., free)
agent because it cuts off the heteronomous determination of
the will. Thus Locke reaffirms his original position by
resorting to the power of understanding.
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18. I shall cite a few examples to show that many commentators on
natural rights and Locke are seduced by the false image of
natural rights arising from the law of nature.
(i) Benn and Peters say: "For Locke, the state of nature
was already a social state, governed by the Law of Nature,
from which natural rights derived" 0 See their Social Principles
and the Democratic State (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959),
po 97 (emphasis mine)o
(ii) A. P. d'Entreves remarks on Hobbes' concept of natural
rights as exceptional, and contrasts it with Locke'so He says:
To the "great majority of natural law writers in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries", "natural law was the necessary
presupposition of natural right. Locke 0 •• makes the point
very clearly". See his Natural Law, 2nd ed. London: Hutchinson,
1970), p. 62 (emphasis mine).
(iii) J. W. Gough becomes a victim of the false image,
though he is a professional Locke scholar. He remarks: "It
might seem, then, that the law of nature embodies the principle
of individual natural rights". Gough not only thinks that the
law of nature seemingly embodies natural rights. But he also
believes that it actually embodies natural rights. See his John
Locke's Political Philosophy: Eight Studies, 2nd ed. (Oxford~
O. U. P., 1973), pp. 21ff (empha~is mine).
These commentators and countless others entertain the loose
thought that natural rights are derived from, or founded on,
the law of nature. They should at once quit commenting on
Locke's concept of natural rights, or his place in the modern
tradition of natural rights. It seems clear that they have not
carefully studied Locke, nor his predecessors such as Hobbes,
Grotius and Pufendorf. Didn't they ever read Locke's own
statement that the law of nature "ought to be distinguished
from natural right", because a right is grounded in a man's
liberty whereas the law is "what enjoins or forbids the doing
of a thing"? (Bili, I, 111.)
19. John Finnis, Natural 'Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: O. Uo Po,
1980), pp. 206ff. Finnis offers a brief account of the modern
transformation of jus, referring to Suarez, Grotius and Hobbes.
He also mentions Pufendorf and Locke as successors to this
modern tradition of subjective, individual ~.
20. Gerson's statement, which I have quoted here, is found in
Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theorists: Their Origin and
Development (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1979), p. 25. I have simply
restated Tuck's view that Jean Gerson is the "first" theorist
to define ~ exclusively as a facultas or power. Tuck's view
is, of course, not finalo Further historical inquiry may alter
it. Yet he made an important contribution to enhance our
understanding of the history of "rights" (or "subjective rights"
as they are called on the Continent, in contradistinction to
"objective rights" or laws or norms).
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Tuck also draws attention to other features of Gerson's
account of ~ which anticipate the 17th-century movement:
the assimilation of jus ("a right") to libertas ("a liberty"),
and the conceptual distinction between jus and ~. See
Tuck, ~. £!!., pp. 26. He quotes Gerson's definition of lex:
..~ is a practical and right reason according to which the-
movements and workings of things are directed towards their
ordained ends" (~., p. 27). Given this definition and the
definition of Jus I have quoted, it seems to follow that ~ is
a facultas or power appropriate to someone and in accordance
with a law. Tuck does not discuss how this idea came to be
transmitted to Locke. But there must be a long chain of causes
and effects which link Gerson with Locke, since their concepts
of rights are strikingly similar.
21. L. Strauss, Natural Rights and History (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 194ff. and no 36 of p. 194.
22. In Appendix 2 of this dissertation, I have shown that three
commentators on Locke -Max Milam, John Yolton, and James Tully
have fabricated various connections between the Second Treatise
and the Essay. Those fabricators take a "foundationalist"
approach to Locke's works, and falsify everything. In trying
to Unk Locke' s account of "Uberty" in the Essay with his
account of "Uberty" in the Second Treatise, I am not ascribing
to Locke the nfoundationalist" picture of philosophy. For my
detailed critique of the "foundationalistn approach to Locke,
see Appendix 2 (Locke's Political Theory and its Epistemo-
logical Foundations: A Systematically Misguided Project).
23. Locke always held the view that the power of "understanding",
rather than the power of "will", is - and ought to be - the
ultimate controller of each man's actions. The primacy of
intellect over volition was clearly stated in the first edition
of the Essay, II, xxi, 30ff., as well as in the later editions
of the Essay. Locke's clearest statement of the thesis of the
primacy of "the understanding" can be found in the Conduct of
Understanding:
The last resort a man has recourse to, in the
conduct of himself, is his understanding: for
••• the man, who is the agent, determines himself
to this, or that voluntary action, upon some
precedent knowledge, or appearance of knowledge,
in the understanding.... The will itself, how
absolute and uncontrollable soever it may be
thought, never fails in its obedience to the
dictates of the understanding (Works, III, sect. 1,
p. 211).
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24. The 20th-century English translation of Pufendorf's De Officio
Hominis et Civis (by F. Moore, published as a part of the
Classics of International Law) translates "intellectus" as
"intellect". For this reason, the Locke-Pufendorf connection
which I have stated may appear to be non-existent. However,
the 17th-century (and 18th-century) English equivalent to the
Latin word "intellectus" is "understanding" or "the understanding".
Locke frequently referred to his Essay concerning Human Under-
standing as "Intellectus" or "De Intellectu" in his letters.
Draft A of the Essay is headed, "Sic Cogitavit de Intellectu
humano 000"; and Draft B bears such titles as "Intellectus"
and "De Intellectu humano".
Having said this, I should like to quote a passage from
the 1716 English translation of Pufendorf's work, and thereby
substantiate my claim for the discovery of the connection
between Locke's account of (true) liberty in the Essay and
Pufendorf's account of "human actions" in De Officio Huminis et
Civiso Pufendorf explains what he means by the expression "a
Human Ac tion" as fo llows:
By a Human Action we mean not every Motion that
proceeds from the faculties of a Man, but such
only as have their Original and Direction from
those faculties which God Almighty has endowed
Mankind withall, distinct from Brutes, that is,
such as are undertaken by the Light of the
Understanding, and the Choice of the ~.. For
it is not only put in the Power of Man to know
the various things which appear in the Wor~
to compare them one with another, and from thence
to form to himself new Notions; but he is able
to look forwards, and to consider !h!!he is to
do, and to carry himself to the performance of
it, and this to do after some certain Manner,
and to some certain End; and then he can
collect what will be the Consequence thereof.
Beside, he can make a Judgment upon things
already done, whether they are done agreeably to
their Rule. ••• [Some of] a man's Faculties
••• are stir8d up in him by an internal Unpulse;
and when raised, are by the same regulated and
guided. ••• often, though an Object of Action
be before him, yet he Suspends any motion towards
it; and when many Objects offer themselves, he
chuses one and refutes the rest.
{Quoted from The Whole Duty of Man, according to the Law
of Nature (5th ed. with Barbeyrac's notes, English trans. by
Andrew Tooke, Dublin: re-printed by Elizabeth Sadleir, for
George Grierson, 1716), Bk I, Ch. 1, Sects. 2 and 3. I have
preserved the punctuation, spelling, and emphases of this English
trans lation.)
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What Pufendorf calls "a human action" is equivalent to what
Locke regards as the action of a free agent in the "true",
rather than crude, sense. Pufendorf says that "often" a man
"suspends" any motion toward the object of an action, just as
Locke says that in "most cases", a man has a "power to suspend
the execution and satisfaction of any of [his] desires"
(Essay, II, xxi, 47). Pufendorf says that a man "chuses onelt
object of action and "refutes" the rest. Locke elaborates it
by saying that a man has a power to "consider the objects of"
his desires, "weigh them with others", and examine them till
"the will" is determined to action (II, xxi, 47).
Pufendorf's De Officio Hominis et Civis is a little
handbook which summarizes the main points of his De Jure Naturae
et Gentium. Since Locke highly recommended both works to those
who wished to study a general branch of politics, there is
every reason to believe that he read them carefully. For his
recommendation of Pufendorf's little book, see Works, III, 296;
IX, 176; X, 308. It seems that Locke read Pufendorf's little
book sometime during his stay in France, 1675-79. According
to John Lough, "Locke's Reading during his Stay in France,
1675-79", The Library, 5th ser., VIII (1953), "Pufendorf de
Cive" occurs in a list of 1678 (p. 255). It is not correct to
say that a passage in Pufendorf's little book influenced Locke
tremendously. But it is correct to say that Locke's account
of liberty was inspired, at least in part, by his reading of
Pufendorf's little book (and perhaps, his large book as well).
25. Pufendorf explains what he means by "a human action" in Bk, 1,
Ch. 1 of De Officio Homines et Civis. Then he adds a new
thought in Bk 1, ea, 2, Sect. 1: "Because human actions depend
upon the will, but the wills of individuals are not always
consistent, and those of different men generally tend toward
different things, therefore, in order to establish order and
seemliness among the human race, it was necessary that some norm
should come into being, to which actions might be conformed.
For otherwise, if with such freedom of the will, and such
diversity of inclinations and tastes, each should do whatever
came into his head, without reference to a fixed norm, nothing
but the greatest confusion could arise among men" (De Officio
Hominis, 1, 2, 1).
26. For Locke's combination of a superior being's right and his
causal power, consider another definition of "a law-;;ker": "one
that has a superiority and right to ordain, and also a power to
reward and punish according to the tenor of the law established
by him" ("Ethics in general", King, ~, II, 133; emphasis
added).
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27. There has been a controversy among Locke commentators over the
question whether Locke had an "intellectualist" (or "rational-
ist") theory of obligation as well as a "voluntarist" theory of
obligation. This controversy takes its origin from von Leyden's
Introduction to Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature, where
Locke is interpreted to have suffered from the uneasy tension
between the two theories. Dr. von Leyden's interpretation
was uncritically accepted by Mabbott, in Chap. 12 of his
John Locke (London: Macmillan, 1973). But it has been
criticized by a number of subsequent commentators. Yo1ton has
briefly criticized it in Ch. 7 of his Locke and the Compass of
Human Understanding (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1970). The most
recent, and perhaps the most detailed, criticism of von Leyden's
interpretation can be found in John Colman, John Locke's Moral
Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), Ch. 2.
I shall not go into the details of this interpretive dispute.
But given the dispute, it is appropriate for me to state
briefly what Locke's position is. He explains why the law of
nature is binding on men, in the sixth essay of!1li. His
account looks complicated because he discusses different types
of obligation. Yet its outline is simple. The law of nature
is binding because (a) God, the maker of the law, is indeed
infinitely superior to men; and (b) He promulgated His will
clearly in the whole of his creation. See!1!, VI, 183, 187,
& 189. God's omnipotence, rather than his omniscience, is
associated with the obligatory force of the law of nature.
Locke nowhere says that it is binding on men because this law
is rational, or because men's rational nature conforms to this
law. What he does say is that it is reasonable that the
law of nature is binding on men, because God is omniscient
(ELN, VI, 183)0 The law is binding not because God is
o~scient, but because God is omnipo~t and willing.
Those who ascribe the "intellectualist" theory of obligation
to Locke are mistaken. "Obligation", for Locke, is the
"binding force" which arises from a pre-existing law-maker.
The rudiments of Locke's thesis of demonstrable morality can be
found in the seventh essay on the law of nature, titled "Is the
Binding Force of the Law of Nature Perpetual and Universal?
Yes". Locke mentions the "essential" and "immutable" or
"eternal" order of things (as opposed to inconstant will); and
he refers to the equivalence of "three angles" to "two right
angles" (~, VII, 199). This talk, IIrationalistic" as it is,
has nothing to do with the binding force of the law of nature
as such. The whole discussion of the seventh essay presupposes
that the law of nature is binding on men. Locke is explicit
about this: "We have already proved that this law is given as
morally binding, and we must now discuss to what extent it is
in fact binding" (!!::!i, VII, 193). In speaking about the
immutable order of things and a triangle, Locke is trying to
show that "if natural law is binding on at least some men" (as
327
it has already been proven), then "it must be binding on all men
as well" (ibid., 199).-
In Locke's mature works, we find his voluntarist (i.e.,
"superior will") theory of obligation on the one hand; and his
rationalist theory of how to derive specific precepts of the
law of nature,on the other hand. The former theory is found
in Reasonableness, Works, VII, l40ff; "Of Ethics in general", King,
~,II; and various places of the Essay. The latter theory,
a theory about how to derive definite precepts, consists of
Locke's thesis of demonstrable morality in the Essay and his
arguments for the thesis. There is a clear division in Locke's
thought about "morality" or "the law of nature". He discusses
"morality capable of obligation" as well as "morality capable
of demonstration". The fundamental weakness of his moral (or
legal) theory is that he does not show how one morality is
related to the other morality.
280 Pufendorf, at one point, relates the notion of obligation to a
superior's causal power to influence the wills of men. He
thereby obscures the distinction which he himself has drawn
between obligation and causal necessity. See De Jure Naturae
et Gentium, 1, 6, 9.
29. There are a few scholars who have discussed the relationship
bebween Hooker's legal theory and Locke's. But their discussions
are too brief, and somewhat misleading. See, for instance,
Abrams' discussion in his Introduction to Two Tracts on
Government (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1967), pp. 69ff; and Colman,
OPe cit., pp. 238ff. A solid scholarly account of the relation-
ship of Hooker's legal theory to Locke's is yet to be written.
Hooker's legal theory, as I said, deals with the regular
modes in which beings work toward a telos. It is not primarily
a theory of obligation. Since Locke scholars seldom read
Hooker, I shall quote passages from his Ecclesiastical Polity to
prove that my characterization of his legal theory is correct.
The following passage shows what his legal theory is about, and
it also contains his definition of a law:
All things that are have some operation not violent
of casuall. Neither doth any thing ever begin to
exercise the same without some foreconceaved ende for
which it worketh. And the ende which it worketh for
is not obteined, unlesse the worke be also fit to
obteine it by. For unto every ende every operation
will not serve. That which doth assigne unto each
thing the kinde, that which doth moderate the force
and power, that which doth appoint the forme and
measure of working, the same we tearme a 1!!!. So
that no certaine end could ever be attained, unlesse
the actions whereby it is attained were regular, that
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is to say, made suteab1e fit and correspondent unto
their end, by some canon, rule or 1awe. Which
thing doth take place in the workes even of God
himse1fe. (Quoted from The Folger Library Edition
of the Works of Richard Hooker, Vol. 1, ed. G.
Edelen (London/Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap
Press of Harvard Univ. 1977), Bk. 1, Ch. 2. 1.).
Hooker goes on to remark: God works according to a law, while
the "being of God is a kinde of lawe to his working" at the
same time. All "other things are "subject" to "some
superiours" (.illi., 1. 2. 2). The subordination of one kind
of beings to another kind, which is mentioned here, is not
important. For a law is not the command which a superior
issues to an inferior being.
Hooker rejects the view, held by lithe learned", that God has
"set downe" an eternal law "as expedient to be kept by all his
creatures". In his view, God "hath eterna1lie purposed
himselfe in all his works to observe" an "order" (1. 3. 1).
God, in other words, sets a law and operates according to it,
in order to accomplish ~ work. Hooker refuses to confine
"the name of Lawe unto that only rule of working which superior
authority imp~h". "We", says Hooker, "somewhat more
enlarging the sense thereof, terme any kind of rule or canon
whereby actions are framed a 1aw" (1. 3. 1).
Hooker does not endorse the "superior will" theory of
obligation. His discussion of "obligation" itself is very
cursory. "Lawes do not only teach what is good but they
injoyne it, they have in them a certain constreining force"
(1. 10. 7). Hooker tries to explain this constraining force,
or the obligatory force, in terms of "the lawfull power of
making Lawes" (1. 10. 8). But this explanation itself takes
place where he discusses the laws of political societies, and
he is not very interested in explaining why the law God made is
binding on men.
30. ed. Norman
31. See Mill's essay on "Nature", which is a part of his Three
Essays on Religion (1874). Collected Works of John Stuart Mill,
Vol. X, ed. -F. E. L. Priestley (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1969), pp. 373ff. Hill says: it is "idle" to "exhort
people to do what they cannot avoid .1oing", while it is "absurd"
to "prescribe as a rule of right conduct what agrees exactly
as well with wrong" (ibid., p, 379).
To disentagle Mill's compressed remark: First,.we can break
prescriptive laws voluntarily and thereby incur punishment,
whereas we cannot break physical laws voluntarilyo Secondly,
prescriptive laws prescribe the difference between right and
wrong to men, whereas physical laws describe what happens
regularly in nature. These are simple, valid points.
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32. I should like to indicate here that Locke's idea of "being
left free" - the idea of negative freedom - is connected
with pis notion of a law-maker as having a greater causal
power. In 1660, Locke wrote: the magistrate ought to consider
the consequences of "those things which God hath left free
before he determine them by his public degreestl, and the
subject ought to consider the consequences of tlthose things
which the magistrate hath left free before he determine them
by his private resolutiontl• Then, says Locke, all men's
"motionstl would be confined "within their own sphere".
(Quoted from F. Tract, 156.) Here the expression "left free"
means the absence of the causal power, of a superior law-maker.
33. Although Locke combines a non-normative liberty with a law,
he 'retains the view thatit is a species of the non-normative
liberty. Among 20th-century libertarians, however, a more
vulgar type of confusion can be found. A power, or an ability,
to 'do what one wills is identified with "a rf.ght" without any"
qualification. See my comment on Murray. Rothbard in Appendix 3,
note 11. Rothbard holds that a man's "command over his body
and actions" is "his natural ownership" (quoted in note
Appendix 3, note 11). "A law" is not even hinted at! For
another libertarian attempt to conflate a right of property
with an ability to move one's body, see Samuel ~eeler III,
"Natural Property Rights as Body Rights". Nous,14 (1980),
pp. 171-93.
I
34. G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, abridged ed.,
trans. P. Remnant & J. Bennett (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1982),
p. 384.
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"Locke's Auffassung urn so wichtiger, da er
der classische Ausdruck der Rechtsvorstellungen
der burgerlichen Gesellschaft im Gegensatz
zur feudalen und seine Philosophie uberdiess
der ganzen spatren englischen oekonomie zur
Grundlage aller ihrer Vorstellungen diente."
(Karl Marx, MEGA, II, 3. 6; S. 2120.)
("Locke's view is all the more important because
it was the classical expression of bourgeois society's
ideas of right as against feudal society, and moreover
his philosophy served as the basis for all the ideas
of the whole of subsequent English political economy."
(Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part I.
trans. E. Burns.)
The discussion in this chapter is not intended to be comprehensive.
Nor is it intended to be balanced. A full~scale critical .ssessment of
Locke's liberalism would require a separate work, and a balanced
Judgement would be valuable only if we had passed imbalanced judgements.
What I am going to say in this chapter is merely an introduction to a
comprehens~ve critical work on classical liberalism which I intend to
produce in the future.
I shall offer a simpLe criticism of Locke's liberal political
theory on the basis of the interpretation I have p~esented in CHAPTER 1.
There are many ways in which we can criticize his liberal political
theory. But the best way to criticize it is to attack its basis, i.e.,
his account of appropriation, and see what happens to its political
superstructure. In CHAPTER 1, I have shown in detail that Locke's
account of appropriati~n is a~. Isn't this a powerful criticism?
Let us see.
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PARr 1. A Disintegration of Locke's Myth of Appropriation
He "only did what philosophers are in the habit
of doing - he adopted a popular prejudice and
exaggerated it". (Nietzsche)1
1. 1 Introduction: A Confused Explanation and-Exaggerated Beliefs
In expounding Locke's account of appropriation, I have
emphasized that it is a myth which conflates facts and norms on the
one hand, and the· remote past and the 17th century on the other hand.
(See pp. 28ff. & 77ff. above.) I have drawn attention to the mythical
features of Locke's account in order to explain what he wrote. But I
have also indicated that one kind of criticism can immediately arise
from my exposition. This is a straightforward criticism that Locke's
account of appropriation is intellectually obscure. Would any schoolboy
pass an examination if he conflated the remote past and the present
in the manner of Locke? No, unless the examination is an exercise in
cr.eative w~iting. Could a man claim that he has "explained" the or}_gin
of property "mare clearly" than anyone else did before him, while he deceives
us into believing that what ought to have happened actually happened?
No, unless we abolish the dis~tian between a belief and an explanation.
We must give a firm and resounding "no" to these questions, and free
ourselves from the illusion that Locke's account of appropriation is
an intellectually respectable account. To repeat, it is an intellectually
obscure account of appropriation. This is the criticism which immediately
springs from my exposition of Locke.
Nevertheless, Locke articulates his beliefs, his century's
beliefs, and some of our century's beliefs about property very powerfully.
Harold Laski once remarked that in offering an account of property,
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Locke repeats "his century's insistence that a man's effort shall not
be without its reward".2 This remark~ true as it is, somewhat under-
estimates Locke's status as an articulator of modern popular beliefs.
Fox Bourne~ a Victorian biographer of Locke, estimates his contribution
as follows: "Locke propounded his very simple and incontrovertible
doctrine that the right of property consists in labour and that alone
•••• It was a discovery almost as simple, and almost as evident when
once stated, as Newton's discovery of the law of gravitation." (Bourne,
Life, II, 173.) Bourne is certainly wrong in interpreting Locke as
claiming that labo~r iL.the .n1y ground of the right of property.
Nevertheless, he is quite right in pointing out the simplicity and clarity
of Locke's account. As a statement of beliefs a~out how property ought
to be acquired, Locke's account is simple,clear, and persuasive. For
who would deny that property ought to be acquired by one's honest labour
rather than by one's dubious investment? And isn't it obviously wrong to take
what another man has earned by his hard work? Locke's account of
appropriation not only fascinated the Victorian Quaker; it also lingers
3on as a popular tradition today. There is no doubt that Locke is one
of the greatest articulators of modern popular beliefs about the acquisition
4of property.
Thus Locke's account of appropriation is at once an intellectually
confused explanation and a powerful expression of modern popular beliefs.
This is not surprising. For in Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise, Locke
seized upon popular beliefs and exaggerated them. Any exaggeration is
at once an intellectually confused explanation and a powerful expression
of beliefs. By his "exaggeration", I mean that Locke projected prominent
features of the 17th-century world of labour, property and commerce to
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a world of the distant past, and mixed what ought to happen with what
actually happened. In short, he exaggerated his beliefs and tried to
persuade us (obliquely) that men's possessions in the 17th century
were the legitimate possessions which they, and their ancestors, had
acquired by their labour, commerce and natural inheritance. In the
beginning of the world, men acted like Robinson Crusoes; then in the
successive period of growing commerce, men acted like those "thriving
and industrious" men in 17th-century England; and finally, 17th-century
Englishmen have acquired their present possessions by the legitimate
methods of labour, commerce and natural inheritance. By putting Locke's
account in this manner, we can see it as a gross distortion of the past.
But since his account also expresses some of our beliefs aboat what
ought to happen, we fail to detect the monstrosity of his distortion.
-,
In order to criticize Locke's account of appropriation, we
must treat it as something criticizable. The story which conflates
what happened and what ought to happen cannot be criticized ..unless we
treat it as something other than a story. A myth, gua myth, cannot be
criticized. I shall treat Locke's account of appropriation as a historical
account. !' shall then show that it is a defective historical account.
This is the criticism I shall launch in Sect. 1. 2 beiow.
1. 2 Locke's Ideological Distortion of History
Locke attempts to establish the legitimacy of men's possessions,
on the ground that those possessions are likely to have arisen in a
legitimate manner. If the process of appropriation which he portrays
in Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise had not actually taken place, then
men's possessions - their current possessions - would lose their justificatory
basis. Locke must rely on history. But his account of appropriation
quickly disintegrates if we treat it as a historical account.
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Some academic philosophers might wonder whether history
is in any way relevant to Locke's enterpriseo They might ask:
Isn't Locke trying to justify the right of property rather than
explain, or describe, how men actually acquired property? This is a
tedious "philosophical" response, and I have already provided a detailed
answer to this in CHAPTER 1. To repeat: Locke is trying to "justify"
the right of property (i.e., men's exclusive rights of disposal over
their current possessions) by showing that they have actually acquired
their possessions by a legitimate method. A historical objection is
certainly .re1evant. It is not only relevant but also fatal. If the
actual course of history diverges from Locke's quasi-history, then he
cannot establish the legitimacy of men's current (i. e., 17th-century)
possessions. But the antecedent of this sentence is certainly true.
I have said "Locke's quasi-history," and any "quasi-history" by definition
is different from history. Hence, Locke cannot possibly establish the
legitimacy of men's current possessions.
What I have said above rest,s on the..assumption that Locke's
account of appropriation is a quasi-history. This assumption is sound.
But let us be specific, and take a look at the real history of appro-
priation. Every student of economic history, unless he is too lazy or
brainwashed by bourgeois historians, knows what is called "primitive
accumulation". It is a forcible expropriation of agricultural producers
from the soil. "The history of this expropriation", says Karl Marx,
-assumes different aspects· in different countries. But in England alone,
it shows "the classic form".5 1n &ogland, this expropriation began
in the late 15th century, and continued until the early lath century.
It culminated in the Highlands of Scotland ("dearing of estates").
Locke' 5 account 0·£ appropriation makes no mention of the violent
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methods which were used to drive peasants out of their land, ioeo, the
land they cultivated. Locke's independent peasants (or "the yeomanry")
peacefully carve their portions, and work diligently without spoiling
their produce. Clea:dy. his account, is one-sided. It excludes the
disast~ous aspect of the 17th-century economic life from view. Marx
is one of the honest historians who described how the expropriation of
agricultural producers had taken place. He made an appropriate remark:
"In actual history it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery,
murder, briefly force, play the great part. In the tender annals of
Political Economy, the idyllic reigns from time immemorial. Right
and "labour" were from all time the sole means of enrichment.,,6
Whether we accept Marx's economic theory or not~ his economic history is
certainly valuable. Locke's account of appropriation is the first of
"the tender annals of Political Economy". It conceals harsh historical
realities. Hard-working, honest peasants!!!! forcibly expropriated,
before Locke concocted a fair~tale which abstractly refers to
the enclosure of the common land.
The ideological function of Locke's account of appropriation
has not attracted much attention from recent commentators.7 But obviously,
an account like his serves to cover up the fact that vast tracts of
North America were violently taken from the American Indians. Locke
knows very well what are the driving forces of modern history - labour,
privately-owned land, and commerce. He depicts the history of the world
from the side of those active forces, and never sees the world from the
aide of those who we.a expropriated. Hi~ account of appropriation
works as a powerful ideological drug, because it is abstract rather
than concrete. God gave the world in common for their benefit and
the greatest conveniences of their life, so "it cannot be supposed
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he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated". He "gave
it to the use of the Industrious and Rational" "not to the Fancy or
Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious". "He that had as good
left for his Improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain"
<§!, 34). As a general remark, this sounds like a morally sensible
claim. Yet who are those "Quarrelsom and Contentious" people? Who
complain that there is no land for "improvement"? It is fairly clear
that Locke is alluding to those dispossessed peasants and preachers
who loudly protested against the violent method of enclosure - the
method which supporters of enclosure justified on the ground of
. 8"improvement". I do not intend tocri ticize Locke for insinuating
the objectionable view. It is not very wise to base our criticism on
one or two criminal allusions. But my point is that the abstract,
idealized picture of appropriation which Locke presents i~ Chap. 5 of
the Second Treatise conceals the real violence and injustice that
took place in the past. The events he portrays in Chap. 5 are not
concrete historical events; they are abstract events that take place
in an undatable, remote, 17th-century-like past. They are, in short,
the chimeras of Locke's brain. They are the products of ~is exaggeration.
We must reject them on historical grounds. We shall not let his
chimeras ~le. Let us always remain good empiricists as Locke officially
taught!
I have raised only one historical objection (other than the'.
case of American Indians), and developed it into a critique of Locke's
ideology. We might raise more historical objections by presenting various
communal forms of ownership that existed in different parts of the world.
Those objections would effectively show how artificial and one-sided
Locke's account of appropriation is. But let us take a closer look at
338
the history of the expropriation of the agricultural population. We
should take a look at concrete details of this history, in order to
emancipate ourselves from Locke's ideologically distorted picture of
appropriation. This history is a prelude to the emergence of a
free-market economy. But according to Locke's idealized account,
a free market emerges out of the prior primitive economy of independent
peasants without. any foxcible expropriation of the peasants. If we over-
concentrate on his distorted account in order to discuss his abstract
claims and "arguments", we are likely to become victims of his ideology.
In fact, quite a few philosophers and political theorists remain addicted
to Locke's idyllic picture of appropriation. They cannot turn away
from it. We must put an end to this sort of philosophical disease.
To do this, we shall stop thinking for a while and start 100kiUi at
what happened. Marx offers us invaluable help. He gives a reliable account
of the expropriation of the agricultural producers, and the consequent
"bloody legislation" against vagabonds, beggars, sad paupers. My purpose
here is not to provide a detailed economic history of expropriation, in
modern England, but to look at a ·few concrete events in order to put
an end to our addiction to Locke's ideological drug. I shall
use Marx to look at a few concrete events, and try to bring about a
Vittgensteinian effect. It should be noted that Marx's historical
account of this matter, unlike many other theoretical claims of his,
has never been seriBualy- dispu tad.
In the last third of the 15th, and the first decade of the
16th century, a mass of free proletarians was hurled on the labour-
market by "the breaking-up of the bands of feudal retainers".9 The rise
of absolute monarchy quickened the dissolution of these bands of retainers,
but "the great feudal lords created an incomparably larger proletariat
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by the forcible driving of the peasantry from the land, to which
the latter had the same feudal right as the lord himself, and by the
usurpation of the common lands". The rapid rise of Flemish wool
manufacturing, and the corresponding rise in the price of wool in England,
"gave the direct impulse to these evictions". The new nobility trans-
formed arable land into sheep-walks for the sake of profit. This is
the first enclosure of the late 15th c~Qtury and the 16th centu~y. Thomas
More made it very famous. The dwellings· o.f the peasants and the
cottages of the labourers were razed to the ground or doomed to decay.
In the words of 'nlomas More: "your shepe that were wont to be so meke
and tame, and so smal eaters, now, as I heare saye, be become so great
devourers and so wylde that they eate up, and swallow downe, the very
men themselfes." Francis Bacon observed the effect of the enclosure:
"Inclosures at that time (1489) began to be more frequent, whereby
arable land •••was turned into pasture •••; and tenancies for years,
lives, and at will (whereupon much of the yeomanry lived) were turned
into demesnes. This bred a decay of people, and (by consequence) a
decay of towns, churches, tithes, and the like." The process of
forcible expropriation received in the 16th century "a new and frightful
impulse from the Reformation, and from the consequent colossal spoliation
of the church property". The estates of the church were given away,
or sold at a nominal price, to "speculating farmers and citizens, who
drove out, en masse, the hereditary sub-tenants and threw their holdings
into one". The poor had a legally guaranteed property in a part of
the church's tithes, but this was tacitly confiscated.
Now this process of expropriation, which took place in the
end of the 15th century and the whole of the 16th century, was accompanied
by a series of legislative measures against the expropriated. Those
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men who were suddenly dragged from their customary mode of life could
not quickly adjust themselves to the discipline of their new condition.
The nascent manufacturing industry could not absorb them quickly. "They
were turned en masse into beggars, robbers, vagabonds, partly from
inclination, in most cases from stress of circumstances ....10 A brief
look at the laws against vagabondage 1:'ev!alsthe'fate ..of .those agricultural
peop1a who had been forcibly expropriated from the soil. Those laws
treated vagabonds and paupers as "voluntary" criminals, and assumed
that "it depended on their own good will to go on working under the
old conditions that no longer existed". The law under the reign of
Henry VII (1530) stipulated that beggars old and unable to work
ought to receive a beggar's licence, and that sturdy vagabonds are to
be tied to the cart-tail and whipped until the blood streams from their
bodies. They are to swear an oath to go back to their birthplace,or
to where they have lived the last three years) and to "put themselves
to labour". A statute of the first year of the reign of Edward VI
(1547) ordains that if anyone refuses to work, he shall be condemned
as a slave to the person who has denounced him as an idler. The master
has a right to force his slave to do any work, no matter how disgusting,
with whip and chains.. A law under the reign of Elizabeth (1572) states
that unlicensed beggars above 14 years of age are to be severely flogged
and branded on the left ear unless someone will take them into service
for two years. If they are over 18 and repeat the offence three times,
they are to be executed without mercy. Thus "the agricultural people,
first forcibly expropriated from the soil, driven from their homes,
turned into vagabonds, and then whipped, branded, tortured by laws
grotesquely terrible, into the discipline necessary for the wage system".
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This is the short history of expropriation in the late 15th
and 16th century. Let us now take a quick look at the 17th century,
Locke's own century. Here I shall make use of R. H. Tawney's history.l1
Enclosures in the 17th century proceeded primarily for the sake of
grain rather than wool. Peasants were expropriated for the purpose
of efficient agriculture or high productivity. Depopulation and pauperism
were burning is~ues. The Levellers issued a petition: "you would have
laid open all enclosures of fens and other commons, or have them enclosed
only or chiefly for the benefit of the pooro" Winstanley expressed
his theoretical communism. In several Midland counties "the peasants
rose to pull down the hated hedges. At Leicester, where in 1649 there
were rumours of a popular movement to throw down the enclosures of the
neighbouring forest, the City Council took the matter up. A petition
was drafted, setting out the economic and social evils attending enclosure,
and proposing the establishment of machinery to check ito" In the latter
half of the 17th century, however, the pro-enclosure trend became strong,
and it discredited the prevention of enclosure and the policy of protecting
the peasants as "the programme of a sect of religious and poli tical
radicals". In 1656 Major-General Whalley introduced a measure to
regulate and restrict the enclosure of commons. There "was an instant
outcry from members that it would 'destroy property', and the bill was
refused a second reading". In 1656 Joseph Lee wrote A Vindication of
a Regulated Enclosure, and expressed the view that the pursuit of
economic self-interest within an enclosed tract of land leads to
"the advantage of the public". Pro-enclosure pamphleteers of the 17th
century resemble the pro-privatization propagandists of the 1980'5 in
that they defended enclosures on the ground of productivity, and believed
in the pre-established harmony of the private interest and the public
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interest. 17th-century defenders of privatization also resemble our
20th-century defenders in taking a simple-minded approach to social
problems - unemployment and pauperizationo Like our 20th-century
defenders, they repeated certain quasi-religious slogans about the
idleness of the poor, and were determined to punish criminals as severely
as possible. In 1649, Parliament passed an Act for the relief and
employment of the poor and the punishment of beggars. As Tawney reports,
a company was to be established under this Act "with power to apprehend
vagrants, to offer them the choice between work and whipping, and to
set to compulsory labour all other poor persons, including children,
without means of maintenance". The expropriated were forced to choose
between two-hideous alternatives.
Having seen the grotesque history of expropriation from the
late 15th century to the 17th century, we shall now return to Locke's
account of appropriation. In short, it is a grotesquely one-sided
account of appropriation. Historically speaking, the appropriation
of land proceeded side by side with the expropriation of people. Locke
focuses on the process of !£-propriation, i. e., the process of annexing
pr fixing something of one's own to a portion'of the external world.
And he ignores the process of ~-propriation, i._e., the process of
dispossessing another man, or d~iving him~. How could he ignore
this process of expropriation? Did he not know that enclosures were
causing social unrest in one part of the community and economic prosperity
in another part? He certainly knew it. He simply thought that enclosures
could be justified on the ground of productivity and. commercial growth~
and refused to say anything specific about the expropriation, depopulation,
and pauperization. Here is Locke's unambiguous argument for agrarian
enclosure: "he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does
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not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind. For the provisions
serving to the support of humane life, produced by one acre of inclosed
and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more,
than those which are yeilded by an acre of Land, of an equal richnesse,
lyeing wast in common." (g,37.) This argument echoes Joseph Lee's
view that private property brings benefits LO the-publico Like other
pro-enclosure pamphleteers, Locke qualifies his support for enclosures
in a lukewarm manner: "no one can inclose or appropriate any part [of
the common land in England] without the consent of all his Fellow-
Commoners," and "after such inclosure, [there] would not be as good
[land left] to the rest of the Commoners" (35). These statements
should be taken to mean that enclosures in a political society ought
to proceed with parliamentary approval, and somewhat moderately to
avoid injury. His basic position is: privatize and let commercial
agricul ture flourish! As for the so-called "social cos t", Locke
merely gestures toward "the Quarrelsom and Contentious". He says that
there was little room "for Quarrels or Contentions about Property"
tn the beginning of the world (31, 39, 51). We might say that his
remark on the beginning of the world is irrelevant to the trouble of
17th-century England. But Locke is suggesting here that there are
many quarrels and contentions about property in England. By contrast, there
was little room for them in the remote past. He simply avoids commenting
on specific problems of enclosures. Instead, he deliberately transports
men to the remote past and to the American Continent, and shows that
men could appropriate the world without injuring - a fortiori, without
dispossessing - other men. "America" i$ an important device for Locke;
since there was plenty of land and (depite American Indians) it was
possible for men to acquire property without dispossessing others.
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But never mind! Locke's chief task is to establish the legitimacy of
landed property in 17th-century England, rather than landed property
in 17th-century America or in the world which existed in the beginning.
Locke uses curious theoretical entitieso They are half historical
and. half imaginary. The world God gave to mankind "in common" is sometimes
17th-century America, and sometimes the common land in England, and
sometimes a more abstract entity. Independent peasants in the beginning
of the world look like yeomen in 17th-century England, though they
are supposed to live in the world like 17th-century America. All sorts
of images can be found in Locke's account of appropriation. Well,
he may use various kinds of curious theoretical entities to write a
story and please small children in America. .The story ~f appropriation
similar to Locke's is found in ~e Reader's Digest from time to time~
So his story would please adults in a dentist's waiting room, too. y!!
he cannot possibly establish the legitimacy of 17th-century Englishmen's
possessions by his story. The reason is simple. The process of
appropriation which took place in modern history is quite different from
what Locke's story leads us to believe, and his justification of men's
possessions in 17th-century England rests on the historicity of the
events he describes.
I should like to conclude my discussion of Locke's ideological
distortion by making two additional remarks. First, I shall not deny
that Locke's account might plausibly establish the legitimac~ of a part of
17th-century men's possessions. Despite its ideological distortion,
his account is based on the observation of the active side of 17th-century
Inglish economy. .Quite a few active men acquired their possessions
by their labour, and expanded them by means of commerce. It would be
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foolish to deny this economic fact. The problem with Locke is that
he seized upon this active side of 17th-century English economy and
exaggerated it, while he completely ignored the dark side of the same
economy. But he might try to defend a weaker claim. He might claim
that at least a part of men's possessions in 17th-century England
are legitimate because they have been acquired by their labour and
voluntary exchange. To defend this claim, Locke must first show
why men's possessions can be legitimized by their labour and voluntary
exchange. He must then point out that quite a few men did in fact
acquire their possessions by their labour or voluntary exchange, and
that their acquisition was not directly linked with the injury another
man had received (above all, the expropriation of another man). This
line of defence is open to Locke, and he might plausibly establish the
legitimacy of a portion of 17th-century men's possessions. I say "plausibly"
because it is imPossible to specify which portion of their possessions
are legitimate or which portion illegitimate. What I have attacked
above is Locke's attempt to justify the whole of men's possessions in
17th-century England on the ground of their labour and voluntary
exchange. Unless we are very dishonest or deeply deceived, we cannot
make an attempt of this sort.
Secondly, I should like to make additional remarks on the
one-sidedness of Locke's account of appropriation. I have said that
it is one-sided because it excludes the concomitant process of ex-
propriation. There are other kinds of one-sidedness. For instance,
Locke asks where men's properties come from, and answers that they
come from men's "industry" or industriousness. But he never asks where
those industrious men come from. Likewise, he never asks where lazy
, f ( h h " t t' "rascals come rom or were t.ose con en ~ous and quarrelsome people
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COlll€ from). Locke takes industriousness or idleness as the end-point
of his explanation, and produces a sermon-like explanation which lacks
explanatory power. This one-sidedness is nowhere more evident in his
proposal of a new Poor Law of England. As a commissioner of trade
and plantations, Locke wrote a proposal to reform the Elizabethan
Poor Law. Just like other 17th-century proposals, his proposal is
an appalling pre-Dickensian document. In the beginning of the proposal,
Locke states that growing pauperism has nothing to do with a "scarcity
of provisions" or the "want of employment for the poor". It is solely
caused by "the relaxation of discipline and corruption of manners;
virtue and industry being as constant companions on the one side as
vice and idleness are on the other" (Bourne, Life, II, 378). This
statement, one might say, is a characteristically Puritan statement
in the latter half of the 17th century. But it clearly represents
the one-sided, sermon-like quality of Locke's explanation. In his
proposal, he harshly condemns "idle vagabonds" without offering even
a rudimentary account of the genesis of those idle vagabonds. This
self-deceptive procedure has a counterpart in Chap. 5 of the Second
Treatise. There Locke highly praises rational and industrious appropriators,
without paying any attention to the process of expropriation by which
idle vagabonds came into being.
One-sidedness is a feature of all ideological distortions.
The one-sidedness of Locke's account of appropriation is not merely an
academic matter. In order to give up his ideological drug, we must
see the point where Locke's ideological distortion of history turns
into an otfscenel.yr.i.ghteous at t itude , Here I use a str.ong expression,
because I believe we ~ give up his ideological drug. Locke's
one-sided account of appropriation turns into his ooscene
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.righteousness, .w.ben he dtscus'ses "the more effectual [method] of rescreInLng
idle vagabonds" (Locke's proposed reform of the Poor Law; Bourne, Life,
II, 379). What are the proper measures of punishment- the measures
which would properly restrain the corrupt manners of beggars? Locke
"humbly propose (s]" the following:
all men begging in maritime counties without passes, that are
maimed or above fifty years of age, and all of any age so begging
without passes in inland counties nowhere bordering on the sea,
shall be sent to the next house of correction, there to be kept
at hard labour for three years. •
• II ••
whoever shall counterfeit a pass shall lose his ears for the
forgery the first time that he is found guilty thereof, and
the second time that he shall be transported to the plantations,
as in case :0£ felony.
II •••
if any body or girl, under fourteen years of age, shall be found
begging out of the parish where they dwell ••• , they shall be
sent to the next working school, there to be soundly whipped
and kept at work till evening, so that they may be dismissed
time enough to get to their place of abode that night.
(Quoted from Bourne, ~, II, 380f.;
emphasis added.)
The severe measures of punishment which Locke proposes should not surprise
us. Punishment was harsh in the 17th century. And the quoted statements
are consistent with Locke's definition of "political power"· in the Second
Treatise, i.e., "a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and
consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of
Property" <E, 3). We should assess these statements about punishment
in a historical context. Locke was proposing the measures of punishment
which were practical in a specific historical context •. Nevertheless,
we must understand that Locke's "humble" proposal - the proposal which
he proudly undertook to write - supports, and is. supported by, the
kind of one-sided account of appropriation which he presents in the
Second Treatise. He might not have· proposed such harsh measures of
punishment, if he hac!'freed l:!imseH from ·the chimerica1 belief that
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appropriation proceeded without expropriation. Locke's humble proposal
of the harsh measures against idle vagabonds and his self-congratulatory
account of appropriation are the two sides of a distorted picture of
17th-century economic society. I am certainly_aware that strict measures
~f punishment had to be introduced to combat the growing pauperism of
the late 17th century. But I find it deeply disturbing - and disgusting,
at bottom - that Locke discussed the problem of punis~ment under the
illusion that property in 17th-century England had arisen without the
expropriation of people.
Locke's account of appropriation is a bold attempt to express
this illusion, the illusion of the modern epoch. Was he a cunning
theorist? No, not at all,. Clearly, he needed this illusion to defend
a violence-free economic society of .property-owners against arbitrary
government •. Unless men's possessions in 17th-century England are shown
to be legitimate independently of any political authority, the supreme
political agent may handle their. possessions arbitrarily. This is why
Locke tried to establish the pre-political legitimacy of men's possessions.·
In trying to establish this legitimacy, he placed himself under the
illusion that those possessions arose legitimately without the expropriation of
people. Without this illusion, he could no~ claim that the state ought
to administer justice to protect one man's ).egitimate, present pos·sessions
- his property - against.:.the.v1.olenceof other men. Locke's claim about
the state's administration of justice is opposed to arbitrary government,
and this claim required him to remain under the illusion. I shall later
show that there- is a way. in which we can -defend his claim about the
state's obligatiGu of justice without holding on to his illusion. So
let us emancipate Locke and ourselves from the illusory, idyllic picture
of appropriation.
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Locke's liberalism, as it stands, rests on the self-deceptive
belief that men's current possessions are the consequence of the
legitimate acquisition and exchange of goods in the past. Our historical
objections can remove this self-deceptive belief. Once this belief is
removed, two important consequences follow. First, we can no longer
enjoy Locke's account of appropriation as a story. We will either
discard it in toto or reconstruct a pure normative theory of property
acquisition out of the original story. In recent years, several
English-speaking philosophers have attempted to construct a pure normative
theory (what is known as a justificatory theory). (See my discussion in
CHAPTER 2, Sect. 1. 2.) Since Locke powerfully expressed the beliefs
of the modern age of which we ate still a part, some such normative
theory might be constructed to confirm our beliefs. I do not think
that this sort of reconstruction is an intellectually healthy exercise.
But at any rate, the point is that this sort of reconstruction ("justifi-
catory arguments", etc.) takes place only after Locke's original myth
of appropriation has disintegrated. Now the second important consequence
which follows from our historical objections and the removal of the
self-deceptive belief is the following: Locke's theory of the state
disintegrates. With the erosion of the economic basis, Locke's
political superstructure also begins to crumble.
in PART 2.
We shall see this
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PART 2. A Disintegration of Locke's Theory of the State
"Why, then, to this other question: What is property?
may I not likewi se answer, It is robbery ......
(P. J. Proudhon, What is Property? Chap. 1.)
"[:r]heir first difficulty ••• is how to separate their
possessions, and assign to each his particular portion,
which he must for the future inalterably enjoy. This
difficulty will not detain them long; but it must
immediately occur, as the most natural expedient, that
everyone continue to enjoy what he is at present
master of, and that property or constant possession
be conjoin'd to the immediate possession. Such is the
effect of custom ...... (David Hume, 'I:HN,III, ii, 3,
503.) -
"Wherever there is great property, there is great
inequality. For one very rich man, there must be
at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the
few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence
of the rich excites the indignation of the poor ••••
It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate
that the owner of that valuable property, which is
acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of
many successive generations, can sleep a single night
in security.
Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the
security of property, is in reality instituted for the
defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have
have some property against those who have none at all."
(Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Bk V, Ch I, Pt II,
The Canan ed., pp. 670 & 674.)
Let us suppose that we provided Locke with abundant historical
evidence, and made him see that he had been deceived by the chimera
of his own brain. He must admit that a sizeable portion of 17th-century
landed property is based on the robbery, violence, and injustice of
the past. He may still be able to justify a part of 17th-century
men's possessions on the grounds of their labour, commercial exchange,
and natural inheritance. But he cannot possibly justify the whole of
their possessions on the same grounds. We have restored the virtue
of honesty to Locke by making use of his favourite principle of
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empiricism. Only a part of 17th-century men's possessions are
"legitimate" by the natural criteria of legitimacy Locke uses; namely,
the criteria of labour, voluntary exchange (including the use of money
and the performance of a contract) and inheritance. Only a part of
their possessions are to be called their "property" in the proper,
de jure sense of the word. The rest of their possessions may be
called "improperty". Some theorists deliberately call this "improperty"
"property". Proudhon is a good example. He calls "improperty" "prop-
erty", and then offers that famous proposi tion which is at once
shocking and tautological: property is theft.
Once we remove Locke's chimerical belief, then w@ have
to revise his own statement of the purpose of the formation of a
political society. There seem to be at least two ways in which we can
revise his statement. First, since men form a political society for
the purpose of the effective protection of their exclusive rights, we
shall state that their purpose is to protect their lives, liberties,
and only those possessions which they and their ancestors have acquired
and ex~hangect legitimately. Men's "improperties" - the sizeable portion
of their current possessions which arose out of the robbery, violence,
fraud, and murder of the past - would have to be redistributed to
numerous injured parties so that the natural or ideal criteria of legitimacy
would be perfectly satisfied. Their illegitimate possessions would
have to be redistributed to bring about the naturally just pattern
of distribution. Locke's liberalism, thus revised, may be called
a priori liberalism. The nomenclature "a priori liberalism" is mine,
and the name suggests that this is a liberal analogue of a priori
socialism (or utopian socialism). It is difficult to find a sincere
supporter of a priori liberalism, and Locke certainly does not defend
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this utopian position. But this is a theoretically possible position.
It might be defended after Locke's chimerical belief has been removed.
Robert Nozick is a recent defender of a priori liberalism. I shall
quote what h~ says in order to illustrate this utopian position:
The existence of past injustice ••• raises the third
major topic under justice in holding. If past injustice
has shaped present holdings in various ways, some
identifiable and some not, what now, if anything, ought
to be done to rectify these injustices? Idealizing
greatly, let us suppose theoretical investigation will
produce a principle of rectification. This principle
uses historical information about previous situations
and injustices done in them ••• and information about
the actual course of events that flowed from these
injustices, until the present, and it yields a
description (or descriptions) of holdings in the society.
The principle of rectification presumably will make use of
of subjunctive information about what would have occurred
(or a probability distribution over what might have occurred,
using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken
place. If the actual description of holdings turns out
not to be one of the descriptions yielded by the principle,
then one of the descriptions yielded must be realized.12
Shall we revise Locke's liberalism into this type of a priori liberalism?
This a priori liberal position is hopelessly impractical, and to take
this posi tion would mean to move from Locke's chimerical fusion of "j.s"
and "ought" to an armchair theorist's chimerical belief about "subjunctive
information" ("a probability distribution", etc.). As Locke himself
remarked long ago in one of his papers, in "civil society one man's
good is involved and complicated with another's" (King, Life, II, 114).
Anyone who reads Mandeville and Hume can understand that justice and
injustice, virtue and vice, etc. are inextricably linked 1n a civil
society. Nozick confesses that he is "idealizing greatly". Indeed,
he is idealizing greatly! He knows at bottom that his proposal is
impractical. He actually gives !!.£ "principle of rectification". He
even says: "I do not know of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated
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treatment of ••• issuesn about the rectification of past injustices.13
The a priori liberal position is not only impractical, but illiberal
(by the criteria of classical liberalism ad~pted by Locke, Smith, Hume,
et al.). Is the state going to rectify past injustices 011 a large
scale, in order to bring about the naturally'just:pattern of distribution?
Robert Nozick may have inherited the possessions which his ancestors
had forcibly taken from American Indians. If the state were to
re-distribute the present possessions by reLy ing on the unreliable
"subjunctive information", it might have to coerce Nozick and many
others to an intolerable extent. Historically speaking, liberalism
defended men's present possessions against arbitrary government. By
this criterion, a priori .liberalism does not count as liberalism.
Of course, liberalism can change and has undergone various chang~s
since the time of Locke. But the revision which Nozick suggests
can hardly be accepted. His philosophical device and jargon serve
to cherish the dream which can never be realized, whereas he - or
anyone who plausibly talks about "rectification" without a practical
device - can comfortably enjoy the sense of moral righteousness.
In short, Nozick's a priori liberalism is an ideology which makes
him feel comfortable and puts him in the perpetual state of dec~ption.
Let us throwaway this rubbish, and consider the second possible
revision of Locke's liberalism.
The second revision is the following. Since men in Locke's
view form a political society in order to preserve their present
possessions as well as their lives and lliberties, we may restate
the purpose of a political society as follows. Men form a political
society in order to protect their lives, liberties, and present
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possessions, even if their prerent possessions have arisen from an
illegitimate process of acquisition and exchange. Locke's liberalism,
thus revised, becomes unambiguously conservative. This position
more or less corresponds to the liberalism of David Hume and Adam Smith.
Unlike Locke who boldly expresses his beliefs, Hume and Smith are
the philosophers who "observe everything" and "do nothing". They
are relatively free from the kind of deception which Locke suffers.
Hume knf'!wvery well that "there is no property in durable objects,
such as lands or houses, [which has not been] founded on fraud and
injustice" "when carefully examined" ("Of the Original Contract",
GG, I, 456). Smith knew very well, as I have quoted in the beginning
of PART 2, that wherever "there is great property, there is great
inequality". Like Locke, Hume and Smith are concerned to defend
a government of laws which protects men's current possessions.
Needless to say, constitutionalism is a conservative doctrine in the
sense that a government of laws preserves the rights and possessions
which men already enjoy. It retards any rapid change (e.g., the em~rgence
of a dictator like Hitler, or the improvement of the living conditions
of the deprived). Shall we seize upon Lock~'s constitutionalism, and
ignore what appears to be (though not what is) his defence of the
ideal rights of men, i.e., the rights men ought to have? If we do so,
then we get the view that the state ought to dispense justice for the
purpose of preserving men's present possessions, though their present
possessions may be based on the injustice, fraud, a~d violence of the
past. The state does not try to redistribute the whole of men's
"improperties" according to the independently available set of natural
criteria (as Nozick suggests). Rather, the state tries to settle,
in a piecemeal fashion, those individual disputes and complaints which
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arise out of specific historical contexts (rather than abstract
theoretical contexts invented by armchair theorists). This is
certainly Locke's view of justice. So it seems that he can revise
his liberalism in this direction. But can he really revise it?
The word "revision" is inappropriate here. What Locke must
do in order to defend his claim about the state's obligation of
justice is to abandon his account of .appropriation, and offer an
alternative account of why men have rights over their present
possessions. In other words, he can defend his theory of the state
(i.e., one haf of his liberalism) only if he abandons his account
of appropriation (i.e., the other half of his liberalism). Since
actual history is quite different from Locke's description of
appropriation in Chap. 5 of the Second Treatise, he cannot justify
men's current possessions in toto by using his account. But the
claim about the state's obligation to administer justice presupposes
men's rights. "Corrective justice" presupposes that men have rights
independently of any positive law. So Locke must offer an alternative
account of why men have rights over their current possessions, i.e.,
the possessions which are based on the injustices of the past. He
cannot simply assert that the state ought to preserve men's possessions
Py laws, though those possessions are.largely the consequence of
the rogues in the past. He must Show that despite the robber)
and violence which took place in the past, men have rights over
their current possessions, independent! y of any posi t ive law.
This is what his accou.nt of appropriation cannot explain. Hume' s
account of the Drigin of property and justice may serve as an
alternative, since it presumes that property and justice arise out
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of the violence which men do to one another's possessions. The
"rule concerning the stability of possession" (i.e., the fundamental
rule that one must abstain from another man's possessions), according to
Hume, "acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated
experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it" (!l;lli, 490).
Ultimately, "the interest of the society" justifies men's rights over
their current possessions (This "interest", or what "is" "between"
men, is not the quantifiable utility of a Benthamite kind. Hume's
"public interest" is not quantifiable. It is what 'Locke calls "the
public good", and what Aristotle and Hooker called "the common good".)
Hume also gives a psychological account of wh)·men attach the idea of
property to what they possess now, what they possessed first, or
they have possessed for a long time, etc. (See my quotation from
Hume about men's current possessions, p. 350 above.) It is possible
to use Hume's alternative account, or any other viable alternative,
to explain why men have rights over the goods whose origin is dubious
or violent. .But as I said, if we use an alternative and defend
Locke's claim about the state's obligation to administer justice, then
we must abandon one half of his liberalism - his account of appropriation.
I have considered two possible ways in which we can change
Locke's statement about the purpose of a political society. Let
us be perfectly clear about his own position. He himself does not
have to choose between a priori liberalism and the classical liberalism
of Hume and Smith. The reason, as I have ~lr('adr emphasiz€:'d,is
that he believes and leads us to believe that men's current possessions
are their "properties" by virtue of the fact that they, and their
ancestors, have acquired or exhanged legitimately.· Once this belief
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is removed, Locke's liberal political theory begins to disintegrate.
The species of liberalism I have discussed are two of the possible forms
of liberalism which emerge after it is desintegrated. Of course,
there are other forms of political thought which can be constructed
out of reinterpretations of small fragments of Locke's account of
appropriation, or his theory of the state. Anarchism and socialism
can emerge out of the earlier part of his account of appropriation9
if the part is taken in isolation and then comhined with some un-
Lockean principles of abittact, ideal· rights, or distributive
justice. Or Locke's talk about "the public good" can be reinterpreted,
and his account of appropriation may be completely ignored. Then we
will get welfare-statism. But let us not distract our attrntiDn from the
two species of liberalism. They represent the disintegration of Locke's
liberal political theory most clearly. A priori liberals claim that
the state should redistribute men's possessions in order to rectify
the injustices of the past, or to actualize the rights men ought to
have. The state ought to bring about men's ideal rights. This is, of
course, not Locke's position. He does'not discuss anything like ideal
rights (though confused commentators often treat him in this way).
Nevertheless, the ·normative strand (rather than the factual strand)
of his account of appropriation can be interpreted to express the view
that men should have rights though they actually do not have them.
Hence, Locke can be turned into an a priori liberal who defended
ideal rights (or "natural rights" in the popular, un-Lockean sense),
or the rights men ought to have. If the normative strand of his account
of appropriation 'is separated· from its factual strand, then his
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libaralisrngoes on 'to survive 'in various forms of a priori lil;>erallsm.
But Locke cannot claim that the state should actualize men's ideal
rights. His central claim of the state is that the state ought to
eliminate the mutual violation of rights among men, where their "rights"
are not the rights which they should have ideally. The state ought
to preserve the rights which men actually have in 17th-century economic
society. In short, the claim of a priori liberalism conflicts with
Locke's claim about justice. The normative strand of his account of
appropriation (i.e., the view that every man should have a ~ight to
own the goods he has mixed with by his labour, ideally speaking) conflicts
with the claim about justice which concerns men's de facto possession.
Property, taken in the de jure sense and distinguished from "improperty",
conflicts with justice. On the other hand, if Locke tries to adopt
the classical-liberal position of Hume and Smith and affirms that men's
current possessions (especially, land) are based on the violence and
roberry of the past, then he can defend 't.heclaim about justice
which concerns men's de facto possessions. But in this case, he must
(as I have said above) abandon his account of appropriation and
adopt a new account to establish the pre-political legitimacy of
men's current possessions.
What does this disintegration mean, then? Locke's classical
liberalism maintains that there is a harmony between private "property"
and public "justice". But once we remove his deceptive belief about
the identity of what ought to happen and what actually happened, this
harmony breaks down. Property, as distinct from "improperty", is
not Calways) compatible with the administration of justice < Justice,
as the preservation of existing rights, is not (always) compatible
with property in the ideal sense. In CHAPTER 1, I have shown that
Locke's myth of appropriation fuses "property" and "justice" together.
359
In this chapter, I have removed his myth. With the removal of the
mythical bond between "property" and "justice", Locke's classical
liberalism disintegrates. It disintegrates into the a priori liberalism
which defends the ideal "property" of every men, and the conservative,
classical liberalism which defends "justice", i.e., the legal protection of
men's current rights and possessions. Anyone who wants to eliminate the
myth of appropriation from Locke must choose between ideal property and
conservative justice.
NOTES to CHAPTER 4
1. Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage
Books, 1966), sect. 19, p. 25. Nietzsche's remark is about
Schopenhauer's account of the will, rather than Locke's account
of appropriation.
2. H. Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism (1936; rpt. London:
Unwin Books, 1971), p. 77.
3. See Richard Schlatter's account of the Lockean defence of
property in the 20th century. He concludes his historical
survey as follows:
4.
5.
Today the natural right theory of property, restated to
fit a complex system of co-operative production, is the
officially-recognized rule for the distribution of wealth
in those parts of the world where socialism has prevailed.
In other lands, where that theory was originally developed,
and where capitalist economic institutions predominate,
the natural right theory lingers on as a popular tradition,
but has been rejected by the more thoughtful defenders of
the existing system. ••• Nevertheless, men are still
fascinated by the theory that just ownership is based
on labour. The natural right of property is not yet a
dead idea •••• (R. Schlatter, Private Property: The History
of an Idea (1951; rpt. New York: Russell & Russell, 1973),
p. 281).
In his philosophical, reconstructive discussion of Locke's
"Labor Theory of Property Acquisition", Lawrence Becker makes
the following remark: "there is scant evidence, outside of
Locke, of any serious thinking about how it is that labour
can ent! tle anyone to anything" (Ptoperty Rights: Phi losophic
Foundations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 32).
Becker speaks of "any serious thinking" because he mistakenly
treats Locke's account of appropriation as a set of justificatory
arguments for why labour is the ground of property rights.
Nevertheless, this remark is significant. What it really shows
is that Locke possessed a rare ability to articulate the modern
belief about the connection between labour and property. Becker's
philosophical prejudice -- his analy~lcal prejudice -prevents
him from seeing this simple point. Elsewhere, however, he says
that we have "the stubborn desire ••• to make the labor theory
work" (ibid., p. 54). Thus in the end, he confesses that the
connectron-between labour and property has more to do with our
- or at least, his - pre-argumentative appetite.
Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Moore and Aveling, ed. Engels
(New York: International Publishers, 1967), Ch. XXVI, p. 716.
Ibid., p. 714.-
360
361
7. Alasdair MacIntyre is an exception among English-speaking
philosophers •. He clearly sees that any Lockean attempt to
write a quasi-history of appropriation serves to conceal
the real violence and injustice that took placev See his
critical discussion of Nozick in After Virtue (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 234.
8. For an account of enclosures and the concomitant protests,
see R. H. Tawney. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism
(Harmondsworth:Penguin Books, 1938), pp. 142-50 and pp. 253-8.
9. What 1 say in this paragraph is a summary of what Marx says
at the beginning of Capital, Vol. 1, Chap. XXVII, "Expropriation
of the Agricultural Population from the Land". All quotations
including quotations from Thomas More and Francis Bacon are
taken from Marx. See Capital (New York: International Publishers,
1967), pp. 717-21 and notes.
10. What I say in this paragraph is a summary of what Marx says
at the beginning of Capital, Vol. 1, Chap. XXVIII, "Bloody
Legislation against the Expropriated, from the End of the
15th Century. Forcing Down of Wages by Acts of Par·1iament".
Quoted phrases and sentences are Marx's. See ~., pp. 734-7.
11. In this paragraph, I make use of Tawney's account of the enclosures
and pauperism. Quoted phrases and sentences are his, and they
are found in Tawney, Ope cit., pp. 254, 256f. and 263. Needless
to say, the reference to "the pro-privatization propagantists of
the 1980's" cannot be found in Tawney's book.
12. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic
Books, 1974), pp. 152f.
13. ~., p. 152.
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A Critique of Laslett's Treatment of the Two Treatises
* An improved version of this appendix is
to appear in The Locke Newsletter, ed. Roland
Hall, No. 16 (1985).
Appendix 1 A Critique of Laslett's Treabnent of the
Two Treatises*
In this Appendix, I shall criticize Laslett's view that
the Two Treatises is a single discourse on government which Locke
wrote in response to the Exclusion Crisis and with the primary object-
ive of refuting Filmer's doctrine of absolute monarchy. Laslett
presents and defends this view in his long Introduction to the
Two Treatises. I criticize it for two reasons. First, this view
has been influential among recent Locke scholars; hence, it
1deserves careful consideration. Secondly, a criticism of this
influential view is required for a full defence of my own view of
the status of the Second Treatise. Laslett treats the Second
Treatise as a work against Filmer, and consequently fails to grant
any independent subject-matter or any independent value to it. I
hold that the Second Treatise is primarily a general treatise on
politics, and its subject-matter(s) should be understood independently
of Locke's relationship to Filmero In order to support this view,
it is necessary to reject the view which Laslett has advanced in his
Introduction.
Although I am going to be sharply critical, I should
acknowledge my indebtedness to Peter Laslett at the outset. In the
following discussion, I shall use the historical information Laslett
has provided; and I owe a part of my understanding of Locke to the
valuable information which he has provided. Though we do not know
exactly when the First Treatise and the Second Treatise were
*Twp Treatises 2£ Gover,mnent, ed , p. Laslett (2nd ed ,, 1967; rp t ,
London: C. U. P., 1970).
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composed, I take Laslett's reconstruction of the chronology of the
composition of the Two Treatises as valid for the purpose of the
following discussion. I shall not criticize his careful recon-
struction of the chronology. Instead, I shall use it to show that
Laslett follows a fallacious reasoning when he comes to put forward
his own views.
Let us first see what Laslett claims in his Introduction.
(Page numbers will be quoted from the 1967 hardbound edition.) There
are three points he makes, which concern us. First, the First
Treatise and the Second Treatise were originally conceived to form a
single discourse on government (p. 49f.). Secondly, "As early as
1679 Locke had begun a work on government, and a work with the
iIllllediateobject of refuting Filmer" (p. 59). This statement is
ambiguous, but I quote this to show that in Laslett's view, Locke's
objective of refuting Filmer is very important. Later he goes on
to say: "Locke wrote his book as a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer"
(po 67). The word "his book" refers to the Two Treatises conceived
as a single discourse on governmento As Laslett repeats later on,
"We mus t describe Two Treatises ••• as a deliberate and polemically
effective refutation of the writings of Sir Robert Filmer" (p. 75).
The third point is the following: Locke wrote a substantial
portion of the Two Treatises in 1679 and 1680, though he revised it
in 1681-3 and then in 1689. And "as a response to pol! tical and
literary circumstances, ••• Two Treatises is an Exclusion Tract, not
a Revolution Pamphlet" (p. 61). To combine the three points,
Laslett's picture of the Two Treatises emerges. It is a single
discourse on government; its primary objective is to refute Filmer's
doctrine of absolute monarchy; and a substantial portion of it was
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written in response to the Exclusion Crisis (or to counter the Tories
who had scored "a notable propaganda victory" by .republishing Filmer (p, 51»).
There are two questions I should like to discuss. First,
is the Two Treatises a single discourse whose primary objective is to
refute Filmer's doctrine of absolute monarchy? Secondly, is the ~
Treatises a response to the Exclusion Crisis in any significant
sense? These questions are distinct from the historical questions
concerning the genesis of the book. They concern the text and what
is written in it. But it is not unfair to put these questions to
Las l e t t , He unfortunately conflates the question about the genesis
of the book with the question about its contents. This conflation
is the basis of his edi-torial conments and his characterization of
what the book is about. This is why Laslett's views have been so
influential on Locke scholars.
question.
I shall start with the second
Even if a large portion of the book was composed at the
time when the Exclusion Crisis was a big political issue, and even
if Locke had an active part to play in assisting Shaftesbury, it
does not follow that the book was produced in response to the
Exclusion Crisis. Nor can we say that the book was written for
the Exclusion Crisis, or about the Exclusion Crisis. Neither the
First Treatise nor the Second Treatise makes mention of the bill to
exclude the Duke of York from the throne. Neither of them is
a book about the possibility of excluding catholic Kings from the-
throne. What we can reasonably conjecture is that Locke's act of
refuting Filmer in the First Treatise was occasioned by the growing
influence of Filmer's writings in the ideological battlefield
between the Whigs and the Tories. It is not improbable that Locke,
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like Sidney or Tyrrell, felt it necessary to refute Filmer to
serve the cause of the Whigs. But this is a question of Locke's
motive for writing the First Treatise, or a question about the
circumstance which moved him to refute Filmer's doctrine. It tells
very little about what the First Treatise is about, nor do we have
sufficient evidence to determine precisely what his motive was.
Furthermore, if we turn to the Second Treatise and compare Locke's
views on constitutional matters with the programmes of the Whig
Exclusionists, we find that Locke and the Exclusionists shared very
little in common. As John Dunn pointed out, the Whig Exclusionists
did not insist on the principle of "taxation with the consent of
the governed", because they thought there existed an effective
institutional check on the king's power to appropriate property
arbitrarily. And most important of all, Locke exempted the
"federative power" from the legislative control, whereas the Whig
Exclusionists were most anxious to control the Royal conduct of
f i 1· 2ore gn po 1CY.
Laslett's use of the label "the Exclusion Tract" was
originally intended to indicate the ~ when a large portion of the
Two Treatises was written. He established beyond any reasonable
doubt that the book was mostly written before the Glorious Revolution.
He also established that a large portion of the book was written
probably at the time of the Exclusion Crisis. Taking these two
claims to be valid, I shall discard the label "the Exclusion Tract"
as false and useless. It is false because it establishes the non-
existing link between the central issues of the Exclusion Crisis
and the main claims Locke advances in the Two Treatises. To put it
in Humean terms, the temporal contiguity of two events - the writing
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of Two Treatises and the Exclusion Crisis - deceives us into
believing that there is also a conjunction between the arguments
which arose almost simultaneously. The label is useless because by
ascribing a partisan, Whig motive to Locke, we cease to take
seriously ~ ~ says in the Two Treatises. Take, for instance,
the First Treatise. This is supposed to be the manifestation of
Locke's partisan spirit. But can we find, in the text of the First
Treatise, any narrow commitment to the small party which was led by
Shaftesbury at the end of the 17th century? I think not. On the
contrary, the First Treatise shows his commitment to God and His care
for every member of the human species. In order to break away from
the then powerful tradition of patriarchalism and attack Filmer's
doctrine of absolute monarchy, Locke appeals to God, "the sole Lord
and Proprietor of the whole World" (!I, 39), and each man's equal
membership of the human species ("the whole Species of Man") ([I,
40; 30). And the method he uses in attacking Filmer's doctrine
is predominantly an analytical method of exposing inconSistencies,
not a partisan method of exposing another man's psychology.
Throughout the First Treatise, Locke stays aloof from Filmer's
method of psychological persuasion; and without being troubled by
his motives or the influence of his writings, he frequently exposes
Filmer's "doubtful Expressions" (Preface), his habit of "hudling
several Suppositions together" or making "such a medly and
confusion" (!!" 20). Like an analytic philosopher of the present
century, Locke wields his intellectual weapon to distinguish "the
several Senses wherein his [ioe. Filmer's] words may be taken"
(!I, 20), and shows that Filmer's doctrine is either senseless or
inconsistent. These prominent features of the First Treatise
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receive no attention if we dissolve the text vaguely into the
Exclusion Crisis, and reduce Locke's thought to a motive which we,
rightly or wrongly, ascribe to him on some scanty circumstantial
evidence. At any rate, whatever motive Locke may have had in
writing the First Treatise, the ascription of one motive or another
to him does not help us understand the highly independent thought
he expresses in it.3
We now come to the first question: Is the Two Treatises
a single discourse whose primary objective is to refute Filmer's
doctrine of absolute monarchy? The answer is, simply, no. Laslett
correctly points out that Locke presents his Two Treatises as lithe
Beginning and End of a Discourse concerning Government", indicating
that they are two parts of a single continuous discourse with the
middle part lost or discarded (Preface). From this, however,
Laslett draws a false conclusion that this discourse has the primary
objective of refuting Filmer. Yet it is clear that this discourse,
which consists of the two parts, has two objectives. As the
title-page of the Two Treatises says: in the First Treatise, "The
False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, and his
Followers, are Detected and Overthrown". But the Second Treatise
is "an ESSAY concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of
Civil-Government"" Given these two descriptive titles, it is
natural for us to conclude that Locke has two distinct objectives.
First, a refutation of Filmer's doctrine of absolute monarchy;
secondly, a presentation of his own theory about the origin, extent,
and end of civil government. This natural interpretation can be
defended. And only by defending this, can we hope to recover the
independent value of the Second Treatise. To do so, we must first
examine Laslett's reasons against this natural interpretation.
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Laslett has two main reasons to think that the Two
Treatises, taken as a continuous discourse, is directed against
Filmer. First, there is a technical reasono The "exact and subtle
methods of analytical bibliography" have shown that the title-page
of the second book was "a later insertion, made in the course of
printing", and the title to the whole Two Treatises (which I quoted
above) was printed even later and "presumably brought into line with
it". Therefore, the word "Treatise", the expression "Two Treatises",
the title "An Essay on Civil Government" applied to the second book
were "all afterthoughts". (p. 50). What Laslett has done by the
subtle technique of analytical bibliography is to dismiss the title
like "An Essay concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of
Civil-Government" as an afterthought, hence, insignificant. Having
removed the significance of the title-pages and created the image
of the Two Treatises as one book, Laslett takes the view that Locke's
objective of writing one book was to refute Filmer. This view
could be easily justified if "one book" in question were the
First Treatise. But what is the justification for the view that the
Second Treatise also has a refutation of Filmer as its primary
objective? Laslett points out that Locke comments on Filmer in his
early notebook (p. 58). Then he adds (in the note to sect. 22, ~)
that the Second Treatise mentions Filmer's name in three places and
his work in one place. Given these references, he says, we can see
that "this work (i.e., the Second Treatise J, as well as the First
Treatise, was written with the object of refuting Filmer, in
particular against his tracts (rather than Patriarcha which was not
published until 1680]" (Laslett's note to~, 22). It is worth
noting here that Laslett says that the Second Treatise was particularly
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directed against Filmer's tracts. His own historical investigation
has established that the Second Treatise was written in the winter of
1679-80, "partially" or "as a complete work". And the First Treatise
was quickly written after this, when Filmeros Patriarcha appeared
(Introduction, p. 65 and p. 59). This is why Laslett tries to be
consistent and says that the Second Treatise was directed against
Filmer's tracts rather than against his Patriarcha.
Thus his application of the methods of analytical biblio-
graphy leads Laslett to dismiss the separate title of the Second
Treatise, and Lockeos references to Filmer in his early notebook and
the Second Treatise make the work's objective a refutation of Filmer's
tracts. It is surprising to find that Laslett refuses to see the
Second Treatise as Locke's positive contribution to political theory.
It seems that in Laslett's view, the work of a political theorist is
almost exclusively a polemical one, the work which tries to refute
another work. And this approach to political theory is reinforced
by Laslett's attempt to destroy what he calls one of the three
"dogmas" of Lockean interpretation, namely, the view that Locke tried
4to refute Hobbes. However, it is a misguided attempt to decide
whether Locke tried to refute Hobbes or Filmer in the Second Treatise.
The fact of the matter is simple. Both figures are always in the
background, but the Second Treatise is Locke's positive contribution
to political theory. It is not directed against any particular
theorist; rather, insofar as it criticizes anything, it criticizes
the general view that political power can be exercised arbitrarily
and without a limit.
Having said this, let us see distinctly where Laslett goes
wrong. We cannot dismiss the separate title of the Second Treatise
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as an insignificant afterthought. Even if the methods of
analytical bibliography had worked perfectly, they could only show
when the title - "An ESSAY concerning 000 Civil-Government" - was
printed. But no matter when it was printed, we have ample evidence
to believe that Locke's thought about the "origin", "extent", and
"end" of civil government was not an accidental afterthought. In
the table of contents and in the text, Locke uses the following
expressions. First, he uses the word "original" in section 4 of
the Second Treatise: "To understand Political Power right, and
derive it from its Original, we must consider what State all Men are
naturally in". Secondly, the words "beginning", "end"J and
"extent" appear in the titles of Ch. VIII, Ch. IX, and Ch. XI
respectively: "Of the Beginning of Political Societies", "Of the
~ of Poll tical Society and Government", and "Of the Extent of the
Legis lative Power". (Emphases are added.) And these words appear
not only in the titles of the chapters but in the main body of the
text (e.g., 99 f f] 124; and 131, 135, 142 for "extent" or "bounds"},
Furthermore, the concept of the "extent" of power is Locke's life-long
concern, whether he discussed the power of the state, or the power of
5the church or the power of the mind.
It might be thought that it is of little consequence to
dismiss, or forget, the title of the Second Treatise as long as we
read the text carefully. But since the way we read a text is
determined by our prior rudimentary understanding of what the text is
about, our reading of the Second Treatise is likely to go astray once
we remove what is written on the title-page, i.e., an essay
concerning the true original, extent, and end of civil government.
Furthermore, once the title is removed, Locke's reference to the
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Two Treatises as "a Discourse on Government" is likely to mislead us
into believing that the Second Treatise, like the First Treatise, is
primarily a work which refutes Filmer's doctrine of absolute
monarchy. On the other hand, however, once we restore the title
of the Second Treatise, and if we have the additional information
that Locke wrote the Second Treatise before the First Treatise, we
can properly regard the former work as his own work on civil
government rather than a work which specifically refutes Filmer's
tractso It is true, as Laslett has pointed out, that,Locke did
make a short comment on Filmer in his notebook at the time of writing
the Second Treatiseo And there are a few explicit references to
Filmer in the Second Treatiseo So we are justified in thinking that
Filmer's tracts stimulated Locke's thinking when he was writing the
Second Treatise. But Locke briefly states Filmer's views (on
liberty, for instance), not to dissect and refute them but to
contrast them with his own views, namely, the views he takes to be
true (~, 22, 57, 61)0 Neither his references to Filmer in the
Second Treatise nor the short entry in his notebook justifies the
claim that the Second Treatise is primarily a work against Filmero
We are now in a position to correct Laslett's mistreatment
of the Two Treatises. As I have argued, it is false and useless to
describe the book as "an Exclusion Tract"o And though Locke called
the book "a Discourse concerning Government", its first part is his
sentence-by-sentence refutation of Filmer's doctrine, whereas its
second part-- written earlier-- contains his positive political
theory. In treating the Second Treatise primarily as a polemical
work directed against Filmer, Laslett misses a distinctive feature
of the book (or the second part of the larger book). The
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distinctive feature of the Second Treatise is that it deals with a
general branch of politics which Locke himself distinguishes from a
particular branch of politics, or "the art of governing men in
society". In Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a
Gentleman, Locke draws a distinction between the ~o branches of
politics, and states that his Two Treatises deals with the general
brancho The general branch, he says, concerns "the original of
societies, and the rise and extent of poli tical power" (Works, III,
po 296)0 Locke's phraseology clearly indicates that he has the
Second Treatise in mind in this context. (Also, since he uses the
particular phrase - "the original ••• the rise and extent of
poli tical power" - to describe the subject-matter of the general
branch of politics, it shows how wrong it is to dismiss the title of
the Second Treatise as insignificant.) The general branch of
politics makes use of general norms and facts about mankind which go
beyond any particular country, or any particular government that
exists. And the primary objective of this general study of
politics is not a refutation of the work of this or that theorist.
As Locke explicitly states in his letter to Richard King, the
general branch of politics is "the foundation" for anyone who wishes
to have an insight into the constitution of a particular government,
and the real interest of his country. If we wish to "proceed
orderly" in acquiring an insight into the latter, we should take
this "foundation" course first (Works, X, p. 507). In Locke's
stated opinion, Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium is "the best
book" for this foundation course (Works, III, p. 296). And though
Locke's Second Treatise is much less encyclopedic, or scholastic,
than Pufendorf's book, both books treat the relationships of man,
society and political power in a highly general manner.
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Laslettas attempt to dissolve the Second Treatise into the
supposed objective of refuting Filmer suffers fro~ anotr.er defecto
He leaves us with a text which does not address any disctinct
problem. Locke's Second Treatise, though it covers many topics, is
organized around two central topics: "property" and the limits of
political power. His theory of the state is, first and foremost,
a theory of the limits of political powero I do not intend to
defend or develop this interpretation of the Second Treatise here,
because to do so would require a reproduction of the interpretation I
offer in CHAP.1 of this dissertation. But let me simply make two
points here. The word "extent" which appears in the title of the
Second Treatise is of central importance, because the core of Locke's
theory of the state is that anyone who holds political power ought
to exercise it within definite "bounds", and cannot extend it
further. And for this reason, Ch. XI "Of the Extent of the
Legislative Power" is central to Locke's political theory.
Secondly, Laslett,who is more concerned about Lockeas relationship
to Filmer than Locke's own problem,fails to grasp the significance
of this chaptero Instead, he makes the curious comment:
Chapter XI is "far less clearly connected with the polemic against
Filmer than other parts of the text", and "it is probably best
regarded as part of the first form of the text, before 1681" (note
to 134, ~). It is doubtful whether any other part of the
Second Treatise is clearly connected with Locke's polemic against
Filmer. But if Ch. XI is not connected with it, we should say
that the core of Locke's political theory exists independently of
his polemic against Filmer, and it is probably a part of the
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composition which precedes his attempt to write a sentence-by-
sentence refutation of Filmer, i.eo, the First Treatise.
Since the purpose of this Appendix is a negative one of
showing that Laslett is wrong, I should like to make another
critical remark on his editorial policy. Laslett treats the whole
of the Two Treatises primarily as a refutation of Filmer. So he
adds various footnotes to a number of passages of the Second Treatise
and hints that Locke "had Filmer in mind". And if we go through
his extensive footnotes, we often come across the name "Filmer" and
the constant appearance of the name makes us ~ that Locke wrote
the Second Treatise to refute Filmer. But this feeling, I suggest,
must be corrected by our sound, impartial judgement. We do not
have any good evidence to think that Locke "intended" to refute
Filmer in the Second Treatise. On the contrary, if he had so
intended, it is a great mystery why Locke did not explicitly state
his intention. Laslett's footnotes provide clues to the various
works Locke read, so ~ might profitably compare Locke's views with
other theorists' on various issues. But our comparison should not
precipitously lead us to think that Locke's Second Treatise is
primarily a polemical work. It is plainly not a polemical work
directed against one or two particular theorists. His chapter V
"Of Property" has been treated by Laslett and other scholars as if
it were Locke's polemic against Filmer and other theorists. To
treat Ch , V in this way is to misunderstand the project of the
Second Treatise. It is a positive project of providing a liberal
(or constitutional) theory of the state, and his account of pre-
political appropriation is a device for this theory of the state.
Locke aspired to be an independent thinker, and refused to be
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influenced by another man's ideas. And his Ch. V is not "a direct
refutation" of Filmer's works, as Laslett claims. When Locke
boasted of his account of property in his letter to Richard King
(25 Aug. 1703), he clearly indicated the connection between "property"
and constitutionalism by stating that "property" is "the subject-
matter about which laws are made" (Works, X, 308).
Laslett attempted to establish a link between the First
Treatise and the Second Treatise by positing Locke's objective of
refuting Filmer. I have argued that this distorts the primary
feature of the Second Treatise, i.eo, a general treatise on the limits
of political power which Locke wrote before the First Treatise.
Laslett reports that Locke seems to have been pleased with, and
seems to have authenticated, the French edition of 1691 (~
Gouvernement Civil) which entirely omits the First Treatise (p. 13).
Locke's book without the First Treatise is the book which was
exported to American colonies; and it is also the book which shaped
such European minds as Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau. And
Laslett is puzzled as to why Locke did not adopt this world-
historical form for subsequent English editions. We might solve his
puzzle by dropping his untenable assumption about Locke's relationship
to Filmer, and replacing it by a more plausible viewo It is likely
that Locke regarded the First Treatise as a polemical book against
the doctrine of an Englishman which should be read by English readers;
whereas he saw the Second Treatise, a general treatise on politics, as
possessing a more permanent and less parochial valueo Though this
is conjecture, it is far more reasonable than assuming that Locke
almost always "had Filmer in mind".
1.
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Few scholars have taken seriously Laslett's proYocative
remark that the Two Treatises is "an Exclusion Tract"o
However, his view that the whole of the Two Treatises is
a polemic against Filmer has been highly influential,
especially among historically-minded scholars such as
John Dunn, James Tully, and Gordon Schochet. These
historically-minded scholars have never asked seriously
why the Second Treatise (or even the First Treatise) should
be read from the side of Locke's opponent(s). They
uncritically accept Laslett's judgement that the Two
Treatises is directed against Filmer, so in criti~ing
Laslett's view in this Appendix, I am at the same time
criticizing their uncritical acceptance of his view about
the relationship between Locke and Filmer.
The beneficial result of Laslett's influence is a rise
of genuine interest in the history of political thought,
as it is exhibited in Schochet's Patriarchalism in
Political Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1975). Yet
where his influence originated- Cambridge, England- it
has become somewhat perverse and produced two illegitimate
children: Dunn's dubious historical account of Locke's
political philosophy, and Tully's still more dubious
historical account of Locke's theot'y of ot'ooertv. Their
historical revisionism is fully criticized in CHAP. 2. of this
dissertation. Also, see my critical remarks in CHAP. 1, note 11,
and in CHAP. 2, note 7.
See John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An
Historical Account of the Argument of the "Two Treatises
of Government" (Cambridge: C.UoP., 1969), Chapter 5,
especially PPo 5lff. Although Dunn points out the
existence of the vast gaps between Locke and the Whig
Exclusionists, he fails to draw the conclusion that the
Two Treatises is not an Exclusion tract. Under the spell
of Laslett's provocative label "an Exclusion tract", Dunn
says that "if the text of the Two Treatises as we have it
now is exclusively or even predominantly an Exclusion
tract, it is often a notably ham-fisted one" (P. 53).
However, the antecedent of this sentence is false.
A political historian's judgement cannot be always
trusted in this matter. For instance, O.W. Furley claims
that the views Locke expresses in the Two Treatises are
very similar to those of the Whig ExcluSionists. However,
we are disappointed to learn that this historian bases his
claim solely on the authority of Peter Laslett. See his
article, "The Whig ExcluSionists: Pamphlet Literature in
the Exclusion Campaign, 1679-81", Cambridge Historical
Journal, XIII, 1 (1957).
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3. A careful reader of the First Treatise must detect LockeQs
independence and aloofness in his critique of Filmer.
He is not at all troubled 'by the sceptical comments Filmer
made on defenders of natural freedom in his tracts and
Patriarcha. He refuses to be drawn into controversy with
Filmer; he refuses to meet him on his own ground. From
the beginning to the end, Locke treats Filmer's doctrine
as senseless or incoherent, i.e., as unworthy of sympathetic
hearing.
Laslett notes that as a reply to Filmer, LockeQs First
Treatise is less fair and less complete than Tyrrell's
Patriarcha non Monarcha. (Laslett's Introduction, pp. 58f).
Laslett also speaks of Locke's failure to recognize the
full strength of the patriarchal tradition, in contrast
with Tyrrell's admission of the effectiveness of Filmer's
criticism. However, Laslett does not note that Locke's
aloofness and his refusal to answer unworthy opponents
were attributes of his independence, whereas Tyrrell's
sensitivity to controversy was a sign of his inability to
develop any independent thought. If we read the letters
exchanged between Locke and Tyrrell, we find that Tyrrell
was anxious about refuting someone else's views whereas
Locke was not bogged down in the controversy of the day.
For instance, when Tyrrell urged Locke to publish his
essays on the law of nature, his reason was not only that
Locke would do a better job than himself or Cumberland.
Tyrrell also thought that he would be able "to confute
with better Reasons the Epicurean Principles of Mr: Hobs
I: sic J" (Tyrrell's letter to Locke, 9 August 1692,
Correspondence, vol. iv, p. 495; cf. his letter to Locke,
27 July 1690, ~., p. l09). Locke did not respond to
Tyrrell. Though this is usually interpreted to mean that
he was aware of the inadequacy of his own account of the
law of nature, it is more plaUSible that he was not
interested in a controversy for its own sake. He had
problems of his own to think about, and when his critics
challenged him he bravely met the challenge.
As far as Locke's relationship to Filmer is concerned,
he did not take Filmer to be a serious challenge. He
clearly'7aw the propag.andist'fuse.of Fil~er'.s,wri,tings
and wrote the First Treatise to show the intellectual
bankruptcy of Filmer and his followers. Furthermore,
though Laslett lumps together Locke, Tyrrell and Sidney as
the Whig propagandists, it is noteworthy that Locke did not
even read Sidney's Discourses concerning Government. (For
this, see his own remark on Sidney's book in "Some Thoughts
concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman", Works. III,
p. 296.)
Locke pursued a philosopher's policy far more than
Laslett realizes. It is the policy of independent thinking
in search of truth. Locke joined a controversy and
became polemical only when he thought that truth was at
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stake, and his ideal was to commit himself to disinterested
search for truth rather to get vain satisfaction by beating
his opponents. Laslett and other historically-minded
scholars simply miss this traditionally philosophical
attitude of Locke; consequently, their interpretation
becomes quite ~istorical. Locke did not want to be
involved with a controversy which would merely cause
disorder and contention. As he wrote to Limborch (29
Oct. 1697): "mais j'aime la paix, & il y a des gens dans Ie
monde, qui aiment si fort les criailleries & les vaines
contestations, que je doute si je dois leur fournir de
nouveaux subjets de disputell (Works, IX, 63). This
attitude to seek peace and avoid unnecessary contentions
has a counterpart in Locke's account of the origin of
property. Contentious and quarrelsome people disturb
peace by trying to take the property which others have
acquired by their honest labour (~, 34, 31). Justice
is at stake in property disputes; truth in theoretical
disputes. About the relationship between truth and
controversy, Locke wrote the following:
Truth .0. I always shall be fond of, and so
ready to embrace, and with so much Joy, that
I shall own it to the world, and thank him
that does me the favour. So that I am never
afraid of any thing writ against me, unless it
be the wasting of my time, when it is not writ
closely in the pursuit of truth, and truth only
(Works, VIII, 417; Lockels letter to Molyneux,
3 May 1697).
'tis Truth alone I seek, and that will always
be welcome to me, when or from whencesoever
it comes (Essay, "The Epistle to the Reader",
Nidditch ed., po 11).
It is search after truth that counts, and controversy is
justifiable only if it is guided by the ideal of seeking
truth, not by partisan spirits and dogmas. Finally, we
must note that Locke explicitly stated his anti-
propagandist position and his ideal of search after truth
and justice in the Preface to the Two Treatises:
I should not have Writ against Sir Robert, or
taken the pains to shew his mistakes, Inconsist-
encies, and want of ••• Scripture-proofs, were
there not Men amongst us, who, by crying up his
Books, and espousing his Doctrine, save me from
the Reproach of Writing against a dead Adversary.
They have been so zealous in this Point, that if
I have done him any wrong; I cannot hope they
should spare me. I wish, where they have done
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the Truth and the Publick wrong, they would
be as ready to Redress it and allow its just
Weight to this Reflection, vizo That, there
cannot be done a greater Mischief to Prince
and People, than the Propagating wrong Notions
concerning Government 0.00 If anyone,
concerned really for Truth, unde~take the
Confutation of my Hypothesis, I promise him
either to recant my mistake, upon fair
Conviction; or to answer his Difficulties
(Laslett's edo, p. 156)0
Locke wrote the First Treatise to expose and correct Filmer's
false views, and show that his followers are merely
empty-headed enthusiasts. Though it is a refutation, it
is not so much a polemic against Filmer as an exposition and
correction of his false viewso It is not a contentious
book though it criticizes Filmer; it rather shows Locke's
commitment to truth, or what he believed to be true.
4. Laslett attacks the old dogma that Locke tried to refute
Hobbes, and in so doing he replaces it by a new dogma that
Locke tried to refute Filmer in the Second Treatise as well
as in the First Treatise. See Laslett's involved
discussion in his Introduction, pp. 67ff.
5. The concept of limits (or "bounds" or "extent") is central
to Locke's thought as a whole. Without this concept it is
impossible to understand the unity of his philosophical
corpus. In Appendix 2, Sect. III, I have given a detailed
account of Locke's preoccupation with the extent, or bounds,
of power. In one segment of Sect. III of Appendix 2
(headed "{L) A Recovery of Parallelism"), I have also given
an exhaustive account of why the separate title of the
Second Treatise is important.
Appendix 2*
Locke's Political Theory and its Epistemological
Foundations: A Systematically Misguided Project
* This is not really an "appendix". Rather, it is a
self-contained work. It combines scholarship, philosophy,
and pleasure. I hope the reader will enjoy this carefully
constructed work. Its length and the academic language
might prevent him (or her) from enjoying it. To remove
this obstacle, I have provided the slogans which express
the spirit of this work, and offered a picturesque table
of contents. I recommend the reader to relish the slogans,
and look for certain interesting images and parallels in
the table of contentso
I have sent this unusual appendix to a learned Locke
scholar as a present. He has commented: the "content" is
"very interesting" 0 In the near future, I shall shorten
this piece, make it more attractive and enjoyable, and
publish it.
SLOGANS
(1) "Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves
false conceptions about themselves, about what they
are and what they ought to be. They have arranged
their relationships according to their ideas of God,
or normal man, etc. The phantoms of their brains have
got out of their hands. They, the creators, have bowed
down before their creations. Let us liberate them from
the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under
the yoke of which they are pining away". (Marx and Engels)
(2 ) "[Tlhe end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it
is an ungrounded way of acting". "The difficulty is
to realize the groundlessness of our believing".
(Wittgenstein)
(1) From the Preface to the German Ideology.
(2) From On Certainty, sects. 110 and 166.
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Appendix 2: Locke's political Theory and its
Epistemological Foundations:
A Systematically Misguided Project
I. Introduction
Some may wonder whether neo-Kantianism really has such a strong
hold on the minds of philosophers and scholars who specialize in Locke.
But the fact remains that there are quite a few philosophers and scholars
who are strongly tempted to discuss "epistemological foundations". Three
commentators on Locke have recently tried to carry out the project of
searching for the epistemological foundations of Locke's theory of
property. Their project is of philosophical interest, for it purports
to elucidate what goes on within his political theory while at the same
time it tries to link it to his epistemology. Upon careful consideration,
however, I have reached the conclusion that their project is systematic-
ally misguided, and the claims advanced within this project are entirely
unfounded. Furthermore, the project breeds, and is bred by, an
illusory view of the relationship of the Two Treatises to the Essay. So
I shall relentlessly criticize this project. My immediate purpose is
destructive, but the ultimate purpose of my destructive arguments is to
liberate us from illusion.
The three commentators I discuss are Max Milam, John Yolton, and
James Tully. The writings which are relevant to my discussion are the
following: Milam's article, liThe Epis temological Basis of Locke's Idea
of Property"; a chapter of Yolton's book, "Property: A Mixed-Mode
Analysis"; and a chapter of Tully's book, "The contribution of the
Essay", which deals with the "Philosophical Underpinnings" of Locke's
1theory of property. Though their specific claims differ, they try to
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carry out the same project. Their project is to discover in the Essay
the epistemological foundations of Locke's theory of property; or to
reconstruct the epistemological foundations of his theory of property
out of the doctrines of the Essay.
The phrase "Locke's theory of property", which I have used to
describe their project, should be understood in a flexible sense.
Though Milam is almost exclusively concerned about the account of
appropriation Locke offers in Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise, Yo'!ton
and Tully deal with larger segments of the Two Treatises where Locke
advances claims about property. So "Locke's theory of property" means
either a set of claims Locke makes about property in Chapter 5 of the
Second Treatise, ~ those claims he makes about property in that chapter
and elsewhere in the Two Treatises. This expands the meaning of
"Locke's theory of property" indefinitely. Given Locke's statement
that men's "Lives, Liberties and Estates, ••• I call by the general Name,
Property" <.2!" 123), his "theory of property" can become equivalent to
his political theory which consists of claims about men's lives,
liberties and possessions. This shows that the project in question is
an attempt to link Locke's epistemology with his political theory as
much as an attempt to link it with his account of appropriation.
The foundations which the three commentators try to discover or
reconstruct are called "epistemological" in the broad sense that they
concern our ideas and knowledge. Yolton, who links Locke's doctrine
of "mixed modes" with his account of property, speaks about the meaning
of mixed-mode words (or concepts). Thus he brings in a semantic
doctrine as well as the doctrine concerning our ideas. But since "a
mixed mode" for Locke is a particular kind of lIComplex Ideas" (Essay,
II, Jodi, 1), Yolton can be said to link Locke's "epistemological"
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doctrine - his doctrine concerning ideas -with his account of
appropriation and political theory.
Since I have offered preliminary terminological clarification,
I now state how I intend to undertake the task of destruction. It is
a two-fold task. First, I shall examine the arguments presented by
Milam, Yolton and Tully very carefully, and demonstrate that their
arguments are not valid. This task requires great care, since they do
not simply make one false claim but a series of false claims which hang
together in a very oblique way. On superficial reading, their writings
may even appear to contain plausible accounts of the relationship
between Locke's theory of property and his epistemological doctrines.
But this is because they are systematically confused over many problems
including the problem of understanding their own project. Their
systematic confusion makes their writings impenetrable. To penetrate,
I shall try to detect a distortion in their perspective. To detect
this distortion is the second aspect of my destructive task. This can
be done by pointing out the ambiguity in the way each commentator
states his task, or by pointing out the illusion which the distorted
perspective creates. As we shall see later, what is non-existent in
Locke's writings appears to Milam, Yolton and Tully as existing. What
is real to them is fictitious to Locke. To Milam and Yolton, Locke's
account of appropriation even appears as an account of the idea of
property instead of an account of property.
The illusion of this sort is the philosophical illness to which
many men are vulnerable. To use a Marxian image: real objects appear
in a mystified, inverted form in the minds of alienated men, so that
they hold on to ideological illusion and illusory happiness. Or to use
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a more appropriate Wittgensteinian metaphor: Milam, Yolton, and Tully
become "captives" of a particular "picture" of Lockeos philosophical
corpus. Having become captives, they struggle to fly out of their
"fly-bottle" by trying to connect Locke's epistemological doctrines
with his political theory, something that lies outside the boundaries
2of his theory of ideas and knowledge.
The picture which captivates the minds of Milam, Tully and
Yolton is the "foundationalist" picture of philosophy. This is the
picture of philosophy to which they have become well-accustomed as a
result of their profession. They approach Locke's philosophical corpus
by making use of this picture. According to this picture, philosophy
is predominantly an epistemological or methodological discipline where
a philosopher works out basic principles and doctrines. Secondly,
these basic principles and doctrines are those which can be applied to
another discipline such as political theory. Thirdly, those principles
and doctrines "support" another discipline such as political theory.
They may support it, by providing a legitimate method of inquiry, or
by demarcating a legitimate domain of discourse for another discipline,
or by justifying the premises from which a philosopher can argue
(deductively or otherwise) to defend the claims he makes in another
discipline.
This is the picture of philosophy which is shared by many
philosophers today. Yet this is not a picture Locke had of his
philosophical corpus which includes the Essay and the Two Treatises.
Anyone who approaches Locke's works by ascribing this picture to him is
likely to suffer from systematic confusion. Milam and Tully unambig-
uously hold the "foundationalist" picture of philosophy and apply it to
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Locke's works. This is clear from their talk about "the epistemological
basis" (Milam) and "the philosophical underpinnings" (Tully). Yolton
is free from the foundational metaphor, and he himself holds the picture
of philosophy as a "conceptual" inquiryo As we shall see later, he
even asserts at one point that Locke is not a systematic philosopher
who applies his epistemological or methodological principles to another
discipline. Yet close examination shows that Yolton retains the
"foundationalist" picture, though with some ambivalence. This is why
he tries to show, by way of reconstruction, that Locke's theory of
property in the Two Treatises can be treated as an application of his
epistemological (and semantic) doctrine about "mixed modes".
The foundationalist picture of philosophy misleads Milam,
Yolton and Tully, and causes systematic confusion in their thought
about Lockeos theory of property and the Two Treatises. I shall rescue
his theory of property and his book from their systematic confusion,
and liberate them from the "foundationalist" picture of philosophy.
Liberation is intended not only for Milam, Yolton and Tully, but all
readers of the Two Treatises and the Essay who wish to carryon a
discourse on Locke's discourses in a free spirit. In place of the old,
"foundationalist" picture of Locke's works, I shall present a new
picture. This picture captures how he himself conceived of his works.
He would welcome it, after a long neglect of later generations. This
new picture, which is in fact as old as Locke, cuts across the two
foundationalist camps who fought a futile battle over the existence,
or non-existence, of any significant philosophical connection between
the Essay and the Two Treatises. Milam, Yolton and Tully are those
foundationalists whp affirmed the existence of philosophical (i.e.,
epistemological) links. Their project, which I destroy, is in part
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a response to the leading Locke scholar who explicitly denied the
existence of any such link by taking the same foundationalist view of
3philosophy -- Peter Laslett. It is possible to show that Laslett
suffers from systematic confusion just as much as Milam, Yolton, and
Tu l l.y , The two camps of Locke commentators were equally attached to
the "foundationalist" picture of philosophy, and equally failed to
understand how Locke conceived of the relationship of his epistemology
to his political theoryo The new picture I shall ascribe to Locke is
this: his discourse on ideas and knowledge does not provide a
legitimate method of inquiry for his discourse on property and government;
nor does it demarcate a legitimate domain of discourse for his political
theory; nor does it justify the premises of his political theory.
What Locke did was to create two independent discourses without any
subordination or interference between them. Within the bounds of each
discourse, he freely used his intellectual labour to increase his
intellectual products (i.eo, doctrines about ideas and knowledge on the
one hand, and doctrines about property and government on the other).
But he used a very general, common method of inquiry in developing the
two independent discourseso It is a method of setting bounds to the
power of an agent (an intelligent agent, or a political agent), and also
of setting bounds to various segments of each discourse and thereby
making them distinct and separate from each other. In short, the two
discourses are horizontally related to each other by a few non-
epistemological linkso The relation can best be described by Locke's
political imagery: the two discourses are "free", "equal" and
"independent"; and those who "labour" within the "domain" of one
discourse ought not to "meddle with" the intellectual product which
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"properly belongs to" the domain of another discourse. I shall provide
the details of the picture of sharply-bounded, horizontally-linked,
discourses after I have completed my destructive task.
The following discussion is divided into two sections. Section
II is devoted to a detailed criticism, and destruction, of the project of
searching for the epistemological foundations of Locke's theory of
propertyo Section III is devoted to the task of liberating us from any
"foundationalis ttlapproach to his poli tical theory.
II. A Criticism of the Project; or the Illusion of Epistemology
I shall examine the three commentators' claims as carefully as
possible, and try to show how their systematic confusion arises from
their own "foundationalist" picture of philosophy. I shall criticize
each commentator individually. Larger space is given to Yolton and
Tully than Milam. This unequal treatment is due to the fact that while
Milam's discussion is obviously fanciful, Yolton seems to support his
case by a careful study of Locke's philosophy, and Tully seems to support
his case by a solid historical scholarship of the modern tradition of
natural law and natural rights. By giving larger space to Yolton and
Tully, I shall try to show that the three commentators are equally
wrong. Let me begin with Milam.
(i) Milam's Fanciful Use of the Idea of a Secondary Quality
In his article "The Epistemological Basis of Locke's Idea of
Property", Milam defends the following thesis: "to Locke, a person may
be said to have 'property' in real estate (and in 'life' and 'liberty')
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in the same sense and for the same reason that any natural object may
be said to have secondary qualities or 'properties'''o4 Notice that
Milam ignores, from the start, the distinction between the meaning of
the word "property" and the (justificatory) reason for having property ..
It is also obvious that his thesis, if taken literally, is impossible
to defend .. For instance, Locke speaks of "property" as "a private
Dominion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind" (.2!, 26) in Chapter 5 of
the Second Treatise, whereas the "sense" of an exclusive right is
absent from Locke's discussion of "secondary qualities". Locke's men
also aequire property "for the reason" that they labour, take pains to
obtain external goods, and improve the general environment.. This
"reason" is plainly missing from a natural object's having "properties"
or "secondary qualities" .. Thus from the start, it appears that
Milam's thesis is hopelessly indefensible .. But let us take a closer
look at what he actually claims.
The gist of the argument which purports to support Milam's
thesis is the following: Locke sees the relationship of primary
qualities, power, and secondary qualities (what he sometimes calls
"properties") in a particular way .. On Milam's interpretation of
Locke's view, when an object A exerts power over another object B, A
alters B's primary qualities and causes the ideas of new secondary
qualities in our mind. In this case, says Milam, "the active power
involved is actually that of the first object".5 For instance, if
fire (A) exerts power over wax (B), it alters the primary qualities of
wax and causes the idea of a new colour (i.e., the idea of a new
"quality" or "property") in our mind. In this process of change, the
power involved is actually that of fire. Milam then applies this
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account of how we receive the idea of a new "quality" or "property"
to Locke's account of "property" in Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise.
He draws on analogy and explains what goes on in Chapter 5 as followso
If a man (A) exerts his labour-power over a piece of land (B), it
alters the primary qualities of land and causes the idea of cultivated
land in our mindo The idea of cultivated land is the idea of a new
"qualityll or "property", and in the process effected by human labour,
the power involved is actually that of the labourer. Ergo, a man in
Locke's view has a property in land "in the same sense and for the
same reason" that any natural object has secondary qualities or
properties.
In offering this curious account, Milam takes for granted what
he intends to prove. The account I have summed up merely presupposes
that "a secondary quality" of the Essay is equivalent in meaning to
"(a) propertyll of the Second Treatiseo But since this is what he
wants to prove, he only argues in a circleo To be charitable, we
can say that Milam presents a picture of what Chapter 5 would look like
if we applied Locke's account of how we receive the idea of a new
secondary quality in the process of cnangeo But this shows, even more
clearly, that Milam fails to prove that Locke used his account of the
production of the idea of a new secondary quality as "the epistemo-
logical basis of Locke's idea of property''o
Beside the fallacy of circular reasoning, there are a number of
objections we can raise. I shall mention only a few. The fact that
Locke sometimes uses the word "propertiesll as a synonym for "secondary
qualities" in the Essay in no way proves that he uses the word
"property" in the sense of "a secondary quality" in the Second Treatise.
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In Chapter 5, Locke himself suffers from what Hutcheson called "confused
imagination" and occasionally thinks of property as if it were a
quality.6 But even LockeGs confused imagination, let alone his strict
meaning of property as a man's exclusive right of disposal (or its
object), does not support the view that "property" of the Second Treatise
is "a secondary quality"o Another objection is that Locke's account of
appropriation in Chapter 5 is ~ an account of how we receive the idea
of property, but "how Men might come to have a property in" definite
portions of the God-given world <2!, 25). Milam has offered no reason
to believe that Locke would have given a different account of
appropriation if he had had a different account of the reception of the
idea of a new secondary quality. Plainly, he could have given the
same account of appropriation even if he had not had the notion of a
secondary quality. Thirdly, the analogy Milam draws between fire
exerting its power over wax and a man exerting his labour-power over
land breaks down, if we think of whiteness as the property of wax and
cultivated land as the property of the labourer rather than the land
itself. Finally, Milam offers no account of LockeDs understanding of
property as a right.
While the fallacy of circularity is a fatal blow to a defence
of Milam's thesis, these minor objections tear his account to pieces.
His account rests on the groundless belief that there is an epistemo-
logical basis of Locke's account of appropriation. But as a result
of his systematic confusion, he gives a distorted, ambiguous expression
to his own beliefo He says: liThe Epistemological Basis of Locke's
~ of Propertyll, instead of "The Epistemological Basis of Locke's
Account of Property".
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(ii) Yolton's Mixed Feelings about "a Mixed Mode"
Yolton makes another attempt to link Locke's epistemology with
his theory of property, in one of the chapters of his book, Locke and
the Compass of Human Understanding. The chapter is entitled,
"Property: An Example of Mixed-Mode Analysis". In this chapter Yolton
argues that Locke is primarily concerned with "conceptual" problems in
the Two Treatises. Whether he refutes Filmer's view of property in the
First Treatise or he offers his own account of property in Chapter 5 of
the Second Treatise, his primary concern is with "conceptual" problems
rather than "justificatory" or "empirical" problems. Besides making
this point, however, Yolton wishes to claim that Locke's account of
property as well as his refutation of Filmer's view is "an example of
mixed-mode analysis". "An example of mixed-mode analysis" is the
expression which Yolton uses without much explanation. But what he means
is that Locke's discourse on property is an example of the analysis of
the concept which is classified as "a mixed mode" in the Essay. Moreover,
Yolton is committed to the view that Locke is primarily concerned with
"conceptual" problems concerning property because he grants a particular
epistemological status to the concept of property in the Essay. If
this view is defended, then Locke's discourse on property can be said to
be supported by his classification of ideas in the Essay; or more
specifically, by his epistemological doctrine about "mixed modes".
How does Yolton defend this view? In fact, he does not try to
defend it seriously. He makes only a half-hearted attempt at defence.
Insofar as he tries to defend it (as he must, given the title "Property:
An Example of Mixed-Mode Analysis"), he merely confuses himself. In
what follows, I shall try to show that he is deeply confused in trying
to connect the Essay and the Two Treatises by Locke's classification of
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moral ideas as "mixed modes". Yolton is a leading Locke scholar today,
and I respect him for his fine scholarly work, John Locke and the Way of
Ideas. Nevertheless, in the chapter of the book which I am about to
examine, he falls victim to the loose association of ideas which his
intellectual hero, John Locke himself, strongly condemned. I shall point
this out clearly and distinctly, without extending my criticism to
Yolton's earlier, solid work of scholarship.
As" I said above, Yolton makes only a half-hearted attempt to
defend the claim that Locke's preoccupation with "conceptual" problems
about property arises out of his epistemological doctrine of Itmixed modes".
His half-heartedness appears as intellectual vagueness in one of his
footnotes to "Property: An Example of Mixed-mode Analysis". Yolton
says, in the footnote:
I do not mean to suggest that Two Treatises is in any
detailed wayan application of epistemic and
methodological principles established in the Essay.
Locke is not a systematic philosopher - his writings
do not present a system - in that traditional sense.
It is wrong to assume that because he holds to certain
doctrines in the Essay, he will conclude thus and so
in other works. Nevertheless, one of the features of
Locke's work which mark him out as a philosopher •••
is his constant interest in clarity and conceptual
connexions. This feature of his science of signs,
the analysis of mixed-mode concepts, occurs in all his
wri tings. 7
In this passage, Yolton affirms and denies the existence of epistemological
connections between the Two Treatises and the Essay. The Two Treatises
is "not" an application of the epistemological doctrines of the Essay in
"any detailed way", where the detailed way is taken to mean the
deducibility of every conclusion of the Two Treatises from what Locke says
in the Essay. Every sensible man would agree with Yolton that the two
works are not related in "any detailed way" in this specially strong
sense. But at the end of the above passage, Yolton affirms that Locke's
"analysis of mixed-mode concepts" "occurs in all his writings". Thus
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Locke's epistemological doctrine about "mixed modes" connects - or
seems to connect - the two works in a very rough way rather than in any
detailed wayo But this is too rough a statement to be made by the
renowned Locke scholaro Yolton, who takes Locke's "Division of the
Sciences" seriously, should have taken his view on the division of the
sciences with greater seriousness. Locke states in the very last
sentence of the Essay: the sciences which he divides into three parts
are "toto coelo different", and "they seemed to me to be the three great
Provinces of the intellectual World, wholly separate and distinct one
from another" (Essay, IV, xxi, 5). Natural philosophy, ethics, and
the doctrine of signs are so distinct and separate from one another that
Locke's doctrine of "mixed modes" belongs to only one branch of the
intellectual world. It does not bridge the three separate disciplines,
nor the two separate writings such as the Essay and the Two Treatises.
Yet Yolton fails to see this. Instead, he assumes that Locke's
doctrine of "mixed modes" connects the two works, and tries to show
though not in "any detailed way" - the way in which his doctrine connects
them.
I now summarize Yolton's rough account of the connecting link.
His account is deeply confused, but I shall first offer a summary
without making any comment. Some of Yolton's passages will be marked by
letters - (a), (b) & (c) - for the sake of a later discussion. What
dominates Locke's thought, says Yolton, is "his notion of mixed modes as
concepts made arbitrarily by the mind 'without patterns, or reference to
any real existence'"oB In the First Treatise, Locke points out Filmer's
misreading of the Bible by a "conceptual" rather than "empirical" methodo
The reason for this, according to Yolton, is the following:
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(a) since the concepts of right, sovereignty,
ruling, property, etc. are mixed modes, the
major test of claims made that employ such
concepts must be conceptual, not empirical.9
Yolton's point is that given the concept of property being "a mixed mode",
the major test of the claims which involve the use of the word "property"
must be "conceptual". He goes on to explain what Itthe major test" is.
AI:> a result of "the arbitrariness of the meanings of moral words",
anyone involved in a dispute over the meanings of moral words must appeal
to common meanings, or else moral principles, in order to settle the
dispute. This is the only way to settle the dispute in a non-arbitrary
way:
(b) The only basis for making non-arbitrary claims
about moral words would be some firm and
unalterable rules of right and wrong. Contro-
versy over moral concepts can be settled by
agreeing on common meanings or by reference to
moral principles. For Locke, the laws of God,
nature and reason contained the principles of
right and wrong by reference to which 8ontroversy
over those concepts could be settled.l
Yolton, then, cites passages from the First Treatise to show that
Locke is involved in "controversy over moral conceptslt with Filmer,
conceding that Locke does "not always" appeal to common meanings or
moral principles to settle the controversy. Finally, Yolton turns to
Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise to drive home the point that Locke's
predominant concern is with "conceptual" problems concerning property
rather than justificatory or empirical problems.
Yolton states:
(c) He C Locke] was not much concerned in Two
Treatises ••• to establish the rights he-claims.
He was rather concerned to point out the
conceptual failings of Filmer and, in the case
of the concept of property itself, to work out
some of the conceptual problems to which that
concept gave rise •
• • •
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The main concern ••• of the chapter on
property in the second Treatise, ••0 is with
explaining how private property of individual
men can arise out of the common property of
all men. ••• The working out of the answer
to this problem is largely a conceptual matter
for Locke, how particularisation of the common
is possible.ll
This is a fair summary of Yolton's account of the relationship
between "mixed modes" and Locke's discourse on property. I have singled
out three passages, and marked them as (a), (b) and (c). This is
because Yolton commits the error of triple confusion. He suffers from
conceptual confusion three times, once in each marked passage. Since
his confusion is deep-seated, I shall trace his confusion backward by
referring to passage (c) first, and then to (b) and (a).
First of all, if Yolton were to establish a link between Lockeos
doctrine of "mixed modes" and his account of property in the Second
Treatise, he would have to show that Locke's Chapter 5 deals with
"conceptual" problems in the sense that it deals with controversy over
the meanings of the moral word "property". In Yolton's own view, if
a concept is classified as "a mixed mode", this special status requires
that we should settle a dispute over the meaning of that concept, or
that moral word, in a non-arbitrary way (as Yolton specifies in (b».
However, Lockeus account of "how men might come to have a property in
several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in common" (g, 25) is
!!2l an attempt to settle the controversial meaning of the word "property".
From the beginning of Chapter 5, Locke takes a particular meaning of
the word as fixed, and asks how men might come to have a "property" in
distinct portions of the God-given world of common things. In passage
(c) above, Yolton loosely speaks of the "conceptual" matter. It is a
"conceptual" matter in the sense that it requires the exercise of
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intellect and some skill in conceptual thinking to write the kind of
account which Locke produced, but not in the sense which is required
for YoltonOs attempt to establish an epistemological link between
Chapter 5 and the Essay. Besides, as far as Locke's problem of Chapter
5 is concerned, it is a half-empirical, half-justificatory account of
the conversion of the original community of things into the world of
property. Locke is ~ performing a transcendental deduction of the
concept of property in the manner of Kant.
The alleged connection between the epistemological status of
the concept of property and Chapter 5 is thus non-existent. Next let
us turn to passage (b). In this passage, Yolton claims that
"controversy over moral concepts can be settled ••• by reference to
moral principles". This is a bizarre claim, and Locke nowhere advances
a claim of this sort. Take the fundamental precept of Locke's law of
nature, for instance: "No one ought to harm another in his Life •••"
(g ,6). Can we settle the meaning of the moral word "ought" by
reference to !h!! principle, ~ law of God? No, we cannot. We may
appeal to this moral principle if we want to settle a dispute about
substantive morality, i.e., a dispute about what is substantively moral.
We cannot settle our controversy over moral concepts (or the meanings
of "moral wordS", as Yolton puts it), by reference to the very rule
that makes use of those moral concepts (or moral words). In short,
Yolton conflates two types of controversy in passage (b): controversy
over moral words or concepts, and controversy over what is substantively
moral.
By this conflation, Yolton abolishes the distinction between
how to settle the meanings of moral words and how to settle the conflicting
claims couched in moral words. Needless to say, the claims Locke makes
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in the Two Treatises contain such words as "rights", "property", and
"law". But it is one thing to settle the conflicting claims which are
substantively moral, while it is quite another to settle the meanings
of the moral words which make up those claims. But again, Yolton
conflates these two distinct things. This confusion can be found in his
passage (a), where he says that since the concept of property is "a mixed
mode", the "major test" of the "claims" which employ moral words "must"
be conceptual rather than empirical. If the "claim" in question is a
claim about the meaning of a moral word, then the epistemological status
of the word as "a mixed mode" may be relevant to the settlement of a
dispute over the meaning. But the "claim" Yolton has in mind is not of
this kind. He refers to Locke's "controversy" with Filmer; specifically
to his attempt to refute the claim that Adam originally had private
dominion over God's creation, to the exclusion of the rest of mankind.
Filmer's claim is a substantively moral claim, and he rej~cts this
claim by appealing to biblical evidence (fI, 24, 29, 30, 40). In onE
sense, Locke's appeal to biblical evidence is an "empirical" method
rather than a "conceptual" method - in the sense that he quotes relevant
passages from the Bible and presents them as the evidence (or the
empirical evidence) for his claim.
Yolton is of course correct in pointing out that Locke uses an
analytical method of exposing Filmer's obscure meanings and inconsist-
encies. However, he offers no convincing reason that Locke's use of
the analytical method is a consequence of the particular classification
of moral words as "mixed modes". Locke certainly is a philosopher who
is sensitive to subtle distinctions, but he exhibits his analytic skill
in most of his controversies whether they involve moral words or not.
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Why did he meticulously examine Filmer's meanings, and try to expose
his inconsistencies by the analytical method? The reason has nothing to
do with the epistemological status of moral words; it has a great deal
to do with the fact that Locke knew of the effectiveness of the analytical
method in combating the degenerate, propagandistic method of spreading
false doctrineso Locke states in the Preface to the Two Treatises:
I should not have Writ against Sir Robert, or taken
the pains to shew his mistakes, Inconsistencies, and
want of 000 Scripture-proofs, were there not Men
amongst us, who, by crying up his Books, and espousing
his Doctrines save me from the Re roach of Writin
against a dead Adversaryo 156 •
I have dissected Yolton's account of the connecting link between
Locke's doctrine of "mixed modes" and his discourse on property in the
Two Treatises. I have shown that it is simply a confused account. If
we push Yolton's view to its logical conclusion, the Two Treatises is
predominantly a discourse on the concept of property or a discourse on
moral and political concepts. His mistake is to treat the book
primarily as a work on political concepts, and secondarily as a work on
political problems. Yolton himself certainly does not wish to commit
this sort of error. Hence, at the very end of his discussion, he
qualitifes his approach by stating that the Second Treatise, other than
its Chapter 5 and early chapters, is "not" "mainly or largely" intended
for "conceptual clarification of the civil and moral mixed modes".12
This is a self-deceptive remark since he holds that the whole of the
First Treatise and a very important chapter of the Second Treatise are
predominantly the work of "conceptual clarification''o He has already
treated a significant portion of the Two Treatises as a second-order
inquiry into moral or political concepts. In taking this approach to
the work, Yo1ton follows the "customary" treatment of political philosophy
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by (some) analytic philosophers of the present century. He also
retains the conventional view that epistemology is the foundation of
political philosophy. In these respects, he falls victim to the
custom which in Locke's view is the chief cause of "the association of
ideas" - the psychological mechanism which is just as opposed to
"reason" as "madness" is (II, xxiii, 4).
I have been sharply critical of Yolton's attempt to connect
Locke's doctrine of "mixed modes" with his theory of property. In
fairness, I should like to add two remarks. First, as I already
indicated, Yolton is correct in pointing out that the Two Treatises
exhibits Locke's sensitivity, or intellectual alertness, to subtle
conceptual distinctionso Yolton, I believe, has shown that Locke is
more alert to subtle conceptual distinctions in dealing with political
problems than is usually thought. What I have criticized is his
explanation of why Locke is conceptually or intellectually alert.
Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the fact that I did not
take seriously the two statements Yolton made to qualify his approach
to the Two Treatises. The first qualifying statement appears in his
footnote which I quoted at the beginning of my critical discussion.
There Yolton denies, though not whole-heartedly, that Locke is a system-
atic philosopher who applied his epistemological or methodological
principles. The second qualifying statement is the one I quoted in
the preceding paragraph: namely, the statement that the Second Treatise,
with the exception of Ch. 5 and other early chapters, is "not"
primarily concerned with conceptual clarification. I did not take these
statements seriously, not only because they are additions to the substance
of his discussion, but because they only show that Yolton's approach
to the Two Treatises is torn apart. Since Yolton is well acquainted
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with Locke's corpus, he instinctively feels that it is wrong to treat
the Two Treatises as an application of the epistemological doctrine
Locke worked out in the Essay; hence, he denies the status of a
"systematic" philosopher to Locke. But since Yolton himself retains
the "foundationalist" picture of philosophy, he goes on to treat Lockeos
corpus from the viewpoint of this metaphilosophy. On the other hand,
Yolton also makes use of the "conceptualist" picture of philosophy
according to which the primary task of philosophy is to clarify
conceptual muddles. He applies this picture to Locke as well, but
since it conflicts with the Second Treatise which deals with the problem
(rather than the concept) of "the true original, extent, and end of
civil government", he also needs to qualify his treatment of Locke as
the conceptualist. Yolton's approach, thus torn apart, becomes
ambiguous. He himself has mixed feelings about what he says about
"mixed modes".
(iii) Tully's Historical Revisionism, and the
"Philosophical Underpinnings" of
Locke's Theory of Property
Though Yolton half-heartedly searched for the epistemological
foundations of Locke's theory of property, James Tully obtains a clue
from Yolton and wholeheartedly involves himself with the project of
searching for the foundations. One chapter of his book, A Discourse on
Property, is entitled "The contribution of the Essay". In this chapter,
Tully claims that certain portions of the Essay are the "philosophical
underpinnings" of Locke's political theory in general, and "his theory
of property" (or his account of appropriation) in particular. Tully
tries to validate this claim by relying on one historical source, the
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writings of Jean Barbeyrac. He also performs an independent recon-
structive task to show that certain parts of the Essay are indeed
supportive of Locke's political theory. I shall concentrate on Tully's
use of Barbeyrac, and later briefly remark on his own reconstruction.
A few words should be spent on Jean Barbeyrac. Barbeyrac was a
French legal theorist who translated and annotated Grotius' De Jure Belli
ac Pacis and Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium. He was thoroughly
acquainted with their works, and he can be rightly regarded as the best
commentator on the modern tradition of natural law and· natural rights
living in 18th-century Europe. Furthermore, Barbeyrac was a great
admirer of Locke. He carefully read Locke's works, admired him for a
fine combination of intellect and wisdom, and corresponded with him for
a short period of time before Locke's death. His letters to Locke show
the extent to which this young French scholar admired Locke's works and
England (as the centre of knowledge). Barbeyrac was an Anglophile
before Voltaire. Locke sent him the Bible and an English dictionary.
In his thankful reply, he wrote: "Plus on medite votre Ouvrage, et plus
la lumiere, qui y brille de toutes parts" (Correspondence, VII, 6 January
1703; cf. Barbeyrac's letter to Locke in ~., VII, May/June 1702,
No. 3141, for his admiration for Ie bon Locke). Given this historical
background, it is possible to make a reasonable use of Barbeyrac's
writings to construct a new historical picture of Locke.
Yet Tully's use of Barbeyrac is far from being reasonable. He
tries to extract claims Barbeyrac never made from two of his writings;
first, from the extensive notes which he added to Pufendorf's De Jure
Naturae et Gentium, and secondly, from the long discourse on the history
of the science of morality which Barbeyrac wrote and appended to
Pufendorf's work. Barbeyrac's discourse is entitled, "An Historical
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and Critical Account of the Science of Morality, and the Progress it has
made in the World, from the earliest Times down to the Publication of
this Work"o (1 shall henceforth call this "Account" Barbeyrac's
discourse.) Tully refers to Barbeyrac's notes and his discourse on
the science on morality, and advances the following claim:
Barbeyrac clearly thought there was an important link
between the two works (i.e., the Essay and the 1:::2.
Treatises]. This provides the historical justification
.00 for an attempt to make the link explicit.13
Let us note Tully's ambiguity hereo He affirms, in the first sentence
of the quoted passage, that Barbeyrac "clearly thought" there was an
important link between the Essay and the Two Treatises. But in the
second sentence, he denies that Barbeyrac "clearly thought" so. Tully
feels a need to "make the link explicit"o If the link is clear, why is
it necessary to make it "explicit"? On the other hand, if the link is
implicit, why does he make a contradictory claim that Barbeyrac
"clearly thought" there was an important link? Who is obscure here
Barbeyrac or Tully? It is Tully who is systematically obscure. I shall
point this out clearly.
First, I shall quote Tully's summary of what Barbeyrac did. He
summarizes what Barbeyrac did, without quoting directly from his writings.
According to his summary:
Barbeyrac isolates three main lines of the Essay •••
which are ••• underpinnings of Locke's own political
theory. First, he takes Locke's workmanship model
[i.e., the model of man as being the workmanship of
God] to be the ground of natural law theory in
general.... Second, Locke's work on modes and
relations is said to be propaedeutic and necessary
in understanding natural law political theory.
Third, Locke's analysis of real essences is responsible
for putting political theory definitely on a superior
footing (pp. 4-5, 10-13).
The aspect of Locke's political theory of which
these lines of the Essay are supportive is Locke's
theory of propertI (P. 5; 1729: 4.4.2n, 4.4.3n,
4.4.6n, 8.1.3n).1
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The references to Barbeyrac's writings (his discourse and notes to
Pufendorf's work) are indicated by Tully parenthetically in the above
passage. However, those references are not at all helpful in clearly
identifying Barbeyrac's passage or sentence. Since Tully himself
scarcely reports what Barbeyrac actually said, I shall examine his use
of Barbeyrac by directly quoting from an English translation of his
15discourse and notes. Barbeyrac's writings are not easily accessible
to modern readers. For this reason I shall present the details of
what he actually said. The following discussion is simply
my report of what is written in the historical document which few
scholars read today. It will become apparent that Tully radically
misinterprets Barbeyrac's writings, and invents various non-existing
connections between the Essay and the Two Treatises.
Barbeyrac, says Tully, "isolates three main lines of the Essay".
What Tully has in mind is Section 2 of Barbeyrac's "Historical and
Critical Account of the Science of Morality". In Section 2 of his
discourse, Barbeyrac tries to defend the thesis, proposed by Pufendorf
and Locke, that the science of morality is capable of demonstration.
By the science of morality, or morality, Barbeyrac means "not only what
is commonly so call'd; but also The Law of Nature, and Politicks:
In a word all that it is necessary for the Conduct of a Man's Self,
according to his Estate and Condition".16 Though Barbeyrac is a great
scholar, he is not a philosopher of Locke's stature. Hence, in his
attempt to defend the thesis, he quotes Locke's view on the matter as
definitive and authoritative, adding a few remarks of his own. This is
the use which Barbeyrac makes of Locke's Essay. He is not at all
interested in "isolating" any Une of thought from the Essay to show
the "underpinnings of Locke's own political theory".
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Let us take a closer look at what Barbeyrac says in Section 2
of his discourse, and rescue it from Tully's misrepresentationo
Section 2 is entitled, "(The Science of Morality] Is capable of
Demonstration", and Barbeyrac tries to explain why the science of
morality can be made into a demonstrable science like the science of
geometry. He begins by expressing the optimistic, 17th-century
belief of ethical rationalism. By making use of Pufendorf's idea
(expressed in Elementa Jurisprudentiae Universalis), Barbeyrac states:
it is "very improbable" that God, who has "given us Faculties
sufficient to discover and demonstrate with entire certainty abundance
of speculative Things", especially "mathematical Truths", has "not also
made us capable of knowing, and establishing with the same evidence,
f 1"" 17the Maxims 0 Mora 1ty • Then Barbeyrac goes on to claim that there
is a philosophy which shows that morality is indeed capable of demon-
s tra tLon, The philosophy is Locke's philosophy. According to
Barbeyrac, Locke's chief contribution lies in the fact that he has
shown that moral knowledge can be built on our comparison of human
actions to a certain rule, independently of our knowledge of the real
essence of substances. Barbeyrac summarizes Locke's chief contribution:
It is no Part of the Business in Morality to know
the real Essence of Substances; which is what has
been attempted without Success, and in all probab-
ility will never be brought about; as a great
Philosopher of this Age has made appear: All that
is requir'd here, is only to examine and compare with
Care and Diligence certain Relations, which we
conceive between human Actions and a certain Rule
(emphasis in the original English translation-or-
Barbeyrac's discourse).18
Then Barbeyrac quotes passages from the Essay. First, he quotes the
famous passage in IV, iii, 18 where Locke states that if we duly
compare the idea of God as a supreme being who made us and the idea of
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ourselves as rational beings, then we might place "Morality amongst the
Sciences capable of Demonstration". Secondly, he quotes from III, xi,
16 & 17 the passages where Locke says that it is possible to have the
perfect knowledge of the precise real essence of the objects which moral
words stand for. Thirdly, he quotes from IV, iv, 8, 9 & 10 Lockeas
statements that moral knowledge is as capable of "real" certainty as
mathematics, and that the truth and certainty of moral discourses exist
in abstraction from the actual lives of men. Barbeyrac fills two pages,
nearly a half of Section 2 of his discourse, with direct quotations from
the Essay. The quoted passages naturally contain such technical terms
as "modes", "relations", and "real essences". After quoting extensively
from Locke, Barbeyrac praises him: "See how this great Philosopher
reasons". Then he closes Section 2 of his discourse by adding a
remark of his own that the demonstration of speculative principles is
"much more compounded, and depend[s] on a much greater Number of
19Principles" than the demonstration of practical principles.
I have presented an accurate summary of what Barbeyrac says in
Section 2 of his discourse. He is trying to defend the thesis that
(the science, or knowledge, of) morality is capable of demonstration.
For this purpose, he relies on Locke's remarks about "modes", "relations",
"real essences" and so forth. Barbeyrac is not trying to "isolate three
main lines of the Essay 000 which are .0 0 underpinnings of Locke's own
poll tical theory", as Tully claims. Barbeyrac does not even mention
Locke's own political theory, i.e., the theory he presents in the ~
Treatises. Nor does he refer to any other political theory of the 17th
century (e.g., Pufendorf's) to claim that Locke's discussions of "modes",
"relations", etc. serve as its philosophical underpinnings. In fact,
the thesis of demonstrable morality which Barbeyrac defends has nothing
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to do with any actual political theory, whether it is Locke's or
Pufendorf's. It is a thesis about the theoretical possibility of
having the knowledge of "morality" (in the broadest sense of all rules
of conduct) by the method of demonstration. Like Pufendorf and Locke,
Barbeyrac is seeking for an intellectually reliable method of unfolding
the contents of "morality" whose core is the will of God, and rejecting
"revelation" as a secure method of unfolding them. This is why
Barbeyrac states at the beginning of his discourse that if we are
"instructed in this Science" of morality, "there will be no occasion
to mount up to Heaven; or to have from thence any extraordinary
. ,,20 ThRevelatlon for that purpose • e immediate purpose for which he
defends the thesis of demonstrable morality (by relying on Locke) is to
try to silence the proto-Humean scepticism of Montaigne concerning the
demonstrability of morality. Thus in the sections which follow
Section 2, Barbeyrac deals with Montaigne's view that moral laws or
justice are "the very Emblem of human Infirmity; so full ••• of Error
and Contradiction" and universal approbation is the only test of the
21existence of the law of nature. Against scepticism of this sort,
Barbeyrac tries to argue with the help of his philosophical hero,
Locke, that the core of morality is given by God, and if we diligently
apply our intelligence we can demonstrate the contents of morality by
a chain of logical consequences. Barbeyrac's defence of the thesis of
demonstrable morality and his reliance on Locke's Essay have nothing
whatsoever to do with the supposed "underpinnings" of the 17th-century
22political theories, or Locke's own political theory.
I have shown that Tully is not justified in using
Barbeyrac's discourse to establish a link between Locke's doctrines of
the Essay and his political theory. I now move on to examine another
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claim Tully makes about the Locke-Barbeyrac connection. As I quoted
already, he says: "The aspect of Locke's political theory of which
these lines of the Essay are supportive is Locke's theory of property"o
This claim is not at all Barbeyrac's but Tully's own claim, though he
refers to Barbeyrac's notes to Pufendorf's work.
Let us see what Barbeyrac actually says in his notes. Barbeyrac
refers to Locke's view of property explicitly in two of the notes he
appended to Pufendorf's account of the origin of property, and implicitly
(ioeo, without mentioning Locke's name) in one of the notes he appended
to the same accounto In note 4 to Bk 4, Cho 4, Sect. 1 of De Jure
Naturae et Gentium, Barbeyrac sums up what is essentially Locke's account
of the origin of property, and complains about the obscurity of
Pufendorf's reasoning. This implicit reference to Locke becomes
explicit in note 4 to Bk 4, Ch. 4, Secto 40 In this note, Barbeyrac
disagrees with Pufendorf's view that the origin of property rests on
the tacit, or explicit, compact of all men. He denies the correctness
of Pufendorf's compact theory of property: "No, in no wise. It is
certain ••• that the immediate Foundation of all particular Right, which
any Man has to a thing, which was before common, is the first possession"
(4. 4. 4., n4). Then Barbeyrac goes on to present a concise summary of
Locke's account of the origin of property as a correct alternative to
Pufendorf's account (40 4. 4., n4). The only other reference relevant
to Locke's view of property occurs in note 3 to Bk 4, Cho 4, Sect. 4,
where Barbeyrac briefly mentions Locke's refutation of Filmer's claim
about Adam's exclusive dominion. Thus Barbeyrac does not even drop a
hint that Locke's epistemological doctrine might support his "theory of
property".
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I have examined Tully's use of Barbeyrac by reporting the details
of what Barbeyrac actually said. It is clear that his use is a misuseo
A hostile historian of ideas might condemn him as having abused history,
or forged historical connections. But such harsh condemnation should
not mislead us. The chief cause of Tully's misuse of Barbeyrac is thiso
He has become a "captive" of the foundationalist picture of philosophy,
just like Milam and Yolton. Tully believed, in the first place, that
some epistemological doctrines of the Essay must support Locke's
political theory. This belief has a root in his own picture of what
philosophy is. The belief is then reinforced by Yolton's earlier
attempt to seek the epistemological foundations, which Tully takes to
23be a successful attempt. Given Tully's belief, thus reinforced, it
is natural for him to misuse or misinterpret Barbeyrac's writings. As
I quoted earlier, Tully says that Barbeyrac "clearly thought" there was
"an important link" between the Essay and the Two Treatises. This is
a statement which expresses Tully's deeply-held picture of philosophy
more than anything else.
Finally, I shall briefly comment on Tully's attempt to recon-
struct the epistemological foundations of Locke's political theory out
of the Essay. As I said in the beginning, Tully not only relies on
Barbeyrac but undertakes the task of reconstruction. In his own words,
it is an attempt to "make the link explicit", i.e., an attempt to make
explicit the link which Tully believed to exist. Tully's reconstructive
discussion is lengthy, and it is an attempt to link the doctrines he
extracts from the Essay with Locke's political theory. My treatment
of it will be very brief. His reconstruction gets off the ground
precisely because he misreads Barbeyrac, and he mistakenly believes that
yolton has already shown how to reconstruct the epistemological
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founda tions. Since Tully tries to do on a larger scale what Yolton
has unsuccessfully tried, he is bound to suffer from the same sort of
confusion as Yolton and on a larger scale. I shall comment on two
points he makes in his reconstructive discussion. I shall thereby show
how his "philosophical underpinnings" collapseo
First, Tully says that Locke's distinction between "archetype
and ectype idea" is the "basis" of Locke's political theory. It is the
basis in the sense that by virtue of the distinction between the two
types of ideas, Locke distinguishes his political theory from "empirical
political science", and thereby treats it as a second-order inquiry into
political concepts. Locke's own political theory, says Tully, is a
discipline where "the investigation of the conceptual connections amongst
mixed modes and relations, and of their relations to natural, customary
d . '1 1 . d t k ,,24 Thi i i t k i il tan c~v~ aws, ~s un er a en • s s a m s a e s m ar 0
Yolton'so Locke's political theory clearly is not a theory about
political concepts, but a theory about political power or government.
His Second Treatise is entitled "An Essay concerning the True Original,
Extent, and End of Civil Government", rather than "an Essay concerning
the True Original, Extent, and End of the Concept of Civil Government".
Locke himself clearly states that his political theory deals with a
general branch of politics which concerns "the original or societies,
and the rise and extent of political power", rather than a particular
•
branch of politics concerning "the art of government" (Works, III,
Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman, p. 296).
The general branch of politics makes use of general norms and facts
about mankind which go beyond any particular government. As Locke
states in his letter to Richard King, the general branch of politics is
"the foundation" for anyone who wishes to have an "insight" into the
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constitution of a particular government, and the real interest of his
country (Works, X, 507).
It goes without saying that Locke clarifies, from time to time,
the concepts or the meanings of the words which he uses in the Second
Treatise. But his clarification is intended to solve problems about
property and government, rather than any problem about the knowledge of
politics or the idea of property. Similarly, Locke points out the
obscurity of Filmer's expressions in the First Treatise, in order to
show that his doctrine of absolute monarchy is incoherent. The Two-
Treatises is not a second-order discourse on the idea, or the knowledge,
of politics; it is a discourse on politics. It is in the Essay which
Locke addresses problems about ideas and knowledge. Like Milam and
Yolton, Tully conflates ideas and things. They mix up the idea of
property and property, or the knowledge of government and government.
This is because they treat Locke's theory of ideas and knowledge as the
"basis" upon which the "superstructure" of property and government ought
to be erected.
The second point Tully makes in his reconstructive discussion is
the following: Locke has a "maker's theory of knowledge" according
to which a man is capable of knowing what he has made, and he is
25incapable of knowing what he has not made. This "maker's theory of
knowledge" provides "the philosophical underpinnings for normative
political theory, establishing its epistemological superiority over the
" 26natural sciences • This claim appears to be the main conclusion of
Tully's attempt to make "the link" explicit. But is this conclusion
convincing? The answer is no.
To begin with, it is doubtful whether Locke really has a "maker's
theory of knowledge". According to Locke, a man is capable of knowing
his own existence with the highest degree of certainty (Essay, IV, ix, 3)
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though it is God who made a man in the first place. Also, "mixed
modes" by definition consist of "simple Ideas of different kinds" (II,
xxii, 1), and the IIUnderstanding is merely passivell when it receives
simple ideas (II, i, 25)0 The mind does not make any simple idea.
But I shall leave this point aside, since Locke at least holds that
moral knowledge consists of IImixed modes" which are made actively by
the mind. The crucial question for us is how Tully's IImaker's theory
of knowledgell, or any other theory or claim Locke advances in his
epistemology, is related to Locke9s own political theory. Tully himself
does not answer this question. He simply says that Locke's maker's
theory of knowledge provides "the philosophical underpinnings for
normative political theory". But what Tully calls IInorma tive
political theory" corresponds to what Barbeyrac and Locke call the
science of "morality" (in the broad sense of ethics, law, and politics).
Hence, he must also show how Locke's claim about the knowledge of
"morali ty" is linked to his particular poli tical theory of the ~
Treatises. This he never does. Tully simply confuses the "philosophical
underpinnings" of Locke's own political theory with the "epistemological
superiority" of moral knowledge in general. Hence, he does not even
see the need to explain how the supposed "maker's theory of knowledge"
is connected with Locke's own political theory. Furthermore, he is
not certain of the very meaning of the expression "philosophical under-
pinnings". The only clarification he offers is that A "underpins" B
in the sense that A's relationship to B is "much looser than formal
" 27logical demonstration. Like Yolton, Tully denies that the conclus-
ions of Locke's political theory follow from his "maker's theory of
knowledgell• But he offers no explanation of how the two theories are
connected. In other words, he fails to reconstruct the "philosophical
underpinnings" of Locke's political theory.
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I now leave aside Tully's failed attempt at reconstructiono I
shall conclude my critical discussion by giving general considerations
to the relationship between the epistemological status which Locke
grants to moral knowledge and the political theory he presents in the
Two Treatises. The relationship is one of mutual irrelevanceo Lockews
claims about the status of moral ideas and moral knowledge in the Essay
are not at all connected with his own political theory. To make this
apparent, I should like to consider Locke's thesis of demonstrable
morality once again, instead of considering the "maker's theory of
knowledge" which he mayor may not have. Locke advances his thesis of
demonstrable morality, without having the slightest intention to use it
as a basis of his own political theory. It is an undeniable fact
that he wrote the Two Treatises while he was also working on the Essay;
hence, without completing the supposed "philosophical underpinnings".
His letter to Molyneux, written about two years after the·publication of
the Essay and the Two Treatises, clearly shows that the irrelevance of
his thesis of demonstrable morality to his own political theory. Locke
says:
Though by the view I had of moral ideas, whilst I was
considering that subject, I thought I saw that morality
might be demonstratively made out, yet whether I am
able to make it out, is another question (Correspondence.
IV, 524).
Of course, by the time Locke wrote this letter, he had already completed
his political theory in the Two Treatiseso The thesis that we can
have a demonstrative system of morality is a theoretical dream which
Locke did not fulfil. It is simply supported by "the view I had of
moral ideas", and it is simply irrelevent to Locke's political theory.
This is not surprising because Locke's discussion of the
demonstrability of moral knowledge is the kind of methodological
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discussion which is entirely divorced from what he actually does as a
prac ti tioner of the science of "morali ty". Like Pufendorf and
Barbeyrac, Locke tries to make the science of "morality" as certain
as the science of geometry. However, their discussions are abstractly
methodological; namely, they are divorced from any practice which has
developed within the science of morality, and from any practical
application of a method. This abstractly methodological spirit
resembles the spirit of those post-Millian philosophers who discuss the
"inferior" state of moral or social sciences. Since the time of J. S.
Mill, quite a few philosophers have put forward the abstract claim that
"moral" or "social" sciences are capable of "prediction" just as the
science of physics is. The 17th-century version of this abstract
claim is that the science of "morality" is capable of "demonstrationll
just as the science of geometry is. Participants in this type of
abstractly methodological discussion try to honour moral or social
sciences, by disregarding the practice which has grown or is likely to
grow in specific branches of the moral or social sciences. It is in
this abstractly methodological spirit that Pufendorf wrote about lithe
certainty of the moral sciences", and conceived of himself as effect-
ively fighting against the Aristotelian, relaxed attitude toward
practical knowledge (De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Bk. 1, Ch. 2). Locke
is also abstractly methodological, when he suggests that "morality"
might one day be placed "amongst the sciences capable of demonstration".
Qua practitioners of the science of "morality", however, neither
Pufendorf nor Locke produced a political theory by the method of
demonstration. They simply went ahead to produce their political
theories, regardless of the truth or falsity of the thesis of demon-
strable morality. Barbeyrac was perfectly right in E2! establishing a
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link between Locke's epistemology and his political theory. Tully
misread Barbeyrac and tried to reconstruct what cannot be reconstructed.
III. Liberation from the "Foundationalist" Picture; or
Prolegomena to any Future Meta-Discourse
The failure of the project which I have exposed above is partly
due to the absence of any serious discourse on Locke's discourses among
scholars. Milam, Yolton and Tully read what other commentators had
written about Locke's works, before they set out to search for the
epistemological foundations of his political theory. Had commentators
and scholars been successful in presenting a picture of how Locke's
works hang together, they could have avoided carrying out the system-
atically misguided project. Given the absence of any serious meta-
discourse within Locke scholarship, it is to be expected that many would
respond to the failure of the project in a wrong way. I should like
to begin by illustrating one wrong response.
I shall illustrate the wrong response by presenting Peter
Laslett's view of the relationship between Locke's Essay and the ~
Treatises. Laslett had expressed his view in his Introduction to the
Two Treatises before Milam, Yolton and Tully attempted to engage in
their project. Laslett's view is worth considering for the following
reasons. First, unlike Milam, Yolton and Tully, he holds that there
is no significant philosophical link between the Essay and the Two
Treatises. Laslett even denies the status of "a political philosopher"
to Locke, on the ground that his political writings are largely
inconsistent with his Essay and reveal no trace of an application of
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his epistemological or methodological principleso Secondly, we are
inclined to accept this view as a correct alternative after we have
seen the failure of the project of Milam, Yolton and Tullyo Laslett's
view strikes us as the very opposite of their failure, and appears to
be true for this reason. Thirdly, however, Laslett's view is in fact
a false alternative which we must not take.- His view represents the
wrong response which we are likely to make to the failure of the pasto
In his long Introduction, Laslett has made a series of
provocative statements about the relationship between the Essay and the
Two Treatises. I shall quote them from a hardbound copy of the
second (1967) edition of the Two Treatises:
Locke is, perhaps, the least consistent of all the
great philosophers (p. 82).
Two Treatises [is] something very different from an
extension into the political field of the general
philosophy of the Essay (P. 82).
Two Treatises is not written on the 'plain, historic
method' of the Essay. If it were, we might expect
in the first place that it would insist on the
limitations of our social and political understanding
•• 00 Then C Locke's material J would have been
presented recognizably as the 'complex ideas' or
'mixed modes' of Locke's system of knowledge (p. 83).
(Two Treatises J cannot be said to represent his
account of the implications for conduct, for
politics, of the doctrines of the Essay. It was
written for an entirely different purpose (p. 83) •.
None of the connecting links is present. It is
extraordinary ••• how little definition there is in
the political work (p. 84).
To call it 'political philosophy', to think of him as
a 'political philosopher', is inappropriate (P. 85).
It is pointless to look upon his work as an
integrated body of speculation and generalization,
with a general philosophy at its centre and as its
architectural framework (Po 86).
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[There is] not a Lockeian philosophy in the
Hobbesian sense, C but there is] a Lockeian
attitude and this can be traced in all that he
wrote. [This is an attitude to reconcile]
rationalism and empiricism (p. 87).
If a distinction between the philosophy and the
attitude of Locke is legitimate, we could fill out
the picture of him as a thinker; we could account,
for example, for his unwillingness to push any
argument to its extreme (p. 88).
I have quoted Laslett's statements at length, not because I
intend to examine the truth or falsity of each particular statement,
but because I want to show that Laslett approaches Locke's works by
making use of his own "foundationalist" picture of philosophy. Although
some of his statements, quoted above, touch upon edges of truth, his
application of the "foundationalist" picture of philosophy to Locke's
works systematically misleads him. The "foundationalist" picture
misleads Laslett to three false beliefs. First, Locke's political
theory is largely inconsistent with his epistemology. Secondly, Locke
is an unphilosophical writer who has produced his epistemology and his
political theory for entirely different purposes, and in entirely
different "states of mind". Thirdly, there is no philosophical
method of inquiry Locke consistently employs in his works.
It is not difficult to show that these three beliefs are false.
The belief that Locke is a wildly inconsistent thinker belongs to an old
myth. Laslett supports this belief by saying that Locke's claim about
the objectively existing law of nature in the Two Treatises is inconsis-
tent with his argument against innate ideas and principles in the
Essay. But there is no inconsistency here, since the main proof
Locke offers for the existence of the law of nature is a version of
28the argument from design, i.e., a posteriori argument. In fact,
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Locke himself explicitly warns that we should ~ identify his denial
of "an innate Law" with his denial of "a Law of Nature" (Essay, I, iii,
13). The second and third beliefs I have mentioned above may be more
difficult to reject as false. Yet the falsity of these beliefs will
become clear in the course of the discussion to follow. At the moment,
what concerns us is that Laslett's approach to Locke's political theory
and epistemology shares one basic assumption with the project of Milam,
Yolton, and Tully. The assumption is that we can properly understand
the relationship between Locke's political theory and his epistemology
by making use of the "foundationalist" picture of philosophy.
This assumption is untenable. Any meta-philosophical
discussion of Locke's political theory based on this assumption is
likely to be systematically misguided, and will breed false beliefs.
My task in this concluding section is to liberate us from our .habit of
using the foundat.LonaH st; picture of philosophy in dea Hng with Locke's
works. My task is not to liberate us from this or that particular
mistake of the past (e.g., Milam's, Yolton's, Tully's, or Laslett's);
but to liberate us from the fundamental cause of their false beliefs
about Locke's political theory and epistemology. The fundamental cause
is the foundationalist picture of philosophy which many professional
academics have, largely due to the unre~ognized influence of neo-
Kantianism in the English-speaking academic world. I shall present
what I take to be Locke's own picture of his philosophical corpus,
with particular attention to the Essay and the Two Treatises. Once
this picture is shown, we are bound to realize the futility of any
future attempt to use the "foundationalist" picture in our meta-
philosophical treabnent of Locke's political theory. This is what I
hope to achieve. What I say below is intended to liberate us from the
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illusion of "epistemology" 0 To put it more satirically, 1 shall present
my "Prologemena to any Future Meta-discourse".
Two cautionary remarks may be appropriate here. First, 1
shall not repeat the definition of the "foundationalist" picture of
philosophy which 1 offered in Section 1. The same definition suffices
for the purpose of the following discussion, though captives of this
picture themselves are often unaware of the elements which constitute
this picture. (1 have listed the constitutive elements of this picture
in Section I.) Secondly, since Locke himself did not make any direct
comment on his own picture of his works, or the place of his political
theory in his philosophical corpus, I have adopted a particular policy
in trying to grasp Locke's own picture. The policy, in short, is
this: DO NOT THINK, BUT LOOK CAREFULLY. In adopting this policy, 1
have followed in the footsteps of the later Wittgenstein. I have
looked at Locke's writings very carefully. What I present is the
product of my looking, though I shall intermingle my thought with this
product.
(i) A Recovery of Parallelism
If we look at the Essay and the Two Treatises, we are struck
by the fact that Locke handles two distinct subject-matters in a simil~r
manner. The subject-matter of the Essay is the power of human under-
standing, or knowledge; whereas the subject-matter of the Two Treatises
is the power of a political agent, or government. These distinct
subject-matters are handled in a similar fashion. In the Essay, Locke
states: it is "my Purpose to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and
Extent of humane Knowledge; together,. with the Grounds and Degrees
of Belief, Opinion, and Assent" (I, L, 2; emphasis added). We can
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express Locke's central purpose by offering the following descriptive
title to the Essay: "An Essay concerning the Original, Certainty, and
Extent of humane Knowledge". The title of the Second Treatise is very
similar to this. Let us first look at the title-page of the 1698
edition of the Two Treatises (which Laslett has reproduced in his
critical edition): It says: "Two Treatises of Government: In the
Former, The False Principles and Foundation OF Sir Robert Filmer, And
His FOLLOWERS, ARE Detected and Overthrown. The Latter is an ESSAY
CONCERNING The True Original, Extent, and End OF Civil-Goverrunent"o
This clearly indicates that Locke's positive political theory, as
distinct from his critique of Filmer's doctrine of absolute monarchy,
is presented in the Second Treatise. There is another separate
title-page inserted before the Second Treatise: "An ESSAY Concerning
the True Original, Extent, and End OF Civil Goverrunent".
It is clear, then, that the Essay primarily deals with the
"original, certainty, and extent" of human knowledge, whereas Locke's
own political theory deals with the "original, extent, and end" of
civil government. The parallelism is striking. The only difference,
apart from the difference between human knowledge and civil government,
is the difference between "certainty" and "end". Locke does not take
the view that "certainty" is the purpose of human knowledge (Essay, I,
i, 5 & 6); hence, the exact parallel does not hold. Yet it is
fairly clear that in dealing with human knowledge and civil government,
Locke tries to show how X originates, how far X extends, and what is
the end-point (certainty or purpose) of X, where X is either human
knowledge or civil government.
Before I go on to a further characterization of the relationship
between Locke's epistemology and his ~olitical theory, I should like to
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emphasize that the descriptive title of the Second Treatise is just as
important as the descriptive title I have given to the Essay. This
emphasis is needed because Peter Laslett has WTongly dismissed the
significance of the title of the Second Treatise. He has treated the
separate title of the Second Treatise as Locke's insignificant after-
thought, on the ground that the "exact and subtle methods of analytical
bibliography" have shown that the title-page of the Second Treatise was
29"a later insertion, made in the course of printing". Despite
Laslett's detective work, the methods of analytical bibliography can
only show when the title-page was printed and inserted. Locke himself
thought about the "origin", "extent", and "end" of goverrunent long
before the title-page was printed. I shall present evidence for this,
and restore the significance of the separate title of the Second Treatise.
Laslett's dismissal of the separate title is a part of his larger
misunderstanding that the Second Treatise, as well as the First Treatise,
is a refutation of Filmer's doctrine of absolute monarchy. Nothing
is further from the truth.
Nearly thirty years before the title-page of the Second Treatise
was "printed" and "inserted", Locke began to think about the "origin"
and "extent" of political power. In his first political writing, the
First Tract on Goverrunent (1660), Locke makes use of the idea that lithe
magistrate's power" is "derived from, or conveyed to him by, the
consent of the people" (!.. Tract, 122). He uses it as a hypothesis
for the sake of his (illiberal) argument that the "magistrate of every
nation" must "have an absolute and arbitrary power over all the
indifferent actions of his people" in their religious worship (123).
He already uses the expressions like the "extent" and "limitation" of
the legislator's authority, and "its original" (123). In the Second
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Tract, probably written a few years later, Locke gives further
considerations to the "sources of civil power" (civilis imperii fontes),
namely, the origin of political power as distinct from ecclesiastical
power. He puts down a few possible accounts of the origin of political
power, without committing himself to anyone of them (~. Tract, 229f.).
But it is clear that Locke thought about the "origin" of political
powero In his view, the question regarding the legislative agent's
power over "indifferent things" in religious worship can be'~xamined
a little more profoundly" if "the sources of civil power" are
"investigated" and "the very foundations of authority uncovered"
(~. Tract, 229).
In 1667, Locke wrote a draft titled "An Essay concerning
Toleration", a piece which contains the main arguments for toleration
which we find in his published work, A Letter concerning Toleration.
In this essay of 1667, Locke also presents a brief outline of his
political theory, his theory about the origin, extent, and end of civil
government (as distinct from ecclesiastical government). This essay
has not attracted the attention of Locke scholars very much, despite
the fact that it contains the first clear statement of his liberal
political theory and his liberal theory of toleration. The "end of
erecting of government", or the "purpose" which the "power, and
authority of the magistrate" ought to serve, is "the good,
preservation and peace of men in that [i.e., civil rather than
ecclesiastical] society" (Bourne, ~ I, 174). The "magistrate ought
to do or meddle with nothing but barely in order to securing the civil
peace and property of his subjects" (175). The "extent" of "politics
and government" is limited to things of this world rather than things
of the next world. The legislative agent, or the magistrate, is an
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"umpire" who is only concerned about "my well-being in this world"
insofar as it relates to the well-being of other men; in short, his
power extends only to the "public good". It "would be injustice if he
should, any further than it concerns the good of the public, enjoin men
th,ecare of their private civil concernments, or force them to a
prosecution of their own private interests"; the legislative agent
"only protects them from being invaded and injured in them by others"
(176). t shall quote one more statement from the 1667 essay to show
that Locke's political theory of the Second Treatise was more or less
taking shape in 1667. The "magistrate has a power to command or forbid
so far as they tend to the peace, safety, or security of his people";
they have a power to make "laws ••• only for the security of the
government and protection of the people in their lives, estates, and
liberties, i.e., the preservation of the whole" (180). The tripartite
formula of "property" (or "civil conce rrenent.a")- "lives~ liberties and
estates" - which Locke frequently uses in the Second Treatise can be
found in the essay he wrote in 1667.
Locke developed his political theory and his theory of
toleration simultaneously and in parallel fashion. In 1673-4, he
offered an analysis of the limits of political power and the limits of
ecclesiastical power by comparing one power with the other. This
interesting parallel analysis is presented in his paper, titled "On the
Difference between Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, Indorsed Excommunic-
ation, Dated 1673-4". (The paper was published by King, in his Life of
John Locke, vol. 2, "Miscellaneous Papers", pp. 108ff.) The parallel
analysis of political power and ecclesiastical power presented in this
paper is the basis of the comparison which Locke makes between the two
powers in A Letter concerning Toleration. For the purpose of our
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discussion, we only need to note that in this paper, Locke uses a
phraseology similar to the "origin, extent, and end" of civil governmento
As he puts it, his comparative analysis shows "the whole end, latitude,
and extent of civil power" on the one hand, and "the whole end,
latitude, and extent of ecclesiastical power" on the other (King, Life
II, 111) 0
It is clear from the evidence presented above that Locke thought
about the "origin", or "extent", or "end" of civil government long
before the title-page of the Second Treatise was "inserted" in the course
of printing. Laslett's dismissal of the title as an "afterthought" is
wrong, even if we consider the contents of the Second Treatise alone.
Certainly, Locke makes use of the words like the "original" (or
"beginning"), "end", and "extent" (or "bounds") in the text frequently.
And we cannot explain the structure of his political theory without
using those categories. Let us look briefly at what he wrote before
the title of the Second Treatise was printed. In Section 4 of the
Second Treatise, Locke states: "TO understand Political Power right,
and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State all Men are
naturally in" (§I, 4; emphasis added). The titles of ea, VIII,
Ch , lX, and Ch, XI are the following: "Of the Beginning of Poll tical
Societies", "Of the Ends of Political Society and Government", and "Of-
the Extent of the Legislative Power" (emphasis added). The underlined
(See ~, 99ff.words, of course, appear in the main body of the text.
for "beginning"; 124, 131, 134-5 for "end"; and 131, 135, 142 for the
"extent" of political power, or the "bounds" within which it can be
exercised).
In order to complete the restoration of the significance of the
separate title of the Second Treatise, let us add the following consider-
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ations. First, as Las1ett himself demonstrated, Locke wrote a
substantial portion of the Second Treatise before he wrote the First
Treatise, and without re~ding or responding to Filmer's Patriarcha ..30
The Second Treatise, in other words, contains Locke's own political
theory which is largely independent of his efforts to refute Filmer's
doctrine of absolute monarchy. Secondly, LockeQs mature published
work shows that he regarded "the original, extent, and end" of civil
government as the proper characterization of his own political theory.
In A Letter concerning Toleration Locke frequently speaks of "the
original", "bounds", and "end" of legislative power. (See Works VI,
21, 42 & 44). As I have already mentioned in Section II above, Locke
himself describes his political theory as dealing with the general
branch of politics "containing the original of societies, and the rise
and extent of political power" (Works, III, 296) ..
Now the theme of the Essay which I have pointed out - the
"original, certainty, and extent" of human knowledge - can also be
traced back to his drafts of the Essay.. In Draft A (1671), Locke
briefly states that he considers "the extent of humane understanding &
what it is capable of" (Sect. 27, p. 92).. Beyond happiness and misery,
"we have noe [sic.) concernment either of knowing or being" (Sect. 10,
p. 56). In Draft B (1671), Locke explicitly states the purpose of his
epistemological inquiry by using the same phraseology that we find in
the Essay: it is limy purpose to enquire into the Originall, Certainty
& Extent of humane knowledg [sic ..]" (Sect ..2, p. 37)0 It is clear,
then, that the theme of "the original, certainty, and extent" of human
knowledge occupied Locke's thought quite a number of years, just as the
theme of "the original, extent, and end" of civil government ..
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(ii) Details of Parallelism
We shall now look into the details of Locke's parallelism~ By
drawing attention to the parallel theme, I have already shifted a
burden of proof on the part of those who wish to treat the Essay as a
foundational work for LockeGs political theory~ In what follows, I
shall offer a positive account of the relationship between his epistemo-
logy and his political theory by taking a clue from the parallel I
have noted aboveo It is fairly clear that Locke himself expected us to
treat his discourse on ideas and knowledge as quite distinct from his
discourse on property and government; he expected us to understand each
discourse in its own righto It is a plain matter of fact that there
is no cross reference between the Essay and the Second Treatise. This
may be explained, in part, as a result of the anonymous publication of
the Second Treatise. Since the Essay was published with Locke's name
firmly on its title-page, it would have been pointless for him to make
any cross reference. But what is significant is that he did not
mention any epistemological principle or doctrine in the Second Treatise.
The two discourses, in his own view, are separate and distinct from
each other. As he says, in the Essay, "great Provinces of the
intellectual World" are "wholly separate and distinct one from another"
(IV, xxi, 5). Given the separateness and distinctness of each
discourse, we can relate the two discourses only by means of the
general categories Locke uses in both discourses. Specific terms which
he uses in one discourse alone cannot bridge the gulf between the two
discourses. Once we focus on Locke's gener~l categories and his
general method, we can discover what is common to the two distinct
discourses. If we can discover what is common, then we can relate what
appears to be unrelated.
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What, then, is common to Locke's inquiry into human knowledge and
his inquiry into civil government? There is a common image in the first
place. Whether the object of his inquiry is human knowledge or civil
government, he tries to show its beginning, its end-point, and what
falls between the beginning and the end. But something more definite
unites his epistemology and his political theory. The basic category
which dominates Locke's inquiry is "power": the power of an intelligent
agent (or the power of understanding), and the power of a political
agent (or the legislative power). His central concern is to set
limits, or bounds, to the power of an agent; or more preCisely, to the
manner by which an agent exercises its power. In his epistemology
as well as his political theory, Locke is opposed to the view that an
agent can legitimately exercise its power without a limit. He tries
to set limits to the activities of an agent, an intelligent agent or a
political agent. By this method, he tries to achieve a practical
(rather than theoretical) purpose. He tries to end the disputes which
tend to arise from an agentis transgression of the limits. HUman
knowledge, in Locke's view, arises from an intelligent agent's exercise
of his power within certain limits. Similarly, civil government arises
from a political agent's exercise of its power within certain limits.
Locke's central task is to show what the limits are in the realm of
human knowledge on the one hand, and in the realm of civil government
on the other hand.
It goes without saying that the Essay discusses a variety of
problems, just as the Second Treatise does. But the two works exhibit
Locke's predominant concern with the limits, or "bounds", of what an
agent can and should do. They also reveal his practical purpose of
settling endless disputes, and encouraging the activities of an agent
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within its proper sphere. These are the central features which Locke's
epistemological inquiry shares with his political theory. I shall
defend and elaborate this view by showing how these central and common
features manifest themselves in the Essay and the Second Treatise. I
shall first turn to the Essay; then to the Second Treatise, and finally
to A Letter concerning Toleration to reinforce and supplement my account
of the central and common features of the two works.
(a) Locke's Attempt to Determine "the Extent of Human
Knowledge", or the Bounds of the Power of Understanding
Though Locke's discourse on the origin, certainty, and extent
of human knowledge (together with the grounds and degrees of belief,
opinion, and assent) takes up a wide range of topics, there is no
denying that his account of "the Extent of Humane Knowledge" (Essay,
Bk. IV, Ch. III) is a very important part of his epistemology. If we
are allowed to be very crude, we can connect Bk I, Bk II,'and Bk III
with his account of the extent of human knowledge as follows: Bk I
is Locke's rejection of the innatist account of the origin of ideas,
while Bk III is a digression as he himself says in III, xxxiii, 19.
AndBk II is his account of the true origin of ideas, which is propae-
deutic to his attempt to determine the extent of human knowledge. Since
human knowledge consists in "the Perception of the Agreement, or
Disagreement, of any of our Ideas", it does not extend any "further than
we have Ideas" (IV, iii, 1). Given this view, it is understandable why
Locke tried to show the origin and extent of our ideas first. By
crudely connecting the three books to one chapter titled "Of the Extent
of Humane Knowledge", I am merely emphasizing that one of the central
purposes of the Essay is to determine the extent of human knowledge.
Though the sheer length of the Essay might obscure the
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importance of Locke's task of limiting the scope of human knowledge, he
himself clearly states that it is the main goal he tries to achieve in
his discourse. At the beginning of the Essay, he says:
If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I can
discover the Powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things
they are in any Degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I
suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy Mind of Man,
to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its
Comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost Extent of its
Tether; and to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things,
which, upon Examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our
Capacities (Essay, I, i, 4; emphasis added)o
He also expresses his concern with the limits, or bounds, of human under-
standing (hence, knowledge), in explaining the origin of the Essay:
we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction
in a quiet and secure Possession of Truths, ••• whilst we let
loose our Thoughts into the vast Ocean of Being, as if all that
boundless Extent, were the natural, and undoubted Possession of
our Understandings •••• Thus Men, extending their Enquiries
beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into
those depths, where they can find no sure Footing; 'tis no
Wonder, that they raise Questions, and multiply Disputes, which
never coming to any clear Resolution, are proper only to continue
and increase their Doubts 000. Whereas were the Capacities of
our Understandings well considered, the Extent of our Knowledge
once discovered, and the Horizon found, which sets the Bounds
between the enlightened and dark Parts of Things; between what
is, and what is not comprehensible by us, Men would perhaps with
less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the one, and
imploy their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and
Satisfaction in the other (I, i, 7; emphasis added).
Let us note why Locke wants to set limits to human knowledge by
examining the power of human understanding. As it is indicated in
the quoted passages, he tries to distinguish the proper objects of human
understanding and knowledge from the improper objects in order to free
men from scepticism and unsettlable disputes over lithe vast Ocean of
Being" (or metaphysical and theological disputes), and thereby encourage
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men to "imp10y their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and
Satisfaction" in the matters they can understand or know. Locke
restates this purpose: if we critically survey the "Powers of our own
Minds", "we shall not be inclined" to "sit still" "in Despair of knowing
any thing"; nor shall we be inclined to "question every thing, and
disclaim all Knowledge". Hence, a critical examination of the powers
of the mind is "a cure of Scepticism and Idleness" (I, i, 6). But
Locke has another positive purpose: to direct the use of men's limited
intellectual powers to their "proper" subject-matter, one of the subject-
matters which their narrow understanding can grasp. This subject-
matter is "morality", or a regulation of men's conducts. Locke is
convinced, from the start, that each man's narrowly limited capacity
is sufficient for the knowledge of morality, the knowledge he properly
needs to have:
How short soever their Knowledge may come of an universal,
or perfect Comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures
their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead
them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their
own Duties (I, i, 5).
Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which
concern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures, whereby
a rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this
World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions
depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that some other things
escape our Knowledge (I, i, 6).
Later in Book IV of the Essay, Locke states that "morality" rather
than "natural philosophy" is "most suited to our natural Capacities",
and it is "the proper Science, and Business of Mankind in general"
(IV, xii, 11). We cannot know (with certainty) whether matter can
think, or whether the soul is immaterial (IV, iii, 6). In these
matters as well as in the "experimental Philosophy of physical Things",
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we must rely on faith and probability (IV, iii, 6 & 27).
We can sum up Locke's central task and his purpose. He
examines the power of human understanding and sets limits to it, in
order to put an end to scepticism and endless disputes about metaphysical
and theological issues. He additionally recommends men to use their
intellectual powers in their proper domain of acquiring moral knowledge.
This summary is based on what Locke actually stated in the beginning of
the Essay, and also on his similar statements in Draft B of the Essay
(sects. 1 & 3)0 It conforms to Locke's statement about the "History"
of the Essay that "a Subject very remote from" human understanding led
him and his friends to "examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects
our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with" (The Epistle
to the Reader, p. 7)0 It also is in accord with James Tyrrell's
statement that the Essay originally arose out of a discussion "about
the principles of morality and revealed religion".
Notice that Locke does not try to lay down epistemological
principles and doctrines in order to justify other branches of human
culture such as political theory and the science of nature. The l7th-
century science of nature was not in a state of crisis, and there was
no need to justify it. Locke only picks up some scholastic "Rubbish"
as an "Under-Labourer" of Boyle, Newton, !!!l who are "Master-Builders"
(The Epistle to the Reader, pp. 9f.). Neither the names like "Boyle"
and "Newton" nor Locke's use of models and problems taken out of the
17th-century science of nature should lead us to believe that the Essay
is an epistemological groundwork for the 17th-century science of nature.
As I have already noted, the positive element of Locke's purpose is to
encourage men to acquire the knowledge of morality. But even this
positive element is not very constructive. It is rather a hope. Its
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concrete expression is his thesis of demonstrable morality. As we
saw at the end of Section II, Locke's discussion about the demonstra-
bility of morality is based on his classification of ideas, and it is
not meant to be a methodological discussion in any practical sense.
His defence of the thesis of demonstrable morality is an attempt to
confirm his initial conviction that even the narrowly limited power of
human understanding is capable of having moral knowledge. It is not
an attempt to support or justify any existing science or theory of
mora Hty ,
To read the Essay as an epistemological groundwork for another
study (of nature, or of morality) is to read it with neo-Kantian
spectacleso It is neo-Kantians in l860's such as Eduard Zeller who
granted the status of academic dignity to the discipline of
"Erkenntnistheorie", and treated it as the centre of philosophy and the
foundation of other sciences or studies. Those neo-Kantians made
explicit what was implicit in Kant, by going "back to Kant". At the
same time, they shared - or seemed to share - the view expressed by
Vaihinger that Locke was the first philosopher to IIhave a clear
consciousness that all metaphysical and ethical discussion must be
. 1 i l' .. It 31preceded by eplstemo og ca lnvestlgatlons 0 But whatever neo-
Kantians thought of Locke's Essay, why should we accept their judgement
so blindly? There is no point in accepting the projection of their
self-image onto Locke, which is further twisted by their super-academic
efforts to get something out of Kant rather than going straight "back
to Kant". If we want to understand Locke, we must go "back to Locke"
in the first placeo
The Neo-Kantian reading of the Essay is wrong.
that Locke himself produced a political writing at the beginning of his
The fact is
intellectual career before he wrote anything about human understanding;
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a "discourse" on the civil magistrate's power over "indifferent things"
in religious worship (known as the First Tract on Government, 1660)0
This discourse is not about "human understanding"o It is about the
question whether political power can "extend" to people's "indifferent"
actions in religious worship (such as making the sign of the cross in
baptism, kneeling at the sacrament, and bowing at the name of Jesus).
Furthermore, it is fairly clear that Locke's vocabulary of the "extent",
"bounds" alid "boundaries" in the Essay was originally derived from his
political and juridical writings on the "extent" of the pCMer of the
civil magistrate, the "bounds" of the law of nature, and the like.
The Essay, just like Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, is full of political
metaphors which are predominantly juridicalo For instance, Locke sets
"boundaries" between the jurisdiction of "reason" and IIfaithllo Faith
and reason, he says, ought to be IIkept distinct by these Boundaries"
(IV, xviii, 11); and if "the Dominion of Faith" is confined within its
prescribed boundaries, then "Reason" is "not injured" (IV, xviii, 10).
I am not suggesting, falsely, that Locke's discourse on ideas
and knowledge was not as important for him as his discourse on politics
or toleration. It is undeniable that he attached tremendous
significance to his inquiry into the power of understanding. Locke
thought his epistemological inquiry to be important and useful, and he
was also fascinated with certain aspects of the 17th-century science of
nature. But it is quite wrong to ascribe to him the neo-Kantian,
"foundationalist" meta-philosophyo Locke did not write the Essay as
an epistemological groundwork, ioe., a work which provides justified
methods and premises for other discourses such as discourses on politics,
toleration, Christianity, education, etco As we have seen, he wrote
it originally for the purpose of cutting off disputes which exceed our
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comprehension, and with an additional hope of directing the use of our
intellect to its proper subject-matter "morality". This original,
practical purpose may escape notice. It is partly because Locke wrote
the Essay "by incoherent parcels" and in a IIdiscontinued way"over many
years, picking up a large number of topics on his way (The Epistle
to the Reader, po 7). But it is partly because we are under the
influence of the 19th-century, neo-Kantian view that "epistemology" or
IIErkenntnis theorie" , is and ought to be the foundational discipline for
other sciences and studies.32
The central task of the Essay, or at least one of its central
tasks, is a "critique" of human knowledge, i.e., an attempt to set
limits to the power of human understanding. This is not an attempt to
provide justified methods and premises for any existing discourse. It
is mostly a negative attempt to disjustify the methods and premises of
the 17th-century metaphysical and theological discourse, while it offers
some justification for the hope for a future acquisition of moral
knowledge. As John Yolton has shown in his John Locke and the Way of
Ideas, Locke's epistemological doctrines had a disturbing effect upon
the traditional moral and religious beliefs of his day. But those who
responded to the Essay in the 17th and 18th ,centuries did not ascribe to
Locke the "foundationalist" picture of philosophy, as neo-Kantians and
our 20th-century followers have done. "Epistemology", or
"Erkenntnistheorie", did not emerge as an unambiguously foundational
discipline for other studies, until 19th-century German neo-Kantians
made strenuous efforts to go "back to Kant". Instead of understanding
the Essay via those neo-Kantians, we should relate it to Hume, Kant,
and the earlier Wittgenstein. For they are successors to Locke's
33project of setting limits to human understanding or human knowledge.
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Hume, the first legitimate successor, faithfully recaptures the original
conception of Locke's epistemological inquiry. In his Enquiry
concerning Human Understanding (whose original title was Philosophical
Essays concerning Human Understanding), Hume states:
The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these
abstruse questions lconcerning what is commonly called
metaphysics], is to enquire seriously into the nature of human
understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers
and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and
abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to
live at ease ever after (Enquiry I, po 12).
Locke's version of living lIatease ever afterll is to employ the narrow
capacity of human understanding to know IImoralityll,or things which
concern our conduct.
(b) Locke's Attempt to Determine "the Extent of Civil Governmentll,
or the Bounds of Legislative Power
Although the Second Treatise addresses a number of problems,
and each of its chapters is devoted to a distinct topic, careful
reading shows that Locke tries to set limits (or "bounds") to the power
of an agent; the natural power of every man, the power of non-
appropriators, the power of appropriators, and the power of the supreme
political agent called lithe Legislative". Just as Locke's account of
"the Extent of Humane Knowledge" is a central part of his epistemology,
his account of lithe Extent of the Legislative Powerll (~, Ch. XI) is a
central part of his political theory. Also, just as his account of
the origin of ideas is propaedeutic to his attempt to determine the
extent of human knowledge, his account of the origin of property (~,
Ch. V) is propaedeutic to his attempt to determine the extent of civil
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government. In Locke's view, the legislative power ought to be
established in every commonwealth (or a society), because men enter into
a commonwealth (or a society) for "the great end" of enjoying "their
Properties in Peace and Safety" under lithe Laws establish'd in that
Soc Lety" (5T, 134). Hence, he must show how each man comes to have a
property in external possessions before he tries to set bounds to the
power, or activities, of the legislative agent.
Let us first see that Locke is preoccupied with the limits of
power in his political theory. The powers of various agents are
limited in various ways, at different stages of his political theory.
In the state of nature prior to appropriation, each man has a liberty
(i.e., a power) to do what he thinks fit, provided he stays "within
the bounds of the Law of Nature" (E, 4, 128; cf , 57, 59). The bounds
of the law of nature are the obligations which God has imposed on the
actions of men. Locke does not sharply distinguish between the
obligations so imposed and the disabilities caused by such imposition.
The most important obligation of the law of nature is the following:
"no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or
Possessions Lrequired for his self-preservationJ" (§!, 6). By
stipulating this fundamental precept of the law of nature, Locke
specifies the limits which each man's action cannot and ought not to
exceed. Just as the limits of human understanding serve to stop men's
continual disputes over religion and metaphysics, the bounds of the law
of nature serve to stop men's continual disputes over one another's
life, health, liberty or minimal possessions.
Whereas each man has the minimal, legitimate sphere of actions
by virtue of his membership of the human species, each man expands this
sphere of actions by his labour prior to the establishment of political
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societies in the worldo In his account of appropriation, Locke is
primarily concerned to limit the power of non-appropriators over
appropriatorso God gave the world to "the use of the Industrious
and Rationalll, and IIHe that had as good left for his Improvement •••
ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's Labour"
(~, 34; emphasis added)o Locke's secondary concern is to limit the
power of appropriators over non-appropriators. In the beginning of
the world, says Locke, each man ought to appropriate external goods
"within the bounds, set by reason of what might serve for his use" (31).
. -
In the successive age of commercial economy, however, the "bounds of
!!!!. just Property" are reLaxed , Each man can jus tly acquire his
possessions, no matter how large they may be, as long as those
possessions do not perish uselessly in his hands (46). This relaxation
of the "hounds" shows that 'Locke's primary concern is to limit the power
of non-appropriators rather than the power of appropriators. This is
a trick Locke plays in Chapo 5 of the Second Treatise, which can be
criticizedo Once men have acquired unequal possessions and have
united into a political society, every man's power is equally limited
by positive laws ("one Rule for Rich and Poor" (142».
Finally, we come to Locke's theory of the state. Its core is
an attempt to determine "the Extent of the Legislative Power" (Chapo 11).
The legislative power is the supreme power of a commonwealth; and
whoever holds this power ought to exercise it within definite "bounds".
Unlike Filmer and Hobbes, Locke holds that no political agent ought to
exercise its power arbitrarily and without a limit (cf. ~,138; !I, 9).
The "Bounds" of the "Legislative Power of every Commonwealth" are set
by the "trust" of lithe Society" on the one hand, and hy the law of
nature on the other hand (~, 142). The society of men erects the
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legislative power with the trust that it shall be "govern'd by declared
~"(136); and the law of nature commands the legislative agent to
preserve mankind (142)0 Men, according to Locke, unite themselves
into a collective society for the purpose of the mutual preservation
of their exclusive rights over their lives, liberties and possessions;
then, the society sets up a legislative agent with the above-mentioned
"trus t". Hence, the firs t "bound" of the legis lative agent is this:
"The Legislative 0.0 cannot assume to its self a power to Rule by
extemporary Arbitrary Decrees, but is bound to dispense Justice, and
decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing Laws, and known
Authoris'd Judges" (136)0 Secondly, since the legislative agent is
bound to obey the law of nature which commands the preservation of
mankind, it ought to preserve its society or maintain its good, "the
publick good of the Socie ty" (135). In other words, positive laws
ought to be made and executed for the good of the whole society (which
consists of the holders of exclusive rights) rather than the good of a
particular section.
power (138-142).
Locke's concern with the limits of power, as we have seen above,
There are two other "bounds" of the legislative
is pervasive in his political theory. Let us now see some of the main
parallels that exist between his epistemology and his political theory.
In his political theory as well as in his epistemology, Locke is
dealing with an agent who has a tendency to exercise its power beyond
any limit. He tries to cut off endless disputes by confining the
activities of each agent within its proper domain. According to his
epistemology, no intelligent agent can, or ought to, interfere with the
vast ocean of beings which remain beyond his comprehension. Hence,
nobody can, or ought to, claim to know whether matter can think, or
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whether the soul is Inma terLa l, This method of cutting off endless
disputes has its counterparts in Locke's political theory. Two kinds
of disputes which are discussed in his political theory ought to be
distinguished: disputes among citizens over their rights, and disputes
between the ruler and the ruled. First, Locke tries to put an end to
interpersonal disputes by limiting the power of every member of a
commonwealth. A citizen's power does not extend any further than his
private domain, i.eo, the domain consisting of his life, liberty and
possessions. Anyone who exercises his power over the object of another
man's domain arbitrarily is liable to punishment. The laws made by a
legislative agent within a commonwealth specify the degrees of punish-
ment, and the state (whose brain is the legislative agent) is nothing
but an impartial arbiter to settle interpersonal disputes by its laws,
judges, and the collective force of the commonwealth. Secondly,
Locke tries to cut off endless disputes between the ruler (i.e., the
legislative agent) and the ruled, by limiting the power of the ruler.
The chief limit placed on the power of the ruler is that the ruler is
"bound" to uphold the rule of law. (The ruler cannot rule
arbitrarily; he ought to rule by an impartial application of equal
laws.) By confining the activity of the legislative agent to that of
making, and enforcing, the laws for the preservation of the lives,
liberties and possessions of citizens, Locke tries to remove any
conflict between the legislative agent and the body of citizens who
have exclusive power over their own lives, liberties and possessions.
If the legislative agent violates the limit of its actions, and fails to
rule by laws, then the body of citizens - "the people" - can exercise a
right to remove the legislative agent. Thus Locke's method of cutting
off disputes, the disputes between the ruler and the ruled as well as
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those between citizens, is the method of confining each agent's power
within its proper domain.
We have seen that Locke's epistemology also encourages each man
to use his intellectual power in the domain of moral knowledge (rather
than natural philosophy, or geometry). It may be said that an
equivalent of this encouragement in Locke's political theory is the
view that each man should use his labour power within his own estate.
(c) The Confinement of Power and the End of Disputes:
A Summary of Locke's Central Strategy
My account of the Essay and the Second Treatise has made it clear
that Locke's epistemology and his political theory share at least two
prominent features. First, Locke tries to set limits to an agent's
exercise of power, in his epistemology as well as in his political
theory. In his own words, he sets "bounds" to an agent's power, or the
actions of an agent. Secondly, Locke seeks to put an end to disputes
which arise from an agent's unlimited exercise of power. These two
features can be combined, and expressed as follows: Locke seeks to put
an end to disputes by limiting the power of an agent.
Some commentators may doubt whether the two features I have
singled out as the common features of Locke's epistemology and political
theory are really central to his inquiry. This doubt is reasonable,
since Locke himself did not comment on the relationship between his
epistemology and his political theory, or between the Essay and the
Second Treatise. As I said before, he produced the two discourses in
the hope that they could be understood independently. However, from
the viewpoint of a meta-discourse which I am conducting at the moment,
it is important to understand that Locke's theory of knowledge and his
theory of politics are two manifestations of his general inquiry into
443
the limits of the power of an agent. The purpose of this general
inquiry, as I said, is to cut off endless disputes. It is a practical
purpose. In what follows, we shall see another manifestation of Locke's
general inquiry: his theory of toleration. I shall discuss A Letter
concerning Toleration below, in order to show that my meta-discourse
has so far concentrated on what is, and was, really central to Locke.
We shall see that in his theory of toleration, just as in his epistemology
and political theory, Locke was preoccupied to set limits to the power
of an agent for the purpose of putting an end to disputes. A Letter
concerning Toleration contains a summary of my characterization of the
central, common features of Locke's epistemology and his political
theoryo (In this paragraph as well as in the preceding paragraph, I
have spoken of "an agent" in the singular. But it should be understood
that Locke set :imits to the powers of different kinds of agents, where
politics and toleration are concerned. In his epistemology, every man
is treated as an intelligent agent of the same kind; hence, his
epistemology concentrates on one kind of agent. In this respect, it
differs from his political theory or his theory of toleration.)
Locke opens his discourse on toleration by commenting on
religious fanaticism. His comment is a reproduction of the main theme
of the Essay which we have already noted:
the es tablishment of opinions C in religious
disputes] ••• for the most part are about nice and
intricate matters, that exceed the capacity of
ordinary understanding (Works, VI, 7; emphasis added)o
What is central to Locke's discourse on toleration is the view that
ecclesiastical power and political power ought to be exercised within
entirely distinct domains, for entirely distinct purposes. Locke
specifies the end and extent of ecclesiastical government as well as the
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end and extent of civil government, and repeatedly emphasizes that the
two ought to be kept sharply separateo It is on the basis of the
sharp separation of ecclesiastical power and political (or civil)
power that he discusses "how far the duty of toleration extends"
(Works, VI, 16)0 We shall focus on this basis, rather than Locke's
specific claims about the duty of tolerationo
Locke says that it is "above all 0.0 necessary to distinguish
exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to
settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other" (Works,
VI, 9). The end of a commonwealth is to preserve and promote the
"civil interests" or "civil concernments" of its members, i.e., their
lives, liberties, and possessions, by an impartial execution of laws.
The "whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil
concernments"; "it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended
to the salvation of souls" (Works, VI, 10). The end of ecclesiastical
power, on the other hand, is Itthe public worshipping of God, in such a
manner as they [i.e., free and voluntary members of a church J judge
acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls" (13).
"All discipline ought therefore to tend to that end, and all eccles-
iastical laws to be thereunto confined" (16)0 Nothing relating to
civil concernments ought, or can, be "transacted" in the "religious
society" called a church; "No force is here to be made use of 00. for
force belongs wholly to the civil magistrate" (16). On the basis of
the distinct ends and extents of civil power and ecclesiastical power,
Locke goes on to discuss "the duty of toleration". The details of his
discussion do not concern us. He claims, for instance, that no private
person has any right "to prejudice another person in his civil enjoy-
ments, because he is of another church or religion". The reason is
that a man's civil concernments are "not the business of religion" (17).
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What concerns us here is the fact that Locke repeatedly
emphasizes the distinctness and separateness of civil power and
ecclesiastical power. By limiting the two powers, he confines the
activities of the magistrate and of the church in separate domains.
By this method, he tries to put an end to any dispute between the realm
of politics and the realm of religion. Let us confirm these two points
by Lockeos text.
I shall quote one of the many passages where Locke emphasizes
that ecclesiastical power is distinct from political power.
[The power of the clergy]ought to be confined within the
bounds of the church, nor can it in any manner be extended to
civil affairs; because the church itself is a thing
absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The
boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles
heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite,
who mixes these societies, which are, in their original, end,
business, and in every thing, perfectly distinct, and
infinitely different from each other. No man therefore, with
whatsoever ecclesiastical office he be dignified, can deprive
another man, that is not of his church and faith, either of
liberty, or of any part of his worldly goods, upon the account
of that difference which is between them in religion (Works,
VI, 21; emphasis added).
Religious intolerance, in Locke's view, is the use of force to convert
men to any religion, whereas "toleration" is nothing but "the removing
of that force" (Works, VI, A Second Letter concerning Toleration, 62).
Hence, intolerance is a form of conflating the two distinct and
separate domains of politics and religion. It is to remove, confusingly,
the "fixed and immovable" "boundaries". The bounds of the two powers,
or the two agents (i.e., the civil magistrate and the church), are the
bounds which Locke has prescribed. Thus he uses the method of inquiry
common to the Essay and the Second Treatise, i.e., the method of setting
limits to an agent who tends to use its power unlimitedly. In his
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discourse on toleration, Locke sets limits to the powers of the church,
the state, and private members of any particular church.
The bounds Locke prescribes are called the "just" bounds
(Works, VI, 9). To be tolerant is to stay within these just bounds;
namely, to abstain from taking or using what properly belongs to the
realm of politics for a religious purpose. All men including the
highest priest and the civil magistrate ought to stay within the "just
bounds". By prescribing the "just bounds", Locke tries to put an end
to the on-going contest and confusion between the church and the state.
He comments on those "heads and leaders of the church" who were "moved
by avarice and insatiable desire of dominion" to preach that IIheretics
are to be outed of their possessions, and destroyed" (53). They are
the men who "mixed together, and confounded two things, •••, the church
and the commonwealth" in resorting to the use of force (53). Locke's
solution to this "unhappy agreement" between "the church and the
state" is to confine each agent within its proper domain:
if each of them would contain itself within its own bounds,
the one attending to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth,
the other to the salvation of souls, it is impossible that
any discord should ever have happened between them. (54).
Just as in the Essay and the Second Treatise, Locke tries to solve
disputes by confining the power of each agent within its proper domain.
Locke's discourse on toleration is, of course, not simply about
the relationship between the church and the state. Throughout his
discourse, he urges every Christian to render what is religious to its
proper sphere, and to render what is civil (or political) to its proper
sphere. Each man's care of his soul ought to be left to each man who
may freely choose to join a church; and what is God's -his power to
dispense justice in the next world - ought to be left to God. Each
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man's care of his life, liberty and possessions ought to be left to
himself, rather than the church or the civil magistrate. And the
public punishment of those who violate another man's civil concernments
ought to be left to the civil magistrate who rules by an impartial
application of equal lawso Locke's method of containing each agent's
power within its proper domain is a method of giving everyone his due,
or rendering to every agent what is "his own". He tries to do
"justice" to the religious as well as the political; the clergy as
well as the civil magistrate; God as well as citizens.
Let me summarize my account of the central features which are
common to Locke's theory of knowledge, his theory of politics, and his
theory of tolerationo The basic category of Locke's inquiry is
"power", or an agent who has powero His general method is to set
limits to the power of each agento His general purpose is to end
disputes. We are now in a position to see Locke's three discourses as
specific manifestations of his general inquiry into the limits of
power. The spirit of Locke's general inquiry, as I have indicated in
the preceding paragraph, is suum cuique tribuere (litorender to everyone
his due (his right, or his own)")o We should interpret the Stoic maxim
of justice negatively in this context, just as Locke and other modern
theorists after Grotius have interpreted it negatively. It means:
abstain from what is everyone's due; or leave intact what properly
belongs to everyone; or preserve what is everyoneQs own. Though Locke
tries to end disputes by containing the powers of agents within their
distinct domains, his main task is to state, clearly and distinctly,
what are the proper domains of the agentso Once he demarcates each
agent's proper domain, or once he determines the "extent" of each agent's
power, then he only urges every agent to stay within his own domain.
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If every agent minds his own business, then justice and peace are
negatively established among all agents - intelligent agents,
appropriators, non-appropriators, the supreme political agent, and the
church. In Locke's view, disputes and injustice disappear if everyone
minds his own businesso The spirit of his inquiry which runs through
his three discourses, then, is this: Mind your own business, and
disputes will cease. Or to adapt one of Locke's propositions of
demonstrable morality for our purpose, we can say, "Where everyone minds
his property, there is no injustice".
(iii) The Bounds of a Discourse
If we are to think about the possibility of a successful meta-
discourse in the future, it is not sufficient to detect Locke's pervasive
concern with the limits of power, or his hope for the end of disputes.
We must recognize another peculiarity of his discourses. Locke sets
limits to his discourse, and various segments of his discourse. He
treats one discourse as distinct and separate from another discourse;
one segment of a discourse from another segment of the same discourseo
He draws sharp boundaries between the topics he discusses, and develops
his views within a narrowly demarcated territory. In short, Locke
limits his discourses and parts of his discourses, just as much as he
limits the powers of the agents he discusses.
This peculiar feature makes it difficult to relate a part of
the Essay to another part, or a part of the Second Treatise to another
part. It makes it extremely difficult to relate a part of the Essay to
a part of the Second Treatise. Often, though not always, a connecting link
is simply absent because of Locke's preoccupation with the bounds of a
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discourse. Every attentive reader would notice how frequently Locke
makes qualifying remarks of the following type: "it is not my present
purpose to discuss "... , "I shall not meddle wi th this ques tion at the
moment •••", or "I shall have occasion hereafter to consider this".
Any writer may make this type of qualifying remark, if he wishes to
indicate that one question (discussed in one place) is distinct from
another question (discussed in another place, or not discussed at all).
But Locke makes qualifying remarks ~ often. Why? The reason is the
following: he is preoccupied with the idea of setting limits to the
Questions he deals with; and he wishes to respect the "just bounds" of
his discourse within which he is supposed to stayo In what follows,
I shall substantiate this point by quoting extensively from Locke.
Examples of Locke's typical qualifying remarks can be found
everywhere in his writings. In the Preface to his first writing, he
already stated the following:
I have chose [sic.] to draw a great part of my discourse from
the supposition of the magistrate's power, derived from, or
conveyed to him by, the consent of the people .0.. Not that
I intend to meddle with that question whether the magistrate's
crown drops down on his head immediately from heaven or be
placed there by the hands of his subjects, it being sufficient
to my purpose that the supreme magistrate of every nation what
way soever created, must necessarily have an absolute and
arbitrary power over all the indifferent actions of his people
(F. Tract, l22f.).
The key expression we must note is this: "I" do "not" "intend" to
"meddle with" another question. It might appear that like so many
academic writers, Locke is simply distinguishing what he intends to
discuss from what he does not intend to discuss. If this is the case,
then there is nothing peculiar about his mode of writing or thinking.
Yet there is more in Locke than the academic convention. Let us look
at more of his qualifying statements:
4.'iO
"l shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration
of the Mind" (Essay, I, L, 2)0
"The Reason of this, I shall shew, in another Place"
(II, iv, 6)0
"00. of bow vast an extent it is, I shall have occasion to
consider hereafter" (II, ix, 4)0
"This might carry our thoughts farther, were it seasonable in
this place" (II, xx, 6) 0
"I shall not now enlarge any farther on the wrong judgments,
and neglect of what is in their power .000 This would make a
Volume, and is not my business" (II, xxi, 70).
"But of this, more in its due place" (!!., 11)0
"What this Duty is, we shall in its due place examine"
(!!" 66).
"But if anyone had began [sic.], and made himself a Property
in any particular thing, (which how he, or anyone else,
could do, shall be shewn in another place) .00" (!I, 87)0
"Every Transgression may be punished to that degree ••• 0
Every Offence that can be committed in the State of Nature,
may in the State of Nature be also punished 00.. it would
be besides my present purpose, to enter here into the
particulars of the Law of Nature, or its measures of punish-
ment "(.§I, 12).
"But this bye the bye.
(ST, 42).
To return to the argument in hand"
lilt is not my business to inquire here into the original of
the power or dignity of the clergy" (Toleration, Works, VI, 21).
Again and again, Locke reminds himself and his readers of his "present
purpose" or "business", by indicating what his present purpose or
business is not.-
The sentences which I have quoted above are not, properly
speaking, cross references. He does not specify where he will discuss
the question he says he will. All he is suggesting is that he is
discussing one question now, and he will discuss another distinct
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question in "another place". Rosalie Colie, who has examined Locke's
skill as an essayist, has consequently found his qualifying remarks
Idistracting".34 Distracting as they may be, we need to explain why
Locke made those remarks so frequently. It is a perverse interpretation
to say that Locke was trying to avoid discussing some difficult problems,
or he was trying to conceal his ambiguities and inconsistencies. No
sufficient evidence exists for this interpretation. The correct
answer is that Locke was in the habit of distinguishing one question
sharply from another question, and he hesitated to transgress the sharp
boundaries he himself had drawn. He became apologetic, and tried to
justify himself, when he realized that he had transgressed the self-
imposed limit. His apologetic and justifying stance is apparent in
quite a few passages. I shall produce some examples:
"True notions concerning the nature and extent of Liberty are
of so great importance, that I hope I shall be pardoned this
Digression, which my attempt to explain it, has led me into.
The Ideas of ~, Volition, Liberty, and Necessity, in this
Chapter of Power, came naturally in my way" (Essay, II, xxi, 72).
"I hoped this transgression, against the method I have proposed
to my self, will be forgiven me, if I have quitted it a little,
to explain some Ideas of great importance; such as are those of
the ~, Liberty, and Necessity, in this place, where they, as
it were, offered themselves, and sprang up from their proper
roots" (first edition, Chapter on "Power", secto 46).
"Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large,
when I come to treat of Words, and their Use: yet I could not
avoid to take this much notice here .0.11 (Essay, II, xxii, 8).
"the method I at first proposed to my self, would now require,
that I should immediately proceed to shew, what use the Under-
standing makes of them [i.e., our ideas], and what Knowledge we
have by them. This was that which, in the first general view
I had of this Subject, was all that I thought I should have to
do: but upon a nearer approach, I find, that there is so close
a connexion between Ideas and Words ••• that it is impossible
to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge ••• without
considering, first, the Nature, Use, and Signification of
Language; which therefore, must be the business of the next Book"
(II, xxxiii, 19).
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In the second passage quoted above, Locke speaks of the "transgression,
against the method I have proposed to my self". The "method" here
seems to refer to the "present Business" he states in Section 2 of
Chapter on I1Power": "my present Business" is "not to search into the
original of Power, but how we come by the !2!!. of it". Locke
certainly does not confine himself to the task of explaining how we come
to have the idea of power in that chapter. In the fourth passage quoted
above, Locke again speaks of the "method" he proposed to himself.
This method refers to the plan he laid down at the very beginning of
the Essay, the plan or "my Purpose" (I, i, 2; also 3) which does not
include a discussion of language and words. Thus Locke is apologizing
for, and justifying, his violation of the limits he imposed on his
discourse. He is saying that he is not strictly minding his own
business.
To Locke, it is important to stay within a sharply delimited
domain of problems. He seems to think that an intellectually
responsible man can, and should, solve one problem at a time by sharply
separating it from a seemingly similar problem. In fact, he became
indignant when his critics ignored the sharp boundaries he had drawn
between different segments of his discourse. Locke harshly condemned
James Tyrrell on this ground. In the letters which Tyrrell wrote to
Locke in 1690 (June and July), he complained that his account of "the
divine law" in the first edition of· the Essay was not very clear (Essay,
1st. ed., II, xxvii, 7-8; in later edso, II, xxviii, 7-8). Tyrrell
misunderstood what Locke meant by "the divine law", partly because he
did not read the Essay very carefully and partly because he was
vulnerable to the unfounded opinion of his friends in Oxford. Whereas
Locke meant by "the divine law" the law of nature as well as the
453
revealed law of God, Tyrrell thought that it would mean the revealed
law alone. What made the matter worse is that Tyrrell made the
following comment in his letter to Locke:
you doe not expressely tell us, where to find, this Law,
unlesse in the SS. [i.e., the Scriptures] and .0. it is
likewise much doubted by some whether the Rewards and
punishments you mention can be demonstrated as established
by your divine Law ••• (Correspondence, IV, 107fo).
This comment infuriated Locke, because it entirely ignored the bounds
of his discourse, i.e., the "present business" he was engaged in at a
particular part of his discourse. His indignant reply is the clearest
expression of his concern with the bounds of a discourse, or the bounds
of a part of his discourseo For this reason, I shall quote Locke's
reply at length:
in the present case demonstration of future rewards and
punishments was no more my business then whether the Squaring
of the circle could be demonstrated or no. But I know not
how you would still have me besides my purpose and against
all rules of method run out into a discourse of the divine law
shew how and when it was promulgated to mankinde demonstrate
its inforcement by rewards and punishments in another life
in a place where I had nothing to do with all this and in a
case where some mens bare supposition of such a law whether
true or false servd my turneo QTwas my businesse there to
shew how men came by moral Ideas or Notions and that I thought
they did by comparing their actions to a ruleo The next
thing I endeavour to shew is what rules men take to be the
standards to which they compare their actions to frame moral
Ideas and those I take to be the divine law, the Municipal law
and the law of reputation or fashion. ••• If I am out in
either of these propositions I must confesse I am in an error
'tis not of concernment to my purpose in that chapter they
[ioeo, the rukes ] be as much as true or noe but only that
they be considerd in the mindes of men as rules to which they
compare their actions and judg of their morality. .00
I did not designe here to treat of the grounds of true
morality which is necessary to true and perfect happinesse
and 'thad been impertinent if I had so designed: my business
was only to shew whence men had moral Ideas and what they were
and that I suppose is sufficiently don in that chapter.
(Correspondence, IV, 4 August 1690, 112f.; emphasis added.)
•••
Locke's message to Tyrrell is, in short, this: I have properly done my
business, and you are unjustly complaining about things which I have
nothing to do witho
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From all these considerations, it is clear that Locke was
preoccupied to solve each problem within a narrowly confined territory
by his own intellectual labouro From his viewpoint, Tyrrell merely
"meddled with" his proper business in a particular part of his discourse,
without launching a just criticism which should take into account his
intellectual labour within that narrow domain. "Meddling" is the word
which Locke frequently used to criticize those procedures and actions
which do not respect prescribed limits. Locke himself, as we have seen,
did not wish to "meddle" with another question which b to be dealt
with in another place. Two years before he wrote the angry letter to
Tyrrell, he complained about Tyrrell's personality to Edward Clarke:
"Mr. Oakley [i.e., James Tyrrell] meddles in business wherein he has
neither commission nor knowledge, and loves to be talking he knows not
what" (Correspondence III, 472; also, 405 & 455 for Tyrrell's
"impudent meddling" and his "medleing, without order, in a businesse,
to,,).35 ddli i hhe was wholy a stranger Me ng w t another domain of a
discourse seems to be just as wrong as meddling with another man's
personal affairs. Locke also condemned Filmer's acts of meddling with,
or conflating, distinct senses of words. Filmer Ithudl[es] several
Suppositions together ••• and in doubtful and general terms makes such
a medly and confusion" (Fr, 20). This meddling is different from
meddling with another domain of a discourse, or another man's personal
affairs. Yet any act which does not respect its proper limits, in
Locke's view, ought to be condemned.
Let us note that what Locke said to Tyrrell applies to any
commentator who conflates the domain of Locke's epistemological discourse
with the domain of his political discourse. One discourse is about
ideas and knowledge, whereas the other discourse is about property and
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government. Locke's views about the idea of "secondary qualities", or
"mixed modes", or "real essences", properly belong to his discourse on
ideas and knowledge. They have nothing to do with his discourse on
property and government. We have seen that Milam, Yolton and Tully
conflated the two discourses. Locke could have said to them: My
"business" in Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise is to show how men "came
by" property and it is "a place" which has "nothing to do with" ideas
or knowledge. Indeed, if we trace Locke's views of "mixed modes",
etco, then we simply end up in a spot within the confined territory
of his discourse on ideas and knowledge, without ever being able to
reach his political theoryo We run up against the bounds of his
epistemological discourse, and if our temptation to seek for epistemo-
logical foundations is strong, we overcome the existing boundaries by
the method of conflation.
Without exaggeration, we can say that Locke's preoccupation
with the bounds of his discourse is just as deep as his preoccupation
with the bounds of the power of an agent. In one case, he is concerned
about the proper domain or business of a discourse, or a segment of a
discourse; and he tries to avoid meddling with another separate domain
or business. In the other case, he is concerned about the proper
domain or business of an agent; and he tries to prevent one agent from
meddling with another's businesso In both cases, the same ideas control
Locke's thought - "property" and "justice".
(iv) Towards a Future Meta-Discourse
I have presented a new picture of Locke's discourses, in place
of the old "foundationalist" picture. His discourses, or at least his
three main discourses, are linked by his general method of setting limits
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to the powers of agents, and his general practical aim of ending
disputes. Those discourses are distinct from one another, in that they
deal with distinct problemso They are independent of each other, in
that one discourse does not depend on the conclusions of another
discourseo Within the distinct sub-domains of each discourse, Locke
also discusses distinct problems without (necessarily) relying on the
conclusions he obtains elsewhere.
One of the reasons why Locke scholars have continued to use the
IIfoundationalist" picture of philosophy in linking his epistemology to
his political theory is that they have been ~able to conceive of any
alternative picture of his works. Now I have presented an alternative
picture of sharply-bounded, horizontally-linked discourses. I have
also shown the miserable failures of the past attempts to seek for the
epistemological foundations of Locke's political theory. In this
final section, I shall urge that anyone interested in a meta-discourse
on Locke should do two thingso First, he should abandon, once and
for all, the foundationalist approach to Lockevs discourses. Secondly,
he should try to enrich the picture I have presented as much as
possibleo I shall expand on these two points.
Some of our stubborn foundationalists might prefer to retain a
hope: although epistemology, for Locke, is not the foundational
discipline for another discipline such as political theory, ~ may
successfully construct the epistemological foundations of his political
theory by making use of his Essay. This is an idle hope. It is idle
to hope that one day, a very skillful commentator may successfully
construct such foundations. We must abandon this hope completely.
The reason for complete abandonment is that since any such attempt is
an attempt to create fictitious foundations which have nothing to do
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with Locke, it fails to clarify any part of his political theory or its
relationship to his epistemology. An epistemological basis of LockeQs
political theory (or any of his discourses, for that matter) cannot be
found in his Essay. And it is foolish to treat his epistemology as if
it could provide some support for his non-epistemological discourses.
Let us consider how foolish it is to remain addicted to the old
"foundationalist" picture, and to retain the hope of constructing an
epistemological basis of Locke's political theory. Suppose that we
look for an epistemological doctrine in the Essay which can possibly be
re-interpreted as supporting, or justifying, a portion of Locke's
political theory. It is very difficult to find such a doctrine in the
Essay. Here as well as elsewhere, we mean by an "epistemological
doctrine" a doctrine about ideas or knowledge. Locke's account of a
man's "liberty" in the Essay, II, xxi, for instance, has a certain
connection with his discussion of a man's "liberty" (of disposal) in
the Second Treatise (58, 63). But his account of a man's "liberty"
in the Essay is not an epistemological doctrine. One might suggest,
then, that Locke's account of the idea of power, as distinct from his
"digression" into a discussion of liberty, necessity and will, can
possibly be re-interpreted as an epistemological basis of his political
theory. This suggestion does not seem to be utterly implausible,
since the concept of "power" is fundamental to Locke's discourses
including his discourse on property and government.
~lat happens if we take this suggestion seriously? We are bound
to be fooled by our own fiction. Locke's account of the idea of power
(as distinct from his "digression") is primarily an account of how we
come to have the idea of power (Essay, II, xxi, 1). Unlike Hume, Locke
does not challenge the presupposition that our idea of power is clear,
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or intelligible. What Locke does in the Second Treatise (and other
works), of course, is to use the idea of power, or the word "power".
So we must ask: what is the connection between Locke's account of the
origin of the idea of power and his political theory? There is no
causal connection. Locke did not use the idea of power in his political
theory, as a result of giving a particular account of the origin of the
idea of power. (From the beginning of his intellectual career, Locke
used the concept of powero) There is no logical connection, eithero
Anyone can use the word "power", or the idea of power, even if he
cannot give a true account of how we acquire the idea of power. Locke's
use of the idea of power in the Second Treatise is certainly independent
of the truth, or falsity, of his particular account of the origin of
the idea of power in the Essay. All we can assert is that we can treat
Lockevs account of the origin of the idea of power!! a justificatory
device for his use of the idea of power in his political theory; or
more precisely, as if his account of the origin of the idea of power had
been designed to justify his use of the idea in his political theory.
Certainly, we ~ give this as-if treatment in the sense that it is
possible for us to do sOo But it is highly ~desirable to do so. Does
it clarify any part of Lockevs political theory which might otherwise be
neglected? Noo To understand that Locke uses the idea of power in his
political theory, we only need to observe that he actually uses the
idea of power or the word "power" in the Second Treatise. By constructing
this foundation, we gain nothingo It only satisfies our pre-existing
inclination to treat Locke's works in accordance with our "foundational-
ist" picture. Furthermore, if we forget that this reconstruction is
based on our inclination and has nothing to do with Locke, then the
reconstruction will serve to cherish the false belief that Locke probably
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gave an account of the origin of the idea of power in order to
justify his use of the idea of power in his political theory. If we
do not wish to cherish this false belief, then we must always keep
reminding ourselves that this reconstruction has no basis in Locke's
thought, but is a fictitious product of our own. But why should we
take this twisted, indirect approach to Locke's works? Why should we
create a fiction only to destroy it afterwards? If a fictitious
construct serves a useful purpose, then it is worth creating it. But
this fiction serves no purpose. It is merely a waste of intellect;
and if we are forgetful, we will perpetuate various false beliefs
about Locke's discourse. For the purpose of a fruitful meta-discourse,
we must abandon this fictitious construct in the first place. Instead,
we should take a direct, straightforward approach to Locke's discourses.
I have illustrated above the futility of any future attempt to
construct an epistemological basis of Locke's political theory out of
his Essay. I say "any" future attempt, though I have considered only
one possible attempt. Since no epistemological doctrine of the Essay
supports his political theory in reality, any attempt to construct an
epistemological basis of it out of the Essay is an attempt to create a
fiction. This fiction deceives us because it gratifies our pre-
existing inclination to treat Locke's epistemology as the foundation of
his political theory. If we create a fiction of this sort, we feel
that we have solved our "problem". But this "problem" is a pseudo-
problem which arises out of our false, prior belief that Locke's
epistemology must support his political theory. Once we get rid of
this belief, then our "problem" gets dissolved. Then we do not need
to struggle to create a superfluous fiction. There are other epistemo-
logical and methodological doctrines in the Essay which look as if they
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36could justify what Locke does in his political theory.
matter how hard we may try, our !!:1! construct cannot elucidate any
real relationship between Locke's epistemology and his political theory.
It only serves to solve our pseudo-problems, the problems which arise
from our prior addiction to the foundationalist picture of philosophy.
We must, therefore, abandon any future attempt to treat Locke's
discourses by using our old philosophical.drug, i.e., the foundationalist
picture of philosophy. The dream of a successful, future attempt to
construct an epistemological basis of Locke's political theory is
nothing but the dream of a drug addict. If a man takes heroin
habitually, he may feel he can construct something valuable and solve
his problems without actually giving up his heroin. What he needs, of
course, is a total conversion. He must turn away from the drug which
creates his problems in the first place. Likewise, what we need is a
total conversion. We must turn away from the old foundationalist
picture. OUr future meta-discourse must be a healthy discourse which
does not conflate the real and the fictitious, the true and the false.
A Gestalt switch is required for this healthy, future meta-discourse.
We can perform the required Gestalt switch by accepting the new
picture of Locke's discourses I have already presented. The vigor of
a future meta-discourse, I take it, depends on the efforts of Locke
scholars to enrich this new picture. But I shall not be so optimistic
as to believe in the unlimited possibility of our future meta-discourse.
On the contrary, we should expect only a limited amount of enlightenment
from our future meta-discourse. This is due to the sharp boundaries
which separate one of Locke's discourses from another, and one part of
his discourse from another part. Nevertheless, we can enrich the new
picture by trying to find what is common to his separate discourses,
and their various segments.
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We can link Lockeos discourses by taking up his general idea
(e.g., his concept of human nature, his concept of liberty), and
tracing various modifications of this general idea across his discourses.
This method has in fact been already adopted by Hans Aarsleff and
37Raymond Polino We can also extract common themes and common
concepts from Locke's frequent use of analogy, or his parallel analysis
of distinct subject-matters. We should try to detect various
parallels in Locke's treatment of distinct subject-matters, because
this is almost the only way to invigorate our meta-discourse. The
parallels which we frequently come across in Locke's discourses may
appear to be superficial at first sight. Yet they are often
indicative of his deeply held beliefs or his deeply entrenched modes
of thought. For this reason, too, we must be very attentive to any
existing parallel in Locke's writings. I shall indicate below that
there are more parallels than I have already noted.
The acquisition of the knowledge of the law of nature is
analogous to the acquisition of external goods such as gold and silver.
Locke draws the following analogy in the second essay on the law of
nature: Neither the knowledge of the law of nature nor natural
resources are given to "idle and listless people". They can only be
acquired "with great labour"o In order to acquire the gold and silver
hidden in darkness, we need to use our "arms and hands" diligently.
Similarly, in order to acquire the knowledge of the law of nature, we
need to exercise our "mental faculties" diligently (!!:li, II, 135) 0
Locke's analogy here is designed to illustrate the point that though
our mental faculties "can" lead us to the knowledge of the law of
nature, not everyone makes "proper use" of his mental faculties (.!k!.2..,
The "proper use", according to Locke, involves a diligent study.
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Most people, he says, are lazy. They are "little concerned about
their duty", and guided mostly by "the example of others", "traditional
customs", "the fashion of the country", and "the authority of those
whom they consider good and wise" (Ibido, 135)0
What Locke is claiming, therefore, is that every man can, and
ought to, acquire the knowledge of the law of nature by diligently
exercising his own powers, and independently of the authority and
tradition of other meno In the Essay, Bk I, he restates this view
with respect to ideas and knowledge in general: God "fitted Men with
faculties and means" to acquire ideas and truths, and men ought not to
"misimploy their power" "by lazily enslaving their Minds, to the
Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which it is their duty
carefully to examine" (Essay, I, iv, 22). This political or juridical
metaphor is significanto It indicates that Locke's discourse on ideas
and knowledge and his discourse on property and government are united
by the common belief that every man can, and ought to, exercise his
powers diligently and independently of the dominion of other men.
According to the Second Treatise, all men are naturally "furnished with
like Faculties", without any subordination among them (g, 6). Everyone
can, and ought to, acquire a property in external goods by his hard work,
and independently of the labour of others, prescriptive rights, and
the authority of a monarch.
We can further develop the parallels involved in the two
discourses. For instance, we can draw attention to Locke's egalitarian-
ism about men's abilities (ioeo, powers, or faculties), and his
libertarianism about their actual achievements. God has fitted men
with equal mental faculties, and the "great difference that is to be
found in the Notions of Mankind, is, from the different use they put
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their Faculties to" (Essay, I, iv, 22). In Locke's view, men's
abilities are equal, but since they exercise their abilities in different
degrees, some acquire more knowledge and ideas than others. This is
one of the main themes of The Conduct of Understanding (sects., 4ff.).
But we find the same combination of egalitarianism and libertarianism
in Locke's discourse on property and government. In the beginning of
the world, every man was able to acquire a property in external goods
by exercising an equal labour-power. But "different degrees of
Industry were apt to give Men Possessions in different Proportions"
(.2.1:, 48).
It is not my task to carry on a meta-discourse by discussing
more parallels, and bringing out more themes and concepts common to
Locke's discourses. That is the task of future commentators. I have
shown that my picture of sharply-bounded, horizontally-linked
discourses can be enriched by further discovery of common themes and
their parallel expressions. The centrality of the concept of power in
Locke's thought has been confirmed, and I have clarified his general
understanding of the relationship of power and its exercise to enrich
my picture of his discourses.
As I said before, we cannot expect to derive unlimited
enlightenment from our future meta-discourse. Locke's discourses are
sharply bounded, and specific doctrines developed within one territory
have frequently nothing to do with doctrines of another territory.
The horizontal links between his discourses are not epistemological
links. They are Locke's basic modes of thinking (e.g., the limits of
power) ; his practical concerns (e.g., the end of disputes) ; or his
beliefs (e.g., men's equal abilities). If we can show more horizontal
links in the future, it will help us see the basic coherence of Locke's
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discourses. But it should be remembered that those horizontal links
are difficult to find. There are not many such links.
Finally, let us ask whether Locke can be called a "systematic"
philosopher. Though he has certain basic methods of handling distinct
subject-matters, the epithet "systematic" is not appropriate for Locke.
He is an "analytic" philosopher in the sense that he is preoccupied
with distinguishing and separating one thing from another rather than
uniting one thing with another. A "systematic" philosopher of the 17th
century is Leibniz, who criticized Locke's tripartite division of the
sciences in New Essays on Human Understanding. The "chief problem" of
his division of the sciences, says Leibniz, is that "each of the
branches appears to engulf the others". Locke's "three great provinces"
are "perpetually at war with one another because each of them keeps
encroaching on the rights of the others". What Leibniz has in mind is
that such encroachment is bound to take place in any systematic and
constructive treatment of a subject-matter. He concludes: the divided
sciences should not be conceived "as distinct sciences but rather as
different ways in which one can organize the same truths, if one sees
. h" 38f1t to express them more t an once. Had Locke lived longer to see
Leibniz' New Essays, he might have sent him his meta-philosophical
reply across the channel. He might have replied: "My chief business,
or concernment, is critical rather than constructive. Unlike continental
metaphysicians who meddle with a number of things, I prefer to work on
properly and narrowly divided subject-matters, and render each subject-
matter its due".
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1. Max Milam, "Epistemological Basis of Locke's Idea of Property",
Western Political Quarterly, XX, 1 (1967). John Yolton, Locke
and the Compass of Human Understanding (London: C. U. P., 1970),
Chap. 8. James Tully, A Discourse on Property (Cambridge:
C. U. P., 1980), Chap. 1.
20 The metaphors I use here are all too famous, and the point of my
use will become clear in the course of my discussion. For the
sources of the Marxian metaphor, see various writings of Marx;
for instance, his Doctoral Dissertation where a religious man is
said to be "a victim of fictions and abstractions", or his
Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right where
a man in an "inverted world" is said to hold on to"illusory
happiness". Quoted from Writings of the young Marx on Philosophy
and Society, trans. & ed. Easton and Guddat (New York: Doubleday
Anchor, 1967), p. 65 & pp. 250ff. Or see Capital, Ch. 1
Sect. 4, "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret thereof".
~ for Wittgenstein, see his Philosophical Investigations
(New York: Macmillan, 1953), sects. US & 309. "A picture held
us captive" (sect. 115); and "What is your aim in philosophy?
To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (sect. 309).
3. Laslett's view of the relationship between the Essay and the Two
Treatises is presented in his long Introduction to his critical
edition of Two Treatises of Government, IV, 2 ("Locke the
Philosopher and Locke the Political Theorist"). Tully explicitly
refers to Laslett's view in his discussion of th~ "contribution"
of the Essay. See Tully, 2£. £!!., p. 8.
4. Milam, 2£. £!!., p. 22.
5. ~., po 24.
6. Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy (Glasgow:
R. & Ao Foulis, 1755), po 318.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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13.
14.
Yolton, .2£.0 £!!., po 184 n •
~., p• 184.
.!ill.
~., p. 185.
~., p. 187.
~., po 195.
Tully, .2£.0 £!!., p. 8 •
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15. I shall quote from the fourth edition of Pufendorf's work,
Of the Law of Nature and Nations, which contains BarbeyracOs
discourse. The descriptive title of the work is the following:
Of the Law of Nature and Nations. Eight Books. Written in
LATIN by the Baron Pufendorf ••••/Done into ENGLISH by BASIL
KENNETT ••••/The Fourth Edition, carefully corrected./ To which
is now prefixed M. Barbeyrac's Prefatory DISCOURSE, CONTAINING
An Historical and Critical Account of the SCIENCE of MORALITY,
and the Progress it has made in the World, from the earliest
Times down to the Publication of this Work./ Done into English
by Mr. Carew •••• LONDON, Printed for J. and J. KLAPTON, J.
Darby, 000. MDCCXXVIII.
I thank the staff of the Special Collection Room of Edinburgh
University Library for permitting me access to this work.
Barbeyrac's Discourse was originally published as a preface to
his French translation of Pufendorf's work (Amsterdam, 1706).
16. Barbeyrac, Discourse, Sect. 1, p. I.
.!2.!!!. , Sect. 2, pp. 3f.
Ibid. , Sec t , 2, p. 4.
tsra., Sect. 2, p. 5.
Ibid. , Sect. 1, p. 1.
17.
18.
19.
21. Ibid., Sects. 3 & 4, pp. 6ff. Barbeyrac replies to Montaigne
"that our perplexities about moral laws arise from "Interest",
"Prejudices of Infancy, Education, or Custom", though moral laws
themselves are "not obscure at all" (po 6 & p. 8). He also
quotes Locke, one of "the most able Philosophers", in order to
reject the claim that morality cannot be demonstrated because of
"the great Diversity of Opinions amongst Men" (Sect. 4).
22. Tully also makes an illegitimate use of Barbeyrac, in order to
connect 17th-century natural-law political theories with Locke's
epistemology and/or another 17th-century epistemology.
He ascribes to Barbeyrac the view that "the superiority of
the seventeenth-century natural law WTiters rests on their
reconstruction of political theory on the basis of a new
epistemology introduced by Francis Bacon" (Tully, OPe cit., p. 6).
But in fact, Barbeyrac does not discuss the significance of
Bacon's "epistemology". What he says is that Bacon tried to
improve the imperfect state of philosophy, and that "we have
Reason to believe, that 'twas the reading of the Works of this
great Man, that inspir'd Hugo Grotius, with the Thoughts of
attempting the first to compose a System of the Law of Nature"
(Barbeyrac, Ope cit., p. 79). All Barbeyrac is claiming is
that Bacon's scientific spirit, or his spirit of systematic
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treabnent, probably inspired Grotius. Barbeyrac's comment in
this context has nothing to do with a "new epistemology" of the
17th century. He only mentions Bacon, and refers to Grotius
as "the first who broke the Ice" in a systematic treatment of
morality. Then he goes on to say that though Hobbes created
many enemies, "no one had ever yet penetrated so far into the
Foundations of Civil Polity" (Ibid., p. 80). What Barbeyrac
is describing is the development of a systematic treatment of
"morality" in the broadest sense of ethics, natural law, and
politics, and not its epistemological foundations. See
Barbeyrac's Di~urse, Sect. 39, "Of the most celebrated Moral
Writers of the Seventeenth Century, (when Morality was much
improvQd beyond what it had ever been before, and reduc'd into
a System)". Additionally, Barbeyrac makes no mention of
Locke in this section because the "celebrated moral writers" he
discusses are those who theorized before the publication of
Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium.
Tully also tries to connect Locke's discussion of modes and
relations with his, and the 17th century's, systematic treatment
of "morality" by the wildest method imaginable. He quotes
from Barbeyrac the following remark: "In a System of the Law
of Nature an author ought, without Dispute, to begin with
instructing his Reader in the Nature of Moral Entities or
Beings" (Tully, ~. £!l., p. 9). Then he mysteriously believes
that this remark establishes a connection between Locke's
epistemology and his, and the 17th century's, political theory.
Barbeyrac "s remark, quoted by Tully, has nothing to do wi th
epistemology, let alone Locke. The point of Barbeyrac's remark
is that whereas Pufendorf begins his systematic treatment of
"morality" by explaining "the Nature of moral Entities",
"the Principles and different Qualities of human Actions", etc.,
"we meet with scarce any Thing in Grotius, relating to all
these Matters". Grotius "saw what was the fundamental
Principles of the Law of Nature". But he "only pOints this out
in his Preface and in such a way as to make readers to suspect
that Grotius' ideas on this matter are not clear". (Quotations
are from Barbeyrac, ~. £!l., p. 84). Not epistemological
foundations, but the fundamental principles of the law of nature
ought to be stated at the beginning of any systematic treatise
on the law of nature; and since Grotius fails to do this,
Barbeyrac thi~<s it is a defect of his work. No epistemology
is at issue. A connection with Locke is not even hinted at.
I cannot help wondering if Tully ever read Barbeyrac. Yet he
claims that he proceeds to discuss Locke "in an historically
more sensitive manner" than most commentators! (Tully,~. ill.,
p. 8.)
23. Tully believes - wrongly - that "Yolton has already broken turf
in this area [ of es tablishing a link between Locke's epis temology
and his political theory] with his excellent discussion of Locke's
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theory of property as an application of the kind of conceptual
analysis recommended in the Essay" (2£. ill., p, 8).
24. Tully, ~. ~., p. 28.
25. ~., pp. 22ff.
260 Ibid., p. 33.
27. ~., p. 8. Tully comments on the relationship between the
Essay and the Treatises by multiplying undefined expressions
such as 'imp1icatory series', 'supportive', 'ground' and
'underpinning'.
280 See Essays on the Law of Nature, the fourth essay. For a
successful attempt to show the coherence of Locke's view of the
law of nature and his attack on innate ideas and principles, see
Hans Aarsleff, "The State of Nature and the Nature of Man",
John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. Yolton (London:
c. U. P., 1969), especially, pp. 127ff. A~rs1eff rescues
Locke from careless interpreters of Locke's doctrine of the law
of nature such as Laslett and Vaughan.
29. Laslett's Introduction to the Two Treatises (2nd ed. 1967;
rpt. London: C. U. Po, 1970), p. 50.
30. Laslett's Introduction to the Two Treatises, pp. 58-65.
Also see my discussion in Appendix 1.
310 For this reference to Vaihinger, I am indebted to Richard
Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 135, n. 5. Hans
Vaihinger's view is found in his "Uber den Ursprung des Wortes
'Erkenntnistheorie,lI, Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. XXII
(Leipzig, 1876) 0
32. For a brief account of the emergence of "epistemology" as the
foundational discipline, see Rorty, ~. ill., Ch. 3. Rorty,
however, mistakenly treats Locke as the founder of the
foundationalist picture of philosophy. I refer to Rorty here,
not because he makes this mistake; but because he elucidates
the role of neo~Kantians in the formation of the epistemology-
centred picture of philosophy.
Let me point out a pitfall of the neo-Kantian reading of
the Essay. In the Epistle to the Reader, Locke says that he
proposed to his friends that a critical examination of our
intellectual powers should be their "first Enquiry", an inquiry
"before [they] set [themselves] upon Enquiries" of that
[perplexing] Nature" (Po 7). It is hardly likely that Locke
made this proposal because "epistemology" is the "first"
philosophy, or the foundational discipline upon which the rest
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of human culture depends. He made the proposal because he
detected a great deal of loose, rhetorical, metaphysical and
theological talk in the discussion of God, revealed religion,
and the foundations of morality. This, he felt, was
intellectually futile. Locke himself says, if "we know our
own Strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with
hopes of Success" (I, i, 6). Or he may have been genuinely
interested in the operation of understanding, even apart from
various religious, metaphysical, theological and moral issues,
because "the Understanding that sets Man above the rest of
sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Domion"
(I, i, I). There may be other reasons as well. But there is
no evidence to suggest that Locke had a meta-philosophical view
that "epistemology" is the queen of philosophy which supports
other "branches" of philosophy such as metaphysics and ethics,
or the rest of h~~n culture in general.
330 I mention Kant and the early Wittgenstein here, because of
their predominant concern with limits. According to Kant,
the "true purpose" of philosophy is "to expose the illusions
of a reason that forgets its limits", and to "recall it from
its presumptuous speculative pursuits to modest but thorough
self-knowledge". See Critique of Pure Reason (A 735, B 763);
my quotation is from Norman Kemp Smith's translation (New York:
St~ Martin's Press, 1965), p. 591. Wittgenstein's early
philosophy is a critique of language rather than of pure reason.
In his Preface to Tractatus, Wittgenstein states: lithe aim of
the book is to set a limit to thought, or rather - not to
thought, but to the expression of thoughts". See Tractatus
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 3. Just as Locke
was preoccupied with the limits of things in his personal life,
Wittgenstein was also preoccupied with the limits of things in
his personal life. See Malcolm's report of Wittgenstein's
frequent exclamation, "Leave that bloody thing alone!" Ludwig
Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Oxford, O. U. P., 1962), p. 85.
Locke's equivalent is: no one ought to "meddle" with that
bloody thing! Though Wittgenstein's philosophy radically
differs from Locke's in many respects, its concern with limits
shows a curious resemblance to Locke's.
34. Rosalie Colie states: "Locke's constant use of phrases
indicating neglect of a subject or its enlargement in another
place is distracting, because also he does not always tell us
why he neglects or where the largement can be found". See
Rosalie Colie, "The essayist in his Essay", John Locke: Problems
and Perspectives, ed. Yolton (London: C. U. P., 1969), p. 256.
Colie, however, does not explain why Locke constantly indicates
neglect of a subject or its enlargement.
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35. Locke's complaint is that James Tyrrell impudently meddled
with his affairs, in trying to procure from James II a pardon
which he himself did not request. For an account of the
worsening of the Locke-Tyrrell relationship, see Cranston's
biography, John Locke (London: Longmans, 1957), pp. 298-302.
36. Let us consider here one methodological principle of the Essay
which might be re-interpreted as relevant to the method Locke
uses in his political theory. We can extract from the Essay
the principle or doctrine that we must always ascribe power to
an agent in order to account for any observed change. Locke
remarks: "whatever Change is observed, the Mind must collect
a Power somewhere" (II, xxi, 4). If we extract this principle,
then stubborn foundationalists might be tempted to link it to
Locke's political theory. If they do link one to the other,
they create another fictitious basis.
Let us anticipate their invention here. They might claim
something like the following: Locke's political theory explains
various changes observed in the state of nature, the original
community of things, a political society, etc. In the Second
Treatise, Locke explains these changes by ascribing power to
various agents. For instance, he explains the change of the
original community into the world of property by ascribing
labour-power to every man. -Thus Locke's procedure in his
political theory is justified by the methodological principle
which he mentions in the Essay.
What shall we say to this account? I have made it as
plausible as possible. Yet it remains an attempt to create a
fictitious basis of Locke's political theory. A great deal of
arbitrariness and distortion is involved in this account. It
is likely that Locke used the concept of power in his political
theory because his predecessors (such as Grotius, Hobbes and
Pufendorf) had already used the concept of power, or potestas,
in their political theories. He also used the concept of
power because it stmply was the central category of his thought.
There is no evidence to suggest that Locke's use of the concept
of power in his political theory is the result of his adoption
of the principle that we must always ascribe power to an agent
in order to account for any observed change. Logically speaking,
too, Locke can certainly use the concept of power without
committing h~elf to t~is principle at the same time. Also,
his political theory is not always an account of the changes
which he has observed empirically; rather, he presents his
theory in a developmental manner. The principle I have quoted
is, as a matter of fact, only half of Locke's statement. His
full statement is: "the Mind must collect a Power somewhere,
able to make that [observed] Change, as well as a possibility in
the thing itself to receive it" (Essay, II, Xxi, 4). But Locke
does not consider, in the Second Treatise, a possibility to
receive a change.
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The foundationalist account which I have anticipated above
is just as illusory as any other attempt to relate the Essay
to the Second Treatise by the picture of epistemological
foundations. It is true that Locke used the concept of power
as a fundamental category in his political theory as well as
his epistemology. But it is false that he applied a method-
ological principle of the Essay to the Second Treatise. If we
produce the kind of as-if account which I have discussed above,
it can only give us illusory happiness. This sort of recon-
struction does not enlighten us.
37. Hans Aarsleff, liThe State of Nature and the Nature of Man";
and Raymond Polin, "John Locke g s Conception of Freedom". These
two articles are found in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives
(London: C. U. P., 1969).
380 G. Wo Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. & ed.
P. Remnant & J. Bennett (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1982), pp. 522-525.
The page numbers of this abridged edition correspond to those
in the Akademie-Ver1ag edition of the French text.
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Appendix 3: Locke's Ego-Centric Concept of Property, with
Special Reference to 20th-Century Commentators
and 17th-Century Theorists
The purpose of this Appendix is to supplement the analysis of
Locke's concept of property which I have offered in CHAPTER 3, PART 2
(An Analysis of Locke's Concept of Property). In my analysis, I have
clarified the "ego-centric" (or "agent-centred") structure of Locke's
concept of property. In this Appendix, I shall supplement my analysis
by undertaking two distinct tasks.
First, I shall briefly and critically survey the 20th-century
commentators' inadequate understanding of Locke's concept of property.
Not many commentators have drawn attention to his concept of property.
Fewer have touched upon the ego-centric structure of his concept.
None has offered the kind of detailed analysis which I have given. I
shall briefly discuss what other commentators have thought about Locke's
concept of property. Secondly, I shall show that contrary to our
impression, Locke's concept of property is uniquely ego-centric among
major 17th-century theorists. I shall contrast his concept with
Hobbes', GrotiusO and Pufendorf's concept of property, in order to show
that Locke is the first major 17th-century theorist who has adopted the
full-blooded, ego-centric concept of property.
These two tasks are distinct from each other, so I shall divide
the following discussion into two sections. In the first section, I
shall compare my analysis of Locke's concept of property with some
20th-century commentators' treatment of it. In the second section, I
shall contrast Locke's concept of property with Hobbes', Grotius', and
Pufendorf's concept of property. By comparison and contrast, I shall
supplement and elaborate my analysis of the ego-centric structure of
473
474
Locke's concept of property. Since the following discussion is meant to
be a supplement to my own analysis of his concept of property, it should
be read in conjunction with what I have said in CHAPTER 3, PART 2. The
outline of my analysis can be found in Section 20 1 of CHAPTER 3 (2. 1
The Ego-Centric Structure of Property: An Outline).
(i) Locke's Ego-Centric Concept of Property, and
20th-Century Commentators
Commentators on Locke in this century - philosophers, scholars,
and critics who have studied and made use of Locke's political theory --
have largely concentrated on Locke's account of appropriation. On the
whole, they have not been interested in clarifying what Locke meant by
the word "property", or what philosophical assumptions underlie the
meaning he attached to it. The "two-sense" doctrine has been popular
Iamong professional commentators on Locke. Those who have seized upon
Locke's idea that "property" is an "exclusive" right have thought that
it is a right to exclude others. So they have failed to grasp the
point that "a right of disposal" is "exclusive" in the sense that the
holder of this right, rather than any other man, is the legitimate
f hi b i 2disposer 0 s 0 Jects.
The first important step toward the correct understanding of
Locke's concept of property is to understand the focal meaning of
"disposal" as "control" or "arrangement". Since the word "disposal"
has flexible meaning, we are likely to forget that Locke used the
expression "dispose (of)" in the manner reminiscent of its Latin root.
"Disponere" is to "put" (ponere) things "in different directions" (,lli).
This etymology nicely fits into Locke's philosophical idea that the
mind of each man is the central-decision making agent, or the director
475
of his actions, objects, and affairs. Locke's talk about "disposal",
however, has misled some commentators. Those commentators who have
been mislead are not aware of the focal meaning of "disposal" which
Locke made use of.
Let us first see two examples of the failure to understand
Locke's focal meaning of "disposal". I shall refer to two commentators
who are professionally competent to discuss Locke, and have actually
commented on his concept of property.
In his attempt to clarify Locke's concept of property, J. P. Day
uses a curious "Argument from the Paradigm Case". Day remarks: "the
paradigm case of ownership (of X)" is "the powers of exclusive use,
including the destruction, of X"o Having remarked thus, he argues
or believes, rather - that Locke must have subscribed to this "paradigm
case".3 It is clear that this "argument" is nothing but the assumption
that Locke must have subscribed to our, or Day's, paradigm case.
remark is typical of anyone who fails to understand Locke's focal
Day's
meaning of "disposal". He goes on to criticize Locke for being
inconsistent, on the assumption that Locke in fact shared Day's paradigm
case. In Day's view, Locke inconsistently held: (a) the law of
nature prohibits suicide (ST, 6), and (b) every man by nature has "a
property in" his person (g, 27). The charge of inconsistency is
based on the "paradigm case" of property according to which the owner
4of property has a power to destroy his objects.
This charge of inconsistency is misplaced. Locke emphatically
repeats that man "has not liberty to destroy himself" (ST, 6), or he
"cannot take away his own life" (23). Given his emphatic claim, there
is no reason to assume that Locke contradicts it by saying that every
man has a property in his person. The assumption arises only if we
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lazily avoid clarifying Locke's idea of "disposal", and become
preoccupied with ~ paradigm case (of getting rid of Coca Cola and
other consumable goods which Day is accustomed to getting rid of).
Day's innocuous use of the Argument from the Paradigm Case is simply
a failure to understand Locke's paradigm case, i.e., the case where
every man has a liberty (or power) to control and arrange his life
(liberty, and possessions), according to the will which he guides by
his understanding. Each man's "understanding" enables him to learn
what the law of nature requires; hence, he learns that he ought not
to commit suicide.
C. B. Macpherson claims that property, for Locke, is "not only
a right to enjoy or use; it is a right to dispose of, to exchange, to
alienate". He defends this claim by saying that this is the "bourgeois"
concept of property, and assuming that Locke is a bourgeois theorist.S
Macpherson is correct in thinking that Locke is a bourgeois theorist
and has a bourgeois concept of property. But he is wrong in identifying
what the "bourgeois" concept of property is. He is also wrong in
believing that the focal meaning of Locke's "disposal" is "exchange",
e.g., a voluntary exchange of one's labour-power for wages, or a
voluntary exchange of one's own goods for money. As I have said, the
focal meaning of "disposal" for Locke is "control" or "arrangement".
A man's voluntary transfer of his person or his goods is a way of
arranging them, according to the decision of his mind. What makes
Locke's concept distinctively "bourgeois" is not that he takes "transfer"
as the core of the concept of "property", ~ is it the fact that he
treats a bundle of rights as a unitary "property". His concept of
property is "bourgeois" because he fails to see that a voluntary
transfer of one's property (i.e., an exercise of the right of transfer)
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in a free market economy can become a way of losing control over his
person or his goods; that is, it can conflict with the central idea of
property, a right to control or arrange one's objects as one thinks fit.
Locke certainly did not see, as Marx later did, that a "voluntary"
exchange of one's person or goods in civil society could dialectically
turn into the loss of control, "alienation" or Entfremdung. This is
not a place to criticize Lockeo6 I simply note here Macpherson's
misunderstanding of Locke's "bourgeois" concept of property. A:3 far as
Locke is concerned, a right of transfer is compatible with, and a part
of, the idea of an exclusive right of disposal (ioeo, control or
arrangement)o
Of the scholars and philosophers who commented on Locke in
English, there are two who understood the ego-centric structure of
Locke's concept of property. K. 01ivecrona hits upon Locke's idea that
each man's mind, or his ego, is located at the centre of his legitimate
sphere of control, when he discusses Grotius' and Pufendorf's idea of
something's being one's "own", or ~. Olivecrona rightly points out
that for Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke, "the 'I' to which those goods
[ioeo, my life, liberty, possessions, etco] belonged was evidently
i· 1 ,,7the sp r1tua ego. Olivecrona does not offer an analysis of the ego-
centric structure of Locke's concept, but my analysis shows that his
remark is correcto Unfortunately, 01ivecrona misapplies his important
insight, and wrongly ascribes to Locke the quasi-Hegelian view that a
man's labour is a legitimate means of acquiring "property" (i.e., a
property in external goods) because he infuses his spiritual ego into
8external goodso Locke does not hold that a man's coming to have "a
property in" external goods is justified on the ground of the infusion
of his spiritual egoo My analysis of the ego-centric structure of
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Locke's concept should not be confused with a distinct question about
the justification of a particular method of appropriation. All I have
shown is that given that a man has "a property in" his person and his
goods, certain conceptual relationships hold between his mind (or his
ego) on the one hand, and his "objects" (i.e., his body, actions, and
goods, or his life, liberty and possessions) on the other hand. Locke
does say that "something that is his own" is IIjoined" to an external
good by his labour. So we might conjecture that a man's ego is joined
to an external good. But he never says so, and justifies a man's
appropriation by labour on the grounds of his "pains", "improvement",
and so forth (~, 30, 34, !! passim). What is clear, however, is that
once an external object becomes a man's property, it is related to his
ego just in the same way that his "person" (his life and liberty, or his
body and actions) are related to it. This is what Olivecrona should
have claimed, and what I do claim.
The ego-centricity of Locke's concept of property is fairly
clear to R. Nozick who self-consciously assimilates his concept of
property to Locke's. Instead of commenting directly on Locke, Nozick
puts forward his own view as follows:
The central core of the notion of a property right
in X, relative to which other parts of the notion
are to be explained, is the right to determine what
shall be done with X; the right to choose which of
the constrained set of options concerning X shall be
realized or attempted. The constraints are set by
other principles or laws operating in the society •••
My property rights in my knife allow me to leave it
where I will, but not in your chest.9
In this passage, Nozick echoes Locke's view that the core of property is
a right of disposal, i.e., of control and arrangement according to one's
choice. The degree by which one can control or arrange objects (e.g.,
one's "knife") is constrained by the laws one is under. In this
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respect Nozick is the true heir of Locke's concept of property. He
himself is aware that he is resurrecting Locke's concept of property.
Referring to the passage I have quoted, he says that this "notion of
property helps us to understand why earlier theorists spoke of people
as having property in themselves and their labour".IO Nozick himself
does not offer any analysis of what he identifies as "the central core
of the notion of a property right in X". My analysis of the core of
Locke's ego-centric concept of property (CHAPTER3 , Section 2. 2) would
suffice as an analysis of what Nozick calls "the central core" of the
notion of a property right in X.
Even Nozick, however, does not recognize one peculiar feature
of Locke's ego-centric concept of property. For Locke, a man can be
said to have "a property in" his objects even if the existence of other
men is unreal to him. Nozick, being a libertarian in America, absorbs
or swallows this element of Locke's concept of property, without
realizing that this feature makes his concept ego-centric in a fu11-
blooded sense. It is true that the story of Robinson Crusoe is still
11popular in the vast continent of the United States. But it is not
true that the ego-centric concept of Locke's kind is the only concept
available to us, as Nozick leads us to believe. Even among the 17th-
century theorists to which Nozick alludes, Locke is unique in holding
the strongly ego-centric concept of property. This we shall see in
the next section.
(ii) Locke's Ego-Centric Concept of Property,
and 17th-Century Theorists
Even among major 17th-century theorists, Locke is unique in
holding that each man is confronted with his disposable objects, rather
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than any human being who is ~ to him. Hobbes holds that every man
in the state of nature is confronted with every other man, as a wolf
is confronted with another wolf. Grotius and Pufendorf, though they
presuppose that a man's ego is the centre of disposable objects, are
nevertheless committed to the view that a property (in external goods)
is the creation of a tacit, or explicit, compact of all men. Though
Hobbes, Grotius and Pufendorf can be said to have "individualistic"
theories of man and society (in the conventional sense of "individual-
istic"), they treat each man primarily as a man among other men rather
than as a man related to his external goods. By contrast, Locke
attempts to show "how Men might come to have a property in several parts
of that which God gave to Mankind in common", "without any express
Compact of all the Commoners" (g., 25). The existence of all the
"commoners" is imagined by each appropriator who appropriates a portion
of the world. Each appropriator does not encounter with any other real
human being when he appropriates.
Locke is the first major theorist who developed the ego-centric
concept of property in a full-blooded sense. Though Hobbes was
concerned about the distinction between mine and thine in his own way,
his main preoccupation lay with the other-directed concepts of justice
and injustice. "Justice, and Injustice", says Hobbes, "are none of
the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. 0 •• They are Qualities,
that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude" (Leviathan, Ch. XIII,
po 188). Grotius is the first modern theorist who made a bold attempt
to relegate the status of Ujustice" to a handmaiden of "right". This
I
innovation, like so many modern philosophical innovations, was brought
about by an act of declaration rather than any argument. "A right"
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(jus) "in the proper and strict sense" of the word, says Grotius, refers
to a person; it signifies a perfect "moral Quality in any person,
sufficient to enable him justly to have or to do something" (De Jure
Be lli , 1. 1. 4 )• This perfect moral quality, which Grotius calls
the "Facu lty", comprehends four powers: a power over oneself (libertas),
a power over others, ownership (dominium), and a power to demand the
payment of a debt (1. 1. 5). Dominium, he adds, is what civilians
traditionally called ~ ("his own"). These statements sound innovative
enough, and it is clear that Grotius transforms "a right" into the
faculty which a man has, or a kind of occult quality which he has. For
this reason, recent scholars (Richard Tuck and John Finnis) have
suggested that Grotius' "right" is the power which an individual man has
independently of any normative rule binding on men. They have also
hinted that Grotius anticipated Nozick's view that each individual
simply has a right, as a kind of possessions.12 This interpretation
must be qualified, however. Grotius' concept of a property in external
things (or dominium) is less ego-centric than Locke's (or Nozick's).
Unlike Locke, Grotius is fully committed to the Stoic ideal of
social harmony, and he treats each owner of external goods as being
confronted with other real human beings. He does E2! treat each owner
as a Robinson Crusoe who imagines the existence of other men. His
definition of "a right", as I quoted, contains the terms "justly".
"Justice" in turn means, primarily, "our abstinence from that which is
anothers" (Prolegomena, 8); justice "consists in abstaining from what
is another mans" whereas injustice is "nothing else but the detention of
another mans Right" (Prolegomena, 44). "What is another mans" here
means what another man has by his "right", or his "faculty", or his
perfect "moral quality" .. It seems that Grotius defines "justice" in
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terms of a man's prior "right", and then circularly defines "right" in
terms of "justice" (or "justly"). However, his claim is fairly clear.
Justice presupposes a "right", and if a man has a right over certain
objects (e.g., his external goods), then this right also enables him
sufficiently to make other men abstain from those objects (e.g., his
external goods). A man's right of property for Grotius, in the last
analysis, is not only his power to dispose of his goods but his power
to request other men to abstain from his goods. Insofar as it implies
a man's power to exclude others, it is an other-directed concept.
This is why Grotius claims that the right of property is the creation
of a tacit, or explicit, compact of all men. He says that external
goods become a man's property (or the object of his "faculty") "Not by
the sole act of the Mind" but by "compact, or agreement, eo. either
express, ••• or tacite" (2. 2. 5). Property cannot be created by a
single act of the mind, since "no man could possibly know what another
would have to be his own, that he might forbear it" (2. 2. 5). This
view is in sharp contrast with Locke's view that a single man can
appropriate merely by mixing his labour, and without the presence of
other men.
It is plausible that Grotius, if pressed, would have said that
a property right is unintelligible without a plurality of men.
Pufendorf, who takes over Grotius' idea of "a right" as "a moral
quality" and is equally committed to the Stoic idea of social harmony,
explicitly states that property ownership is not "intelligible before
more than one man has come into being" (De Jure Naturae CA], 4. 4. 3).
Property, according to Pufendorf, implies "an exclusion of others"
and presupposes that there are "more men than one in the world";
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"things could not be said to be proper to a man, if he were the only
being in the world" (4. 4. 3). This view is reinforced by the claim
that the right of property, like any other right, is "a moral quality''o
By this Pufendorf means that a man's right of property is his power to
dispose of his goods, with "a moral effect" on other men - namely, with
the effect of imposing on other men the obligation to abstain from his
goods (1. 1. 19; 4. 4. 1; 4. 4. 9). Since this "moral effect" is
constitutive of a man's right, the right of property cannot be created
by a man's "external act or seizure" alone, but this act must be preceded
by an implicit, or explicit, pact of all men (4. 4. 9). This view is
again markedly different from Locke's. Locke simply discards the
Grotius-Pufendorf notion of "a rightU as "a moral quality". Further-
more, his "exclusive right of disposalu excludes imagined or potential
human beings in the sense that they simply have no right to the objects
of his right of disposal.
It is clear, then, that Locke is unique among major l7th-
century theorists in holding the radically ego-centric concept of
property. Even if there is only one man in the world, Locke's concept
of property remains intelligible as long as other human beings are
imagined to exist. Locke's individual man has a right to dispose of an
external good to the exclusion of the right of any potentially existing
man, and independently of any contact or compact with other men. Of
course, there may be many minor theorists in the 17th-century Who adopted
the full-blooded, ego-centric concept of property similar to Locke's.
But the idea that Locke's ego-centric concept of property was universally
accepted in the 17th-century is, Simply, a myth.
4R4
1. See Note 8 to Chapter3 , and my discussion at the beginning of
Section 1. 2 of Chapter 3.
2. See Note 15 to Chapter 3, and my comment at the beginning of
Section 2. 1 of Chapter 3.
3. J. P. Day, "Locke on Property", Life, Liberty and Property
(Belmont: Wadsworth, 1971), p. 113.
4. ~., p. 117.
5. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
(Oxford: 00 U. Po, 1962), pp 214 ff.
He says:
the more emphatically labour is asserted to be a
property, the more it is to be understood to be
alienable. For property in the bourgeois 'sense
is not only a right to enjoy or use; it is a
right to dispose of, exchange, to alienate. To
Locke a man's labour is so unquestionably his own
property that he may freely sell it for wages
(pp. 214 ff.). (emphasis added).
6. Locke is not at all aware of a possible conflict between a right
of control and a right of transfer. In discussing the transfer
of labour and money in Considerations of the Lowering of
Interest, and Raising the Value of Money, he assumes that the
two rights can both be effectively exercised in free-market
economy. The Marxian notion of the loss of control through
"voluntary" transfer is entirely alien to Locke. He remarks:
[money] by compact transfers that profit, that was
the reward of one man's labour, into another man's
pocket. That which occasions this is the unequal
distribution of money (Considerations, Works, V, 36).
Nothing is farther from Locke's intention than saying this is a
form of robbery, or a loss of control over one's product. As
he explicitly states in the Second Treatise, men give a tacit
consent to the use of money (~, 47, 48, !!passim). Locke
always wants to treat social arrangements as the product of
each individual man's act and free will. He does not want to
treat one man's actual subjection to another man sociologically.
The "Authority of the Rich Proprietor, and the Subjection of
the Needy Beggar began not from the Possession of the Lord, but
the Consent of the poor Man, who preferr'd being his Subject to
starving" (FT, 43). This statement appears in the context
where Lockesays that nobody ought to be another man's "Vassal"
(FT, 42). Thus Locke's moralism of independence goes hand in
hand with his sociological naivete.
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7. Olivecrona, "Locke's Theory of Appropriation", The Philosophical
Quarterly 24 (1974), p. 223.
8. Ibid., pp. 225 ff.
9. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books,
1974), p. 171.
10. .!ill.
11. This note is devoted to a critical discussion of the relationship
between Lockean ideas and a vulgar species of American libertar-
ianism.
The contemporary, American libertarian literature makes use of
the story of Robinson Crusoe to illustrate what property is,
and how each man comes to have property. This use of Robinson
Crusoe is found in Murray Rothbard's book, The Ethics of Liberty
(Atlantic Highlands, No J.: Humanities Press, 1982), Chapter 6
"A Crusoe Social Philosophy"o Though Rothbard does not mention
Locke, it is clear that he read Locke's Second Treatise and Essay.
For we can find in Chapter 6 of his book a vulgar illustration
of various Lockean themes. Let me quote from Rothbard's version
of the story of Robinson Crusoe:
Let us consider Crusoe, who has landed on his island, and, to
simplify matters, has contracted amnesia. What· inescapable
facts does Crusoe confront? He finds, for one thing, himself,
with the primordial fact of his own consciousness and his own
body. ••• In fact, he begins his life in this world by
knowing literally nothing; all knowledge must be learned by
him ••••
00 0
Crusoe must produce before he can consume, and so that he may
consumeo
o. 0
He also discovers the natural fact of his mind's command over
his body and its actions: that is, of his natural ownership
over his self.
Crusoe then, owns his body; his mind is free to adopt
whatever ends it wishes, and to exercise his reason in order
to discover what ends he should choose 00 ••
(The Ethics of Liberty, pp. 29-31; Emphasis in the original.)
In this passage Rothbard takes over Locke's assumptions and
ideas. A man is confronted with his consciousness and his
body; no knowledge is innate; production must precede
consumption (cf. ~,26); and a man's mind has command over
his body and its actions (ioe., a man has a liberty of actions).
Whereas Locke connects the notion of the liberty of actions
with the idea of a law to form his concept of property,
Rothbard equates 'bwnership" with the mind's non-normative power.
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Here Rothbard's vulgarization of Locke becomes obvious.
American libertarians take over certain Lockean themes,
without giving any critical consideration to what Locke said.
Locke may be considered the innovator in the history of the
concept of property. Some of his mistakes - for instance, his
view that the life of a primitive man was like that of a
Robinson Crusoe in the wilderness of the American Continent
might be excused as the product of the late 17th century. But
there is no excuse for the 20th-century American libertarians
who treat a man's isolation (and amnesia!) as the basic mode of
life rather than an anomaly in healthy human life. The
libertarian literature in the U. S. today adds nothing important
to Locke. It magnifies some of the difficulties inherent in
his account of appropriation and his concept of property. It
transforms some of Locke's difficulties into manifest absurd-
ities. So it is much easier to criticize what is stated in the
vulgar species of American literature today than what is stated
by Locke. Let me perform this task very briefly.
Is it the case that Crusoe ~ produce before he can consume,
and in order to consume? This is an extremely naive view. If
Crusoe is alive, he must be consuming something alreadyo But
does that mean consumption must precede production? If we say
"yes", we commit ourselves to another naive view. To state the
matter simply, production and consumption are merely two aspects
of a man's continuous interaction - or "metabolism" - wi th
nature. A man produces and reproduces his body by consuming
food and drink; he produces tools by consuming a part of external
nature and his mental and physical energy; and so on. What
we can say about Crusoe's mode of life in general terms is that
he must remain in constant exchange with nature, in order to
survive. To say that he must produce before he can consume is
to take an arbitrary viewpoint that he can begin a new process
- the process of production -without prior consumption (or
production, consumption, production, et ad infinitum)o What
Rothbard really wishes to say is that a man in Crusoe's
situation should produce actively (rather than die or merely
consume plants). But this is a distinct claim which may, or
may not be justified. At any rate it is irrelevant to our
discussion. Production must precede consumption - this is not
a "primordial fact" of human existence.
Secondly, o~ship is ~ the mind's power to command his
body, or its actions, or external goods. If this were the
case, ownership would disappear as soon as a man's mind fails
to control those objects. If Crusoe stumbles on a rock, he
ceases to be able to control the movement of his body by the
mind. Does he cease to be an owner of his body then? No.
Or if he becomes ill and cannot exercise the power of his mind
effectively, does he cease to own his cottage? No. Or if a
slave (e.g., Friday) can move his body according to the direction
of his mind, does it mean he is the owner of his body? No.
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If a slave is already the ·owner- of his body in this simple
manner, there is no need to emancipate him - no need to make
him the owner of his body. He can be said to be the "owner"
of his body even in his master's house, as long as his mind
retains a power to move his arm. What is needed, of course,
is to think of ownership or slavery as the complex relationships
which pre~upeose the existence or non-existence of one man's
right (or power) over another. If we equate a man's non-
normative, non-interpersonal, liberty of actions with his
ownership, then we must say that we all lose "ownership" by
drinking Scotch Whisky at home and getting intoxicated. But
who wants to drink Scotch Whisky at home, if he ceases to own
his house (temporarily or otherwise) and someone else may
rightfully enter the house to take everything he has previously
possessed? Whatever ownership may be, it is clearly not
identical with the mind's power to command certain objects.
In this long note, I have criticized Rothbard because his
type of vulgar libertarianism seems to be plaguing a certain
quarter of the English-speaking, intellectual world. I shall
not say that all libertarians in the United States today are
like him. But the vulgar species of American libertarianism,
as represented by Rothbard or Rand, contributes nothing to
political theory. They convert Defoe's wonderful fiction into
an awkward prose, and turn some of Locke's novel ideas into
simple, dogmatic slogans. Whether Robert Nozick belongs to
this vulgar species of libertarians is an interesting question.
Sometimes, he is a sharp, witty, and clever philosopher. But
sometimes - it must be admitted - he trivializes and American-
izes Locke's ideas (in a pejorative sense of "Americanize").
In discussing the relationship of appropriation and its potential
harm to others, he gives a conspicuously trivial example: "If
I appropriate a grain of sand from Coney Island, no one else
may now do as they will with !h!! grain of sand. (Nozick,~.
cit. p. 175). Locke does not share this conspicuous triviality
;ith Nozick. Nozick's Robinson Crusoe fools around in Coney
Island, and plays with a grain of sand. By contrast, Locke's
Crusoe picks up apples and acorns for the sake of self-
preservation, or else he cultivates land by his honest labour.
12. See Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their origin and
Development (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1979). Nozick is mentioned
in his Introduction, and in Tuck's view, Grotius played a vital
role in the development of a strongly individualistic theory
of rights (Ch. 3 & Ch. 8, Ibid.). John Finnis, Natural Law and
Natural Rights (Oxford: O. U. P., 1980); p. 207 for his comment
on Grotius' concept of "right"; and pp. 186 for his comment on
Nozick's concept of justice in relation to "the post-Cajetan"
tradition of justice. Neither Tuck nor Finnis is interested
in establishing a significant link between Grotius and Nozick.
But I infer from what they say that Grotius' concept of rights
and justice have ~ affinity with Nozick's concepts of rights
and justice.
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